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Abstract 
Civil society has come to dominate the discourses of development and social change 
for the last few decades. This thesis is a critical engagement with the liberal ideas of 
civil society; it specifically explores the politics that surfaces in the civic sphere in 
the context of caste inequalities through the study of Dalit socio-political 
organisations that occupy the margins of civil society in India. 
 
This ethnography of Dalit politics interrogates the intersections of caste and civil 
society in current globalised times and spaces through exploration into post-Panther 
phase of Dalit politics in rural Maharashtra.  The focus is on two socio-political 
movements; one is Manavi Hakk Abhiyan (MHA), a grassroots Dalit organisation 
with international networks and the other is Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) a national 
Dalit political party. 
 
This study offers insights into the dynamic nature of caste and its vitality in 
constructing localised form/s of civil society in India. A common running theme in 
the thesis is Dalit politics of resistance and their struggle to access justice through the 
state despite the continued denial of justice to Dalits through fragmented institutions 
of the state. The study, thus, observes how the participation of Dalit movements in 
claiming democratic citizenship through party politics occurs alongside the 
marginalisation of Dalit assertion in electoral politics. 
 
Looking beyond the state, the thesis charts the relationships between Dalits and the 
external relational fields within which they operate: it details the vernacular modes of 
communication in the civic sphere where protests and violence are important modes; 
the innovative uses of caste and cultural repertoires by Dalit movements in 
challenging caste hierarchy and forming collective identities of protest; and finally, 
the context of global associational revolution and engagement of NGOs and INGOs 
as new associations in Dalit politics of resistance. 
 
This thesis contributes to the larger debates on the makings of caste and civil society 
in India and argues that caste and Dalit movements have a key role in constructing 
localised forms of civility and civil society that challenge the dynamic hierarchies 
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Glossary 
 
Aani-baani Marathi term for state of emergency in India between 1975- 
1977. 
Ati-shudra Refers to untouchable castes that are classed as outside of the 
Varna therefore ‘untouchable’. 
Babasaheb  Ambedkar is also referred to as Babasaheb as a sign of respect 
amongst Dalits. 
Bahujan Literally means “majority”.  As an ideological construct 
Bahujan  refers to organising the lower castes that constitute a 
majority into a political community. 
Bajra Pearl millet, also referred to as bajri in Marathi. 
Bauddha Mahars who have converted to Buddhism are also referred to 
as Bauddha. 
Bhakar/bhakri Flattened bread made out of jowar or bajra. 
Chambar The third most numerical ex-untouchable caste in Maharashtra 
whose caste occupation was shoe making and leather work.   
Charmakar Sanskritised name for the word Chambar. 
Dhangar Shepherd Caste 
Gaairan Gaai literally meant cow and ran means land. The grazing 
lands attached to villages are referred to as gaairan in 
Marathwada. 
Gaav  Village 
Gavaki Village duties of Mahars. 
Girdhawar Circle[comprising of few villages] revenue inspector. 
Gram panchayat The decentralised governance structure in Maharashtra is a 
three tier system with Zilla Parishad at District level, 
Panchayat Samiti at Block/Taluka level and Gram Panchayat 
at the village level. 
Jai Bhim  
 
Means victory to Ambedkar and followers of Ambedkar prefer 
to greet each other with Jai Bhim instead of the Hindu ways of 
greeting like ram ram. 
Jat(i) Caste 
Jatiwad(i) Casteism or communalism 
Jayanti Birth anniversary, Jayanti is used to refer to annual birthday 
celebrations of political and socio-religious leaders. 
Jwaree/Jowar Indian variety of sorghum and an important cereal for rural 
poor. 
Karan A karan refers to a religious event of sacrificing animals 
(buffaloes or goats) which friends and relatives feast on. A 
potraj is called to make this sacrifice in the case of goddess 
mari-aai. A karan of mari-aai can also be done by the village 
patil if he offers the halya (male buffalo).  Karan is generally 
done to ask for a navas (specific blessings) from gods or to 
return the blessings that goddess has extended.   

Khairlanj A village in Bhandara district of Maharashtra. In September 
2006 four members of a Dalit family were murdered in this 
village by the Kunbi-Marathas. 
Kunbi 
 
A peasant/cultivator caste considered as lower sub-caste of the 
Maratha caste. 
Lok Sabha House of the People, members of which are directly elected. 
Mahapurush Literally means great-men. A term used in Dalit movements to 
refer to ‘great men’ who challenged indignities of caste. 
Mahar The most numerous ex-untouchable caste in Maharashtra 
ranked lower than the Chambars in caste hierarchy. 
Maharuda/Manguda Dalit localities, places where Mangs and Mahars live. 
Mang The second most numerous ex-untouchable caste amongst in 
Maharasthra after the Mahars. Mangs are ranked lower than 





In Maharashtra Mariaai or Laxmi aai are symbolic of the 
virgin village goddesses.  
Namantar means changing of name. The terms are associated 
with Dalit mobilisation that ensued from late 1970s till mid- 
90s in Maharashtra to rename Marathwada University.  
Panchayat Samiti See Gram Panchayat 
Parishad Meeting/conference 
Parit Washer man 
Patil Village headman who generally came from Maratha caste. 
Potraj A potraj generally belongs to Mahar or Mang caste and is the 
worshipper of Mari-aai. 
Rajya Sabha Council of States, member of this council are elected by 
through the representatives of state legislative assemblies. 
Samaj A term variedly used in to refer to social groupings  like caste  
or collective identities like Dalit or Bahujan. 
Sarpanch  Chairman of village panchayat 
Satyagraha Peaceful modes of protest 
Savarnas Caste Hindus. The term is also used as a synonym for 
Marathas by Dalits in Marathwada. 
Shudra Shudra is the fourth and lower Varna and castes under Shudra 
Varna are considered ritually impure. 
Talathi Village Revenue Inspector  
Taluka Also referred to as Block/Tehsil, is an administrative unit in a 
District. 
Tahsildar/Tehsildar Block/Taluka revenue officer 
Teli Oil pressing caste 
Valmiki Sweepers or cleaners [also referred to as Bhangi] 
Vanjari Identified as OBC in Maharashtra is ranked lower than the 







Extracting forced labour related to caste, was practiced in 
Marathwada region. 
Literally means thoughts/ideas, was used in the movements to 
refer to ideology. 
State Legislative Assembly 
Yeskarki Caste duties of the Mahars like cleaning village streets and 
removing carcasses of dead animals. 





BAMCEF – Bahujan and Minority Community Employees Federation  
BBM - Bahujan Bharipa Mahasangh 
BJP – Bhartiya Janta Party  
BMP: Bahujan Majdoor Paksha 
BPL – Below Poverty Line 
BSP – Bahujan Samaj Party 
CBI – Central Bureau of Investigation 
CM – Chief Minister 
CPI – Communist Party of India 
CPI (M) – Communist Party of India (Marxist)  
DS4 – Dalit Shoshit Samaj Sangharsh Samiti 
FIR – First Information Report 
GoM – Government of Maharashtra 
GP – Gram Panchayat 
I/NGO – International/Non-governmental organisation 
MLA – Member of Legislative Assembly 
MHA – Manavi Hakk Abhiyaan 
MLC – Member of Legislative Council 
MP –Member of Parliament 
NCP – Nationalist Congress Party 
NT – Nomadic Tribes 
OBC – Other Backward Classes 
PCR – Protection of Civil Rights 
PM – Prime Minister 
PWPI - Peasants and Workers Party of India 
RDC – Rural Development Centre 
RPI – Republican Party of India 
SC – Scheduled Castes 
SC/ST (PoA) Act: Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Prevention of Atrocities Act 
SS – Shiv Sena 
ST – Scheduled Tribes 
ZP – Zilla Parishad 
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On an afternoon of December 2008 during my fieldwork, I was with Chanderlal 
Banage at his small cobbler shack in Majalgaon town of Beed District in 
Maharashtra. Banage is from the Chambar1 caste (ex-untouchable caste2) and we 
were discussing here an incident of caste discrimination that he had faced early in 
his life. Banage worked on a shoe as we conversed. Two men came on a motorbike 
and the one riding the bike asked Banage about the owner of the closed shack next 
to Banage’s shop.  Banage informed him that the owner was out of town and may 
come tomorrow, following this he continued working and talking to me. Banage’s 
reply however did not seem sufficient for the man who with some authority asked 
Banage again, ‘where has he gone? When will he come?’ Banage this time stopped 
the work at hand and politely provided details about a crisis in the neighbouring 
shop owner’s family. He also added that the shop owner will return day after 
tomorrow for sure. After this the man rode off, I asked Banage if the man on the 
bike was from the Maratha caste which is a dominant caste in Maharashtra, Banage 
smiled acknowledging that my guess was right, and added, ‘they think they are big 
(mote).’ 
 
Since the man did not refer to Banage by his name nor did he use any usual 
etiquettes of courtesy or respect used in Marathi, and carried a sense of authority in 
his speech, I tried to take a guess at the man’s caste which worked out to be right. 
My guess was partially influenced by the narratives of activists and participants of 
Dalit movements who emphasise the dominance of Marathas and continuance of 
caste based exclusions in Marathwada. Banage though aware of the rudeness in the 
behaviour of the Maratha man did not get into any argument with him and opted to 
ignore it. Banage’s silence may be mistaken for docile behaviour, but this does not 
                                                 
1 Chambars/Charmakars are the numerically third most populous caste after the Mahars and Mangs 
respectively in Maharashtra. Charmakars are considered higher in status than the Mahars and Mangs. 
Charmakar is a relatively new sanskritised term for the word Chambar that has come in vogue in last 
two decades. 
2 The Dalit Panther movement in Maharashtra used the term Dalit broadly to include landless 
labourers and poor of all castes. The word Dalit however is used mostly to refer to Untouchable castes 
in Indian politics. I use the term Dalit to refer to (ex) Untouchables who are identified as Scheduled 
Castes in the Constitution of India, at times these terms are also used interchangeably in this thesis.  
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represent his politics and agency against caste exclusion. Banage though not from 
Mahar caste which has traditionally dominated Dalit movement and politics in 
Maharashtra, is part of Bahujan Samaj3Party (BSP) and also works for a social 
organisation called Akhil Bhartiya Guru Ravidas Samata Parishad (ABGRSP) that 
mobilises Chambars in favour of BSP and Ambedkarite ideology. Besides 
mobilising the opinion of Chambars and other castes in favour of BSP, Banage 
contributes funds to these organisations from his limited earnings. He reads and 
circulates literature linked to the Bahujan movement and his shack was a site for 
discussion on party politics during the elections of 2009. Due to such efforts he had 
also managed to convince few Marathas to join BSP.  
 
Banage’s politics reflects the deliberative practices in public sphere. He resorts to 
rational communicative strategies to convince people to join BSP and its anti-caste 
ideology so as to bring social transformation through capturing state power. In 
contrast to Banage’s politics is Massa Rambhau Kasbe’s (37) contentious political 
engagement. Massa is from Umri village in Beed district and comes for the Mang4 
caste. Being landless he works as a sugarcane migrant labourer for half the year. He 
also cultivates gaairan land (common grazing land) in Umri village despite the 
opposition of dominant castes and the state authorities. His cultivation of gaairan is 
‘illegal’.  A local movement organisation called Manavi Hakk Abhiyaan (Human 
Rights Campaign, MHA hereon) had played a critical role in raising awareness 
amongst Dalits, particularly landless Mangs against caste exclusions and for 
cultivating grazing land.  Umri village has around 250 acres of gaairan land of 
which Massa cultivates five acres. MHA has supported Massa and other Dalits to 
cultivate gaairan land in this village since 1996 despite Marathas threatening Dalits 
                                                 
3 Bahujan literally means “majority” and samaj can be translated as social group or society. As an 
ideological construct Bahujan  refers to organising the lower castes that constitute a majority into a 
political community 
4 Mangs are the second numerous Scheduled Caste in Maharashtra. Mangs are the most deprived 
amongst the three major Scheduled Castes, for instance literacy amongst the Charamkars and Mahars 
is 74.9 and 74.1 per cent respectively, whereas the Mangs stand on 62.2 per cent. Literacy amongst 
Mang women is at the lowest at 48.6 per cent compared to 60 per cent average for the Scheduled 
Caste women in Maharashtra. Amongst the Mangs 66.9 per cent continue to reside in rural areas 
highest amongst the Scheduled Castes followed by Mahars at 65.5 per cent. Mangs have higher 
percentage as agricultural workers of around 57.9 per cent followed by Mahars at 48.5 per cent. All 
figures from www.censusindia.gov.in/Tables_Published/SCST/dh_sc_maha.pdf 
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with violence and occasionally letting their cattle loose in the standing crops. The 
politicisation of Dalits in Umri has also enabled Dalits to access the common well 
in the village where they were prohibited earlier.  
 
MHA’s politics however is not all extra-institutional. For instance, it helps Dalits 
resist dominance though helping Dalits resort to legal means like registering police 
complaints against violence they may face. Grieving Dalits who may have faced 
violence or face the threat of violence for violating etiquettes of caste, approach 
activists of MHA who are based in various villages or they visit the Rural 
Development Centre (RDC) office in Telgaon village. RDC is an NGO run by Dalit 
activists since mid-80s and is part of MHA.  RDC networks with international 
NGOs and movements in Europe and South America.  It also conducts research 
surveys on gaairan cultivations by Dalits and atrocities against Dalits that are used 
for lobbying with the government.  
 
Massa’s membership in Dalit politics is not limited to MHA and he participates in 
rallies of other Dalit socio-political organisations. For instance he attended a small 
meeting of MHA in Kaij town meant for organisation building of MHA in 
September 2008 followed by a massive rally organised by a faction of Republican 
Party of India (RPI) in October.  
 
Socio-political organisations like RPI, BSP and MHA constitute the fragmented but 
vibrant Dalit politics of protest and resistance in Maharashtra. These organisations 
despite their marginal location in the civil society arena continue to influence and 
shape civil society, state and caste so as to assert Dalit concerns of recognition and 
redistribution.  Banage and Massa’s civic engagement is visible in their 
participation in BSP and MHA respectively to challenge their perceived exclusions 
of caste and economic deprivations. Banage and Massa’s politics point to the 
simultaneous relevance of caste and liberal institutions of the state and civil society 
in Dalit politics. The international networks of RDC that partially aid the vernacular 
practices of MHA’s Dalit activism,  and the party politics of BSP that is supported 
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by small non-party organisation like ABGRSP explicate the intersections of civil 
and political in civil society in general and Dalit politics in particular. 
 
Studying civil society through Dalit politics 
The social and economic exclusions of Dalits and the continued stigma and 
pollution attached to Dalit identity stand in opposition to the conferment of 
universal citizenship in India. Caste and untouchability continue to be culturally 
reproduced in insidious forms, generating newer modes of Dalit exclusions and 
Dalit politics of resistance. Dalit politics in colonial and postcolonial periods 
achieved several critical socio-political changes and civil society constitutes a 
critical sphere that has enabled political participation and Dalit politics of 
resistance.   
 
 “Research on civil society has mostly focussed more on theoretical dimensions than on 
field level processes” (Varshney 2002: 41). One under studied area in the Indian 
context is the interface of caste and civil society and, specifically, the agency of the 
marginalised, particularly Dalits, in shaping civil society.  What does the interface of 
caste and civil society in India means for Dalits and Dalit politics in present globalised 
times? How do Dalits organise in the realm of civil society and what role do Dalit 
movements play in civil society? Any endeavour to comprehend the dynamic 
intersections of (anti?) caste based mobilisations and civil society should consciously 
include a study of Dalit mobilisation at the grassroots. My research is an attempt in 
this direction.  
 
Caste and civil society can be viewed as two conflicting structures if analysed 
through the heuristic dualism of tradition vs. modern where caste is synonymous 
with tradition and civil society to modern. However a study of the dialectic 
intersections of caste and civil society can offer insights into the dynamic nature of 
caste and its vitality in constructing localised form/s of civil society in India. It is this 
dynamism of caste and civil society that I unravel through my ethnographic study of 
Dalit movements operating in the socio-political landscapes of the Marathwada 
region of Maharashtra. Maharashtra makes an interesting case for such a study 
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because of the historical dimensions of ideology building and mobilisation primarily 
carried out by Ambedkar followed by growth of post-Ambedkar Dalit movement 
politics and their supposed ‘impasse’ in the state (Shah 2002). 
 
This thesis moves beyond the instrumentalist analyses pursued by liberal and Marxist 
traditions that tend to deny ascribed identities a role in the making of civil society 
and civility. In transcending normative readings of civil society I argue that caste, 
civil society and state intersect and co-evolve in postcolonial times. Caste, civil 
society and state are not rigid structures rather I analyse them as fragmented 
processes that shape the dynamic fields of power relations. My effort thus is to move 
beyond the dichotomies of local against global, state against civil society and more 
importantly caste against democracy or civil society. Caste has continued to 
dominate the civic sphere since colonial governmentality opened up space for 
political conversations and competitions. The postcolonial modern sovereign state 
with a ‘liberal’ constitution and ‘socialist’ leanings, followed by the present 
neoliberal state have hardly reduced the salience of caste in civil society. In moving 
beyond the structural emphasis, I seek to construct the meanings of civil society, 
caste and the state through a study of their daily workings and their ideological as 
well as strategic usage by Dalits who are generally located at the margins of the state 
and civil society.    
 
Thesis Summary  
My study of Dalit politics in the civil society arena  rejects structured understandings 
of civil society, as they can underplay the element of power and the exclusionary 
character of civil society and public sphere (Flyvberg 1998),  and may also ignore the 
significance of non-bourgeois public spheres and counterpublics (Kellner 2000; 
Bhandari 2006; Fraser 1985, 1992). A framework that emphasises counterpublics can 
however be limiting as Dalit movements and politics do not merely communicate 
within themselves, they also affect changes in the state and civil society at large.  As 
suggested by Asen (2000) counterpublics do not refer to particular places, persons or 
topics, therefore it is more useful to study how counterpublics set themselves against 
wider publics.  Approaches with structural emphases are not fully adequate to 
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capture the contextual and complex praxis of grassroots Dalit movements. This 
research therefore moves beyond the framework of political opportunity structures in 
the study of social movements in favour of studying social movements in their 
‘external relational fields’(Goldstone 2004). My study trails anthropological 
approaches like that of Scott (1985) and Chatterjee (2004) to explore the resistance 
strategies and politics of the governed, so as to understand the small revolutions that 
may be happening daily. The specificities of Dalit politics in civil society has 
partially been studied through a focus on print and popular music (Narayan 2006). 
An attempt to theorise their marginal position, daily strategies and challenges 
involved in Dalit politics, however is still missing, particularly in the cultural and 
political landscapes of Maharashtra.  
 
My research is an ethnographic exploration into the post-Dalit Panther phase of Dalit 
politics in rural Marathwada.  The focus is on two socio-political organisations: one 
is Manavi Hakk Abhiyaan (MHA), a grassroots Dalit movement with international 
networks; and the other is Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), a national Dalit political party 
with considerable presence in the Marathwada and Vidarbha regions of Maharashtra. 
Dalit socio-political organisations like MHA and BSP are engaged in creating spaces 
for the articulation of alternatives to the dominant public sphere and democratic 
processes. The socio-political struggles and strategies of Dalit movement politics are 
explored in the following chapters. A common theme running through all the 
chapters is the Dalit politics of resistance: the struggle of Dalits to access justice 
through the state and the continued denial of justice to Dalits through fragmented 
institutions of state. Looking beyond the state, the thesis charts the relationships 
between Dalits and the external fields within which they operate: it details the 
vernacular modes of communication in the civic sphere where protests and violence 
are important modes; the innovative uses of caste and cultural repertoires by Dalit 
movements in challenging caste hierarchy and forming collective identities of 
protest; and, the context of global associational revolution and engagement with 
NGOs and INGOs as new associations in the Dalit politics of resistance.  
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The first chapter is an engagement with the intersections caste and civil society in 
India. I argue here that the distinction between civil society and political society that 
Chatterjee (2004) suggests in the study of postcolonial societies and politics has 
shortcomings.  His handing over of civil society to the elites is particularly 
problematic. Civil society, I argue, serves as a key concept in the study of Dalit 
politics as it is a critical space of political freedom and self realisation which can 
reform and civilise caste relations. I dwell here upon the interface and intersections 
of caste and civil society and elaborate the politicisation of caste and caste 
inequalities and rise of Dalit politics in western India. Such politicisation, 
competition and conflicts were not accidental and reflected the suppressed political 
aspirations of citizenship amongst Dalits. Moving beyond impact of colonial and 
postcolonial governmentality in disaggregating and disciplining society, I elaborate 
upon Dalit politics in civil society that influenced the evolving civil society and the 
colonial and postcolonial state and make a case for study of Dalit politics under 
globalisation and globalised grassroots.  
 
The second chapter sets out the socio-economic and political context of Marathwada, 
particularly Beed where I carried out this ethnographic study.  I introduce the power 
fields of Beed in particular and Marathwada in general where the dominance and 
traditional authority of Marathas as ‘Raje’ (king/s) dominates the political fields and 
constructs the excluded status of Dalits and Dalit politics.  
 
The third chapter is on methodology and fieldwork processes. I consider the 
importance of using an anthropological approach to study Dalit politics in order to 
gain a processual understanding of the workings of caste, the state and civil society. 
My research questions, methods of data collection, fieldwork process, insider-
outsider status and some ethical issues are detailed here.   
 
In the fourth chapter, I present the post-Ambedkar Dalit politics in Maharashtra to 
highlight the rise of Dalit politics and Ambedkarisation despite factionalism. The 
centrality of the state and the reliance on democratic/electoral politics continued in 
the post-Ambedkar phase of Dalit politics. While in the socio-cultural and literary 
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fields Dalit politics continued to grow, Dalit politics faced fragmentation in party 
politics with politically ambitious leaders leading various factions.  It is in this 
context that I situate the growth of BSP in Maharashtra as a formidable Dalit party, 
and also the mobilisation of MHA as a grassroots Dalit movement which utilised the 
new associational form of NGOs. I argue that the growth of Dalit politics in 
Marathwada represents a continuum of their marginal locations. This however is 
coupled with increased politicisation and socio-political struggles, and it is these 
struggles that are charted in the following chapters. 
 
Two key issues that Dalit movements in Marathwada region of Maharashtra organise 
around are encroachment of grazing land for cultivation purposes and caste 
atrocities. Dalit mobilisation for land rights in the last decade attracted international 
civil society actors who participate in such mobilisation through local Non 
Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Chapter five explores the land rights activism 
by Dalit movements in globalised times and spaces, which has a long history in 
Marathwada that remain parallel to the exclusionary state. This chapter offers a 
theoretical engagement with the forms and roles of the state and civil society in the 
current era of globalisation and liberalisation. The case of MHA’s mobilisation for 
land rights with international support is critically analysed in order to engage with 
the debates on changing spaces and forms of civil society under globalisation. Land 
rights mobilisation by MHA in Marathwada illustrates the intersections of 
recognition and redistribution in Dalit politics. NGOs, I argue are ‘new associations’ 
in Dalit politics and do not necessarily depoliticise Dalit politics. In the context of 
Marathwada where fragmented institutions of the state are also active forces of Dalit 
marginalisation, international networks serve as a resource for local Dalit political 
claims. 
 
In the sixth chapter, I move on to discuss Dalit activism around the issue of caste 
violence and the role of violence in democratising public spaces and civilising caste 
relations. I argue in this chapter that the increased violence against Dalits is a product 
of Dalit assertion in public spaces.  Dalit assertion challenges traditional authority 
embedded in caste hierarchies that dominate public spaces.  Dalit assertion and 
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mobility threaten the Raje-shahi (king-ly) control of dominant castes particularly 
Maratha.  I elaborate through ethnographic details, the changing meanings of Dalit 
labour, Dalit assertion in public spaces, the violence that accrues against Dalits, and 
Dalit engagement with state institutions and legal measures. Dalit politics and 
empowerment in public spaces, I argue needs to be studied not through merely 
consensus and deliberations in the public sphere but also through violence revolving 
around public spaces.  
 
 
While Dalit movements come together when Dalits are faced with extreme crises and 
political violence, the realities of caste divisions within Dalits run deep and affect the 
formation of a united Dalit ideology and identities of protest. Moving beyond 
violence, chapter seven and eight develop a processual understanding of collective 
identity formation in Dalit politics. They present the intersections of caste identities 
and cultural repertoires in anti-caste politics that Dalit movements claim to practice. 
The case of BSP, in chapter seven, is of post-Dalit mobilisation in Dalit politics. In 
forming the ‘Bahujan’ collective from below where Dalits play the role of leaders 
and facilitators for electoral politics, I argue that the BSP makes selective use of the 
fragmented anti-caste culture and history making democracy and democratisation a 
cultural project that encompasses issues of both recognition and redistribution. 
 
Chapter eight presents the case of MHA, and the play of Mang identity and its 
intersections with the swabhimani (self-respecting) Mang identity that MHA seeks to 
construct. I argue here that jati though a resource for socio-political mobilisation is 
not an absolute social category. Mobilisation of jati into a political community is a 
dynamic process shaped in the relational contexts of movements and may lead to 
multiple collective identities and socio-political outcomes. The case of MHA 
illustrates the performance, politics and limitations of the particularistic Mang 
identity and its engagement with the evolution of an alternative politicised 
swabhimani Mang identity.  
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The ninth Chapter moves beyond collective identity formation, to analyse the 
participation of Dalits and Dalit movements in electoral politics. Dalit movement 
participation in electoral politics does not neatly fit into analyses that emphasise the 
‘sacredness’ of elections and democracy for the marginalised and poor (Banerjee 
2008). This chapter recounts Ambedkar’s efforts of constructing assertive Dalit 
politics through purging them from the mainstream nationalist thinking, particularly 
Congress. This was also an attempt to challenge the sacredness of political practices 
pursued by elite Hindus. The idea, therefore, of symbolic equality for one day at the 
polling booth was considered as ‘madness’ by Ambedkar as the Scheduled Castes 
elected under joint electorates would end up being slaves of Hindus (Ambedkar 
interview: Broadcasted on BBC 31st December 1955). Chapter nine contextualises 
the challenges of practicing assertive Ambedkarite politics that BSP and MHA 
attempt to pursue in rural Marathwada, where the expanding rural state consolidates 
patronage politics and the control of dominant castes over the state.  MHA and BSP’s 
electoral strategies and challenges are analysed through their participation in the 
2009 Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabha elections.  
 
MHA’s engagement in grassroots decentralised politics elaborates on the absolute 
control of dominant castes on the state institutions and the resulting Dalit exclusion 
from their entitlements. Dalit political mobilisation to autonomously represent their 
own interests is pushed into narrow lanes of jati politics where MHA comes to 
represent only Mang interests. BSP, though a marginal player in Beed, mobilises as 
an autonomous (Dalit led) Bahujan movement in Marathwada. While the ideological 
and principled politics dominate mobilisation processes of BSP, electoral 
compulsions bring the cadre face to face with caste arithmetic and money power that 
dominates the electoral politics. This clash of principled politics and politics of 
power in BSP presents the forced marginalisation of ideological considerations. 
While BSP and MHA are partially forced into margins to replicate the power process 
of dominant political parties during and after elections they continue to retain their 
non-political roots and commitment to Dalit ideology and politics, thus sustaining 
Dalit politics in the arena of electoral and non-electoral politics. 
 
 11 
The concluding chapter revisits the liberal struggle to make caste status irrelevant in 
the civil realm due to its inherent primitivism. The collective trauma of Dalits 
requires caste to be at the centre in their anti-caste struggles. Dalit politics, I argue 
has no doubt changed the local norms of civility and has partially cured 
discriminatory elements of society. Dalit politics engages in what Alexander (2006) 
calls civil repair thus contributing to the continuing process of reforming the state, 




Caste and Dalit politics in the making of Civil Society in India 
 
Civil society has come to dominate discourses of development and social change 
over the last three decades. Although there is a lack of consensus on what constitutes 
civil society, the idea of civil society has become increasingly celebrated across 
academic, activist as well as national and international bureaucratic circles. The 
liberal notion that a free and vibrant civil society forms the heart of successful 
democratic regimes (Gellner 1994), is increasingly held as commonsense now. This 
thesis is a critical engagement with the idea and practice of civil society as 
manifested at the micro socio-political level in the state of Maharashtra in India. It 
specifically explores the politics that surface in the civic sphere in the context of 
caste inequalities, through the study of Dalit movements that occupy the margins of 
civil society in India.  
 
In this introductory chapter, I argue that civil society as a realm of freedom for 
associational and extra-institutional mobilisation emerged in the colonial period. 
During this period these limited opportunities of political freedom were largely 
dominated by the upper castes (mostly Brahmans). However, the lower caste masses 
too were able to participate and influence the colonial state by organising around 
ideologies of protest that countered dominant nationalist currents. The sustenance 
and growth of localised ideologies through associational and extra-institutional 
mobilisation under the democratic state in the postcolonial period is also briefly 
analysed. The nature of mobilisation in the realm of civil society at the interface of 
caste and civil society suggests two specific outcomes: firstly, community 
(gemeinschaft), particularly caste, became central in constructing local forms of civil 
society (gessellschaft); and, secondly, civil society and political society became 
intertwined. I elaborate upon these in the following discussion.  
 
The chapter proceeds as follows: it begins by making a case for recognising civil 
society of India in its existing vibrant form, particularly the role of the ascribed 
identity of caste in shaping civil society and the prevalence of caste-based social 
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movements. This is then followed by a discussion about the interface of caste and 
civil society in the colonial and postcolonial phases. The continued relevance and 
dynamism of caste and its intersections with civil society and the state as they are 
evolving are highlighted. The politicisation of caste and rise of Dalit politics in 
western India are also presented to contextualise discussion on the post-Ambedkar 
Dalit politics which I will pursue in later chapters.  
 
Where is civil society? Identifying India’s vibrant civil society 
The origin of civil society as a modern political phenomenon is Western both in 
terms of thought and practice. I will not follow the much travelled path of 
summarising the development of civil society in the western context which has been 
carried out systematically by several scholars.5  Rather my focus is on elaborating 
and engaging with the challenges posed by some scholars to the utility of the concept 
of civil society in India. 
 
The Western orientation embedded in the notion of civil society does not necessarily 
act an impediment to its use,  however, problems do arise with ethnocentric terms 
like civil society (Goody 2001). The localisation of Western conception of civil 
society in the Indian context is no doubt riddled with some tensions.6 Two good 
examples of this disjoint between the western liberal orientation of civil society and 
its complex local practices in current times are the liberal emphasis on the, firstly, 
‘non-ethnic’ nature of civil society and, secondly, the ‘associational’ forms of civil 
society. If followed these approaches could almost render invisible the existence civil 
society in India 
 
Gellner’s (1995) discomfort with segmental loyalties in the sphere of civil society is 
repeated in Beteille’s (1999) critique of caste ‘imposition’, in the form of caste-based 
reservations, on the intermediary institutions (e.g. universities). He suggests that 
caste imposition leads to inefficiency and hampers autonomy of civil society. In a 
similar vein, Chibber (1999) maintains that associational life in India is weak and 
                                                 
5 See Khilnani (2001), Kumar (1993), Cohen and Arato (1994).  
6 Gellner (2009) points out the difficulties of finding a closest translation for the term civil society in 
South Asia.  
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this enables political parties to play a larger role. The disjuncture between the liberal 
ideas of civil society and the localised forms of civility raises some crucial questions 
for studying the intersections of civil society and caste society: What implications do 
the dominant approaches to understanding civil society have for understanding civil 
society and the public sphere in the Indian subcontinent? Is civil society a space 
meant for collective consciousness building (Cohen and Arato 1994) and public 
deliberation focussed on the common good (Cohen 1997)? Or does it continue to be 
a colonial [now neo-imperial] project of civilising and normalising its subjects (Scott 
1995)? Putnam’s (1995) emphasis on associational dimensions, Gellner’s (1994) 
preference  for modularity as opposed to segmentality7,  or understanding civil 
society as realm of hegemony and counter hegemony (Gramsci 1971), and civil 
society and public sphere as associated with a long-term ‘civilising’ of political and 
societal relations  through rational public deliberation (Habermas 1991); how do 
these work in the caste context of India? Did civil society exist in India in the pre-
colonial period along these lines? If not, then why not? Can civil society exist in a 
caste context? If yes, what happens to caste and civil society at their interface? And, 
most specifically, how do Dalits find or create spaces to articulate their anti-caste 
concerns in contemporary civil society? 
 
Answers to these questions largely depend on how we understand the concept of civil 
society. A narrow definition of civil society with emphasis on associations will fall 
short of answering the questions raised above. Besides missing the vibrancy of civil 
society in the form of extra-institutional movements, this narrow definition fails to 
capture the diverse strategies that the competing actors in civil society adopt. For my 
purposes, I take civil society to refer to a political and socio-cultural space for 
collective mobilisation that is dependent on state for legitimacy but is also 
independent in its functioning. I take my cue here from Gramsci’s separation of civil 
society from the state and economy: ‘civil society stands between economic structure 
and the state’(Gramsci 1971: 31). While Gramsci views civil society as an apparatus 
that sustains the state’s hegemonic project he also acknowledges the emancipatory 
potential of civil society and the challenge it can pose to the state’s hegemony. To 
                                                 
7 By segmental loyalties Gellner refers to those associations that are formed on the basis ascribed 
identities where membership may be restricted and exit difficult.   
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explore this emancipatory potential of civil society I understand civil society in a 
broad communitarian sense to include associational and non-associational forms of 
mobilisation and organisation which could evolve around ethnic and non-ethnic 
interests and can be both institutional and extra-institutional in nature.  Cohen and 
Arato’s (1994) emphasis on conscious association building as one of the key 
processes in civil society is important for my study of caste and civil society, 
particularly in examining the daily workings of civil society through Dalit politics 
and the politicisation of Dalits. A further analysis that is important for this study is 
that civil society is a mere reflection of the society and, therefore, the possibility of 
conflict within remains at the heart of civil society (Chandhoke 2001). Processes of 
conflict and consensus constantly reinvent civil society and the state. Civil society 
cannot be abstracted from the state and the market and is ‘constituted by the politics 
of power as much as it is constituted by the politics of protest’ (Chandhoke, 2001: 
21).  Civil society is also a realm of freedom that gives rise to politics and spaces for 
self realisation (Chandhoke 2002). For the marginalized groups, civil society can 
open spaces for making claims of citizenship and justice. Such claims are embedded 
in complex and unequal social relations making consensus building around these 
claims a process full of conflicts. Justice, as argued by Alexander (2006), is an 
outcome of social and cultural conflicts, and the complex interplay of these conflicts 
influence human qualities that are included and respected in civil society.  
 
Civil society, ‘thus, is a project and cannot be achieved, even in fullest flush of 
success’ (Alexander 2006: 9). It remains a space for critical (and complex) public 
conversations influencing the goals and values of governance (Elliot 2006), for 
reforming not just state and society but civil society itself.  Civil society cannot be 
purged from the ascriptive possibilities of caste in the Indian context and neither can 
it be restricted strictly to associational forms excluding social movements. The 
criticism of Habermas (1981) for maintaining strict distinction between rationality 
and irrationality and for his insistence on the power of ‘rational’ arguments are 
critical in the study of civil society in India. The imagination of an ideal public 
sphere offers little in India where rational deliberations are not the only mode of 
public communication. The distinctions of rational and irrational, ‘depend on 
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keeping some higher sphere separate from lower order contamination’(Alexander 
2006: 17). 
 
Chibber (1999) and Gellner (1994) have been rightly challenged by various scholars 
(Chandhoke 2001; Rudolph 2003; Rudolph 2000; Varshney 2001) who question the 
very basis of claims that deny the existence of strong civil society in India. Rudolph 
(2003: 1118) observes, ‘If caste associations, demand groups, issue and movement 
politics, and nongovernment organisations are taken into account, India could be 
“read” as having a pervasive and extraordinarily active associational life, perhaps 
one of the most participatory in the world.’  
 
Debates in the context of India thus revolve mostly around what should be included 
and excluded from the civil realm and not on the fundamental relevance of civil 
society. The “autonomy” of civil society and the importance of universal ideas that 
inform it (Alexander 2006), remain relevant to the Indian context as well.  It is the 
lack of this autonomous space or a civil sphere for collective mobilisations that 
makes any effort to trace the existence of civil society or public sphere in pre-
colonial India a difficult proposition. The state or other institutions promoting 
citizenship for all were simply missing in pre-colonial India. The public sphere in 
pre-colonial India was not egalitarian and was largely dominated by power holding 
elites, excluding women and the masses (Hasan 2005). Thus, in pre-colonial India 
civil society did not exist and there was no concept of citizenship (Beteille 1999).  
 
Civil society as a realm of political freedom in India emerged during the colonial 
period.  Contesting arguments have prevailed on the makings of caste and civil 
society in India, and on whether caste associations formed as organic movements or 
caste became a specific form of civil society as a result of colonial technologies of 
governance.   It is to an assessment of these arguments that I now turn. 
 
Caste and Civil Society in Colonial India: Interface of the opposites? 
There are two important perspectives on the origins of civil society and intersections 
of caste and civil society in the colonial period that are important for our discussion 
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here. One maintains that caste remained a major challenge to the introduction of the 
idea of citizenship during the British period. The closed societal relations arising out 
of caste (and also religion) affected the possibilities of individuation and freedom as 
they existed in the West (Bhargava and Reifeld 2005; Beteille 1999). The second 
important position is to be found in Kaviraj (2001) and Chatterjee (2001) who argue 
that civil society in its early inchoate form was created in the colonial period by and 
for the elites. Both perspectives, however, offer only a partial view of the complexity 
and dynamism of caste in its interface with the evolving sphere of civil society. 
 
The understanding of caste as a strictly rigid form of hierarchy based on the 
principles of purity and pollution has been an issue of dissent. Such an understanding 
would turn caste into gemeinschaft.8 Dumont’s (1980) thesis of Hindu religious 
values dominating state and sustaining hierarchic caste structure has long been 
challenged (Mary Searle-Chatterjee and Sharma 2003).   Caste is said to have turned 
rigid due to a modern kind of discourse that emerged in the colonial period. This 
discourse insisted on having a fixed determinate form for local collectivities, as 
destruction of community was fundamental to the project of capitalism (Chatterjee 
1996). Much of the arguments about the formation of caste as a rigid structure in 
postcolonial discourses are attributed to the 1872 census of the British government, a 
process of communal enumeration. The British, in trying to be fair referees, made 
political representation ‘communal’ and created fixed communal categories, a feature 
inherent in the modern civil society (Chakraborty 1994). Dirks (1997)  goes a step 
further in this strand of argument to claim that colonialism created much of what is 
now accepted as Indian 'tradition', including the autonomous caste structure. Caste 
achieved its critical position in colonial times, because the British state was 
successful in separating caste as a social form from its dependence on pre-colonial 
political processes, and caste became a specifically Indian form of civil society as a 
result of the colonial project of legitimising its rule over colonial subjects  (Dirks 
1997).  
                                                 
8 For Tonnies (1988: xvii), ‘Gemeinschaft[community] was deeply conservative and sheer antiquity of 
a rule was enough to justify its application and the imposing religious sanctions of heaven and hell 
assured compliance.  Gemeinschaft demanded structure of church and authority of pope. 




These views, however, ignore the pre-colonial socio-cultural, political and material 
basis of caste inequality and also the dynamic transformation that caste society was 
witnessing as a response to the political and economic changes during colonial 
period. Guha (2003: 162-163) reminds us that communal enumeration processes 
were also present in the pre-colonial period and suggests that pre-colonial 
community structures survived into the colonial era using the colonial public sphere 
to assert their claims. Similarly Lorenzen (1999: 654) observes, ‘Caste, like 
Hinduism, undoubtedly responded to the British conquest with significant changes, 
but neither institution was so radically transformed during the colonial period to 
claim that the British invented them’.9   
 
As discussed above, Chatterjee (1996) seems to challenge the possibility of the 
movement from gemeinschaft (community) to gesellschaft (civil society) as a 
problematic of the discourse of modernity. The discourse of the modern state, he 
suggests, cannot provide a theoretical language in which community (caste) can be 
discussed, and the struggle between the narrative of capital and community has, 
therefore, remained unresolved. Such an approach fails to capture the interface 
between civil society and caste vis-à-vis the politics that was surfacing between the 
elites and the masses in the political realm. The interface of caste with the colonial 
imposition of civil society that forced new rules of politics, could also help us 
critically examine Chatterjee’s (2001) second proposition that civil society in 
colonial India belonged to the elites. 
 
Politics of/in the evolving civil society and the public sphere 
Civil society as a political arena of associational activity did emerge during the 
colonial period, especially during the first half of the nineteenth century. Before the 
colonial injunction of civil society, ‘India had non-liberal forms of pluralism that was 
constituted by groups […] with widening scope of citizenship, these groups 
                                                 
9 Dharma Kumar cautions historians against an over emphasising the exploitative nature of 
colonialism and the possibility of underplaying pre-colonial local social conditions of inequality. She 
also discusses socio-political contributions including the growth of public sphere in the colonial 
period (Kumar 1998).  
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reconstituted as political agents.’ (Khilnani 2001: 29). These spaces of civil society 
were largely engaged by local elite castes to protest against the limited scope for 
their political mobility and for independence from the colonial rulers. The second 
mode of associationalism came from the lower castes (especially those who were 
exposed to western education through Christian missionaries). This, however, was a 
case of unintended consequences: the British did not intend to affect such social 
changes in Indian society, but their diverse interventions began to rupture the 
traditional bonds that held the ascriptive hierarchy of caste together (Aloysius 1997: 
21-51).  
 
The localised civic culture that evolved in the colonial public sphere revived the 
fractured indigenous ideologies of change, protest and hegemony. While the ‘twice-
born’ (pure) castes became active members of the civil society created under the 
British regime, the shudra castes too were able to carve out spaces of resistance.  An 
example of how the colonial government opened up new associational spaces was in 
the Societies Registration Act XXI of 1860, which continues to be important and 
survives (with some amendments) to enable registration of various non-profit 
organisations today (Sheth and Sethi 1991). After the act was passed, registered 
societies started cropping up including various caste and religion based associations. 
 
Carroll (1978) limits her analysis of caste associations to the rise of elites amongst 
castes and the success of these elites in seeking state patronage. Besides 
homogenising the fractured nature of caste mobilisation across India, she denies the 
colonised any of their own agency or civic sense.10 The limited conditions of 
modernity - the growth of the printing press, education, the changing economy and 
the evolving public sphere - produced new elites amongst upper caste groups and 
some of the lower castes. The ex-untouchables/Dalits were definitely last in terms of 
accessing these socio-political spaces. 
 
                                                 
10 See Carroll’s (1978) study of the Kayastha movement which highlights the ‘one-man show’ nature 
in terms of leadership. These organisations are seen as a response to colonial constructions, 
specifically for seeking patronage in terms of jobs from the British Government.   
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The specific local conditions of caste hierarchy and its fragmented ideologies paved 
the way for the growth of associational culture and resistance movements around 
transforming caste status and relations, these movements also reconstructed local 
ideologies of change, protest and hegemony. One can categorise some of these 
mobilisations as organised around three competing prominent ideologies: Gandhian 
nationalism, Hindu nationalism and the low caste movements for claiming 
citizenship rights under the emergent colonial state.11 All three mobilisations 
intrinsically dealt with the question of caste and religion in different modes. The 
reason for the formation, and evolution processes of these ideologies too were 
different. While incipient associational culture was the prime mode of organisation, 
extra-institutional mobilisation connoting the growth of social movements was also 
dominant in the civil society. 
 
Competing associations and caste politics in the civil sphere 
Gandhian nationalism focussed on bringing together competing castes and religions 
(specifically Muslims and Hindus) under one umbrella in the struggle against the 
British colonial state. Gandhi voiced this through the Indian National Congress 
(INC), a political organisation that largely was dominated and articulated the 
interests of the elite castes. The “Other” was necessarily British rule and their 
modern institutions and his critique became known as the Gandhian critique of 
modernity. According to Rudolph and Rudolph (2006), Gandhian mobilisation 
contradicts Habermas’s insistence on critical rational exchanges as the basis for 
communication in a society where the majority of people were illiterate. They argue 
that the coffee house was reconstructed by Gandhi to suit the local context of India: 
Gandhi envisioned the public sphere as an ashram where commitment to changing 
hearts as well as minds was the foundation for a democratised public sphere, and the 
language of publics was both communal (religious) and  individual centric (Rudolph 
and Rudolph 2006: 140-174).   
 
                                                 
11 I am consciously limiting my discussion to mobilisations around these three ideologies in order to 
focus on the theme under discussion: the intersections of caste and civil society. This is not to 
underplay other critical mobilisations like the Muslim League, the peasant’s movements and the 
women’s movement, all of which can be critically examined through a caste lens.  
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The Hindu nationalist movement was a movement that developed in parallel to the 
growth of Gandhian nationalism. Hindu nationalism rejected the non-violent 
positioning of Gandhian ideology and celebrated violent Hindu traditions as a means 
of securing freedom. Jaffrelot (2007: 6) sees the growth of Hindu cultural 
nationalism as a modern phenomenon that developed on the basis of organisational 
strategies of ideology building. Hindu nationalist mobilisation began with the 
formation of Brahmo Samaj (1828), and then Arya Samaj (1875) and later the Hindu 
Sabhas (1907) and then the Hindu Sanghatans (1915). Jaffrelot (2007) describes a 
historical shift in this movement from Hindu reform to Hindu revivalism. All these 
organisations had close ties with the Indian National Congress. Under the project of 
Hindu nationalism all castes had to unite against the common enemy which had been 
configured as Muslim assertion and Christianity (especially lower caste conversions). 
Some limited reform of Hindu religion was also a mobilising strategy for including 
lower castes in its ambit.  
 
The emerging Gandhian ideas of the nation and nationalism were countered here by 
promoting the idea of Hindus as the majority community and the race that could 
embody the potential independent nation (Hansen 1999). Hindu nationalism and its 
mobilisation had not been able to take much hold in the colonial period due to the 
dominance of the Indian National Congress, which to an extent successfully united 
the masses and the elites under its ambiguous union of political and spiritual 
ideologies 12. Its dominance was also because it stayed away from party politics.         
 
The imagined national community both of Gandhi’s Congress and of Hindu 
nationalism were largely based on caste Hindu traditions, the former with slight 
Bhakti
13 orientation and the latter with Brahmanism as its base. Colonial India 
however also saw the emergence of a lower caste subaltern nationalism which was 
based on its oppressed past as the “Other” (Aloysius 1997). Growth in the press 
culture, military recruitment, the liberal values of Christian missionary education, 
                                                 
12 For the politics of Gandhian synthesis see Aloysius (1997: 170-213) and a re-reading in Rao (2009).  
13  Bhakti literally means devotion and Bhakti movement(s) is a term used to refer to various socio-
cultural sects and practices preached by saints in medieval India. These were considered to be against 
inequalities of caste, class and gender and had element of modernity, see Lele (1981) and  Lorenzen 
(1995). 
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development of  cities under the new economic regime and the rise of associational 
activity, were intertwined with changes in the lower echelons of the caste structure. 
First it was the shudras who organised and protested against ‘caste disabilities’. In 
spite of the fact that the judiciary playing a limited role (it generally judged in favour 
of upper castes), the judicial system was actively engaged by the new elite amongst 
low caste groups.14  
 
The conflict and competition that was emerging within the Indian society gained new 
forms, constructing fragmentation and conflict within the evolving civil society. 
Whilst analysis of the new waves of capitalism and colonialism requires a critique on 
moral grounds, there is also a need to recognise that local practices of civility 
historically were not just when it came to citizenship rights for untouchables.  
Washbrook (1990) rightly questions the “all is bad with capitalism” approach and 
suggests that this may result in other kinds of “orientalism with moral intention”. He 
maintains that the British Raj was never simply an instrument of foreign domination, 
it also related to struggles inside South Asian society for status, privilege and power.  
 
Such struggles in western India translated into the growth of non-Brahman 
mobilisation against Brahman dominance in civil society and state society. These 
associations also temporarily integrated untouchable concerns within this newly 
imagined non-Brahman community that attempted to mobilise against Brahmans and 
Brahmanism.    
 
The rise of Untouchable politics and ideology in western India (the Bombay 
Presidency)  
The 1830-40s in Western India witnessed the growth of the printing press and the 
production of periodicals both in English and Marathi, some of which were 
controlled by the Christian missionaries. A new elite amongst non-Brahman groups 
emerged through exposure to western education and also due to the evolving public 
sphere that was open to ‘political’ criticism of the dominant values and religion. 
Western India also had a specific history of the Peshwas (Brahmans) overthrowing 
                                                 
14 See Galanter (1963) and Rudolph and Rudolph (1963) for the brahmanical bias of the colonial 
legislation. 
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the Maratha15 rule to establish a Brahmanic state. Rao (2009) suggests that this 
created the ground for a novel alliance between peasant protests and anti-caste 
thought, the former being the shudras and the latter atishudra.16  In order to sustain 
the struggle against Brahmanic dominance, in 1873 Jyotirao Phule17 founded the 
Satyashodhak Samaj (the Truth Seeking Society, refered to as SS hereon). This had a 
clear ideology that aimed at educational empowerment of shudra and atishudra 
castes and at promoting cultural-religious protest by giving up Hindu practices that 
gave primacy to the ritual leadership of the Brahmans. SS’s ideology starkly 
contrasted with the Hindu nationalist and Congress ideology in its celebration of 
Western ideals and the enlightenment, in its overt support to the colonial rule and in 
viewing Brahmanism as it’s ‘Other’ (Gavaskar 1999; O'Hanlon 1985).18  Phule 
turned the Aryan [Brahman] invasion theory on its head by identifying the pre-Aryan 
era as the golden age and posing King Bali as an alternative to Brahman centred 
interpretations of culture and models of social leadership (O’Hanlon 1985: 186). 
 
Naregal (2001) has explored the emerging vernacular public sphere in western India, 
which she maintains was dominated by the conservative interests of upper castes. 
She also describes the low caste counter-public and its associational form in 
Satyashodhak Samaj formed by Phule, and highlights that he understood the 
importance of education in modern politics; she suggests that education and political 
representation became sites of conflict. Naregal (2001: 272) observes that, ‘the 
limited potential of the upper-caste intelligentsia to develop an inclusive discourse 
found itself at odds with the logic of representative politics, resulting in historical 
incompleteness of the hegemonic influence they were able to establish’. The 
hegemonic influence of the upper castes, however. was strengthened after the end of 
Phule’s ideological leadership of the non-Brahman movement. Phule belonged to a 
lower shudra caste and tried to merge the interests of shudras and atishudras through 
forging an imagined anti-Brahman collective identity of the kshatriya (warriors). It 
                                                 
15 Marathas referred to a small social elite who were considered Shudras by the Brahmans in western 
India, a claim that Maratha Kings contested. 
16 Shudra is the lowest and impure Varna in the Varna order and the Atishidra  is classed as outside of 
the Varna order, and therefore classified as ‘untouchable’. 
17 Born into the Mali [gardener] caste, a shudra caste that is lower than Marathas.  
18 Dilip Menon presents a detailed critique of Chatterjee  by discussing the celebration of 
enlightenment, modernity and English education amongst the lower castes (Menon 1997). 
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was only Shahu Maharaj (a Maratha king of Kolhapur province) who pursued a pro 
non-Brahman politics (Copland 1973). The non-Brahman mobilisation was 
dominated by Marathas and did not always accommodate concerns of untouchable 
castes easily. The non-Brahman ideology and identity, argues Rodrigues (1998), was 
never an ideological union of castes and the interests of land owning Marathas 
dominated non-Brahman politics. Further, the Marathas did not accommodate 
untouchables in their anti-Brahman politics and they claimed Kshatriya status.  The 
anti-Congress ideology of Phule and the non-Brahman movement came to an end 
with the Marathas joining the Congress and the dissolution of the Non-Brahman 
Party in December 1930. The Kshatriya ideology that Phule constructed to undo the 
dominance of Brahmans (as Aryans) in ritual and political spheres was diverted by 
the Marathas to claim higher social status, thereby constructing the untouchables as 
the lower ‘other’.  It was now left to the untouchable movements to take forward 
remnants of the anti-caste ideology constructed by Phule. The untouchables saw a 
need for initiating an independent struggle to challenge their total exclusion, which 
was opposed not only by the Brahmans but also non-Brahmans, their former 
ideological counterparts.  
 
Untouchable protests in western India evolved as a counter current within the non-
Brahman politics. Hardtmann (2009) distinguishes between the earlier caste 
federations that emerged amongst the untouchables and the later Dalit movements, in 
that the former believed in Hindu reform and the latter in an autonomous anti-caste 
tradition.  The late nineteenth century struggle of the untouchables in claiming 
educational rights made limited but important gains from colonial educational policy 
and the Christian missionaries in promoting untouchable education. Constable (2000) 
argues that the syncretic incorporation of the ideologies of Christian missionaries 
(who also brought some material help) by radicalised untouchable local cultures, 
produced radical untouchable ideologies and created dynamism for structural social 
transformation through associations such as the Anarya Dosh Pariharak Mandal 
(Society for Removal of Problems of non-Aryan Origin) in 1890. The recruitment of 
untouchable castes in military service was banned from 1892 and untouchable 
leaders influenced by Phule’s ideology challenged this exclusion. Constable (2001) 
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demonstrates that the Kshatriya status claimed by untouchables under the influence 
of Phule was a contestory consciousness that stood in opposition to the Brahmanic 
caste structure.  
 
These initiatives were to provide a foundation for the later Dalit movement under the 
leadership of Dr. B. R. Ambedkar. Ambedkar’s struggle for political rights of 
untouchables/depressed classes had associations like the Bahiskrit Hitkarni Sabha 
(Depressed Classes Institute) and Peoples Education Society, these associational 
features and the extra-institutional struggle (protests) later took the form of political 
formations like the Indian Labour Party, the Scheduled Caste Federation and finally 
the Republican Party of India (Omvedt 2004; Jaffrelot 2005; Zelliot 1996). 
Ambedkar’s scholarly political action mined the possibilities for collective 
emancipation of Dalits through the use of associations both charitable and political.  
 
The colonial government dispersed and disaggregated Indian society along religious 
and caste lines thus leading to a rise in the idea of “community” as a parastate entity. 
Caste radicals19 in western India made use of these terms and context to theorize 
caste as structural violence that imposed structural negativity on Dalits (Rao 2009). 
To liberate Dalits from the “structural violence of caste”, Dalits were framed as a 
peculiar kind of political minority by Ambedkar, a position that brought him into 
conflict with the Hindu community, Congress and the British colonial state (Rao 
2009).  
 
The liberal rejection of segmental associations from the civil society is similar to 
Ambedkar’s fear of the ‘tyranny of cousins’ structured around caste in Hindu society, 
which he felt limited the possibilities of civility and civil society across caste. Caste, 
for Ambedkar stood in contradiction with democracy, caste could not be reformed 
and had to be annihilated. Ambedkar’s struggle for political and social equality for 
Dalits also revealed a nexus of caste exclusion and liberalism in the Indian public 
sphere, where Dalits were considered to be ‘trespassers’ (Rao 2009: 116-117).   
 
                                                 
19 A term used by Rao (2009) to refer to radicals like Phule, Ambedkar and their followers in colonial 
India. 
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I will return to the innovative interpretations of the influence of Ambedkar in Dalit 
politics in the current times in the following chapters. What is important to note is 
that the newly emerging realm of civil society, under an alien and partially secular 
colonial state, created a buzz of political activity in the public sphere with the 
formation of associations around identities and socio-religious issues. Civil society 
did not necessarily emerge in contradiction with the state, rather it was promoted by 
the colonial state at times to disaggregate the society and discipline its subjects. The 
fragmented, dynamic and hierarchic caste society responded to this new sphere of 
political (in) dependence by organising around competing ideologies of change and 
hegemony. Civil society though dependent on colonial state for its legitimacy did 
have elements of political freedom. The lower caste associations and ideologies 
under civil society focussed on uniting the lower echelons of the society primarily for 
their political rights, the other two dominant streams focussed on promoting 
associationalism across all castes under the patronising leadership of the upper 
castes. The caste context and the resulting movements in the newly evolving public 
sphere turned what had been the ‘homogeneous’ project of nationalism into 
something much more ‘heterogeneous’.  
 
Contrary to Chatterjee’s (2001) proposition that civil society was the exclusive 
domain of interaction between elite Indians and the colonial/postcolonial state, civil 
society,  even within Tocqueville’s more limited conceptualisation of civil society as 
associationalism, was also  to a certain extent accessed by the lower castes during the 
colonial period. Chatterjee (2004), referring to Ambedkar’s movement, 
acknowledges the impact of politics upon governmentality and that incipient 
resistances may succeed in inventing new forms of social justice. However, he does 
not see an interface between civil society and the masses, especially the lower castes. 
For him, civil society belongs to the elites and the other forms of resistance lie 
outside civil society.20 
 
Where the evolving civil society and public sphere interfaced with caste, they did 
reflect the contradictions of caste in terms of hierarchy, fragmentation and 
                                                 
20 Similarly Kaviraj (2001: 311-312) observes, ‘as long as politics was between elites and colonisers, 
rules of liberalism and etiquettes of civil society were observed punctiliously’. 
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competition; however, they also created space for public conversations especially 
about the social role of the colonial government and about hierarchies of caste. The 
colonial state and colonial forms of governmentality were new sites for influencing 
or solving the contradictions of caste, and civil society emerged as a sphere for 
communicating between and amongst competing ideologies and with the state. 
Crucial features of mobilisation in the realm of civil society during the colonial 
period were the implicit tendency to organise around ascriptive identities like 
religion and caste (and coalitions of these) and also the intense engagement with 
state. Thus, sustaining the role of community in the working of civil society where 
caste shaped the civil society and the intersections of caste and civil society were a 
local political necessity in postcolonial India. 
 
Caste and the making of civil society in the postcolonial period 
The caste character of civil society in the colonial period did in some way influence 
the nature of growth that would ensue in civil society, sovereign state and politics. 
The modern postcolonial state is criticised for being isolated from the logic of the 
social order (Kaviraj 1984), and for its secular aspirations that were not in touch with 
the cultural practices of ordinary citizens (Madan 1997). The Constitution, however 
carried in it the contradictions of caste by guaranteeing fundamental rights to all 
citizens irrespective of caste, religion and gender and also by providing special 
representation for the Scheduled Caste and Schedule Tribes (and later to the Other 
Backward Classes21). The secular and liberal constitution of India also protects the 
sacred Hindu cow22, thus the Hindus managed to save the cow through the 
constitution and the lower caste radicals their political rights and access to education 
and employment through reservations.  
 
The implications of caste as an active constituent of civil society in the colonial 
period continued into the postcolonial period, although under different conditions of 
democracy and the progressive Constitution of India. As understood by Ambedkar, 
                                                 
21Other Backward Classes (OBCs) refers to the socially and economically backward communities 
other than Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. They were identified for extending the benefits of 
reservations in education and employment to these groups. Most of the OBCs come from the lower 
shudra Varna.  
22 For elements of Hindu bias in constitution of India see Singh (2005).  
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India entered a period of contradictions, with equality in politics and inequality in 
social and economic life. Social and economic inequalities were seen by Ambedkar 
as a threat that could blow up the new democratic structure (Drèze 2004). Ambedkar 
preferred to curb the liberties of an oppressive civil society than those of the state 
(Baxi 2000). The recognition of caste inequality and injustices that Dalits faced were 
thus imposed on the Indian civil society through state measures, ‘by laying Dalit as 
an exceptional legal subject’ (Rao: 2009).  
 
The inequalities of caste further interacted with the scarce opportunities of mobility 
in social, political and economic life. The structures of the newly independent state 
besides being sites for resolving conflicts that emerged due to caste discrimination 
and scarce opportunities was also a site of consolidation of dominance for dominant 
classes. Civil society thus was ‘promoted’ by the state, and the borders of civil 
society and state blurred, with Congress as the bridging institution that straddled the 
two (Jenkins 2004). In the realm of associational culture, when the state was 
controlled by Congress and the upper castes one noticed an increase in state 
supported civil society, be it Gandhian organisations, the cooperative movement or 
the Vanavasi Kalyan Ashram (Welfare for Forest Dwellers) of the Hindu nationalist 
variety. Most of these organisations relied on government funding, ‘gradually little 
difference could be seen between their work and the government programmes of 
social welfare’ (Sheth and Sethi, 1991: 53).  
 
The 1970s however witnessed growth of organisations, social movements and 
associations that were beyond the state controlled and promoted civil society. The 
student’s movement in Bihar, navnirman (reconstruction) movement in Gujarat, 
Naxalite movement in West Bengal, Marxist feminist movement, and the Dalit 
Panther Movement in Maharashtra emerged during this time (Baviskar 2010). The 
emancipatory role of state had come under serious criticism due to increasing 
corruption and poverty. ‘The catalyst for the social movements of the late 1970s was 
the state of Emergency imposed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1975’, observes 
Baviskar (2010: 4).  Civil society also served as a critical space for consolidating 
ethno-religious solidarities that were linked to Hindutva nationalist aspirations. Non-
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political Hindu nationalist organisations like RSS23 contributed in the formation of 
Hindu nationalist parties – Bhartiya Jana Sangh (BJS) and later Bhartiya Janata 
Party.  
 
The Gandhian homogenisation project of nationalism under the Indian National 
Congress could not sustain itself for long as caste, region and religious 
configurations were growing strong in local level party politics. The consociational 
Congress system collapsed in part under the pressures of identity politics. The signs 
of the collapse of the Congress system had started in the 1970s.  Under the 
ideological legacy of Gandhi and the arrangement of the Congress system around 
patron/client relationship, democracy largely benefited the upper castes. India, 
according to Jaffrelot, overcame this Hobson’s choice (of change), ‘thanks to social 
transformation from below which occurred in the realm of caste’ (Jaffrelot 2003: 
492-493).24 
 
The dynamic nature of caste possessed the inherent potential to divide and create 
hierarchies, leaving India as a country of fractured minorities in current times. Some 
castes have been traditionally privileged in terms of access to power and social 
capital (social, economic, political and cultural) while the others have started 
reversing the power structure in their favour under the conditions of democracy. 
Caste-based mobilisation has at times been utilised for securing state patronage and, 
therefore, has required the support of numbers which cannot be gained merely 
through specific caste (jati) based organisation; mobilisation across caste then 
becomes a necessity. Rudolph (1965) points to the possible modernisation of caste 
that could happen through its interaction with democracy and electoral politics. 
Gellner’s (1995) concept of modular civility is thus achieved at times under 
compulsions of democratic politics.  Besides the compulsions of caste arithmetic in 
electoral politics that facilitated the merger of castes into temporal political 
collectives, postcolonial politics has also witnessed a real deepening of democracy 
through the rise of shudra castes in party politics (Varshney 2000; Jaffrelot 2003).   
                                                 
23 Rudolph (2000: 1766) denies RSS the status of an association that generates social capital for 
democracy in Putnam mode, it is nevertheless an association. 
24 Rudolph (1965) suggests  that revolution was spared in India due to transformation of caste. 
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Caste, civil society and state remained in dynamic interaction affecting both micro 
and macro political processes in postcolonial India. Party politics too contributed in 
flourishing associations locally that got organised around caste and religious 
identities. Khilnani has made the important point that modern political parties are a 
crucial point of articulation between civil society and the state and their exclusion in 
the study of civil society yields an overtly partial perspective (Khilnani 2001: 31-32).  
 
The Indian National Congress for instance shifted from being an association to a 
political party that accommodated elite caste and class interests in postcolonial 
politics. In general, the interweaving of caste, religious and regional identities in 
electoral competition also suggest the centrality of political parties as civil society 
institutions of self assertion and realisation. In Maharashtra the intersections of party 
politics and social movements is most visible in Dalit and Hindutva politics. 
Associationalism can be a result of electoral competition and patronage culture in 
electoral politics and associations formed for ideological goals can lead to formation 
of political parties. Such associational mobilisation that took initial roots in the form 
of BAMCEF (Bahujan and Minority Community Employees Federation) in 
Maharashtra resulted in the formation of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP). This calls 
for understanding the ‘associational’ dimensions in the political mobilisation 
amongst the lower castes, especially their ideological and critical rational 
dimensions.  
 
The initial foundations of BSP were laid through the formation of ‘The Scheduled 
Caste, Scheduled Tribes, OBCs and Minority Community Employees Association’ 
by organising the middle class elites amongst these groups. This later turned into 
BAMCEF. In 1980, BAMCEF had around 200, 000 members of which 500 held 
PhDs, and 15,000 were scientists largely from Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra 
(Jaffrelot 2003: 391). This strictly elite association was transformed into the structure 
of a political party, the BSP, through intensive grassroots organising. The merger of 
the middle class interests with those of the rural downtrodden masses in BSP’s 
mobilisation is detailed in later chapters. For our discussion what is relevant here is 
 31 
the challenges that a naïve understanding of ‘middle classes’ can pose in studying 
caste politics particularly Dalit politics. Prakash (2008) problematises the idea of a 
homogeneous middle class and points to the possibilities of a subaltern middle class 
amongst Dalits. Like most movements, leadership in Dalit politics came from the 
comparatively well-to-do amongst them. The ‘civil’ (elite) and ‘political’ (masses) 
are not at loggerheads and continue to intersect in Dalit movements and politics of 
resistance. 
 
Civil society is not a non-political but a non-state space of solidarity building and 
collective identity formation. ‘Since India is a multiparty democracy, its political 
parties are part of the nation’s civil society along with its unions, business 
associations, reading clubs, NGOs and so on’ (Varshney 2002: 4) . The postcolonial 
civil society in India thus encompassed growth of associations, social movements 
and political parties around varying concerns like that of gender, environment, class, 
caste and religion. Local associationalism intersects with wider politics of identity 
that may be pursued by political parties and social movements (Mosse 2006b). 
 
Caste has not been at loggerheads with democracy and civil society in postcolonial 
politics.  Therefore the distinction that Chatterjee (2001) carves out between civil 
society and political society to sustain his earlier proposition of a contradiction 
between modernity and community becomes problematic. Caste has a Janus-faced 
nature, continuing to inhabit both tradition and modernity at once (Prakash 2002). 
The current forces of globalization and neoliberalism that are increasingly 
transforming the state and civil society seem to merge innovatively with caste instead 
of displacing it. The growth of neo-liberal state is coupled with increased presence of 
transnational development organisations and major social movements revolving 
around ‘market’ [liberalisation], mandir/masjid, Mandal and Marxist-Leninist 
revolutionary movements (Baviskar 2010). These conditions create new contexts, 
challenges and opportunities for Dalit politics of resistance and my research is an 




Civil society, state and Dalit politics in a context of Globalisation 
“The effect of caste on the ethics of the Hindus is simply deplorable. Caste has 
killed public spirit. Caste has destroyed the sense of public charity. Caste has made 
public opinion impossible. A Hindu’s public is his caste. His responsibility is only 
to his caste.” (Ambedkar 1945)   
 
I am preparing to organise masses who have been victimised by the caste 
system…Caste is not a problem for us but an opportunity and we must know how 
to use it at the appropriate time and occasion. (Kanshiram, undated: quoted in 
Mahanayak) 
 
The above quotes by two prominent figures of Dalit movements in India reveal the 
complexities in the ideology and practice of Dalit movements and the centrality of 
caste in anti-caste politics. Ambedkar faced the dilemma of caste vs. class as political 
choices of mobilisation. He moved from the Indian Labour Party (ILP) to the 
Scheduled Caste Federation (SCF) and finally back to the Republican Party of India 
(RPI). ILP could never become a party of labourers as the Maratha-Kunbi cluster 
distanced themselves from the party (Jaffrelot 2005: 74 - 90). While the Martha-
Kunbi cluster rejected Ambedkar’s leadership because of his caste, non-Mahar 
untouchable castes too did no come in full support of socio-political formations led 
by Ambedkar because of hierarchies and competitions within Dalits. 
 
Ambedkar however aspired for a strategy to annihilate caste so as to create a truly 
liberal civility and civil society. Civility is a key measure of the success of 
democracy, besides respecting liberal institutions, ‘it involves treating others as, at 
least, equal in dignity, never as inferior in dignity’ (Shils 1991: 12). Local practices 
of civility however remain embedded in hierarchies of caste. These hierarchies also 
construct cultural notions and political practices that label Dalit bodies as 
untouchable and stigmatised. Ambedkar’s liberal procedural engagement for political 
commensuration of Dalits revealed that “Dalits were incommensurable” (Rao 2009: 
157). Recognising the limitation of political means for making justice accessible to 
Dalits and the impossibility of a merger of caste and democracy, Ambedkar 
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advocated for en masse conversions of untouchables to Buddhism. He suggested that 
this was a path all Indians should follow to revoke a liberal local tradition that was 
compatible with the modern democratic polity. Ambedkar’s measures positioned 
Dalits as a non-Hindu minority. “The model of Dalit identity was the model of 
permanent struggle through exacerbation, rather than the idea of resolution of 
difference.” (Rao 2009: 158 emphasis in original).  
 
Kanshiram’s quote above sets out the complex strategies that post-Ambedkar Dalit 
movements enlist to make the ideals of Ambedkarism work. My research is an 
ethnographic exploration of these complex exchanges of ideology and the 
substantive practices in Dalit movement politics, and contributes to the 
understanding of caste, state and civil society as socio-political, economic and 
cultural processes.   
 
Democracy and civil society are processes that are not merely implemented through 
the procedures laid out in the Constitution and by the institutions of the state, but 
through daily negotiations between those with historically consolidated access to 
socio-cultural, political and economic capital and the excluded others who aspire to 
unsettle the processes and structures that construct their marginalisation. We need, 
therefore to, move beyond traditional indological approaches oriented toward 
culturalism which have contributed toward diminishing of class analysis in South 
Asian studies (Chibber 2006). I agree and follow Rao’s (2009) reiteration of the need 
for understanding secularism and democracy as cultural objects. A material vs. 
symbolic distinction does not help in study of Dalit politics. Similar is the liberal 
insistence for excluding caste or ethnic mobilisation from the realm of civil society 
which ignores the centrality of caste not only as a source of inequality but as a 
resource for mobilisation against inequalities.25  
 
What does the dynamism of caste, civil society and state mean for Dalit politics in 
globalised times?  
                                                 
25 Chandhoke’s (1995) attempt to merge the strengths of liberal and Marxist ideas on civil society is 
also sceptical of the utility of caste.   
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There is a debate amongst scholars on the affects and possibilities that globalisation 
and capitalist expansion have for both civil society and the state. Some scholars 
highlight the emerging possibilities for civil society in general due to the emergence 
of transnational/global civil society which can facilitate access to networks and 
resources (Appadurai 2001; Olesen 2005). A contra-view emphasises the decreased 
role of the state in the provision of welfare and an increased fragmentation of civil 
society, both seen as negative outcomes that increasingly de-politicise civil society 
and weaken the state. With increasing assertion of neo-liberal ideas in India, Harriss 
has warned: ‘Poorer people may be excluded through the 'new politics' and 
progressively denied the possibility of engaging in politics as self realization’ 
(Harriss 2005: 35). Basille and Harriss-White (2000) argue that various civic-social 
organisations formed around caste sustain the hegemony of the capitalist class.   
 
A radical left reading of the Dalit situation only class inequality at the core of its 
analyses may not offer the requisite insights into the fragmented nature of Dalit 
agency, protests and resistance at the globalised grassroots. Emergence of global 
civil society is not necessarily a threat. Caste, besides its increasing relevance in local 
politics has also ‘travelled’ globally through the linkages of globalisation (Ramaiah 
2009; Ilaiah 2006). Nigam (2002) argues that instead of opposing globalisation, Dalit 
politics is in search of a Dalit bourgeoisie under globalisation. Recent research on 
Uttar Pradesh has documented substantial improvement in the lives of Dalits and has 
urged that development be reconceptulalised as ‘freedom from social inequality’ 
(Kapur et al. 2010). Dalit movements in resorting to democratic processes and means 
do not aspire for millenarian intervention or a sudden revolution. In their emphasis 
on undoing social inequality they also partially challenge their economic exclusion. 
Caste, state and civil society become key processes that may aid or obstruct the 
complex practices of Dalit politics.  
 
No doubt, Dalit politics may not seem like ‘revolution’ to left radicals nor does it 
neatly fit into what Appadurai (2001) calls ‘politics of patience’. Resistance are 
means to modest goals suggests Scott (1985: 347).  The same cannot be said about 
Dalits and Dalit politics as they engage challenging their inferior social status and in 
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writing a new contract for themselves with civil society and state. Changing the 
‘untouchable’ status of Dalits involves Dalit assertion and self-realisation and these 
processes are riddled with conflict and violence. Locally, depending on the regional 
or the specific village context of politicisation of Dalits, caste may operate either to 
reproduce hierarchical ritual practices in terms of caste-cooperation or to redefine 
practices in order to accommodate the radical interests of Dalits.26 Dalit organising at 
the grassroots is not always peaceful and can lead to violence and counter-violence. 
Gorringe (2005: 85-111)  refers to violent Dalit protests as extra-institutional 
mobilisation and argues that the facile correlation between democracy and 
mobilisation cannot explain the prevalence of extra-institutional mobilisation 
especially violent protests. He suggests that the prevalence of extra-institutional 
protests may reflect a failure of the institutions of interest mediation.  
 
Further, the changes in caste do not occur in a cultural vacuum and the fragmented 
institutions of the state could play a critical role. I am, therefore, cautious of 
approaches that overemphasise the disciplining and civilising power of the colonial 
state, coupled with a linear reasoning that stresses governmentality and its role in 
consolidating caste identities and politics under the colonial and postcolonial state. 
This approach may overlook the politics of the excluded that surface at the margins 
of civil society and their critical engagement with both the state and society.  
Governmentality also helps us understand the complex relationship between structure 
and agency, and power–knowledge strategies function both as instruments of control 
and as points of resistance (Lacombe 1996). The state, therefore, is not above or fully 
separated from society. The daily working of state and society point to blurred 
boundaries of both and also a combination of state based legal authority and 
traditional authority (Fuller and Harriss 2001).  The threats posed to the state and its 
welfare potentials under globalisation are real, but, the state continues to have a 
critical role in local politics despite the growth of NGOs. Whilst pointing to the vital 
                                                 
26 An interesting case for comparison is Tamil Nadu and Orissa. Orissa has seen what Tanabe (2006)  
terms the reinvention of  new sacrificial practices based on caste cooperation. Caste in Orissa, argues 
Tanabe, has withered away in the politico-economic sphere and has been reformulated in ritual sphere. 
On the other hand, Clark-Deces (2006)  describes the radicalism of Dalits in Tamil Nadu in redefining 
the nature of mourning rituals so as to free the Paraiyars (untouchable caste) from shameful ritual 
obligations. 
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role that state can continue to play, however, Randeria (2007) regards the Indian state 
as ‘cunning’; 
 
‘…cunning states manage to have conveniently few duties towards their 
citizens. Given the political will, they could exploit the limited degrees of 
freedom still available under conditions of globalisation to protect the 
interests of vulnerable citizens.’ (2007: 28)  
 
Randeria’s attempts to incorporate issues of caste and caste mobilisation in civil 
society have however ended up, celebrating legal pluralism and marginalising the 
role of the state (Randeria 2002). Similarly Ganguly (2000) observes that structures 
of governmentality and Indian democracy make Dalits virtually inarticulate. My 
study cautions against such conclusions. Dalit politics in India poses a critical 
challenge to scholars theorising politics and resistance at the margins. The politics of 
Dalits does not fit neatly into the culturalist critique where state and associated 
politics are seen as the imposition of modernist ideas from above. Dalit politics on 
the margins of the state seems to demand more state intervention (Guru 2009), for 
Dalits the state is a pool of resources and opportunities and they are eager to (mis) 
use the government administration (Fuller and Harriss 2001). Spencer (2007), 
critiquing culturalist theses, maintains that the politics at the margins is not anti-
politics but counter-politics: a response to and not a rejection of the state. 
 
Under globalisation and the emergence of new civil society spaces, Dalit movement 
politics continue to revolve both around state and non-political spheres through 
formation of politicised collective identities of protest. Caste does not necessarily 
work against class in Dalit movements. Change processes that Dalits movements 
mobilise for are not merely ones of recognition and redistribution concerns too are 
involved. As argued by Alcoff (2007), identity politics does not have an inevitable 
logic that destines it to fracture, border patrolling and internal conservatism and 
redistribution claims may require identity politics.  Further undoing of caste status 
and privileges is a contentious process and involves more than rational deliberations 
as Dalits face ritualised forms of political violence.  
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Within this broader context, my research is an anthropological enquiry into Dalit 
politics. I describe how Dalit politics attempts to affect changes in power-relations 
through constant engagement with caste and the state and also reveal role of Dalit 
politics in the making of civility and civil society. In the following Chapter I will 
introduce Beed District, where I carried out the study. 
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Chapter 2 
Socio-economic and political profile of Beed 
My ethnographic study of Dalit politics was based in Beed district of Marathwada 
region in Maharashtra [see Annexure I for maps]. This chapter introduces the socio-
political and economic context of Marathwada and more particularly Beed. I dwell 
here on Dalit status and the power processes that construct the external fields within 
which Dalit politics operate.  
Marathwada region in Maharashtra refers to the geographical areas that were part of 
the erstwhile Hyderabad state under Nizam rule. The Marathwada region, comprised 
of the eight districts of Hingoli, Jalna, Parbhani, Beed, Aurangabad, Latur, 
Osmanabad and Nanded, account for around 17 per cent of Maharashtra’s 
population. Marathwada exposes the stark reality of the socio-economic deprivation 
in Maharashtra, which may be invisible due to the industrialisation and development 
of Mumbai and the western region of the state. A look at the development indices of 
the districts of Marathwada reveals that they are well below the state average in 
terms of human development and poverty.  
For instance, the Human Development Index (HDI) value for Maharashtra is at 0.58, 
In Marathwada, however, all districts with the exception of Aurangabad (0.57), are 
much lower than the state average; Jalna - 0.27, Parbhani - 0.43, Hingoli - 0.43, Beed 
- 0.47, Nanded - 0.37, Osmanabad - 0.38 and Latur - 0.47 (Kamdar and Basak 2005). 
Largely an agrarian society, landholding patterns are highly skewed in favour of 
dominant castes like Marathas followed by other castes like Vanjaris and Lingayats 
(Mandavdhare 1989). 
 Marathwada has slightly higher proportion of Dalits (14.96 per cent) compared to 
the state average of 10.2 per cent (Census, 2001). 27 The semi-feudal culture of caste 
                                                 
27 Maharashtra has 59 caste groups which are identified as Scheduled Castes. Of these, the Mahar, 
Mang and Chambar/Bhambi together constitute 92 per cent of the Scheduled Caste population in 
Maharashtra. Mahars are numerically the largest group, accounting for 57.5 percent of the Scheduled 
Caste population; the Mangs constitute 20.3 per cent and the Chambar 12.5 per cent. All figures from 
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and the traditional economy were long sustained in Marathwada because of the 
disinterest of the Nizam administration in developing districts other than Hyderabad 
(Kate 1987: 86) and due to the unreformed nature of the state of Hyderabad (Guru 
1994; Omvedt 1993: 64-66). Under Nizam rule the land tenure systems gave 
immense power to big landlords (Jaagir-dars) constructing a highly feudal economy 
and society that survived in the post-Nizam period leaving Dalits as landless 
labourers and veth begars (unpaid labourers compelled to work for village officials 
and village landlords).  
The political and economic deprivation of this region merged locally with the 
traditional hierarchies of caste rule in the postcolonial period. Marathwada still 
retains some of the semi-feudal elements of a caste based economic system - like 
practices of yeskarki and gavaki - that tied Dalits to traditional polluting occupations 
that were not paid for in cash. Yeskarki refers specifically to the cleaning duties 
attached to the temple and gate keeping in the village that untouchables carried out 
whereas gavaki refers to services rendered to individual patil families which included 
a mix of work considered polluting coupled with farm labour.  
Beed 
Beed (also referred to as Bhir/Bir in government documents till the late 1960s) is 
largely representative of the Dalit situation in Maharashtra in terms of their 
demographic, social, economic and political status and caste violence. The socio-
political landscapes of both rural andslowly growing semi-urban pockets in Beed are 
marked by the centrality of caste and the vibrant presence of Dalit socio-political 
movements. Most Dalits in villages still continue to be landless or small and 
marginal farmers who depend on dominant caste lands for their livelihood sources. In 
Beed, though, we also encounter increased mobility amongst the labourers, 
particularly Dalits, who migrate out as sugarcane cutting workers and to cities like 
Pune and Mumbai seeking seasonal employment. As in the rest of Maharashtra, 
Marathas are dominant castes who control politics and economy in Beed too. 
                                                                                                                                          
Census 2001, accessed on 22/7/08 from 
www.censusindia.gov.in/Tables_Published/SCST/dh_sc_maha.pdf   
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Beed is located around 450 kilometres from Mumbai and is part of the seven districts 
that constitute the administrative division of Aurangabad (Marathwada) in 
Maharashtra. Beed has eleven Talukas (blocks) and the land area of Beed is around 
three percent of Maharashtra. The total population of Beed as per 2001 Census was 
just over 2,161,250. The population density in Beed is 203 per sq. km as compared to 
318 for whole of Maharashtra. The sex ratio in Beed stands at 904 females per 1000 
males when compared to the state average of 922 females. It has a literacy rate of 
60.48 per cent as opposed to the state average of 76.88 per cent(GoM 2002: 91-92). 
Of the total population of Beed over 80 per cent reside in rural areas, and agriculture 
and agricultural labour constitute the main source of income  (GoM 2008). As this 
suggests, Beed is amongst the most underdeveloped districts of Maharashtra and 
Marathwada. 
Beed falls under semi arid zone and receives from average to scanty rainfall 
annually. Since most agriculture is dependent on rain rather than irrigation this 
renders marginal landholders even more vulnerable and entails the risk of limited 
seasonal work for agricultural labourers. Cultivation is undertaken for both Kharif 
[monsoon/summer] and Rabi [winter] crops in Beed, the crops in Kharif includes 
cereals like jowar (hybrid), bajra and pulses like tur, udid and cotton and soya beans 
as cash grops, whereas the Rabi season includes cereals of jowar, wheat and pulses 
like harbhara, and oilseeds like karadi. Amongst the cash crops, sugar cane and 
cotton are the main crops; the area under sugarcane cultivation is 3.65 per cent.  
Scheduled Castes in Beed 
Out of the total population of 2,161,250 in Beed, Scheduled Castes constitute 
281,240 (13.01 per cent). The Mahars, Mangs and Chambars are the three largest 
Scheduled Caste (SC) groups and comprise 95 per cent of SC population in Beed 
District. In Beed the Mahars are the largest Scheduled Caste group with a population 
of 160,215 (56 per cent), followed by Mangs who number 84,100 (29 per cent) and 
the Chambars number 24,485 (8.7 per cent).28 In Beed during the ninth five year plan 
                                                 
28Accessed on 22/7/08 from http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Dist_File/datasheet-2727.pdf  
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period 25.84 per cent families were Below the Poverty Line (BPL) and Scheduled 
Castes constituted 28.63 per cent of the total BPL population in Beed.29  
Land owning 
Beed has a total land area of 10.44 lakh hectare of which 2.47 per cent is forest area 
and 8.81 lakh hectares (84 per cent) is under cultivation (GoM 2008). Beed has 5, 49, 
776 land owners/cultivators (khatedar) and below is a detailed breakup of land 
holding.  
Land Distribution in Beed 
 
Holding in hectares Land holding (%)   Cultivators (%) 
        .2 – 1        13.88       42.72  
        1 - 2        26.76       31. 06 
        2 – 5       40.73       22.28 
        5 – 10       14.46         3.48 
        10 and above         4.47         0.46  
                                              All figures from GoM (2008: 5) 
The landholdings are highly skewed as can be seen from above table. Around 26 per 
cent cultivators own 58 percent of total cultivable land. There is no detailed break-up 
of caste-wise landowning for Beed. The figures for Maharashtra present the marginal 
nature of land holding for Scheduled Castes. Amongst the Scheduled Castes in 
Maharashtra, 57 per cent are landless and near landless. Including the marginal 
farmers [land holding below 2 hectares] this share goes over 75 per cent,  in 2001, 46 
per cent of SCs depended on agricultural labour as compared to 26 per cent for non 
SC/ST and only 12.9 per cent were self sufficient cultivators (India. Planning 2007). 
                                                 
29 Accessed from http://beed.nic.in/htmldocs/drda.htm. These figures however seem to be an 
underestimate as Dalits from various villages in Beed contested these figures during my fieldwork and 




The average size of land holdings amongst the SC and ST land holders was 1.31 and 
1.97 hectares respectively in the year 2000-2001 (GoM 2009).  
Mandavdhare’s (1989) study of land and caste relations in 50 villages of Marathwada 
offers insights into the domination of Marathas in land holding. His study also 
includes villages from Ambejogai Taluka of Beed which reveals the intersections of 
caste inequality and land distribution. The Marathas constituted 50.22 per cent of the 
total land holders owning 51.48 per cent land, followed by Vanjaris who made up 
13.66 per cent of land holders and owned 12.73 per cent of land. Amongst the 
Scheduled Castes, the proportion of land holders from Mang caste was 0.39 per cent 
and the per cent of land they owned was mere 0.49 per cent. Of the Chambars 0.49 
per cent were land holders of 0.24 per cent land. The Mahars were relatively better 
off as there were 3.69 per cent of land holders, but they collectively owned 2.67 of 
land.  
The unequal land holding pattern in Beed is one of the important reasons for Dalit 
deprivation. Contemporary Dalits, however, are far more mobile in search of 
employment and better paying options than they were till early 1980s. 
Changing meanings of Dalit labour in Beed 
The village economic organisation in Marathwada was structured around caste 
occupations which existed in the form of Balute-dari system. A close variant of 
Jajmani, Balutedari had Patil (village head man) and Kulkarni (village accountant) 
who were generally Marathas and Brahmans respectively. Guha (2004) questions the 
rigidity of Balutedari (and Jajmani) as understood by Dumont (1980) and suggests 
that the practice was always fraught with conflict, occasional breakdown and re-
establishment; the society was therefore never static in some ‘traditional’ mode. 
Fuller (1989) too critiques the understanding of Jajmani or Baluta as a system that 
survived unchanging in 'traditional' India. While the debate on the fluidity of labour 
and exchange practices are important, for the untouchable castes the traditional 
exchange schema meant dual disadvantages; firstly in their labour (and bodies) being 
framed as stigmatised and secondly in the exploitative nature of returns offered in 
kind.  
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The earlier labour practice of veth begar required Dalits to work for individual patils 
and as village servants; these were coupled with newer forms of (bonded) labour 
which are referred to as saal-gadi (Year Worker) in Beed. Those who worked as 
saal-gadi laboured throughout the year for a Patil family for cereal and clothes and a 
nominal amount of money.  
There has however been an increase in labour mobility amongst Dalit workers who 
have moved out of traditional caste occupations. Migration for coping and 
accumulation purposes amongst Dalits is increasingly seen in Marathwada and is 
most visible in Beed. One of the important sources of Dalit livelihood has been 
seasonally migrating as sugarcane cutting workers to sugar belts in western 
Maharashtra and northern Karnataka. Of the total sugarcane migrant workers in Beed 
the number of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes is reported to be as high as 60 
per cent (SACRED 2005: 7).  
Sugarcane migrant workers labour in exploitative conditions. Paradoxically, the 
workers who previously received payment in kind were somewhat protected and can 
now be at the mercy of market forces. Women in particular carry the dual burden of 
managing a mobile household which is coupled with harsh working conditions. 
Migration however opens a way for labourers to break away from patron-client 
relationships and change from being semi-free to free (Breman 1993). Recent 
research has documented the nature of accumulative migration that is on the increase 
and the relative socio-economic mobility that is noticed amongst the poorest sections 
of the society (Deshingkar and Start 2003).  
Migration as sugarcane workers has facilitated economic mobility amongst various 
Dalit families. Besides employment as sugarcane cutting workers Dalits also make 
the most out of other non-farm employment in cotton ginning mills or migrating to 
Pune for temporary jobs. It is difficult to find families who strictly survive on the 
earlier practices like gavaki. Increased possibilities of non-farm employment for 
Dalits also means decreased dependency on the land owning castes like Marathas. 
The changing meanings of labour for Dalits also affect the dominant castes like 
Marathas both socially and economically. Labour is neither cheap nor easily 
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available especially when the landless Dalits migrate for sugarcane cutting and 
Marathas are forced to increase the wages when they are in dire need of labourers. 
The economic changes though substantial are not permanent, a bad drought or 
shortage of sugarcane can put the sugarcane worker in a debt trap.  
The vibrant civil-political society and Maratha power  
While passing through the main roads of Beed city or any other Block head quarter 
in Beed one easily gets a feel of the vibrancy of civil-political society and the 
politicisation of public spaces. Be it the streets or the government offices, banners, 
hoardings and wall paintings are replaced regularly with new ones informing the 
citizens of new socio-political events. These are all cleared (totally) only during the 
achar-sanhita (code of conduct) of Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabha elections. 
Advertised events varied from a mass rally of Hindu Jagruti Sabha (Hindu right wing 
organisation) to rallies of various political parties or birthday wishes for local and 
national leaders.  
Similarly one can see collective performances either in support or in opposition to 
something. The Beed Zilla Adhikari’s (District Collector) office had some groups 
protesting or fasting most of the time. Some worth mentioning, that depict the 
political culture were; by Brahmins against cow killings, doctors protesting against 
an FIR filed by MHA against a Doctor for his negligence leading to death of three 
children, Dalits protesting caste atrocities or for regularisation of grazing lands they 
cultivated, Marathas demanding reservations in government jobs and a small group 
of Gandhians fasting against corruption.  
The politics of protest and civic engagement also includes active participation of 
people across caste in party politics of Beed. In Beed, party politics is dominated by 
the Marathas and Vanjaris. During the 2009 general elections, of the total 16 Lakh 33 
thousand voters, Marathas constituted 5.50 Lakh, Vanjaris 4.50 Lakh, Dalits and 
Muslims together constituted 4 Lakh votes and other voters were around two lakhs 
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(LNS 2009). The Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) is synonymous with Marathas 
and BJP (Bhartiya Janata Party) with the Vanjaris.30  
Beed has six Vidhan Sabha seats, Georai, Majalgaon, Beed, Ashti, Kaij (SC 
reserved) and Parali. Elections for the Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabha in Maharashtra 
were held in April and October of 2009 respectively. The voting turn out in Beed 
Lok Sabha elections was 65 percent, and it was 58 per cent for the Vidhan Sabha. 
The political competition in Beed is a bi-polar one between NCP and the BJP-SS 
(Shiv Sena) combine. NCP’s emergence in 1999 has roots in Maratha dissidence 
within Congress. The dominance of Congress in the politics of Maharashtra was 
absolute between 1957 and 1977. The real political competition in the state was 
confined to factions within the Congress and the success of the party lay in its ability 
to accommodate these factions and keep them under control (Palshikar and Birmal 
2004). Maratha elite dissension against the Delhi (Gandhi family) control of 
Congress was exacerbated in the 1970s, when Indira Gandhi attempted to undo the 
hegemony of the Maratha leadership.  
Sharad Pawar has been a key Maratha leader who engineered the Maratha split 
within Congress on various occasions. Pawar who was part of Congress led the 
breakaway factions of Congress (Socialist) formed in 1978, he also led the faction of 
the Maratha leadership to form the first non-Congress coalition government in the 
state in 1978 (Palshikar and Birmal 2004). In 1986, however, Sharad Pawar 
dissolved Congress (S) and rejoined Congress under the leadership of Rajiv Gandhi, 
creating political space for Maratha mobilisation against Dalit assertion. Shiv Sena 
was not active in the villages of Beed till the late 1980s when they mobilised strongly 
to gain support of Congress (S) dissidents who were not willing to return to Congress 
with Pawar. Shiv Sena grew stronger in rural areas of Marathwada evoking Maratha 
emotions against Dalit encroachment of gaairaan lands and against the Dalit demand 
to rename Marathwada University making violent conflicts against Dalits a regular 
sight in Marathwada. The coalition of BJP-SS, formed in 1989, further combined the 
Hindutva and anti-Dalit forces. The decision to rename Marathwada University as 
Babasaheb Ambedkar Marathwada University in 1994 by the Congress under the 
                                                 
30 I will deal with in detail with the politics of accommodation in NCP in the Chapter nine. 
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pressure of RPI factions led to Maratha rage against Congress and the BJP-SS 
combine gained power in 1995 with strong Maratha support. Pawar rejected 
Congress again in 1999, questioning Sonia Gandhi’s right to become Prime Minister, 
and formed the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP). This emerged as a Maratha Party 
and made the party competition triangular in Maharashtra (Palshikar and Birmal 
2004). Congress and NCP contested elections independently in 1999 assembly 
election and formed a post election alliance to recapture power.  
Since the 2004 assembly elections, Congress and NCP have been contesting 
elections in alliance. Due to this alliance Congress (I) is almost absent in Beed which 
is a stronghold of the NCP which contests all the seats for Vidhan Sabha and the 
Beed Lok Sabha constituency. Shiv Sena contests only one seat of the Beed Vidhan 
Sabha whereas the BJP contests the other five and the Beed Lok Sabha seat as well. 
Electoral politics, thus, is competition between Vanjaris and Marathas through BJP 
and NCP. There is also competition within dominant Marathas who switch to the 
BJP when disgruntled by the NCP. BJP, though Vanjari controlled in Beed, remains 
dependent on dissident Marathas. 
Violence, money and caste dominate in local dynamics of the assembly elections, 
and the elections for Zilla Parishad, Panchayat Samiti and Gram Panchayats31 are no 
less political. This is more so due to the increased devolution of development funds 
to these decentralised bodies of governance. These bodies along with the rural credit 
cooperative structure are mostly in control of Marathas in Beed followed by Vanjaris 
in pockets of their stronghold. The development apparatus of the state and Congress 
(NCP) are thus sites of economic and political power and dominance of Marathas. I 
have briefly outlined Maratha dominance in political realm here; the dominance of 
Marathas has particular ritual and social content in Marathwada which distinguishes 
them from Vanjaris in Beed as dominant castes.  
 
 
                                                 
31The decentralised governance structure in Maharashtra is a three tier system with Zilla Parishad at 
District level, Panchayat Samiti at Block/Taluka level and Gram Panchayat at the village level. 
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The ‘Raje’ in Maratha dominance 
The term Maratha previously referred to a small social elite that differentiated itself 
from the mass of the peasants called Kunbi (O'Hanlon 1985). These elite families 
claimed genealogical links with north Indian Rajput families and Kshatriya status. 
Overtime, Kunbi (as a lower part of Maratha) was slowly subsumed into the Maratha 
identity (O'Hanlon 1985). Laine (2003) has specifically suggested that Hindutva and 
Maratha polemic were not common until recently but were systematically 
constructed by the writers of the Hindu-Bhakti orientation in the pre-colonial period 
and later co-opted as a symbol of Maratha pride with strong Hindu credentials by 
Hindutva nationalists like Tilak and Savarkar.  
Marathas constitute the dominant castes in Beed. The term ‘dominant caste’ refers to 
the numerical, economical and political preponderance of some castes (Srinivas 
1959). In Marathwada the Marathas are numerically stronger than the average 31 per 
cent in Maharashtra (Vora 2009). Going by the numerical criteria, in Beed district 
two castes namely the Marathas and Vanjaris can be termed dominant castes, as 
Vanjaris too are a numerically strong in some villages of Beed. Vanjaris in the past 
have claimed to be a branch of Marathi(a) Kunbis (Hassan 1920:627-634). The 1885 
Gazetteer mentions that a Vanjari eats from no one but a Brahman or a Maratha, they 
rank themselves with Marathas but Marathas object to dine with them (Bombay 
Gazetteer, 1885: 429). The repulsion of Marathas to Vanjaris and several other castes 
lower to them makes them a particular kind of dominant caste in Marathwada.32  
It is therefore important to emphasise the specific socio-cultural context of caste 
along with the political and economic power while addressing localised dominance. 
The emphasis merely on numerical preponderance is rightly challenged by Dumont 
(1980), something that seems relevant in the case of Maharashtra, as Mahars are the 
most numerical caste in Maharashtra after Marathas. Dumont (1980: 160) instead 
emphasises the homology between the caste of the king and the dominant caste and 
the reproduction of royal function at the village level by dominant castes. This is a 
key difference between the Vanjaris and the Marathas in Marathwada. The Marathas, 
                                                 
32 Vanjaris and the Kunbis are currently identified as OBCs in Maharashtra. 
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as dominant castes at the village level, try to reproduce the royal function of caste in 
miniature. They valorise their Kshatriya claims, revere Shivaji (the Maratha King) 
and also look down upon Vanjaris who have historically claimed to be equal to the 
Marathas.  
While the Marathas and Vanjaris both indulge in violence against Dalits their 
political symbologies are different. It is interesting to note that the Vanjaris and other 
smaller castes (Dalits included) refer to themselves as alpasankhya (minority) in 
Beed. During the parliamentary elections of 2009, contrary to BJP’s traditional anti-
Muslim rhetoric, Gopinath Munde (from Vanjari caste) appealed to Muslims, and 
reminded Dalit voters of how the family Marathas (NCP) had violently opposed 
renaming of Marathwada University after Dr. Ambedkar. A dominant caste, thus, is 
not just numerically predominant but also has material and cultural bases which are 
reproduced in political fields and performed through dominance in public spaces. 
Most Marathas in Beed also refer to themselves as raje (king) and it is common to 
see vehicles (motor bikes, jeeps, cars and rickshaws) owned by Marathas which have 
raje written on them in saffron. The kingly valour of Marathas comes in political 
performances especially when Dalits violate caste boundaries and roles. I will return 
to this while discussing caste violence in chapter six. Dalits are not meek victims, 
however, and organise around multiple Dalit socio-political organisations to contest 
Maratha’s socio-political and ritual dominance. 
Dalit politics and political violence in Marathwada  
The absence of the non-Brahman (Satyashodhak) movement in Marathwada and 
repressive monitoring of civil society and associational mobilisation by the Nizam 
government set a specific terrain for Dalit exclusion. Dalit political mobilisation took 
roots in Marathwada in the mid-1930s under three important leaders from the state of 
Hyderabad – B. S Venkatrao, J. H Subayya and Shyamsunder who aligned with 
Ambedkar and formed associations like Depressed Classes Association and 
Hyderabad Scheduled Caste Federation. Their activism secured some political, 
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economic and educational concessions from the Nizam government for the ex-
untouchables till independence of Hyderabad in 1948.33  
 
Factions of RPI had consolidated their position in Marathwada in the post-Ambedkar 
period where Bhaurao (Dadasaheb) Gaikwad led the mobilisation for land rights, 
leading to encroachments on gaairan lands by Dalits. Conversions to Buddhism also 
followed after 1956 particularly amongst the Mahars in Marathwada radically raising 
the population of Buddhists. Ambedkar’s conversion to Buddhism had made the 
Dalit project of liberation more cultural and not merely political (revolving around 
state).  
Amongst the educational concessions derived from Nizam was the grant for the 
People’s Education Society that turned Aurangabad into a centre for Dalit activist-
intellectual pursuits. Gokhale (1986) terms these educational institutions in 
Aurangabad, like Milind College 34, as Buddhist institutions. Milind College was the 
centre of political conscientisation for Dalit students from its inception, a site for DP 
activism during its heydays and also a political space where much mobilisation for 
the contentious Namantar movement took place. 
The movement for Namantar is a critical event in the history of Dalit assertion in 
Marathwada and evokes memories of large scale political violence against Dalits. It 
refers to the Dalit demand for Namantar (name-change) of the Marathwada 
University to Dr. Ambedkar University. Various scholars have analysed the violence 
associated with Marathwada university and have brought out the interplay of caste, 
class, religion and state in the sustained violence against Dalits (Abraham 1978; 
Guru 1994; Omvedt 1979; Punalekar 1989; Gupta 1979). Rao (2009: 205-26) notes 
the ritualisation of political violence and archaic forms of punishment and casts the 
                                                 
33 For a detailed discussion over their activism in Marathwada, differences and competition amongst 
these leaders and their alliance with the Nizam against the Indian government, see Gaikwad (1990). 
The Nizam government in the mid-40s was positively inclined towards the development of pasta 
kaum (Depressed Classes). See Kakade (1990: 87-89) some political efforts of Nizam to attract 
untouchables towards Islam and in supporting Ittehad (Muslim loyalist organisation).  
34 Milind College is part of the educational institutes started by People Education Society (PES). PES 
was registered and initiated by Dr. Ambedkar for promoting education amongst the Dalits. The Nizam 
Government had funded this initiative in 1940s and these institutions continue to be a hub of Dalit 
movement activities till date.  
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state as a perpetrator against, rather than protector of, Dalits. Namantar mobilisation 
and political violence lasted for 15 years (1979 – 1994) costing Dalits especially the 
Mahars loss of lives and property as the upper castes, particularly Marathas, attacked 
Dalits in the villages. The Dalit Panthers (DPs) mobilised radically for Namantar and 
against the ensuing violence in Marathwada particularly in small towns and cities. 
It was during the Namantar period that SS made an entry into rural Maharashtra 
particularly Marathwada. SS was the only political party that overtly opposed 
Namantar tooth and nail. SS merged the anti Namantar sensitivities with acts of Dalit 
militant behaviour like anti-Hindu positionality35 of Dalits and grazing land 
encroachments. Religious conversions of Mahars, critique of Hindu religion by DPs, 
caste based reservations and the special acts in the constitution that prohibited 
violence against Dalits were amongst the constituting factors that SS capitalized 
upon against Dalits in Marathwada. Members of SS (mostly Marathas) thus launched 
campaigns to reclaim grazing land that Dalits had encroached for cultivation under 
various movements. Dalits (mostly Mahars) and Muslims were targeted particularly 
and lower OBCs (Malis and Vanjaris) were mobilised along with Maratha youth to 
save the pride of Maharashtra (Lele 1995; Palshikar 2004). Jai Shivaji Jai Bhavani 
(Hail Shivaji Hail Bhavani), Shivaji Maharaj ki Jai (Victory to Shivaji) were the 
slogans of Marathas attacking rural Dalits, turning the Namantar struggle into a war 
between Shivaji (Kshatriya king) and Ambedkar (untouchable’s icon of pride) 
resulting in large scale desecration of Ambedkar symbols.  
As this thesis demonstrates, however, large scale political violence against Dalits and 
Dalit symbols of pride has not tamed Dalit movements. The deepening of Dalit 
politics in Beed is best witnessed during Ambedkar Jayanti. In Beed city almost all 
the Dalit socio-political actors come together for this event. The Jayanti is organised 
jointly by a committee with representatives from various non-political Dalit groups 
for one week and the contributions (mostly from Dalits) are anywhere between 8-10 
lakhs rupees. The celebration comprises various activities like talks by intellectuals 
from Pune or Mumbai University, plays, musical performances, exhibitions, selling 
                                                 
35 The Mahars converted to Buddhism and are also referred to as Nav-Buddhas or Bauddhas. While in 
1951 no Buddhists were returned in Beed district, in the census of 1961 there were 21,769 Buddhists 
in Beed district (Bhir Gazeetteer: 1969). 
 51 
literature and the grand march with Dalits, both men and women dressed in white on 
the streets through Beed to meet at the Ambedkar statue. The week ends with a 
carnival like performance on the evening of 14th April where Dalit families are out 
enjoying the view of men dancing to tunes of Hindi, Marathi and at times English 
songs almost conquering the streets of Beed till late mid-night.  
Dalit politics of resistance blurs the boundaries of the state, society, civil society and 
caste. In the political fields of Beed, Dalits engage in political assertions around 
public spaces and mobilise for issues of redistribution through cultivating 
government gaairan/grazing lands, these evoke a violent response from the dominant 
castes and the state machinery. Besides these conflictual processes, Dalit movements 
also engage in civil and democratic processes by forming collective identities and 
alternative political communities that challenge their ‘untouchable’ status, leading to 
politicisation of Dalits and changing of caste relations. The participation of Dalit 
movements in electoral politics and democratic procedures further complicates the 
nature of Dalit belief in politics surrounding the state.  
Conclusion  
The political fields of Marathwada continue to stage Dalit politics for dignity and full 
citizenship. Marathwada also represents a peculiar context within Maharashtra where 
the socio-economic changes have been slow and the vertical mobility of social 
groups has sustained the domination of Marathas leaving not just Dalits but also 
other non-Maratha castes at the margins of local politics. The changes in labour 
practices and rise in labour mobility have partially undone the casteist nature of 
labour exchange that stigmatised Dalit bodies. Dalits however continue to face new 
humiliations and political vulnerabilities that deny them full citizenship.  
BSP and MHA in Marathwada constitute two key socio-political organisations of 
Dalit politics that sustain the political and ideological struggles against the inequities 
of caste in different ways. It is through the study of their functioning in their 
relational contexts, that I analyse the intersections of caste, anti-caste ideology, 
politics and the political culture that (re)locates Dalits to margins and also the Dalit 
struggle to reform state and mainstream culture, to gain recognition and self respect 
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for Dalits.  Before introducing the context of post-Panther Dalit politics and MHA 
and BSP in chapter four, I will detail the methods used and the importance of 




The key objective of my research was to study the intersections of caste and civil 
society through study of Dalit politics and mobilisation at the grassroots. Besides 
comprehending the diversity of Dalit agency and politics in their (g)localised 
contexts, I hoped to develop a nuanced understanding of the working of civil society 
within the context of caste inequality and Dalit mobilisation. I followed an 
anthropological approach to understand the processes and politics of Dalit civic 
engagement and its role in defining local politics and political culture. In this chapter 
I detail the fieldwork processes, my reasons for pursuing ethnography, my activist 
orientations and insider-outsider status, methods of data collection, analysis and 
ethical considerations.  
Some of the key questions that I planned to explore at the outset and which remained 
unchanged were; why do some Dalits organise and others do not? What are the 
different forms of Dalit ideology/ies? In what forms do Dalits organise in civil 
society/ the public sphere? What are the social, economic, cultural and political 
factors that facilitate Dalit mobilisation? What are the challenges that Dalit 
movements face -both internal and external? How are gender or jati identities and 
inequalities dealt with? What is the impact of Dalit politics on Dalits and non-Dalit 
society and the wider polity?  
Why Beed? And why MHA and BSP? 
I developed the above research questions and chose Beed as my fieldsite after I 
developed initial contacts with MHA for preliminary fieldwork in May 2007. 
Though there was an element of convenience in studying Beed due to the contacts I 
had developed with MHA, the backwardness of Beed, the general deprivation of 
Dalits, violence against Dalits and the politicisation of Dalits make Beed a good 
representative district for studying Dalit politics.  
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My decision to study Beed and MHA was also partially influenced by my experience 
of working in a Brahmin-run NGO in another district of Marathwada in 2001 
(Waghmore 2002). The CEO of this NGO would criticise Eknath Awad in our 
informal conversations for doing ‘politics’ and not ‘social work’. Though I could not 
contact Eknath Awad or RDC till 2007 I came to know about the activism of MHA 
with Dalits during my stay in Marathwada and was intrigued by the nature MHA’s 
engagement with Dalits.  
My preliminary fieldwork with MHA in Beed gave me insights and contacts and also 
helped me decide on a focus. During this time I went around with the activists of 
MHA and interviewed some Dalits who were part of MHA’s mobilisation and were 
involved in cultivating gaairan. Given the presence of diverse Dalit socio-political 
organisation I was cautious of focussing on a single organisation and was aware of 
the shortcomings of such a study. In 2007 I particularly noted the celebration 
amongst Dalits across castes after BSP secured full majority in 2007 Vidhan Sabha 
elections of UP.  BSP in Maharashtra had not been studied ethnographically so far 
and BSP’s overshadowing of RPI groups since the 2004 Lok Sabha and Vidhan 
Sabha elections of Maharashtra made it a critical case to pursue.   
Since MHA and BSP have a strong presence of Mangs and Mahars respectively I 
also included Charmakar Mahasangh (CM), a Chambar organisation functioning in 
Beed in my study. I decided not to focus only on MHA so as to broaden the scope of 
my research beyond one movement-organisation and caste constituency to gain a 
deeper and broader understanding of Dalit politics.  
After few months of fieldwork in 2008 I had to change the plan of studying three 
socio-political Dalit organisations. I had to drop CM from the study after following it 
for a while and interviewing some of its key leaders. I realised that CM is a small 
time registered organisation with no mass base or regular activities. The main leader 
who formally registered CM is a fulltime assistant lecturer in a college in Beed and 
was actively supporting BSP during fieldwork. I decided to drop CM from my study; 
primarily because it lacked active organisation. The key reason for selecting CM was 
specifically to include Chambars in the research, as BSP and MHA are dominated by 
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Mahars and Mangs respectively. This assumption, however, proved wrong as many 
Chambars in Beed were active in the BSP. I however interviewed the leaders of CM 
and meet them in the meetings of BAMCEF and BSP in Beed. Chapter four further 
details why MHA and BSP are critical cases for studying Dalit politics in post Dalit-
Panther phase.  
Given the specific nature of my study which hoped to explore Dalit agency (culture, 
world-view and action) through Dalit social-political movements, a qualitative 
methodology, particularly ethnography, best suited the purpose. This study was not 
just about the general deprivation and exclusion of Dalits which could be achieved 
through quantitative techniques. It focused on the socio-cultural, political and 
economic aspects of Dalit exclusion and more specifically on Dalit responses to their 
exclusion in diverse forms of mobilisation. The dynamism in objectives and 
interventions of Dalit movements need to be observed in their complex social 
environments on a day to day basis and ethnography served as the best 
methodological approach in achieving this. 
Anthropology of Dalit politics 
The role of social anthropology in the study of politics has been a contested one in 
the past. The cultural as “apolitical” is generally handed over to anthropologists for 
interrogation, thus constructing a futile distinction between civil society and the state 
(Hearn 2001). Despite this the post-colonial phase has also seen a simultaneous 
increase in anthropologists pursuing study of politics, particularly the interface of old 
societies and the new states (Geertz 1963). The key contribution of social 
anthropology to political science is the analysis of the symbolism in power relations, 
argues Cohen (1969); he also calls social anthropologists to drop their nausea of 
studying the state. Spencer (1997) urges anthropologist to move beyond dichotomies 
of tradition and modernity and politics as opposed to cultural and symbolic, he 
argues for a radical re-introduction of ‘transculturation’ and ‘obsessional empiricism’ 
for an anthropology of ‘actually existing politics’. My thesis furthers such an effort 
and transcends assumed dichotomies of caste vs. civil society and civil society vs. 
state through an ethnography of Dalit politics.  
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The importance of participant observation in exploratory and descriptive studies is 
well acknowledged. Participant observation is best suited when the problem is 
concerned with human meanings and interactions viewed from insiders’ perspectives 
(Jorgensen 1989). In the case of social movement research, participant observation 
produces the most direct evidence on action and the phenomenon of investigation is 
thus observable within an everyday life situation (Lichterman 1998). Participant 
observation in movements can best explore the everyday meanings of the concepts 
identified before or during the study. Ethnographies of everyday participation in 
mobilization also help to counter the popular image of social movements as coherent, 
well-bounded entities consisting of individuals committed to the goals of the 
collective (Wolford 2006). Ethnography is important in understanding the 
perspectives of people, and the use of multiple data sources in ethnography is a great 
advantage (Hammersley and Atkinson 1983: 25). 
A recent addition to the anthropology of Dalit politics in Marathwada is Rao (2009) 
who uses historical anthropology as a critical strategy to explain the paradoxical 
centrality of ‘Dalit’ to Indian democracy. My concerns are more with the daily 
working of Dalit politics and this research is thus an exercise in political 
anthropology where I also explore the intersections of Dalit movements with the 
fragmented institutions of the state. My study however moves beyond a micro village 
study framework to follow the dynamism of Dalit politics in their external contexts. 
Various studies have productively used similar anthropological approaches in 
empirical study of Dalit politics. Such studies have successfully used ethnography, in 
particular participant observation, to study Dalit movements and ideology (Khare 
1985; Gorringe 2005; Jaoul 2006, 2008; Hardtmann 2009).  
Ethnographic approaches have contributed immensely in understanding Dalit 
perspectives and their strategies of anti-caste mobilisation. They have done well in 
the study of Dalit movements and help in comprehending non-class issues like 
identity and culture and their interface with class structures. The dynamism in 
objectives and interventions of Dalit movements need to be observed in their 
complex social environments on a day to day basis. I participated and observed in the 
daily socio-economic, cultural and political processes of Dalit mobilisations to 
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examine the centrality of state (political opportunity structures) and caste (inequality 
and social capital) in the context of globalised grassroots. The blurring of national 
political and economic boundaries and the expansion of transnational/global civil 
society organisations in global democratisation processes is seen in the grassroots of 
Marathwada as well. It is particularly reflected in the presence of transnational 
advocacy NGOs that attempt to influence the politics and practice of local 
governments.  
Ethnographic study of civil society or Dalit politics can capture the local and the 
global and the interaction between the two on the ground. Dalit activists had forged 
links not only with activist groups in Mumbai and Delhi, some from MHA also 
participated in the Durban Conference and UNHRC general meetings in Geneva. 
Suggesting methodological innovation especially in anthropology under 
globalisation, Appadurai (2000), calls for a shift from study of trait geographies to 
“process” geographies to map the flows and disjunctures of globalisation, and 
intersections of globalisation from above and below. Multi-sited ethnography has 
emerged as a key methodological innovation to study the blurred boundaries of local 
and global (Marcus 1995). I pursued a multi-sited ethnography to follow the 
dynamism of Dalit activism wherever it flowed, coupled with regular interactions 
and staying with participants.  
My ethnography of Dalit politics has helped me transcend ritual and symbolic 
emphasis in studying caste to comprehend its dynamism in interaction with modern 
politics. It also helped me gain insights into alternative politics and political culture 
that Dalits seek to construct through the merger of modern and traditional symbolism 
and also the challenges they face in real substantive politics of caste. Below I detail 
the process of my field work in detail. 
The fieldwork process 
I carried out fieldwork between August 2008 to June 2009 and later briefly in 
January-February 2010. My focus during fieldwork was on understanding the 
evolution, growth and functioning of BSP and MHA since their inception in Beed, 
changes over time in organisational structure, socio-cultural and economic 
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dimensions of worldview and ideology, their principal and peripheral constituents 
and stakeholders in terms of caste, class and gender, strategies of mobilization and 
empowerment, socio-economic and political networks, engagement with their 
environment and cooperation and conflictual processes. These organisations were 
ethnographically explored to understand the dialectical relationship between the 
Dalits, Dalit movements, the state and non-Dalits so as to include an analysis of 
political culture and political economy, and also to critically appraise the formation 
and functioning of collective identities - both jati and Dalit (or Bahujan) -- in Dalit 
politics and civil society at large.  
I did not divide my fieldwork into two halves to study one movement at a time and 
moved between MHA and BSP during fieldwork based on the field situations. 
Moving between MHA and BSP did not noticeably affect my relationship with either 
group. Though some BSP members doubted if I was a spy of NCP because of my 
proximity to MHA, there were various others who understood my research and 
helped me gain access to party processes, procedures and politics. 
My ethnography of the BSP and MHA was multi-sited at three levels, one with the 
activists/leaders of these movements, second with participants/supporters/volunteers 
and finally with the networks of movements. In each case I moved around with 
people from each level. As compared to the time I spent with the activists and 
participants of MHA and BSP I spent less time with the network respondents. Use of 
multiple data sources however helped me reach out not just to the activists and 
participants of the movements under study but also to their networks, those with 
whom they competed for votes and mass support as well as those with whom they 
co-operated in various ways. Dalit activists engage in a varied range of activities, 
which can be categorised as brokering around the state (providing Dalits access to 
benefits offered by the developmental state), protest for Dalit rights (mostly anti-
caste atrocity or to establish rights over gaairan cultivation), mobilising 
support/opinion for the movements and building organisation, activism/brokering 
during elections, and ritual roles during Jayanti (Ambedkar, Annabhau Sathe36, 
                                                 
36 Annabhau Sathe was a prominent writer, novelist and communist leader who belonged to the Mang 
caste. 
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Savitribai and Jyotiba Phule) and other similar celebrations. The activists of MHA 
were those who were paid staff working in RDC projects. Others who were not paid 
were mostly lower down the hierarchy. Similarly in BSP there were village based, 
Taluka level and district level workers. I moved through this hierarchy of activists in 
both MHA and BSP. 
I had support from above in both. In MHA, Eknath Awad and other senior leaders 
were supportive of my research and would urge other workers of MHA to help me. 
Awad and some other workers were appreciative of my research and they would 
regularly suggest readings for me. Their support enabled me to have easy access to 
the activists and supporters of MHA. In the case of BSP, the district-in-charge and 
one of the Maharashtra state–incharge provided contacts locally. One of my ex-
student’s brothers-in-law in Beed was a key BSP volunteer who provided me 
valuable contacts and information of meetings. I gained trust from below as I spent 
time with activists and participants. Getting support from below entailed living with 
some of the activists and participants. Discussing food, especially my liking for beef 
(motyacha), brought me close to respondents, also some would share more about 
their life because of my being from Athani Taluka as most sugarcane workers had at 
some point been to the sugar belt in Athani. Conversations around caste would turn 
into productive exchanges as respondents at times too would enquire more about my 
caste (Holeya in Karnataka and Mahar in Maharashtra) or caste practices and politics 
in Karnataka. I spent time with the activists at the government offices, meetings, 
protest rallies, tea stalls, liquor bars (only men), Jayanti celebrations, sang and 
enjoyed listening to movement songs, danced with them in Ambedkar Jayanti, and 
simultaneously observed their daily activism practices in varied locations.  
During my fieldwork I mostly stayed at the RDC office near Telgaon village or at the 
Savitribai Phule Mahila Mandal (SPMM) office (another NGO in MHA network) in 
Beed city and travelled from here to multiple sites in Beed and at times to other 
neighbouring districts (Aurangabad, Latur and Osmabanabad). At RDC there were 
personal rooms whereas at SPMM the office in the day was also sleeping space for 
some workers at night. I had offered to pay for my stay and food at RDC which the 
workers declined. The workers would tell me that I am one of them and there was no 
 60 
need to pay. I was also not treated like the funders for whom special meals would be 
cooked. Staying at RDC did not affect my relationship with the workers of RDC or 
MHA. No worker or leader interfered or tried to influence the research process. They 
would help me when I asked and leave me on my own when I was following other 
networks and people  
At RDC besides participating in some of the office activities I had regular access to 
Eknath Awad, since if he was not travelling he would largely be in the office till late 
evening, Besides observing his interaction with those visitors who visited him 
throughout the day, I would also engage in informal conversations with him and the 
visitors. The RDC office was a site for activist meetings and training and also had 
officials from funding organisations, politicians, social workers and grieving Dalits 
(and, at times, non-Dalits) as visitors.  
I started fieldwork in August 2008 by accompanying the activists of MHA in 
Annabhau Sathe Jayanti celebrations in villages and towns and also attending the 
meetings of gaairan cultivators mobilised by MHA. I also attended rallies of RPI 
occasionally. While I would voice record the speeches, my observations on the 
political performance and informal conversations amongst the activists were 
recorded in Fieldnotes. I would mostly be sitting amongst the participants in the 
gatherings of BSP and MHA (unless requested vehemently by the activists to be on 
stage) which helped me also gauge why some of them were participating in these 
meetings. I would follow the daily practices of activists of MHA by spending most 
time with the workers of MHA in Dharur Taluka. In addition to government offices 
like Tahsildar and Mandal Panchayat office, our meeting point was often at a tea stall 
near the bus stand. I would travel to Dharur from Telgaon -- a journey of about an 
hour -- by bus. I also stayed for some days in Tandalwadi, Rajewadi and Sonimoha 
villages with families who were active supporters of MHA. While these families 
were very welcoming and we had long engaging discussions on caste and ensuing 
changes in their lives and their understanding of MHA, I did not continue staying 
with them as it also meant inconvenience to them.  
Some senior workers of MHA had a past in BSP and they introduced me to current 
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BSP workers who in turn took me into the thick of BSP in Beed. I met them till the 
end of my fieldwork, and they informed me about the events and changes that they 
were aware of. While workers of BSP in Beed city helped me in getting to know 
better the district committee and activities of BSP, I followed BSP at the grassroots 
in Majalgaon Taluka where I spent time regularly with BSP workers. I particularly 
visited Phule Pimpalgaon village as it has a strong BSP presence and is amongst the 
few villages that plunged into Dalit assertion in the 1960s. I participated in the cadre 
trainings, meetings, election campaigns, rallies of BSP in Beed. I also travelled to 
Nagpur with the workers of BSP to listen to Mayawati during the campaigning for 
parliamentary elections of 2009, attended a BAMCEF cadre camp in Mumbai, and 
some of the meetings of BAMCEF groups other than that of BSP in Mumbai and 
Delhi.  
My field plans were influenced on a daily basis by the nature of activism. After 
spending sometime in the field I also learned to avoid some suggestions and friendly 
persuasions of activists on what I should be studying and made decisions on field 
sites specifically to understand and participate in diverse engagements of activists. 
My field engagements thus varied from attending Awad’s birthday celebration in a 
village, Awad’s speech at a Pune University seminar on Dalit movements, and 
activism around caste atrocities in villages in Kaij Taluka. There was a moment of 
union in the activism of BSP and MHA and various other movement actors when 
both were involved in protest and mobilisation against incidents of caste violence. I 
switched in my field engagements between BSP and MHA based on what I thought 
would add new value to the data I already had.  
Besides field notes based on my participation in the movements I also conducted 
semi-structured interviews and focus group interviews. For interviews, besides the 
regular set of questions on the personal background and factors leading to their 
participation in Dalit politics, I used to jot down some specific questions for each 
individual I was interviewing based on the background information I had about the 
person or the information I was looking for from the concerned individuals. Not all 
interviews turned out to be personal interviews and there used to be others like 
family members and friends present while I conducted interviews. Some individual 
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interviews also turned into group interviews. I recorded some of these as the 
discussions were turning out to be productive for research purposes.  
Life histories and oral histories have helped in exploring the trajectory of multiple 
movement participation in individual lives of both activists and movement 
participants. Life histories and oral histories face the shortcoming of being 
individual-centric. These were however checked with other sources of information 
and participant observation. Focus groups interviews were not restricted to Dalit 
participants and non-Dalits were engaged when possible/required to suit the research 
questions. I reached out to a diverse group in terms of gender, caste and class to 
understand varied views, voices and strategies (see the table in Annexure II for 
details).  
Following networks  
Until recently, anthropology has lacked methods that could deal with collective 
political actions particularly due to its focus on a demarcated field (Hardtmann 2009: 
26-27). While a processual approach has always been a reality to the anthropological 
fieldworker, the revival of the concept of ‘network’ in anthropology marked a 
departure in the study of social movements. Now, depth is no longer a question of 
staying long enough at one, two or three localities, or travelling between them, but of 
extensive following in any direction of importance to the people in the field 
(Hardtmann 2009: 27). Hardtmann (2009: 35) thus, ‘went wherever Dalit activists 
happened to be’ in her study of Dalit movements.  
I followed a similar approach but focused more on Beed as my objective was to 
develop a nuanced understanding of the functioning of Dalit movements in the 
localised context of Marathwada. While I worked with Awad and others on the 
presentation that he was to make at UNHRC in Geneva, I did not travel with him. 
Rather, I observed how his foreign visits were translated locally into the making of 
his (contested) charisma. Thus the universe of my study was in one sense limited to 
BSP and MHA in Beed district; however I also partially studied important players 
located outside Beed having implications for Dalit mobilization (movements under 
study) in Beed too. I was not based in a particular location for a long period but was 
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moving around to important sites of movement activity. I followed the BSP and 
MHA to comprehend their external relational fields.37 In the case of MHA besides 
interacting with and interviewing officials from funding organisations who shared 
their critical insight into functioning of NGOs and MHA, I also followed MHA in 
electoral politics and its temporary alliance with NCP during elections. I attended 
political rallies and meetings organised by other groups like NCP, RPI and factions 
of BAMCEF.  
The activists of various Dalit formations including MHA and BSP engaged in critical 
discussion within and between themselves. Thus Mang members of BSP too would 
give me critical insights on MHA and Awad’s politics, it was not rare to see heated 
discussions between BSP and RPI workers, and while moving around with Dalit 
activists I would also observe their interactions with members of dominant castes and 
their socio-political formations. I traced some of the older members of BSP who 
were no more part of BSP but were key sources of information for me on the history, 
shortcomings and challenges for BSP in Marathwada. This helped me understand the 
fluid nature of institutions or organisations through individuals like journalists, 
politicians and government officials and individuals who sympathised with or 
opposed BSP and MHA. 
One of the key issues that emerged during fieldwork was multiple memberships with 
various organisations/movements of Dalit movement participants. The movement 
participants did not have rigid movement alliances and had multiple memberships, 
for instance gaairan cultivators supported from Mang caste by MHA would also 
attend the rallies organised by RPI on gaairan. Similarly, women supporters of BSP 
would be part of SHGs formed by RDC and attend MHA rallies/meetings regularly, 
and some Mangs supporting Awad would also participate in political rallies 
organised by another prominent Mang political leader of Congress. The reasons for 
                                                 
37 I follow Goldstone (2004)  who calls for study of social movements in their external fields and 
relational contexts. External fields include other movements and counter-movements, political and 
economic institutions, various levels of state authorities and political actors, various elites – economic, 
political, religious, media various publics; symbolic and value orientations and  critical events. 
Goldstone makes a case for ‘relational’ approach as it is the, ‘relations among these elements of the 
external field – both relations among them and of them to movement claims and actions – that shape 
movement dynamics (2004: 358). 
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the multiple memberships would vary from identity, interests and ideology and their 
intersections. Discussion with participants helped me further understand the 
competition within Dalit groups who had to create, sustain and satisfy their 
constituencies to retain their role as representatives of Dalits. This contributed in 
understanding specificities of modularity in Dalit organisations where membership is 
voluntary and Dalits may switch their loyalty or have multiple loyalties. 
Documents and other sources 
One of the important features of Dalit movements has been the use of literature and 
print media in strengthening the movement (Punalekar 2001; Narayan 2006). The 
literacy rate amongst Dalits in Maharashtra is as high as seventy one per cent and 
Dalit literature continues to play a vital role in Dalit mobilisation. Documents 
ranging from publicity/campaign pamphlets, letters to state officials, posters and 
publications pertaining to ideological dissemination or action are widely used in 
MHA and BSP. I collected these materials and their analysis has further added to 
contextualising of movement ideologies, strategies of protest, mobilisation and 
dissemination.  
Organisational records/documents like annual reports, project proposals/reports of 
RDC and other publications of MHA have helped as supplementary sources of 
information, and have helped to understand the growth and changes that have 
happened in MHA since its inception. These documents enriched the information 
collected through interviews and participant observation. MHA has retained various 
news clippings and older records pertaining to Dalit and land rights movement since 
the late 1980s. These also include report of projects implemented by RDC since its 
inception. News coverage of MHA was available almost since the inception. These 
records have too helped in mapping the activities, role and growth of MHA along 
with interviews. The official records of RDC-MHA have specifically enabled me to 
evolve a detailed understanding of the land rights and Dalit rights activism that MHA 
leads. MHA also provided me access to the data that they had collected in 2009 on 
caste atrocities in Marathwada from the PCR offices of all the districts in 
Marathwada. I also had access to emails relevant to the land rights activism that I 
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studied in MHA. Not all the documents were about the positives of MHA and 
documents critical (especially communication with funders) of RDC helped me to 
contextualise its functioning better.  
Documents like District statistical handbook from Beed district information centre, 
schemes for specific Dalit sub-castes, and government orders on land allotment to 
landless/encroachers have enhanced the understanding of local political economy and 
also the interaction between state institutions and the movements at the micro level. 
Besides documents, artefacts like symbols of protest used in the movements have 
also been sources of data. I have analysed their meanings and politics for selective 
presentation in this study.  
Participant observation, reflexivity and emotions in Dalit movements 
 It is more or less agreed now in ethnographic studies that acknowledging ‘self’ and 
personal element of the researcher is an important exercise for checking the glossing 
over of researcher’s biases and for allowing the readers to understand and interpret 
the field and the author better. Location and analysis of self and reflexivity as a 
methodological issue in anthropology though not recent is a product of reflexive 
progress in ethnographic studies (Davies 1999). The impersonal, all-but-invisible –
status of ethnographic narrator was questioned by scholars from poststructuralist and 
feminist quarters (England 1994). Spencer (1989) emphasises the acknowledgment 
of personal elements to rescue anthropological work and writing from what he sees 
as the literary denial of anthropological presence in ethnographic writings.  
The principles of anthropology and the dynamism of caste hierarchies can put 
ethnographers in odd spaces and identities. Anthropological approaches appreciate 
the value of participant observation and the involved intensive interaction with the 
population under study. Interviewing itself is seen as social interaction and not social 
encounter that happens under survey-interviewing (Santis 1980). In contrast, the 
elements of hierarchy and repulsion in caste can affect social interaction between 
various caste groups. Social interaction with those caste groups located below purity 
line is most regulated and culturally prohibited. Caste in its dynamism reproduces 
new modes of exclusion or inclusion under the new politicised contexts.  
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Such dynamism of caste may also affect the access of researchers to field situations 
due to their caste identities38. However locating the insider/ outside researcher in a 
caste based society is a complex process (Narayan 1993; Srinivas 1997). To follow a 
simplistic approach, anyone outside the immediate geographic location e.g. village 
may be an outsider or an Indian may be an insider compared to a foreigner, thus a 
foreign researcher (not born in South Asia) maybe an obvious outsider. However a 
beef eating Dalit, Muslim or Christian may be an insider compared to a non-beef 
eating shudra/ Brahmin researcher especially if the research involves comprehending 
food cultures of natives. 
Acknowledging of insider or outsider location of researcher with self reflexivity is 
also a political process for researchers in India. Identity of self as an Indian may be a 
most secular and safe route of acknowledging self for glossing over the identities of 
caste and religion, personal socialisation, belief systems and their influence on one’s 
interpretation and analysis. The problematic of self in ethnography of caste society 
lies in the cultural politics of inclusion and exclusion in caste society. 
Acknowledging self and the insider status critically therefore becomes a necessary 
exercise for the ethnographers to strengthen objectivity.  
This research is also part of my passion against caste violence and exclusion. I come 
from Mahar caste, also called Holeya in northern Karnataka. Facing instances of 
untouchability and also being exposed to varied means of challenging untouchability 
had turned me into an assertive Dalit by the time I turned eighteen. From being 
someone who would hide caste in my schooldays to someone who would assert (and 
not be ashamed of) in college. I would go all out to make friends with Dalits but was 
slightly cautious while dealing with non-Dalits; I would particularly look for those 
who would openly discuss caste and not humiliate me in my absence.  
My personal experiences with caste and untouchability and poverty have helped me 
in understanding the field context better. Further the rural context of Beed was not 
totally alien to me, both in terms of rural livelihoods and general topography. My 
                                                 
38 See Shukra (1994) for reconfiguring of caste biases even amongst educated British citizens of 
Indian origin. 
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native village in northern Karnataka (bordering Maharashtra) in Belgaum district has 
similarities to other drought prone villages of Beed with rain fed agriculture 
dominating the rural economy. I have had my close relatives including my maternal 
grandfather work as migrant sugarcane workers; I have had very brief stints of 
working as a daily wage labourer (unlike one of my elder brothers who bore most of 
it) but have been a landowning farmer fulltime for three years between 1993 to 1996 
and later part-time as I interspersed farming with my undergraduate studies. During 
fieldwork it was therefore easy to relate with Dalits – both men and women who 
worked as sugarcane migrant workers, some of them had laboured in Karnataka and 
had therefore visited Athani (the Taluka I come from where the area under sugarcane 
is high in the villages on the banks of Krishna River). It was also not difficult for me 
to relate my passion for challenging caste and untouchability with those of the 
activists of MHA and BSP, mostly because of their (and my) Ambedkarite leanings.  
There was also competition along caste lines within activists despite their 
Ambedkarite leanings. Some Mang activists who would despise Mahar presence or 
higher clout within MHA would openly share it with me and so would Mahar 
workers of MHA share their discomfort with some Mang activists. I would try to 
play neutral and would consciously try to be someone who does not merely take a 
position as a Mahar. I also developed genuine friendships with activists across castes. 
As time progressed I was also part of the humour that surrounded caste within the 
activists.  
I went to the quadrangle (at RDC) where two Mang workers of MHA, Tatya 
and Chandrakant sat reading newspaper. Tatya saw me approaching the 
quadrangle and greeted Jai Bhim39 sir. Just to humour I replied, Jai Matang40. 
Tatya responded, Jai Matang tar jai Mang (if you say Jai Mang I will too). As 
I pulled a chair to join them, Chandrakant asked Tatya in farashi,41 if I was 
                                                 
39 Jai Bhim means victory to Ambedkar and followers of Ambedkar greet each other with Jai Bhim 
instead of the Hindu ways of greeting like ram ram. 
40 Jai Matang (Victory to Matang) refers to a form of greeting that was coined by a particularistic 
Mang formation, Jai Matang is generally criticised by Mangs of MHA who prefer Jai Bhim.  
41 I was told by various activists that Farashi was a language used by old criminal tribes including 
Mangs to communicate within themselves. Though I did not learn much of this language, I had picked 
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Ambuj. Tatya said yes. I too sensed what he was asking and added, ‘yes.. 
Ambuj’. There was some excitement about me being Ambuj in Chandrakant. 
He further asked Tatya where I was from. He is from far away, said Tatya.. 
Karnataka, I added. And we all got back to reading newspaper. After a while I 
realised that I should clarify with Chandrakant that I was not Ambuj and I told 
Chandrakant that I was a Mahar. There was slight disappointment on his face. 
It was Tatya’s turn now to question my so called anti-caste credentials and he 
asked; are you a Mahar or a Buddhist? I told Tatya smilingly that if he called 
himself Ambuj, I would become a Mahar. Tatya then told Chandrakant that I 
was a very nice person and that he would not find any qualities (of mahars) in 
me. He is a human being, he added. Chandrakant responded to this by saying 
that caste does not matter what matters is vichar (thought/ideology) [Fieldnotes 
7/6/09]. 
The Mahar dominance of the Dalit movements in Maharashtra is well researched and 
documented. However, the resistance and agency of Mangs and other ex-untouchable 
castes both within and outside Dalit movement still have to be studied. Since the 
activists at MHA were Ambedkarites, a sense of Dalit bonding had forged between 
us. Though my shared experiences of untouchability would have brought me closer 
to the Mang activists, an acknowledgement of my difference and my appreciation of 
Mang assertion in principle also helped me gain greater trust. While the activists 
understood the category of Dalit well due to their Ambedkarite orientations, I would 
problematise the category of Dalit both for clarifying my positionality and to 
understand the reflexivity of the Dalit idiom. The activists in turn shared their ideas 
of caste and criticism of other castes. 
In multi-sited ethnography I changed my identities according to the context and was 
what Marcus (1995) calls a ‘circumstantial activist’. My participation in both MHA 
and BSP varied from being a photographer, giving career advice to those interested 
in higher studies, and a sounding board for the activists who shared personal and 
political problems and criticism of the movement they were part of. In MHA I was at 
                                                                                                                                          
up three key words of my interest, Ambuj (meant Mang), Bhukar (meant Mahar) and Dandyal (meant 
Maratha).  
 69 
times helping as translator for foreign visitors, editing reports, making power-point 
presentations and participating in planning some meetings. In BSP I was seen as 
researcher who was clearly supportive of its politics. I spent time with the activists, 
listening and participating in various informal conversations. Though I had planned 
to be a non participant observer in formal meetings, I was also asked to address the 
Kanshiram Jayanti gathering in Beed as chief guest by the BAMCEF (affiliated to 
BSP) workers and my name was printed on the pamphlets. Similarly on some 
occasions I had to be on stage in the gatherings of MHA and BSP where I was 
felicitated or welcomed with flowers or was asked to garland pictures of 
mahapursush. While my Dalit identity had benefits it did not make me a natural 
insider and I travelled through multiple identities during fieldwork. 
Throughout my fieldwork with activists and participants I rarely felt like an outsider. 
But there were moments of unease. For instance those Dalits who did not know me 
would at times poke fun at me, especially my long hair which seemed like that of a 
Potraj42 to them. Others checked my commitment, some would ask me if I was 
planning to return from UK after my PhD, and others enquired how I would 
contribute to the movement after the PhD. Some of the BSP workers in Majalgaon 
suspected me of being a spy of NCP. However the activists I knew or the activists 
who knew me were always there to help and to explain the purpose (and importance) 
of my being there.43 In turn I used the kindness of the activists in making new friends 
and finding varied respondents. Some of my respondents were themselves well read 
and appreciated the value of my research. They would suggest readings and also test 
my knowledge. With the activists in Beed my Dalit identity and commitment to Dalit 
issues coupled with the fact that I was pursuing PhD abroad and was assistant 
professor at TISS were of help. Dalit workers from various castes told me that mala 
                                                 
42In Maharashtra, ‘Mariaai or Laxmi aai are symbolic of the virgin gramdevata [village goddesses] 
and the potraj belonging to Mahar or Mang caste is the official worshipper. The potraj wears feminine 
attire (a long skirt) haldi-kumkuk, green bangles and leaves his long hair loose on the back’ (Rege 
1995:231). The practice of potraj are referred to as potrajki and are most criticised by the activist in 
public discourses for being a practice which turns a masculine Mang man into helpless feminine 
individual who has to beg for his living.  
43 In both BSP and MHA, there were participants and activists who knew me or about me without me 
personally talking to them. This was because of me hanging out with the leaders at times, or being on 
the stage. In some of the MHA programs Awad would call me on the stage to do my satkar 
(felicitation) to motivate Dalit participants to pursue education.  
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tumcha abhiman vatato (I am proud of you). This also translated into Dalits sharing 
their humiliations and (manipulative) strategies of protest.  
While interacting and interviewing with non-Dalits my identity of a researcher doing 
PhD abroad or that of faculty at TISS worked best in my favour and helped in 
diluting my Dalit identity.  Bhonjal a Brahmin of BSP would appreciate me for the 
education I had accessed and would like to invite me for drinks and discussion and 
he would regularly talk to me in English and Hindi instead of Marathi.  
The workers of BSP and MHA would also was ask about my personal life and I did 
not hesitate in sharing whatever people were interested to know. Though most 
activists knew that I was a Dalit, not all were sure of my caste. Kailash, a BSP 
worker from Mahar caste who had become a close friend assumed that I was a 
Chambar because of my surname. I would not always reveal my caste and would 
continue conversations in 'aapla' (our people) mode. This would translate into 
'particular' caste (like Mang, Mahar and Chambar) or Dalit based on the content and 
context of the conversations. I had become friends with some Mang activists of 
MHA who would vehemently criticise Mahars despite knowing that I was one. Awad 
once jokingly asked me how I as a well educated person could get along so well with 
Tatya who was not even 10th pass and was radically Mang centered (anti Mahar).  
Some activists visited my home while they were visiting Mumbai and some stayed 
back for a night halt. Informal discussions and the time spent with some activist 
friends have been of much more value at times than interviews which I always noted 
down in Fieldnotes. I also did not interview some people because I did not want to 
record something that I was listening to and was part of on a daily basis. I continue to 
have this bonding with some of the activists who I am in touch with on phone as 
frequently as I am with my family members. 
I was mostly addressed as 'sir' in both the BSP and MHA which was due to my 
teaching position at TISS. The activists were very supportive and went out of their 
way to make me part of the movement processes, their personal lives and in helping 
me get access to information and information sources I was looking for. I was aware 
that the support and respect of activists came with a lot of responsibility. I was 
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someone who persistently asked questions to activists and participants but I also 
knew when to withdraw from such persuasive behaviour.  
When Radhabai, MHA worker reached the Beed office from Majalgaon for a 
night halt to participate in the next day’s meeting at Beed, she was looking 
visibly tired and I offered to make a cup of tea for her. While the tea was not 
made with the intent of getting any 'data' we ended up discussing political 
strategies that she adopts to counter Maratha dominance at the village level 
(Fieldnotes: 21/1/09).  
Activists and participants of movements did not always perceive me as a researcher. 
They also saw me as a friend and provided me insights into their lives and political 
strategies. Despite all my commitment and interest in Dalit assertion and politics, it 
remained a fact that I was there also for the selfish purpose of research but I also let 
Dalit participants and activists make use of my presence, below is an instance.  
Bhagwan got down of the jeep (at Adas) and after 5 minutes came with a 
Maratha man, who he introduced to me as the chairman of the credit 
cooperative society and told him pointing towards me, ‘this sir has come from 
England, he can speak 12 languages Marathi as well. He is here to study 
atrocity that happened on me, there are two other women from Germany along 
with him they have gone to other villages [...] I said Namaskar and asked the 
chairman his name, since my scratch book was open, I thought of noting it 
down. The man told me his name, but added; ‘don’t write it, I have nothing to 
do with that case’. I stopped penning down. Bhagwan then took the man and 
returned alone after sometime into his seat while getting in he winked at me 
and I smiled. [..] He later told me that man is a Deshmukh [landlord Maratha], 
earns at least 55-60 000 per month from money lending. [..] All these are big 
land lords [Sahukars] here. (Fieldnotes 30/9/08) 
Bhagwan trusted that I would not question his minor manipulation of my identity to 
size up to a powerful Deshmukh Maratha. Due to the friendship and trust that I had 
gained of the activists I was always cautious not to seem obsessed with my research 
all the time. When there was an internal conflict between workers of BSP during 
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elections and a BAMCEF worker (who I did not know) from Nanded had come to 
intervene, I attended the open meeting that went on till late at night of the workers 
and decided to stay away from the closed-door meeting that followed where the 
committed cadre were to meet. I did not want to be a source of distraction in the 
meeting of 'familiars' in this stressed moment despite having access to most of the 
committed cadre.  
Emotions in Dalit movements 
One of the volunteers of BSP, who laboured in a hotel on a daily wage of Rupees 
120 in Beed city, had lied to his reluctant employer that his pregnant wife was 
supposed to deliver so that he could volunteer in erecting a huge tent for the BSP 
rally. He explained this bizarre behaviour of lying for losing wage to volunteer for a 
political meeting where he was everything but visible, ‘the waves of emotions 
(bhavana, sahanubhuti) are like this… like they say love is blind, it is like that’ 
(September 22, 08). Movements are a passionate affair (Goodwin et al. 2001),  
something that I kept stumbling into during my fieldwork. These emotions translated 
into tears, anger and the continued practice of hope on various occasions.  
Rajbhoj (78) while being interviewed could not control his tears when he recalled 
how his illiterate and widowed mother had fainted with a grass stack on her head on 
hearing of Ambedkar’s death in 1956. Awad’s eyes had turned misty in Shindi when 
the parents of the humiliated Dalit girls narrated how their daughters were beaten up 
by Maratha men and women (Fieldnotes: 27/1/09) Emotions also turned into anger as 
MHA worker Alka (a Mang) saw one of the Mahar victim girls in an unconscious 
state. After wiping her tears, Alka hurled rusty abuses against the Maratha women 
who had participated in beating the Dalit girls (Fieldnotes: 20/1/09). Similarly when 
the chief doctor at the hospital in Kej gave technical answers to justify his 
subordinate’s negligence in treating the badly injured Dalit girl, Dalit activists of 
various groups resorted to stone pelting smashing the glass of hospital windows and 
vehicles. Though I did not participate in stone pelting at the hospital I was as 
passionately involved as the activists in questioning the doctor as to why a girl so 
seriously injured was not hospitalised.  
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One of the most adventurous and disturbing days during my fieldwork was on 26th 
January 2009 when I was picked up twice by the police. In the first case they had 
mistaken me for one of the BSP workers who had blocked the district guardian 
minister’s car and had staged a self immolation. The police inspector who pushed me 
inside the police jeep particularly asked the constable to check my camera. After 
getting into the jeep I immediately deleted all the pictures on my camera so that 
nothing on it could be used as evidence against the activists. A call from the 
women’s wing leader of MHA ensured my immediate release from the police station 
as this activist warned the police that they would get into trouble if they mistreated 
me. I returned to join the women activists of MHA who were planning to corner the 
minister again and attack him with bangles as a sign of shame. I was warned by the 
women activists to stay at a safe distance this time but after the women activists had 
done their job, the police to me seemed to be turning violent I rushed closer again to 
join in sloganeering and also clicked some pictures of the police pushing the 
workers. After the activists were arrested I was picked up again by two constables 
who snatched my camera and later my mobile when I tried to make a call. This was a 
scary experience as these constables took me on the motorbike with them to SP 
office and not to the police station where other activists were. The next time too the 
police were concerned about my camera as they felt it may contain images of Dalit 
activists attacking the minister. While the activists were protesting against the case of 
violence against Dalit girls in Shindi village, I was most disturbed when the news of 
more violence against Dalits in some other villages flowed on the same day.  
Following this incident some BSP workers who were earlier apprehensive of my 
commitment and identity became friendlier. I on the other hand reduced the use of 
camera and my expected role of photographer after being picked up by the police. I 
also learnt to say no to activist persuasions and avoided rushing everywhere with 
them. Dalit activists also came across as intellectuals who analysed the macro and 
micro political situations on a daily basis. A Dalit activist who was neither part of 
MHA or BSP asked me why I was using the word Dalit and what I meant by Dalit. 
When I told him that I was referring to Scheduled Caste and used the word Dalit as it 
was used by most Dalit organisations, he asked me to think differently and not to 
follow the tide (Fieldnotes: 11/4/09). He was of the view that the word Scheduled 
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Caste was constitutional and should be used instead of Dalit or they should be called 
‘nationalist’ Indians. I have used the word Dalit interchangeably with other words 
like Scheduled Castes, Mang, Mahar and Bauddha. The word Dalit dominates in my 
thesis to retain the radicalism it entails and also because it was used widely in both 
the movements I studied.  
I did not always get carried away with the activist persuasions. I would keep my 
ethnographic eyes open, not looking just for linear developments but for events, 
actions and process that contradicted my evolving analysis and thinking. Writing 
Fieldnotes and taking regular breaks from fieldwork, listening to interviews helped 
me to think and rethink the shortcomings of my data and also to use my emotions 
productively. It also helped me de-stress from the some of the above mentioned field 
situations. 
Analysis and Ethical issues 
This study generated a large amount of data derived from participant observation, 
interviews, and recorded speeches. Data from semi-structured interviews and focus 
group interviews were selectively transcribed after listening to the recordings and 
reading field notes. Most interviews were done in Marathi except a few which were a 
mix of English and Hindi. I did the transcribing and translating on my own due to my 
fluency in all the languages (Marathi, Hindi and English) that respondents used in the 
interviews. This helped in including my field observations and notes in the 
translation process. I transcribed data directly into English to save time whereas 
regional words and sentences are selectively used to present the findings. 
The analysis however began in the pre-fieldwork phase and continued till writing 
(Hammersley and Atkinson 1983: 174). Data analysis was an ongoing process both 
in the field and later -  in the field  it contributed in enriching the data and post data 
collection enabled comprehending the theory, field linkages and to reinforce or to 
reconstruct them (Lichterman 2002). 
Data was initially organised according to movements and research methods within 
movements, followed by categorising and coding data according to themes 
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particularly the activities and events that the movements were involved in. Some key 
themes like violence, activism around gaairan and use of caste repertoires emerged 
out of fieldnotes,  
Themes and concepts were thus based on inter-case and across case analysis for 
movements and individuals. The evolving themes/concepts were abstracted and 
categorized across individuals (respondents), and movements. Data thus included 
evolving new codes and categorization based on data reading and field 
experiences/observations. Specific efforts were towards answering the research 
questions based on the emerging themes. The abstraction process helped in formation 
of concepts to evolve an understanding of the processes of Dalit movements. While 
data reduction was important, it is not valuable in all research circumstances 
(Flyvbjerg 2006 : 237-241; Schwandt 1996). I have decided between abstraction of 
data and detailed case presentation based on the nature of content in the 
cases/interviews and field experiences. Some cases are presented in detail to avoid 
losing the thickness and self explanatory material of such cases. However data from 
field notes, focus groups, and documentary sources have been largely put through 
reduction and abstraction.  
Some ethical considerations 
As Mosse (2006a) argues, the very act of ethnographic writing is an anti-social act. 
Some Dalits asked me not to write about internal Dalit conflicts and not all Dalit 
activists and respondents were convinced that this research would aid Dalit 
movements. One of the elder workers of BAMCEF asked me not to write all that I 
was seeing and listening to as the opponents (Congress-Gandhian and BJP-Hindutva) 
would use this information to tame ‘our’ movement (Fieldnotes: 28/6/09).  
Arriving at decisions of what should be mentioned and not in this research has been a 
difficult one as Dalits despite their assertiveness are vulnerable. Dalit movements/ 
activists/participants are at the risk of state violence and violence from the dominant 
castes. I experience this fear at close quarters when I was picked up by the police for 
merely an hour and also when the husband of one of my female respondents whom I 
interviewed in March was murdered in caste violence by Marathas in June.  
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To reduce risk to individuals and movements from any third party, I have 
anonymised names of activists and participants who gave me information that could 
cause them harm. These include names of villages and people who are cultivating 
gaairan, and their criticism of dominant castes. I have also not mentioned names of 
government employees who worked for BAMCEF as requested by the members. 
Similarly, I have not included names of activists who shared criticism of their 
movements and leaders. I haven’t included some information even in my fieldnotes 
as these could be used against the movements I studied. The network respondents 
shared valuable information which helped me contextualise and understand the 
movements critically. I have not included all of it in this research as it may affect 
relations between the movements and the networks. Anonymity is assigned to the 
descriptions which I think will affect individuals negatively. Such data is used only 
after discussion with the providers of the information and the leaders of the 
movement.  
The outcomes of this study are designed cautiously so as to ensure that no third party 
misuses the research outcomes against the movements/organisation or individual 
research participants. I have however not compromised in offering a critical view and 
analysis of both the movements by triangulating data, collecting multiple 
perspectives and being open to both internal and external critiques of the movements. 
I plan to share the final outcome of the research with the research participants, 
particularly organisations under study, before submitting it for publishing. If the 
movement leaders have major disagreements with my analysis and findings I will 
consider anonymising the movements and study region.  
Conclusion  
With the increasing intersections of local and global there has also been a shift in 
utility and practice of anthropology. It is no more a colonial instrument of power. 
The possibility of ethnographic subjects contesting the anthropologist's description is 
more and more likely (Spencer 1989). Some Dalits too have reached a stage where 
they can contribute and collaborate in their own representation both in theory and 
practice of ethnography. One of the most important biases Dalit ethnographers may 
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carry due to their life experiences is of caste inequality being omnipresent. It is also a 
product of the upper caste anthropological groundings that make caste ‘invisible’. 
While Dalit self narratives are important in ethnographic research, they should cross 
the boundaries of standpoint theory to acknowledge fractured foundationalism and 
refrain from constructing caste as sociologism. Only such an approach would 
advance exploration of the changing forms of oppression and resistance and enable 
us to understand the inter-linkages of gender, caste, class and the state in the 
localised political culture. 
 Like the activists I moved beyond the hopelessness of the situation in my analysis to 
comprehend and analyse the possibilities of civility and civil society raised by Dalit 
movements and Dalits through politics at margins. Doing anthropology of Dalit 
politics has helped me gain a top-down and bottom-up understanding of Dalit 
mobilisation, and the political strategies of not just Dalit socio-political formations 
but also individual participants. It has helped me explore the complex nature and 
dynamism of caste and reconstruction of hierarchy, violence and exclusion of Dalits 
in insidious forms, and most importantly to map the politics and processes of 
fragmented but vibrant Dalit contestations in the localised contexts.  
This thesis provides thick description and analyses of the intersection and co-
evolution of caste, state and civil society through the study of Dalit politics. Dalit 
mobilisation into the civil realm offers immense scope to understand the politics and 
perspectives of micro and macro Dalit formations, their role in Dalit politics, 
empowerment and democratisation of state and civil society. Besides comprehending 
the diversity of Dalit agency in their (g)localised contexts, I develop a nuanced 
understanding of civil society and political society and their intersections within the 
context of caste and class inequality. 
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Chapter 4 
Dalit Politics in the Post Panther Period 
Contextualising the BSP and MHA in Marathwada 
 
 
Chapter one has described the blurring of socio-cultural and political boundaries in 
Dalit politics of self realisation under Ambedkar. This created a mass of Dalits that 
was highly politicised. According to Chatterjee (2004: 24), Ambedkar died in 1956 
after his conversion to Buddhism, ‘only to be reborn some twenty years later as the 
prophet of Dalit liberation’. However, this identification of Ambedkar as prophet to 
follow Chatterjee’s idiom amongst the Mahars of Maharashtra was a process that had 
set in much before Ambedkar’s death.44  
 
This chapter presents in brief the post-Ambedkar deepening of Dalit politics in 
Maharashtra and proceeds as follows; it first provides an overview of the history of 
Dalit politics in Maharashtra, to argue that Dalit movements have not reached an 
impasse as suggested by some scholars (Guru 2004; Wankhede 2008; Omvedt 2001; 
Deshpande 2004b; Teltumbde 2010). While in the non-party politics the movement 
has thickened, there has also been a recovery in the party politics since the mid-
1990s with the growth of the BSP. The chapter then moves on to introduce the two 
critical cases of my ethnographic study that are representative of the nature of this 
growth that is ensuing in Dalit politics, those of the BSP and MHA. In the case of the 
BSP, I chart its ideological and non-party roots in an organisation of government 
employees (BAMCEF) before demonstrating how Kanshiram’s new vision of 
politics made ‘party’ politics central to BSP and its ideology. Finally, I present the 
case of MHA, a movement organisation that builds on NGOs to strengthen Dalit 
assertion, particularly amongst Mangs. 
 
The conclusion summarises the context of Dalit politics in Maharashtra and, in 
particular, highlights the marginal location of the Dalit party and non-party actors 
who together constitute Dalit politics of resistance. From their marginal position they 
                                                 
44 See Moon’s (2001) autobiography which has detailed insights into the political and philosophical 
bond that lay Mahars developed with Ambedkar.  
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survive the politics of challenging and reforming state and civil society through 
innovative strategies which are discussed in the following chapters. 
 
Post-Ambedkar Dalit politics in Maharashtra suffered from the immediate shock of 
losing its leader. Miller (1967) notes the sense of lack of direction within the Mahar 
community, especially within the Buddhist movement after his death. Ambedkar, 
however, continued to be a political icon of protest and all that he had touched or 
done became sacred for his followers, who even regarded the constitution of India as 
a sacred document because it was ‘written’ by him. Various protest groups and local 
associations that merged political and cultural activities rose up to pursue the task of 
politicising Dalits. Through interpreting and following Ambedkar in different ways, 
Dalit movements pursued strategies which included: criticism of Hindu religion; 
pursuing education; and motivating untouchables to abandon Hinduism (through 
conversions to Buddhism), stigmatised occupations (village/caste economy) and 
corrupt politics (Congress). 
 
These movements thus grew too strong to be stalled by the loss of its leader and, 
though factionalized in Maharashtra, Dalit politics continues to spread at the 
grassroots in the post-Ambedkar phase. I categorise this growth process into three 
broad phases: first, the expansion and splintering of the Republican Party of India 
(RPI) in the period until the early 1970s; second the growth and decline of the Dalit 
Panthers (DP) until mid-80s; and finally the post-DP phase. In this chapter, I briefly 
provide an overview of the first two phases and then move on to discuss in detail the 
third phase which has seen a growth of diverse localised collectives and also some 
major political parties in Dalit politics. It is in this phase that I situate the formation 
and growth of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and Manavi Hakk Abhiyaan (MHA) 
in Marathwada.  
 
Have Dalit Movements in Maharashtra reached an Impasse?  
Dalit movements in Maharashtra attracted attention of various scholars due to large 
scale politicisation of Mahars who converted to Buddhism following Ambedkar’s 
call. The growth of RPI and its fragmentation was followed with the rise of the DPs. 
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The fragmentation of the DPs and the simultaneous rise of Hindutva politics made 
scholars sceptical about the future and potentials of Dalit movements and pointed to 
an impasse that Dalit movements had reached. Scholars following an instrumentalist 
analysis tend to deploy dichotomies like party politics against socio-cultural 
mobilisation (Wankhede 2008), jati politics against anti-caste politics (Omvedt 
2001), NGOs against Dalit politics (Teltumbde 2010), globalisation against Dalits 
(Guru 2004) and the symbolic against the material (Deshpande 2004b). These studies 
suggest an impasse that Dalit movements have reached in Maharashtra in the post-
Panther period. The impasse is critically explored both in the contours of ideology 
and praxis in Dalit movements of Maharashtra. For example, Gokhale (1986) argues 
that the ideological change of conversions amongst Mahars instead of collectivising 
the Dalits, separated the Mahars from other Dalit castes. Gupta’s (1979) class lens 
analyses the Mahar assertion for symbolic space in the Namantar movement as a 
matter of Mahar ‘class’ dominance. Commenting on the fragmented nature of Dalit 
politics and its limited negotiating power, Palshikar (2007b) emphasises the 
competition between Mahars and non-Mahars that acts as a deterrent to effective 
Dalit politics. For him the fragmentation of Dalit politics has resulted in the 
absorption of Dalit politics into bourgeois politics.  The affinity of Dalit politics to 
electoral politics is argued to have made the category of Dalit (both identity and 
ideology) amenable to the pressures of numbers and alliances, Deshpande (2004b) 
argues that Dalit movements form conservative alliances and remain concerned only 
with symbolic issues which throws them into crisis. The emphasis on ‘party’ politics 
and backtracking from the ‘socio-cultural’ issues, leads to a politics of compromise 
and not the annihilation of caste. Wankhede (2008: 57), thus,  maintains, ‘Post-
Ambedkar Dalit movements by not giving the needed importance to the socio-
political and cultural notions of Buddhism have developed a strategy that is limited 
to the issues of political democracy’. In current neo-liberal times Dalit politics is 
viewed as antithetical to radical politics, and NGOs - as means of de-politicisation - 
offer soft resistance to the states’ neo-liberal agenda (Gopal Guru and Chakravarty 
2005). Omvedt (2001) emphasises the failure of the Dalit movements in their 




Most of the above analysis is a commentary on macro social movements with a mass 
Dalit base and not on micro Dalit formations, outcomes and daily working of 
movements. They remain insufficiently attuned to grassroots initiatives and fail to 
capture both the dialectic relationship between grassroots movements and macro 
political movements within the broader context and the dynamic nature of caste 
inequality. Therefore, these analyses render parts of the complex processes and daily 
workings of Dalit movements invisible. Contrary to these macro-level analyses, I 
argue that Dalit politics has grown both in the arenas of party politics and in non-
party spaces. The post-Panther phase of the Dalit movement in Maharashtra is 
characterized by growth of diverse localised collectives, movements and 
organisations that coordinate and associate with Dalit and non-Dalit political parties 
and carry out daily struggles for survival with dignity. These movements are varied 
in nature, protesting socio-political and economic issues that affect the Dalits on a 
daily basis.  Below I detail the process of this growth that has occurred in Dalit 
politics and ideologies, in spite of factionalism. 
 
A History of post-Ambedkar Dalit activism: From the factionalism of RPI to the 
radicalism of DP  
The scholars cited above are right in noting the fragmentation that Dalit movements 
faced, however the fragments have continued to work in unity in non-party political 
fields. The rise of factions has not translated into these organisations ceasing to raise 
Dalit issues and efforts of uniting the factions have been continuous. 
 
 Formation and splits in the RPI  
 
Toward the end of his life, Ambedkar initiated two political processes; conversions 
to Buddhism and the formation of the Republican Party. Omvedt (2001) calls these 
as a spiritual force and a political platform respectively. The merger of the socio-
cultural and the political in Dalit politics continued in the post-Ambedkar phase. The 
Republican Party of India (RPI) came to be an important Dalit political force 
dominated by Mahars in Maharashtra, and many local social organisations and 
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groups worked on spreading Buddhism amongst Dalits. These party and non-party 
processes did not exist independently, rather they grew in interaction. The political 
parties, however, remained fickle, due to their regular assimilation (and annihilation) 
in mainstream politics. The non-party movements on the other hand, continued to 
disperse and grow through processes like production and distribution of Dalit 
literature, protests, and rise of commemorative politics around the prophet-like 
symbol of Ambedkar.   
 
The post-Ambedkar period in Maharashtra also included the rise of linguistic 
nationalism and mobilisation of multiple political forces under the Samyukta 
Maharashtra (United Maharashtra) Movement, which consolidated the political 
boundaries of Maharashtra on a linguistic basis. The RPI also played a part in this. 
After the formation of Maharashtra state on a linguistic basis, the RPI was relocated 
to the margins of Maharashtra politics as language became an ideology and 
collective identity, rendering ‘caste’ marginal within the macro politics of 
Maharashtra. Large masses of Dalits continued to remain socially, economically and 
politically marginalised and the newly independent nation-state followed by the 
linguistically defined regional state offered little hope to them. The marginalisation 
of caste in the macro politics of Maharashtra was coupled with political and 
economic consolidation by dominant Marathas. Though fractured, they tilted the new 
political economy in their favour: they dominated state politics, controlled the state 
aided education sector and controlled the rural cooperative economy (credit societies 
and sugar industries), making the most of the new agrarian and industrial policies 
(Rosenthal 1974; Dahiwale 1995).  They, thus, consolidated their dominance 
throughout Maharashtra and turned Maharashtra into what Vora (2009) has called 
the Maratha Rashtra (nation).  
 
The idea of RPI was conceived in 1956 by Ambedkar, it became formally organised 
in October 1957 after his death. Shortly after its formation, the RPI was faced with 
the problem of factions: the first split came about in 1958 (led by BC Kamble and 
Dadasaheb Rupwate) alleging the domination of Communists in Samyukta 
Maharashtra Samiti; the second split came about in 1967 as Y B Chavan, the veteran 
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Maratha leader wooed RPI leaders into Congress. The anti-Congress ideology that 
Ambedkar had carved out through his critique of Gandhi and Gandhian nationalism 
could not survive for long as factions of the RPI continued to be co-opted by 
Congress.  Dadasaheb Gaikwad, a key leader of the RPI, shifted to extra-
parliamentary methods and massive protests demanding land for the landless were 
held between 1953 to 1966 in Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh under the RPI he led 
(Zelliot 1996; Omvedt 2001). 
  
The Rise and fall of the Dalit Panthers 
 
The failure of RPI and its compromising politics paved the way for non-party Dalit 
assertion. The 1970s thus witnessed the resurgence of a Dalit assertion which was 
dualistic in nature, creating disturbances in political and mainstream literary circles. 
Disgruntled by the compromising politics of the RPI leaders, Dalit youth from the 
Bombay slums formed the Dalit Panthers in 1972, inspired by the Black Panther 
movement in the United States. This was also the time when the word Dalit gained 
much currency.  The Panthers called themselves "Dalit", meaning downtrodden or 
ground down, because it was a casteless term that both acknowledged and challenged 
their history of caste oppression; and "Panthers" because ‘they were supposed to 
fight for their rights like panthers, and not get suppressed by the strength and might 
of their oppressors’(Murugkar 1991: 64). Panthers equated Congress rule with Hindu 
feudalism and attacked the RPI for its corrupt politics. Power, wealth, landlords and 
capitalists and moneylenders were seen as enemies of Dalits. The DPs distinguished 
themselves by openly advocating violence for violence, raising class issues and 
bringing in revolutionary Dalit literature that attacked Brahmanic (Hindu) cultural 
hegemony, which contributed to consolidating Dalit identity further. 45 The DPs 
made a formidable contribution to raising revolutionary consciousness amongst the 
Dalits, however, infighting and splintering weakened it considerably. The DP 
movement carried in it the tension between Buddhist (peace) and Socialist (violence) 
                                                 
45 See Punalekar (2001) on Dalit literature and identity formation; Murgurkar (1991) for a 
comprehensive study of rise and fall of Dalit Panthers; Gokhale (1979) on the radical politics of Dalit 
Panthers and Contursi (1993) for her empirical study of Bharatiya Dalit Panther (a faction of the 
divided Panthers with Buddhist leaning).  
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as approaches to emancipatory politics, which led to a split in 1974 (Contursi 1993). 
The DPs were further factionalised by personality clashes and competition within the 
leadership. Omvedt (2001) suggests that although the DPs pursued radical politics, 
they failed to envisage a socio-economic programme for the new society and 
Murgurkar (1991) attributes this to the failed leadership of the DP. Nevertheless, 
even the factionalised DP remained a formidable power against the Shiv Sena during 
the riots of 1978 that followed the announcement of Marathwada University being 
renamed after Ambedkar (Contursi, 1993). After the split of 1974, some Panthers 
united and continued the DP movement under the leadership of Prof. Arun Kamble, 
Ramdas Athawale and Gangadhar Gade in Maharashtra (Paswan 2002: 326). 
 
While the DPs criticised the docility and compromising politics of the RPI leaders 
and initially boycotted elections, they found it difficult to stay aloof from party 
politics. Some later leaders like Ramdas Athawale were accommodated in Congress 
through an alliance with factions of RPI. DP’s distrust in electoral politics could not 
take root amongst all its leaders, however their non-party, radical mobilisation 
partially institutionalized the collective performance of anger/violence by Dalits as a 
necessary Dalit response to caste atrocities and other stigmatised exclusions of 
Dalits. The reliance on electoral politics continued to form a central constituent of 
Dalit politics for most Dalit formations, including within the DP. The intersection of 
non-party political formations and party-political formations has remained at the core 
of Dalit politics. This is at the core of the ambiguous relationship of Dalit politics 
with the state, a muddled relationship where there is both trust (in the Constitution) 
and distrust (because of the upper caste dominance in the state).  
 
In the realm of party politics there were regular efforts to unite the RPI factions. In 
1989, students went on a fast until death demanding unity of the republican parties 
that forced the leaders to come together for a while (Morkhandikar 1990). However, 
these efforts had limited success and the splintering of RPI continued.  For instance 
in 1999, the election commission was concerned over which faction was to be 
allotted the RPI election symbol of the rising sun (Indian Express: July 31, 1999) and 
currently the RPI has more than ten factions. Some leaders of RPI factions like 
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Ramdas Athavale who heads RPI (Athawale) are accommodated on and off in the 
Congress/NCP through paternalistic alliances. Another important political party 
among the RPI factions is Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangh (BBM) led by Prakash 
Ambedkar (grandson of Dr. Ambedkar), which has a strong presence in Vidarbha, 
particularly Akola district. Prakash Ambedkar has striven to create broad-based 
support for BBM by moving beyond Dalits (Gavaskar 1994). Workers of BBM are 
also part of Boudha Mahasangh, a Buddhist organisation that works on propagating 
Buddhism amongst Dalits.  
 
While the factionalism within RPI may present a sorry picture of Dalit party politics 
in terms of performance in elections, they have retained their cultural roots and 
continue the politics of commemoration and propagation of Buddhism. The arrival of 
BSP in Maharashtra has seen a return to assertive Dalit parties in the arena of party 
politics. The BSP has a dominant presence of Mahars most of whom have moved to 
the BSP from the factions of RPI, however, the BSP also has a good presence of non-
Mahar Dalits in the party organisation. The growth of the BSP hints at the possibility 
of the consolidation of Dalits as a political community through the consolidation and 
politicisation of non-Mahar Dalit castes, particularly the Mangs and Chambars. 
While Ambedkar’s being a Mahar helped attract Mahars to Ambedkarite ideology, it 
had also affected Ambedkar’s efforts of enrolling non-Mahar untouchables in Dalit 
politics, a trend that continues till date.   
 
Dalit politics beyond Mahars: Mang and Chambar consolidation  
 
The frontiers of Dalit politics also moved beyond Mahar dominance in the 1980s 
with independent mobilisation and politicisation amongst the Mangs, the second 
most numerical Scheduled Caste in Maharashtra after the Mahars. Key amongst the 
non-party formations was Akhil Bhartiya Matang Sangh (All India Matang 
Organiation, ABMS hereon) under the leadership of Dr. Babasaheb46 Ghopale who 
organised the Mangs. Ghopale managed to establish a separate political identity for 
                                                 
46 Ghopale does not hold a doctorate or medicine degree. With the growth of his political clout 
amongst the Mangs, ‘Dr’ and ‘Babasaheb’ were eventually added to his name making him the 
‘Babasaheb’ of Mangs.  
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Mangs as Matangs (a sanskritised term) through grassroots mobilisation against 
traditional practices like potraj and economic deprivation. Following a 26 day fast in 
Mumbai which he undertook, a separate development corporation for Mangs was 
approved by the government and the Lokshahir Annabhau Sathe Development 
Corporation (LASDC) was established in 1985. Another important demand, ABMS 
mobilised for was the separate allotment of 8 per cent separate reservations for 
Mangs within the Scheduled Caste quota. This demand received some attention from 
the state government in 2003 which formed the Lahuji Salave47 Commission to study 
the socio-economic status of Mangs in Maharashtra. Ghopale was also 
accommodated within the state apparatus by making him the chairman of LASDC. 
Various other Mang organisations like the Dalit Maha Sangh (Dalit Great 
Organisation, led by Machindra Sakte, a lecturer), Bahujan Rayat Parishad (Bahujan 
and Peasant Conference, formed by Dhobale, a NCP political leader) and Lahuji 
Sena (Lahuji’s Army, visible in the Mumbai region led by Reddy) and political 
parties like the Democratic Party of India and Bahujan Majoor Paksha (Bajujan 
Labour Party) that advocate equality for Mangs, have emerged over time. Since the 
early 1990s, one particular organisation in Marathwada, Manavi Hakk Abhiyaan, has 
emerged as an important Mang socio-political organisation.  
 
While some mobilisation amongst Mang groups is a product of anti-Mahar 
sentiments, not all pursue such an agenda. The term Dalit is not totally rejected and 
Ambedkarism is pursued as a political ideology by some of these groups, alongside 
the politicisation and consolidation of Mang identity. For example, Machindra Sakte, 
of the Dalit Maha Sang, and Sukumar Kamble of Democratic Party of India (DPI) 
are known for their critique of Hindutva mobilisation, and some exceptional Mang 
leaders who have also converted to Buddhism.  
 
While Mangs are part of Dalit politics despite Mahar domination, the Chambars 
largely remained outside the purview of Dalit politics. In Maharashtra, the 
                                                 
47 Lahuji Buwa Vastad was a Mang who ran a gymnasium in Pune in the mid-nineteenth century. He 
imparted physical training to revolutionaries like Phule and Vasudev Balwant Phadke. Lahuji Buwa 
assisted Phule in his attempts to gather untouchable children and make them attend school (Paik 2007: 
184) 
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comparatively pure and higher status of Chambars, compared to Mahars and Mangs, 
was made use of by Shiv Sena who portrayed itself as the protector of ‘non-Dalit’ 
Scheduled Castes (Morkhandikar 1990), to accommodate Dalits who were Hindus 
and not Ambedkarites or Buddhists. Vicziany (2002) observes that the Shiv Sena's 
strategic response to the BSP threat was, ‘to foster the establishment of the 
Maharashtrian Charmarkar Sangh.’ Maharashtra Charamkar Sangh (MCS), a social 
organisation, was formed under the leadership of Babanrao Gholap, a Chambar 
political leader of Shiv Sena. Within Chambars, there are other non-political 
organisations that resist the strong influence of Shiv Sena and the BJP like Guru 
Ravidas Samata Parishad (Guru Ravidas Equality Conference) and Guru Ravidas 
Satyashodhak Sanghatan (Guru Ravidas Satyashodhak Organisation) in Marathwada, 
which mobilise opinion in favour of Dalit identity and the BSP.   
 
Those Dalit non-party socio-political organisations that have grown in political clout 
and performance are also necessary sites of accommodative aggregation for 
mainstream political parties like the Congress/Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) and 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)/Shiv Sena (SS). Non-party political organisations are 
also formed by Dalit leaders of mainstream political parties to serve the interest of 
these parties. MCS discussed above was promoted by SS to capitalize on the 
differences between Mahars and Chambars, similarly Bahujan Rayat Parishad 
(Bahujan Peasant Conference) a Mang organisation, dominated by its leaders, is 
active mostly during elections to mobilise Mang support for NCP. 
 
The paradox of political cooptation, thriving Dalit politics and political violence 
 
Dalit movements, though fractured, continue to play a vital role in the democratic 
politics and democratisation processes of Maharashtra. While some of the Dalit 
political parties and leaders were co-opted within the non-Dalit mainstream parties, 
Dalit non-party politics did not succumb to the failure in party politics. The 
politicisation of Dalits is a process that has continued in the post-Panther period.  
‘Ambedkar’ entered villages, small towns and slums in multiple symbolic forms as a 
saviour, prophet, symbol of protest, constitution and Buddhism that contested the 
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hierarchic boundaries of caste in public spaces. Various non-party political 
organisations worked on spreading Ambedkarite politics and ideology beyond Dalits. 
For instance some factions of BAMCEF and others like Boudha Mahasangh continue 
to form vibrant non-party organisations in Dalit politics, holding mass awareness 
meetings and producing movement literature and a culture of volunteerism in Dalit 
politics. In 2007, around one lakh Dalits and other lower tribes converted to 
Buddhism to mark 50 years of Ambedkar’s conversions to Buddhism (Bavadam 
2007).   
 
Ambedkar’s conversion to Buddhism and the Panther radicalism gave rise to various 
localized groups of educated youth who mobilised to demarcate the Dalit-Buddhist 
boundaries as against those of Hindus. The rise of Dalit politics in Maharashtra 
despite its factionalism, is also a function of the intertwining of culture and politics 
in Ambedkar’s schema where conversions to Buddhism and party politics were both 
important in turning politics of resistance into a culture. Dalit politics thus has 
deepened over the years also due to pressures from below, where Dalits become 
Ambedkarised by reading Ambedkar and listening about Ambedkar in rallies 
organised by numerous organisations. 
 
Dalit cultural-political assertion and simultaneous consolidation of commemorative 
political symbolism in Dalit politics also resulted in increased political violence 
against Dalits (Rao, 2009).  The interlinked economic, socio-political and religious 
landscapes in Maharashtra, particularly Marathwada, sustain the dominance of 
Marathas and have been a site for the regular and sustained conflicts where the 
dominant castes and the Dalits from their marginalised locations engage in 
manoeuvring and violence. Dalits too participate in performing violence, or what 
Jaoul (2008) terms as ‘righteous anger’. Violence against Dalits co-exists with Dalit 
assertions. Maharashtra has seen a steep rise in cases of caste violence against Dalits 
and also the registration of such cases under pressure from Dalit movements. The 
number of cases registered under SC, ST (Prevention of Atrocities Act) have 
increased from 689 in 2004, to 844 in 2005 and 1,173 in 2008 (Sonawane 2010).  
The politicisation of Dalits and political and ritual violence against Dalits are thus 
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parallel processes.  
 
Like the non-party arena, Dalit resistance in party politics continues in the presence 
of assertive organisations that criticise dominant mainstream political parties and the 
state. BSP and BBM have more particularly sustained the critique of compromises 
that Dalit leaders make in party politics.   
 
Post-Panther Dalit politics is thus marked by mobilisation in socio-cultural and 
electoral fields and their intersections. BSP and MHA are two critical cases that best 
represent the fractured geographies of Dalit politics in post DP phase because of their 
varied oganisational forms, their main constituent castes, strategies of mobilisation 
and possible empowering impact on Dalits. BSP represents the homogenising current 
within Dalit movements which tries to include non-Dalits. This attempt to ‘go 
beyond’ the identity of Dalits as an oppressed category is an effort to establish the 
identity of ‘Bahujan’. The political strategies of BSP revolve around the belief that 
they can bring about change from above through securing political power.  In the 
context of Dalit movements in Maharashtra that are largely dominated by Mahars. 
MHA represents an interesting case of grassroots Dalit politics with an NGO face 
and global civil society intersections, largely representing Dalit interests with a focus 
on Mangs. MHA is a Dalit Movement that includes NGOs and a critical site for 
studying intersections of the local and the global in the civil society arena. In the 
following section I will present the rise of BSP in Maharashtra and its meanings in 
Marathwada through ethnographic material. I will then turn to describing the 
formation and growth of MHA and the vernacularisation of NGOs in MHA’s 
politics. 
 
BSP in Maharashtra  
The BSP’s growth in Maharashtra, despite the presence of various Dalit parties, is 
interesting to note as it marks a departure from the impasse that Dalit party politics 
had reached. The BSP’s performance in Maharashtra cannot be compared to Uttar 
Pradesh where it came to power with full majority within 23 years of its formation. 
The socio-political context in Maharashtra is different from UP primarily in the 
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numerical marginality of Dalits. While in UP Dalits constitute around 21 per cent of 
the total population, in Maharashtra the average population of Dalits stands at 10.2 
per cent. It is not surprising, therefore, that BSP has not won a single seat in 
Maharashtra either in the Lok Sabha or in the Vidhan Sabha since its formation. BSP 
has however grown as a major Dalit political party in Maharashtra over the years, 
marginalising the factions of the RPI (Jha 2006).  
 





 1990 1991 1995 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009 
Vidhan 
Sabha 
.98   1.49    .29  4.00  2.35 
Lok Sabha   .48  .29 .75 .32 3.05 4.83 
 
While other Dalit parties have declined, the BSP has managed to emerge as the 
single largest Dalit political party in terms of vote percentage in Maharashtra (Jha 
2006). In the 2004 and 2009 Lok Sabha elections, besides emerging third in various 
constituencies, the BSP spoiled the chances of various BJP and Congress candidates 
in Vidarbha and Marathwada (Sainath 2004; Gaikwad 2009). Eastern Vidarbha and 
Marathwada have a visible presence of BSP, where it polled 11.4 per cent and 6.1 
per cent of the vote respectively in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections. In 2009 the BSP 
polled more than 10 per cent votes in five constituencies of which three were in 
Vidharbha (Wardha, Nagpur and Gadchiroli) and two in Marathwada (Hingoli and 
Nanded). These figures tell us about the growing visible presence of BSP in 
Maharashtra’s politics despite not forging alliances with any political party. BSP 
however faces competition from various other Dalit political parties, below I will 
elaborate upon BSP’s specificities and how it claims to be different.   
 
How BSP claims to be different? 
                                                 
48 All figures are from Statistical Reports of Lok Sabha and Assembly Elections published by Election 
commission of India. 
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The social structure of India is based on inequalities created by caste 
system and the movement of the Party shall be geared towards changing 
the social system and rebuilding it on the basis of equality and human 
values (Constitution of BSP: pg.5) 
 
To eliminate caste you must take note of caste [...] Caste is a two-edged 
sword it cuts both ways. It cuts one way and it can also cut the other way 
when you use it in the opposite direction. I decided to handle caste to our 
benefit and deprive the Brahmins of its benefit (Kanshiram cited in, 
Mane 2006: 251). 
 
The above two quotes reveal the dynamic nature of BSP’s politics. While the first one 
casts BSP as a ‘party of ideology’, the second exposes BSP as spoils faction with 
conservative interests. Sartori (2005: 67-68) makes this distinction between parties of 
ideology and the spoils factions to distinguish between those who are principled ones 
against those that are a mechanism for settling a bargain between two or more parties. 
The distinction of ideology and spoils faction is blurred not only in the practice of 
BSP but more generally in Dalit politics in Maharashtra. The BSP’s success also lies 
in making ‘party politics’ and the securing of ‘political power’ central to achieving its 
ideological goals: seeking political power has become part of achieving what is 
termed the ‘Ambedkarite mission’. Therefore, my approach here is not to evaluate the 
performance of BSP in elections, but to map the growth and meaning of BSP through 
analysis of movement practices and narratives of participants since the formation of 
BAMCEF and later the DS4 (Dalit Shoshit Samaj Sangharsh Samiti [Dalit and other 
Exploited groups struggle committee]). 
 
One of the major limitations of Dalit politics in the 1990s in Maharashtra, as suggested 
by Morkhandikar (1990), was its inability to move beyond Dalit identity. Similarly 
Palshikar (2007) more recently emphasised that the competition between Mahars and 
non-Mahars acts as a deterrent to Dalit politics. However, more than the Mahar-Mang-
Chambar fragmentation it is the internal Mahar fragmentation that affects Dalit 
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politics in Maharashtra. Kanshiram’s political strategy, since its incipient stage, had 
been to construct a broad political community on an ideological basis so as to unite 
OBCs and religious minorities (low caste converts) with Dalits at its core.   
 
Kanshiram, though a non-Maharashtrian and non-Mahar, ventured into Ambedkarite 
activism in 1964 while working in a government job in Pune. Stories of Kanshiram 
being influenced by reading Ambedkar’s Annihilation of Caste and of his anger 
against the upper caste officers, who cancelled the leave of a Mahar colleague wanting 
to celebrate Ambedkar Jayanti, are common amongst the committed cadre I met. It is 
said that it was these important events that led to Kanshiram renouncing his job and 
family for the Ambedkarite mission. By committed cadre, I refer to those workers who 
have not moved out of the BSP despite its dismal performances in some elections. 
They referred to the BSP as a social movement and not a political party, thus 
designating political power as secondary to the BSP’s mission. The word ‘mission’ is 
commonly used amongst the cadre, but their understanding of their mission was not 
always coherently articulated: most implied that the mission was achieving Buddhist 
India (Bauddhamai Bharat) or the India of Samrat Ashoka’s dreams.49 The 
mobilisation around this mission reached initially to cities and some small towns in 
Marathwada through the formation and strengthening of BAMCEF. 
 
Dalit elite in Dalit politics: BAMCEF in the making of BSP 
 
After working for RPI and getting disillusioned with its compromising alliances with 
Congress, Kanshiram formed the All India Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, OBC 
and Minority Employees Association in 1971. This organisation later became 
BAMCEF (Bahujan and Minority Community Employees Association) in 1978. 
BAMCEF gained a visible presence in Marathwada. It was conceived as a non-
political, non-religious and non-agitation organisation that appealed to the conscience 
of the educated amongst the SC/ST, OBC and Minorities to join the Ambedkartie 
mission. BAMCEF appealed to the class amongst the Dalits that was comparatively 
well off, mostly based in urban areas and small towns working as government servants 
                                                 
49 See Jaoul (2007)for what he terms the Buddhist Avatar of BAMCEF in UP. 
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and partially alienated from their deprived untouchable identities. Kanshiram 
(Kanshiram 1981[2006]) in his small booklet titled “BAMCEF - An Introduction” 
asks this elite section of Dalits to get ready to face humiliation and losses that would 
come their way in pursuing the interests of the community.    
 
In Marathwada, cadre camps (as they are referred locally) and weekly magazines, like 
Bahujan Nayak published from Nagpur, were important means of communicating 
Dalit ideology and culture in BAMCEF. Some elderly members of the BSP that I met 
still retained the older issues of publications like Bahujan Sanghatak (Hindi) and 
Bahujan Nayak (Marathi) from as early as 1980. Kanshiram started various magazines 
in Hindi and English and often wrote editorials for these publications. Manohar Atey 
(1997), who published the editorials of Kanshiram, described him as a practical 
philosopher. I met some older members of BAMCEF who had resigned from their 
government jobs to emulate Kanshiram’s selflessness and was told about various 
others who had made similar sacrifices. Although its membership was mainly made up 
of government employees, BAMCEF was not conceived as an institution for the 
welfare of government employees. It instead aimed to mobilise resources, time and 
knowledge of SC/ST and OBC employees, for the liberation (mukti) of the exploited 
social groups that they belonged to (Ram 1982).  BAMCEF had wings that 
emphasised self-help, like the BAMCEF Volunteer Force (BVF), Brotherhood Centre 
and Buddhist Research Centre (which was added in 1981). The Brotherhood Centre 
was supposed to be involved in community awareness activities and in supporting 
needy students amongst the Dalits. Elder members would speak about the spirit of 
volunteerism in BAMCEF members where even Class I officers cleaned up after 
meetings alongside Class IV employees and BVF members.  
 
In the annual gatherings of BAMCEF, scholars (like Gail Omvedt and Raoasheb 
Kasabe) were called to address the members. Similarly in cadre camps at district or 
Taluka level, local scholars and members of BAMCEF conducted cadre training on 
Bahujan history. Following Phule, the Bahujans (SC/ST/OBC and minorities) were 
imagined as indigenous communities that were exploited by the invading Aryans. 
Seminars were also organised to discuss challenges for the success of the Ambedkarite 
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movement nationally (Mane, 2006). Pen and paper were provided to participants to 
take notes in such meetings, a practice that continues to date in the cadre camps of the 
party.  
 
BAMCEF, however, was an organisation of government employees who could not 
engage in political action as that would mean risking their government jobs. They 
were instead mobilised to provide pay back to the deprived communities that they 
came from, through what movement narrative calls ‘time, money and brain’ 
(knowledge). This support continued for the later political struggles that Kanshiram 
planned. DS4 was formed in 1982 to pursue politics of protest and also to test grounds 
in electoral politics. After the formation of DS4, BAMCEF came to be a shadow 
organisation and its members now continued to mobilise resources for DS4 and later 
for BSP.  
 
The strategy of ‘Limited political action’ and the formation of the DS4  
Members of the DS4 remember it being conceived as a means of pursuing the 
strategy for ‘limited political action’. After the formation of the DS4 on 6th 
December 1981, mass mobilisation became a strategy. DS4 and BAMCEF workers 
worked together with the DS4 workers at front and BAMCEF workers in the shadow 
supporting DS4. BAMCEF members too would travel to distant villages and towns 
where they felt they could make a difference and consolidate support for DS4.  
 
In 1982, when the BAMCEF workers from Majalgaon read the news of D N 
Kambale50 from Parbhani district organising a religious ceremony for a Brahmin 
priest to perform Munja (sacred thread ceremony) on Mang children, they visited 
Parbhani to convince him against this move as it was consolidating/affirming the 
idea of caste hierarchy. Though D.N. Kambale was not convinced, the BAMCEF 
workers managed to persuade his nephew D. S. Kambale to join DS4. D. S. Kambale 
had studied at Milind College in Aurangabad and had been associated with the Dalit 
Panthers earlier. I asked D.S. Kambale why one would leave a radical group like the 
                                                 
50 D N Kambale was famous locally as he was the first educated Mang from Nizam state who had 
written a letter to Ambedkar accusing him of being biased towards Mahars (Burra: 1986). He was also 
a Congress (INC) Member of Parliament from Nanded constituency from 1951 to 1962.  
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Panthers to join the DS4. He explained: 
 
Sure, the panthers were jahal (fiery) but they were not vaicharik (ideological). 
Just using verbal abuses (mainly against Hindu gods) and criticising does not 
help. They were aggressive but not constructive (rachnatmak), and they did not 
have a theory or perspective. I was part of all that abusing (Hindu gods) and the 
villagers attacked us. We were beaten up and never felt bad about it. There was 
only anger in the Panthers. It was revenge driven anger. BAMCEF people were 
systematic, they had a plan for changing the whole system (Interview D S 
Kamble: 29/1/10).   
 
As can be seen from the above quote while DS4 was an agitation wing, the workers 
also claimed intellectual depth in their politics due to engagement of educated 
employees of BAMCEF. One cadre from the Mang caste named Sudhakar Kshirsgar, 
whom I interviewed, ran a tailoring shop and was earlier associated with Dalit 
Panthers. Being a good orator he later graduated to conducting cadre trainings 
between 1986 and 1989. The approach of BAMCEF and DS4 was seen as different 
by those who shifted from the Dalit Panthers and Republican Parties to BAMCEF 
and DS4: they referred to this difference mostly as vaicharik or boudhik 
(intellectual). Such ‘intellectual’ content included use of history in understanding the 
varna system so as to challenge it.  
 
 The cadre camps explained history from Buddha, Kabir, Phule, Narayana 
Guru, Periyar, Shahu, Ambedkar to RPI […] We were taught to make people 
who would destroy this samaj vyavastha (social system) and not to take up 
small issues like atrocities […] In BAMCEF we felt that the savarnas51  did 
some ‘action’ [atrocities] and we gave ‘reaction’ [protests] and reaction resulted 
in our loss […] DS4 was set up to promote action not reaction against injustice 
( Interview Kshirsagar: May 2009).  
 
Atrocities and violence against Dalits related to caste had seen growth or radical 
                                                 
51 Savarna means caste Hindus and does not include untouchables who are considered Avarna [one 
not part of Varna].  
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mobilisation amongst Dalits through Panthers. Such radicalism was seen as harmful 
‘reaction’ in DS4 and BAMCEF. While movements like Panthers performed violent 
protests and saw violence as a means of communication, workers of BAMCEF 
considered violent protests of Dalits as mere reactions which would yield not long 
term results.  
 
The introduction of the term Chamcha (stooge) in Dalit politics by Kanshiram 
marked the departure of DS4 (and later BSP) from its predecessors in Maharashtra.  
Kanshiram published a historical and analytical reading of Dalit politics called 
“Chamcha Age”, which labeled all those Dalit (and backward) politicians serving the 
interests of dominant upper caste political parties as “chamchas” and their supporters 
as “chamchas of chamchas” and radically reiterated the need for political separation 
from Congress and other upper caste parties. The “chamchas” were seen to have sold 
out the Dalit community to serve their own purposes and Congress interests. The 
traditional understanding in Dalit politics of Ambedkar winning reserved seats from 
Gandhi through the Poona Pact in 1932, received a jolt as Kanshiram organised 
Poona Pact Dhikkar rallies (Down with Poona Pact) and published Chamcha Age in 
1982 to mark 50 years of Poona pact. The historic Ambedkar-Gandhi clash was 
reconstructed to explain the socio-political exclusion of Dalits and the new era of 
“chamchas”. While historical struggles since Buddha, Kabir, Phule, Shahu and 
Ambedkar were important, the Poona Pact marked the downfall of the Dalit and 
Shoshit (Dalit and exploited).  
 
Poona Pact for Kanshiram affected the possibilities of real representation in the 
democratic procedures for the Dalits and other exploited groups; therefore, they 
needed to organise to regain political power.  This fiery criticism of factors external 
to the Dalit movement (Gandhi/Congress) and internal to the movement (e.g. the 
shortcomings  of the chamchas) attracted new entrants to BAMCEF, DS4 and later 
BSP. The new entrants to BSP, distinguished BSP from other Dalit organisations in 
its critique and antagonism of Congress (Gandhi). The critique of chamchas as 
internal others has now become part of the ritual political oratory of BSP cadres who 
use it regularly in their critique of RPI and Dalits affiliated to other parties.   
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Within Dalit movement circles the factions of the RPI and the Dalit Panthers saw 
BAMCEF and the DS4 as an elitist group that did not believe in protests or 
agitations. They criticised them for being led by a Chambar (Kanshiram as a Chamar 
from north India) and not Mahar, for having leaders that did not remove their 
footwear (as sign of respect) while garlanding Ambedkar and for being against 
Namantar. DS4 did not participate in the agitations for Namantar and held the 
position that securing political power was the only answer.  
 
In 1983, the DS4 organised a nationwide mass mobilisation for equality (samata) 
and self respect (swabhiman) through a cycle ‘march’. This witnessed a violent 
reaction from the Dalit Panthers in Marathwada who stoned a gathering in 
Ambejogai that had assembled to listen to Kanshiram.  Kanshiram continued to 
address the crowd despite a stone hitting the microphone he was using, and the cadre 
rushed to shield Kanshiram with their bodies. The workers of DS4 were advised by 
Kanshiram not to resort to violence as a strategy against the Panthers or against non-
Dalits.52 Violence by savarnas against Dalits was conceived as a mere symptom of 
the larger oppressive varna-vyavastha (Varna system). The workers of DS4 (and 
BAMCEF) thus aimed to unite Dalits, OBCs and religious minorities (with an 
emphasis on low caste converts) against this social system that oppressed them.  
 
These agitations in the early 1980s attracted more Dalits into its fold, some of whom 
were disgruntled by the politics of RPI and the factionalism that has riddled the 
Panthers too. Marathwada particularly had seen increased participation from amongst 
the Dalits, and the well to do within them besides participating would also provide 
resources for mobilisation. Besides retaining the middle classes and lower middle 
classes within its fold through BAMCEF, DS4 also reached out to the rural Dalits 
through its mobilisation strategies. For Kanshiram, it was an apt time to reach for an 
advanced strategy to achieve the mission of capturing political power and the BSP 
came into being in 1984. 
 
                                                 
52 Based on several informal conversations and some interviews with those who had participated in 
this rally. 
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Political power as the ‘master key’ and the formation of BSP 
After the experiment of DS4 with the strategy of ‘limited political action’, the 
strategy shifted and became oriented towards gaining political power. As a result of 
this the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) was formed on 14th April 1984. Some earlier 
workers that I interviewed had travelled to Delhi for the formation rally of the BSP. 
Despite being a political party, the BSP came to be viewed as a social movement by 
its cadres, a movement aiming to capture political power though democratic 
processes as they believed political power was the “master key” for social change. 
BSP also evolved into an authoritarian structure where Kanshiram was at the helm of 
affairs and controlled decision-making, and the cadre revered him and his 
commitment and accepted his authority. They followed all the orders from above as 
part of the party shista (discipline). It is this shista of the cadre that distinguishes 
BSP from other Dalit organisations locally: those who are not disciplined or quit 
mid-way to join other parties are termed as gaddar (hindi word for ‘traitor’).53   
 
In Marathwada, all the Lok Sabha seats were contested by BSP in the 1984 Lok 
Sabha elections. An ex-member of BAMCEF and DS4 from Beed who had quit a 
government job to work for the mission on a fulltime basis was the Marathwada ‘in-
charge’ of BSP. Elections fought in the formative years of BSP in Beed by various 
candidates who were ideologically committed and economically weak were termed 
as sacrificial elections, not for winning but for consolidating Dalit votes.  In Beed, an 
OBC man (Vanjari) contested as the BSP candidate and polled 6482 (1.42 %) votes, 
whereas other Lok Sabha constituencies in Marathwada were contested by a Muslim 
(Hamid Khan), a Mang (D N Kambale, who had been convinced to stand by his 
nephew) and a Takari (Laxman Gaikwad54). All these candidates came from the 
imagined Bahujan political community. The BSP did not contest the Legislative 
Assembly polls of Maharashtra that followed in 1985 as Kanshiram decided that BSP 
would support RPI in Maharashtra. This decision did not go well with some of the 
senior leaders of BSP in Maharasthra. Kanshiram’s interest in UP and in making 
Mayawati the first MP of BSP was a cause of envy amongst some local leaders. 
                                                 
53 It is usual for the BSP cadres to use Hindi words. Some cadre trainings too are organised in Hindi. 
54 Laxman Gaikwad was part of the radical Dalit literary circles and was author of well known 
Uchalya. He came from the Takari caste which was listed as a criminal tribe during colonial rule.  
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During the Bijnor by-elections of 1985, Kanshiram demanded 5 lakh rupees and 
three thousand workers from the people of Maharashtra, failing which he threatened 
to quit the movement. Some of the senior cadre of BAMCEF/BSP in Maharashtra 
raised allegations in the meantime of Kanshiram having an affair with Mayawati, 
Kanshiram on the other hand labeled these rebels as gaddars (traitors).  
 
While the splintering of BAMCEF had started at national level since the formation of 
DS4, as some disagreed over the use of political (electoral) means, this became a 
possibility in Marathwada only in 1985. Sham Tangade, the head of BSP in 
Marathwada, left the BSP to join another group of BAMCEF (led by Tejinder Jhalli 
from Punjab) to pursue ‘non-political’ means. Various BAMCEF factions emerged 
over time. One faction of BAMCEF linked closely with BSP as a shadow 
organisation continued to mobilise resources and volunteers for the BSP.  
 
The interweaving of party and non-party activity remained crucial in the politics of 
the BSP, even for those who objected to the merger between BAMCEF and the BSP. 
After working in various factions of BAMCEF, in 2000 Sham Tangade started a 
political party named the Prabuddha (Enlightened) Republican Party of India. He 
was very critical of BSP’s politics which he maintained reinforced caste and did not 
lead to its annihilation. On electoral politics, he held the view that, ‘the task of 
manav mukti (human liberation) can be pursued through electoral politics and 
Ambedkarites should take the lead in this’ (Interview: 5/6/09).  
 
BAMCEF was not a legally registered body until, in 1987, an opposing group legally 
registered BAMCEF, thus taking away the legal right to use the name BAMCEF 
from Kanshiram and BSP. There have been various factions of BAMCEF since then.  
Important among them in Maharashtra are the factions led by B. D. Borkar, Waman 
Meshram and Vijay Mankar; all engage in non-electoral politics like large scale 
conscientisation of Dalits and reinforcing Dalit antagonism to mainstream Hindu 
culture. BSP’s BAMCEF exists as an informal body amongst followers of those who 
remained with Kanshiram. BAMCEF of the BSP in Beed attracted not just Dalits but 
also some OBCs (like Vanjari and Mali) and Muslims. Teacher/lecturer members of 
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BAMCEF also encouraged students to join the movement. Similarly the financial 
contributions to the Party have continued to flow. Workers in Beed profoundly 
remember contributing to a one lakh rupee thaili (bag) for the Bijnor elections of 
1989 in Uttar Pradesh where Mayawati emerged victorious.  
 
After the success of consolidating the Chamar vote in UP followed by the 
mobilisation of other castes around Chamars, a discussion in Maharashtra arose on 
which caste could be the core here. A rift emerged between the Mahars and non-
Mahars in the party, with some Dalits suggesting that the leadership be given to 
OBCs in Maharashtra. “Kanshiram however was of the view that BSP was a 
movement and the OBCs were not yet ideologically as inclined as the Dalits” 
(Kshirsagar Interview: 29/1/10). Some OBCs who were part of BAMCEF 
acknowledged that Kanshiram contributed in making the OBCs aware of their rights. 
Interestingly in Beed OBCs were protesting against the implementation of the 
Mandal Commission recommendations. An important female Vanjari political 
leader, who is also an academic, explained, “they [OBCs] thought that Mahars and 
Mangs are going to get more reservations through Mandal and joined the Marathas in 
protest” (Morale Interview: 29/1/10).   
 
Omvedt (1994) suggests that Kanshiram was the first Dalit to take the task of 
organising the OBCs. Various OBC leaders have been attracted to BSP, joined and 
left the party since its formation.  The Mahar prominence within the BSP still 
continues. A committed cadre from the Mahar caste echoed Kanshiram’s words 
when he told me, ‘Mahar nahin toh Maharashtra nahin’ (No Maharashtra without 
Mahars). There are, however, other SCs and OBCs who form part of the committed 
cadre in Beed along with the Mahars. The elder workers have taken a back seat and 
there is a growth of younger workers who appreciate and associate with the politics 
of BSP with as much commitment as their seniors.  
 
BSP and the new missionaries in Beed 
The older missionaries have been replaced by younger cadres in Beed most of whom 
joined BSP in 2002. A major BSP political rally was organised in Kolhapur in 2002 
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to mark 100 years of the reservation policies initiated by Shahu Maharaj. This rally, 
now part of the cadres’ collective memory, attracted more youth to the party who 
have continued to be part of BSP’s cadre. Kanshiram’s address to the cadres of 
Maharashtra, included a slogan in Marathi which they regularly recall: “hou shakat 
aahe” (it is possible), referring to the possibility of gaining political power in 
Maharashtra. The possibility of gaining political power through electoral politics, in 
spite of their small numbers, is something that continues to drive and motivate the 
cadres. Kanshiram is now added to the list of Mahapursh (great men) of the Bahujan 
Movement and his writings and speeches, recorded on CDs, are sold widely at 
movement events. His Jayanti is also celebrated by the cadre and BAMCEF 
members by organising discussion sessions. Some Dalits have put pictures of 
Kanshiram and Mayawati in their homes along with Ambedkar, Phule and Shahu. 
The BSP related faction of BAMCEF in Beed is still active and is led by a medical 
doctor who is a faculty member at a Medical College. The cadres of BSP mobilise 
resources from BAMCEF members, well wishers and contribute from their own 
pockets for party purposes. BSP thrives on volunteerism of the cadre, some of whom 
campaign for the whole day without food or attend meetings with packed lunches as 
they cannot afford to eat outside their homes.   
 
Competitive factionalism in the non-party fields has led to the deepening of 
Ambedkarite ideology and politics, whereas competitive factions in party politics 
amongst the Dalits had taken a degenerative turn, leading to an almost disastrous end 
for Dalit politics. Kanshiram’s highly institutionalised, leader dominated form of 
mobilisation in the BSP is considered by the cadre as an attempt to deal with the 
challenge of factionalism that pervades other Dalit political parties. Mayawati has 
now replaced Kanshiram as the absolute head of BSP, and the cadres respect her 
equally. Her ‘dictatorship’, as reported by the mainstream (manuwadi55 for cadre) 
media, is seen as a strength of the party by its cadre.  
 
                                                 
55 Manu refers to the author of Manu Smriti; Ambedkar had burnt Manu Smriti in protest of the stigma 
and lower status it attached to Shudras and Atishudras. Cadre use Manu, Manu-wad (ism), Manuwadi 
(followers of Manu) interchangeably to emphasise the Brahminic bias of mainstream media, political 
parties, their leaders and sometime they talk of Manuwad amongst Dalits. 
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Patriarchal movement structure 
BSP in Maharashtra does not have a visible presence of women workers in contrast 
to Uttar Pradesh (Ciotti 2009); they are particularly absent in leadership roles at the 
grassroots.  There are no specific opportunities or structures to include women within 
the organisation. The leaders emphasise upon the cadre to expand the movement by 
recruiting new cadres who can give time, money and those who are educated. This 
has translated, in practice, into only men being identified as cadres and workers. The 
new ‘bhai-charas’ (literally meaning brother-hood) are constructed around caste and 
religious lines and are totally dominated by men. While one sees a visible presence 
of women participants in rallies and meetings, women in Beed were totally missing 
in the oganisational structure of BSP.  
 
In one of the BSP cadre meetings Jadhav, the vice-president of BAMCEF in Beed, 
explained to me the importance of BSP in social change. After listening to him for a 
while and taking notes, I asked him if BSP was a Bahujan men’s movement. 
Apologetically he replied, “you have left me nirottar (answerless)”, but added after a 
while, “you must appreciate that the leader of our party is a woman and we are proud 
of it.” (Fieldnotes: 31/1/09). Local, well-read and ideologically sharp activists of the 
BSP also link gender discrimination and the exclusion of women from BSP’s 
leadership to the ideology of caste that Manu constructed through Manuwad (Manu-
ism). One such worker emphasised, “our slogan is Nari ke samman main Mayawati 
maidan main” (For the respect/honor of women, Mayawati is in the battle field). He 
also added an explanation that the historical Buddhist roots of egalitarian gender 
relations were corrupted due to manuwad:  
 
Buddhism gave equal respect to women [….] and it is not only Brahmans or 
Marathas who are Manuwadi. There are manuwadis within us too (Group 
Interview: 5/3/09). 
 
 The liberation of women is viewed as an essential part of achieving the Ambedkarite 
mission, but it is neither a priority within BSP nor is it ideologically transmitted to all 
cadres. Amol (21) is one of the young committed volunteers of BSP who besides 
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pursuing his law degree is also a dhamma pracharak (one who spreads the Buddha’s 
teachings). He was candid in sharing his assumptions that women’s bodies would 
necessarily corrupt themselves and also the movement. His views reflect the 
assumptions associated with female bodies that are prevalent in society at large:   
 
A: I am the eldest son in the family, my mother listens to me, and my wife, if I 
were married, will listen to me too. They will vote for BSP […] there is no 
need for women to become leaders […] 
S: Why has Mayawati become the leader then? 
A: […] Mayawati is an exception. Here there is a lot of importance for 
charitrya, [he translates in English] character. If a woman goes around in 
public (char manus), even if she is a good woman, they say she is not. And 
some women in the Dalit movement are not of good charitrya […] because of 
these four women others do not come out.  It is my observation; out of ten 
women in the movement eight do not behave properly [meant bad charitrya] 
(Interview: 11/12/08) 
 
Amol’s assumptions about women’s bodies, their social roles and the possibilities of 
corruptibility also explain the exclusion of women from leadership positions in the 
BSP in Beed, and their forced domestication in the localised contexts of 
Marathwada. Nevertheless, female supporters of BSP were critical of male party 
workers who they felt did not give them opportunity to engage actively in the party. 
These dominant gender attitudes that have been adopted within the party from local 
social attitudes, are, therefore, not uncontested.  
 
BSP, the state and democratic politics 
 
In this section I have mapped how the growth of BSP in non-party spaces contributed 
to the growth of BSP as a political party. BSP holds a specific political position in 
Maharashtra that has come to signify Dalit assertion and political separatism. This 
practice, however, operates in the challenging context of party politics where money 
and caste overwhelm principled politics. Thus there exists a tension between the 
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ideal and the substantive, in the actual practice of politics in the BSP. I will explore 
this tension and the strategies of BSP cadre in more detail in chapters seven and nine 
that focus on use of caste and cultural repertoires of BSP and on the mobilisation 
during parliamentary elections of 2009 respectively.  
 
BSP workers become most active during the elections; the cadres are mostly 
discouraged from resorting to protests56 and are advised to concentrate on conducting 
cadre camps instead for ideological dissemination and BSP’s growth. The case of 
BSP presents an organised effort, backed by the spirit of its volunteers, to secure 
political power. They hope to bring social change from above through the sovereign 
state whose functioning can be controlled through securing political power 
democratically. Thus reforming society through the state, this also requires 
mobilisation from below for formation of an imagined Bahujan political community 
which is appreciative of Ambedkarite ideology. BSP’s politics helps us gain an in-
depth understanding of the blurring of the state- civil society boundaries and the 
claim of Dalits over the state despite being at the margins of civil society and the 
state.   
 
 
MHA on the other hand is a movement which resorts to the politics of protest and its 
workers engage with the daily challenges that Dalits approach them with. MHA has a 
visible presence of women activists and also has a ‘NGO’ face to its politics. In the 
following section I will present these civil and political forms of MHA and their 
intersections. 
 
Introducing Manavi Hakk Abhiyaan and its civil and political identities  
Manavi Hakk Abhiyaan (which translates in English as ‘Human Rights 
Movement/Campaign’) is a grassroots Dalit movement organisation lead by Eknath 
Awad. MHA is active in Marathwada, more particularly Beed, and has a strong 
support base amongst the Mangs.   
 
                                                 
56 BSP workers do not always follow the orders especially ones related to protests. See Chapter seven 
for Sanju’s activism.  
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MHA is not a registered body and in its actual functioning has two parallel 
organisational forms: one is of a registered NGO called the Rural Development 
Centre (RDC); and the other is of MHA as a grassroots Dalit social movement 
organisation. In the official correspondences of RDC with the INGOs who support it, 
MHA is referred to as Campaign for Human Rights (CHR hereon). CHR in RDC’s 
official discourses conveys the mass support that RDC has, which strengthens RDC’s 
funding support from INGOs. It is however the name Manavi Hakk Abhiyaan and its 
vernacular practices, that are prominent in Beed amongst Dalits, more particularly 
Mangs.  It would be hard to find Dalits in Beed who know MHA as RDC-CHR.   
 
In the following sections I will detail MHA’s dual accountability; one is upward 
accountability to the international organisations and movements that RDC-CHR 
networks with, and the other is downward accountability in the form of MHA that is 
rooted in the complex vernacular Dalit politics. I will also present here the 
intersections of RDC and MHA.  
 RDC-CHR as the NGO face and ‘upward’ accountability 
Awad was associated with Dalit activism particularly Dalit Panthers since school 
days. He pursued education despite coming from a very poor landless Mang family, 
and completed a Masters in Social Work in 1982. He had dropped out of his M.A in 
political science to join Social Work because of the good job prospects. After 
completing his degree in Social Work he joined as an employee at Vidhayak Sansad, 
an NGO working on tribal rights in Thane. Later in 1983 Awad worked with another 
NGO, the Churches Auxiliaries for Social Action (CASA), as a field officer in 
Maharashtra. While working with CASA, he registered Rural Development Centre 
(RDC) in 1985 under the Societies Registration Act and the Public Trust Act.   
 
RDC’s emergence can also be seen as part of the ‘non-political’ NGO boom that 
India has witnessed since 1980s (Kamat 2002). Registering of an association gives 
such organisations the legal sanction to secure resources from national and 
international organisations for engaging in non-political activities like welfare and 
development projects. Along with legal recognition come certain norms and 
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regulations over the types of activities the NGOs can perform. Kamat (2002: 52) 
observes, ‘NGO interventions that are apolitical are allowed financial support from 
within or outside the country, whereas struggle-based organisations are denied such 
support.’    
 
Registering an association, besides legal recognition, also gives absolute control over 
the registered societies/organisations to the group of individuals who register them. 
RDC like several other NGOs has a board of trustees but Awad remains the key 
force who heads RDC.  Most funding support in India to NGOs, including support 
from the government funding organisations, requires three years of registration and 
work experience as a pre-requisite for extending funding to NGOs. RDC received its 
first funding support from CASA which enabled it to build up its credibility. The 
initial project implemented by RDC focused on ‘income generation and 
development’ (apolitical) activities like forming village-level development 
committees and cooperatives raising goats and building brick kilns. Whilst the 
monthly reports from April 1988 to July 1988 by Gaikwad, the only staff member on 
this project, were confined to details of village level meetings on water, health and 
livelihoods, he informed me that as part of his work he was also involved in 
mobilising Dalits against traditional discriminatory caste practices and for Jayanti 
celebrations (Interview: 9/6/09). Such projects of ‘development and conscientisation’ 
operated alongside the livelihoods work and were merged with creating awareness 
amongst Dalits through kala pathaks (artist groups) to mobilise Dalits for celebrating 
Ambedkar Jayanti. 
 
Significantly, the bylaws of RDC that chart the official objectives do not mention the 
intention of working on the issue of caste or Dalits. The broad objectives stated in the 
organisation’s documentation include health, education, livelihood and youth 
development. RDC was thus the associational cover for Awad’s Dalit activism from 
the mid-80s till early 90s where he officially focused on development and not on 
caste issues or Dalits.  
 
The discourse of human rights consolidated in the practices of INGOs in early 1990s. 
 107 
This also included Dalit issues in the discourse of human rights in international 
activism (Bob 2007).  Similarly the discursive practice of Dalit and Dalit rights has 
become part of RDC’s procedural practice since the 1990s. This was also a result of 
recognition of Dalit issues in INGO discourses and increasing (financial) support 
extended by INGOs to work on Dalit issues. CHR was thus conceived as a people’s 
movement for securing human rights for Dalits. It was formed on 10th December 
1989 to mark international human rights day. CHR was thus an NGO-supported 
movement and some of the earliest activists working for CHR were provided with 
the financial support in the form of fellowships by INGOs (Holdeen India Program 
and Oxfam). Such support was routed through RDC and was coupled with legal 
training for the activists in legislation that abolished bonded labour, untouchability 
and caste discrimination/violence.  Kamat’s (2002) critique of a limited vision of 
NGOs that revolves around local feudal practices at the cost of capitalist social 
relations is relevant in the study of RDC-CHR as CHR was formed as a campaign 
with NGO support to raise similar issues facing Dalits. The stigmatization of Dalit 
bodies and labour were framed under RDC-CHR as one of bonded-labour.57 The 
international conventions against bonded labour and the interests of INGOs to 
support activism challenging these practices were made relevant in the caste context 
of Marathwada through RDC-CHR.   
 
Paid activists of RDC-CHR raised issues of caste atrocities and veth begar by using 
the Bonded Labour Abolition Act (1976). Dalit families who worked as agricultural 
labourers for a specific landlord on an annual basis for food and minimal cash were 
identified and motivated to leave such jobs. For instance the case of Narayan 
Mukund Awad and his family from Rajewadi was taken up by RDC workers in 
1991. Narayan and his family had been working at the house of a Maratha landlord 
for an annual amount of rupees 250 (started with 50 rupees loan) and 50 Kg jowar 
(cereal) per month for 10 years. The family was freed and secured compensation for 
resettlement. The activists actively continued to identify various such cases of what it 
termed “caste-based bondage”. The state officials were initially supportive, however, 
                                                 
57 As discussed in chapter three, the land tenure systems under Nizam in Marathwada gave immense 
power to Jaagirdars  constructing a highly feudal economy and society that survived in the post-
Nizam period leaving Dalits, particularly Mangs as landless labourers and veth begars.   
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after with inflating number of cases, the state machinery stopped recognising these 
cases as bonded-labour. RDC workers also participated in village level mobilisation 
motivating Dalits to cultivate grazing land. MHA’s approach can be distinguished 
from that of the Panthers and other Dalit actors in Marathwada primarily by the 
superior knowledge and training that MHA activists possess on acts like Protection 
of Civil Rights and Prevention of Atrocities Act 1989.   
 
RDC-CHR thus came to be the modern and civil face that networks with the 
international organisations and movements and they also fit well within the type of 
associations that the state promotes and recognises for development purposes. RDC-
CHR in their upward accountability to the INGOs present MHA and its vernacular 
politics in a form that INGOs can legitimately engage with. As such these 
organisations reflect the procedural face and interpretation of MHA’s vernacular 
politics. This does not mean that there is a contradiction between the human rights 
discursive practices of I/NGOs and the vernacular practices that Awad engaged in 
through RDC-CHR. The vernacular form of MHA is of a Dalit Sanghatna 
(organisation) which can be termed as driven by downward accountability to its 
supporters/members. This sanghatna largely comprises of Mangs. 
 
Manavi Hakk Abhiyaan as the vernacular face and “downward” accountability 
 
While CHR was started as I/NGO-supported movement, its practices remained 
vernacular and similar to other Dalit movements.  I prefer to speak of MHA as this 
was the term used on ground and vernacular practices instead of CHR as used in 
RDC procedures. The earliest activists who worked on fellowships in RDC-CHR had 
previously been associated with Dalit Panthers; they thus consolidated vernacular 
practices of Dalit mobilisation in MHA besides learning some procedures of NGOs. 
RDC on the other hand remained a shadow organisation locally providing resources 




D.R Jadhav, another founding member of MHA from Mang caste had resigned from 
his government job to be part of MHA. Jadhav noted the conscious focus on Mangs 
in MHA: ‘Though in principle we thought of going beyond caste in our work, it was 
also decided that the focus will be on Mangs who are the most backward within the 
Dalits’ (Interview: 25/4/09).  The main objective of MHA, as conceived by its senior 
Dalit workers, was to promote Phule-Ambedkarism.58 Caste thus remained at the 
centre of the formation and mobilisation strategies of MHA.  
 
The office of RDC in current times is a small compound which now hosts training 
halls, guest rooms, file rooms, and office computers. Awad has an office space here 
which is similar to a Dalit political party office with pictures of Ambedkar, Shahu, 
Phule, Annabhau, Savitribai Phule adorning the wall behind Awad’s chair. This can 
be termed as one part of the daily vernacular practice of MHA where Dalits visit 
Awad with their various grievances. MHA also has village level branches in some 
villages of Beed, like other (non-NGO) Dalit socio-political organisations, with its 
boards and flags erected in village public squares.  
 
In the formative years of MHA, this RDC office space was burnt down twice by the 
Marathas. MHA’s mobilisation against untouchability brought it into conflict with 
the dominant castes locally (both the Marathas and Vanjaris). MHA for them came to 
be known as a Dalit group (like some other Dalit formations) that turns every case of 
conflict with Dalits (particularly Mangs) into a caste “atrocity” case, thereby 
registering “false” cases against dominant castes under the SC/ST (PoA) Act.59 
While the state institutions usually do not fund assertive Dalit mobilisation through 
NGOs, international funding to RDC has grown with various INGOs financing 
projects that merge development and rights including projects on child rights, gender 
                                                 
58 The Phule-Ambedkarite ideology and discourses are also referred to as Dalit-Bahujan discourses in 
academic circles.  Rodrigues (2006) identifies the key the constituents of Dalit-Bahujan discourse as, 
‘self respect, opposition to Brahmanism, own historiography, positive perception to modernity and 
soft on colonialism, affirmation of political values and rights (includes political and cultural in 
addition to economic), rejection of the culture of masculinity and religion as morality with no belief in 
god or salvation’. 
59 See Chapter seven for caste violence , the importance of atrocity act in Dalit politics and the 
Maratha angst against protective legislations for Dalits. 
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equity, land rights, livelihoods and Dalit rights.60  
 
Overemphasizing the role of the discursive emphasis of ‘human rights’ in RDC-CHR 
would underplay the previous Left and Dalit movement leanings of key Dalit leaders 
and would also turn a blind eye to the vernacular identities and performances of 
MHA. Though it was formed on International Human Rights Day (IHRD), 
celebration of IHRD is a mere formality in the current activism practices of MHA. 
More passionate mobilisation and conscientisation happens on Annabhau Sathe 
Jayanti, Ambedkar Jayanti, Savitribai Phule Jayanti and also on Awad’s birthday 
which is celebrated as sangharsh (struggle) day by activists. Awad thus seized on 
INGO funding priorities to legitimize issues that he and other Dalit activists were 
already engaged in. Caste thus remained at the centre of the formation and 
mobilisation strategies of the vernacular form and practices of MHA. 
 
The intersections- NGOs as support for the Movement and Dalitisation of NGO 
activism in MHA  
 
As stated earlier, Awad was part of Dalit movement politics much before his 
exposure to the mushrooming NGO sector of the 80s. He was active in the Dalit 
Panthers during his schooling and later became the Majalgaon Taluka president of 
DS4 and he was the up-adhyaksha (vice-president) of BAMCEF while he was 
working with CASA. The activists of MHA under Awad’s leadership engaged in 
challenging untouchability in villages especially through temple entry for Mangs, 
politicising caste relations and particularly mobilising Mangs. Movement songs were 
written for MHA by well known local Dalit movement shahirs (ballad singers) like 
Vamandada Kardak. These songs included slogans like those quoted below, which 
established MHA as an assertive Ambedkarite Dalit group: 
 
Aamcha ladha nyaya sathi Manus Mhanun Jagnyasahti 
Our struggle is for justice and for living like human beings                                                                                                                      
Phule Shahu Bhim Anna chya vicharachi Shaan Manavi Hakk Abhiyaan                                                                                                 
                                                 
60 The sixth chapter presents in detail the vernacularisation of INGO rights practices in MHA’s 
mobilisation around gaairan.   
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The pride of Phule, Shahu, Ambedkar and Annabhau’s thought is MHA                                                              
Manuskichi Bhik Nako- Hakk Hava Hakk Hava 
We do not want our humanity [recognised/] as charity but as our right 
Vishamte viruddh tufaan Manavi Hakk Abhiyaan 
The storm against inequality is MHA 
 
Awad has also encouraged registration of other organisations and trade unions which 
are independent of RDC but remain affiliated informally under the larger umbrella of 
MHA. These organisations are implementing small projects, key amongst them is 
Savitribai Phule Mahila Mandal (Womens Organisation, SPMM) which is emerging 
as a Dalit Womens’ organisation in Beed.   
 
MHA can be distinguished from non-Dalit NGOs in Marathwada, not only in its 
claims for self representation and recognition of Dalits in the NGO field, but also in 
its willingness to engage in conflicting processes of Dalit assertion,  its networking 
with Buddhist NGOs and its use of Phule-Ambedkarite ideology and symbols.  
Dalits politicised by MHA in some villages erected boards with the MHA logo that 
came into being in 1995. This logo contained the earth held in two hands and the flag 
half red and half blue which symbolised caressing the world with Ambedkarite and 
Marxist ideas. Awad maintains that he is influenced by Ambedkarite and Left 
ideology and felt that the Left has failed in India because it did not come through 
Ambedkar but through the Brahmins. Awad also disagrees with the Left’s criticism 
of NGOs. He insists that caste hierarchy is much more dangerous than globalisation 
and distinguishes the priorities of Left from his own:  
 
For instance if [standing crops on] gaairan [cultivated by Dalits] are destroyed 
by cattle [of upper castes] they [left] will not protest, they will say that that the 
world economic order should change. If a Dalit woman is raped. This is not 
their priority. If a Dalit is beaten up this is not their priority but globalisation 
should not come - this is their priority. They cannot think at a smaller level; 
most of their suggestions are impractical (Interview: 2/10/08). 
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MHA and all the externally funded projects of RDC are intertwined. RDC, however, 
remains mostly invisible in local political performance and activism. Some MHA 
activists are part of the paid staff of RDC projects but an activist working for RDC 
on child rights will not only be concerned with his/her project duties but would also 
participate in Dalit activism through MHA activities. Those who are not part of paid 
projects are motivated and influenced by the mobilisation of MHA and come mostly 
from the Mang caste. The activists motivate Mangs to set up village level branches 
by installing boards and forming committees and for organising Annabhau Sathe 
Jayanti. Such politicisation of Dalits particularly that which has involved claiming 
public spaces also led to violent reactions from dominant castes (see Chapter eight). 
Activists of MHA also act as brokers and provide Dalits access to the state, besides 
helping them in times of difficulty particularly violence from dominant castes.  
 
Dalit women’s involvement in MHA 
MHA has much stronger contact with Dalit women compared to other non-NGO 
Dalit socio-political groups and a visible presence of women activists. This is related, 
to some extent, with the various projects implemented by RDC that require securing 
participation of women in development activities. MHA has seen an increase in 
women’s participation as RDC project activities have increased 
 
In the case of MHA, most projects implemented through its affiliated NGOs - RDC 
and SPMM - revolve largely around mobilisation of women who are organised in 
self-help groups (SHGs) at village level. Through this, women are encouraged to 
attend various meetings and rallies organised by MHA, making Dalit women a key 
constituent of MHA’s mobilisation. The number of women activists increased over 
time both as a result of pressures from funders to recruit women and interest on the 
part of the leadership to enrol women. MHA thus has a far more visible and active 
leadership of women compared to other Dalit political formations. There are women 
workers who are part of paid projects and there are some exceptions who work like 
male Dalit activists brokering state accesses for Dalits and other deprived groups.  
 
While the main constituents of MHA were Dalit women, women’s leadership has 
 113 
become increasingly visible since 2005. This was simultaneous with a ‘dialogue’ 
(and not imposition as insisted by funders) that was ongoing between SWISSAID 
and the leaders of MHA about SWISSAID’s interest to deal with the issues of gender 
imbalance within MHA as well as within Dalit households. A project on gender 
sensitising was thus conceived so as to transform both the movement processes of 
MHA and Dalit patriarchy at household level:  
 
The situation of Dalit women within the whole Dalit community should be 
brought out. It should be recognised that even within the Dalit community the 
women are marginalised and exploited. If Dalits are fighting against 
discrimination [...] what about discrimination that Dalit women face? Within the 
movement we have women coming on the streets and protesting but the whole 
leadership lies with men. The whole patriarchal structure is sustained like this 
[…] what is the point? (Interview SWISSAID Country Director: 28/1/09). 
 
Professionals provided training on gender mainstreaming to workers, both men and 
women. As part of transforming the leadership imbalance, new opportunities were 
opened up for women, key among them was the formation of a Women’s Wing in 
MHA. Some the women activists of MHA are as active as the men especially in 
dealing with the state machinery, leading protests or giving speeches. Women who 
were active but at the margins came to play more important roles. Very few male 
workers have been influenced by the training and sensitisation processes and have 
atteplted embraced these trainings in their daily lives; others have mocked the idea of 
gender equality.  
 
MHA however has contributed to increased participation and politicisation of Dalit 
women. The women’s Self-Help Groups within MHA, that are generally formed for 
savings and credit purposes under state and (I)NGO practices, are also involved in 
organising Savitribai Phule, Ambedkar and Annabhau Sathe Jayanti. Female 
participants are urged through speeches by MHA activists to give up “backward” 
practices like karan61, maria-aai and male participants are particularly warned 
                                                 
61 A karan refers to a religious event of sacrificing animals (buffaloes or goats for gods) which friends 
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against the evils of alcoholism. Dalits are encouraged to invest in children’s 
education and are encouraged to participate in certain ritual practices of Dalit 
movements; the critique of caste Hindu order and patriarchy and mobilising opinion 
in favour of religious conversions are merged into the projects of RDC. The activities 
of MHA are not restricted to caste and Dalit atrocities but also include issues like 
promoting education, child rights, grazing land development, land rights, 
employment rights [National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme] and health.  
 
MHA in local politics and electoral competition 
The political influence of MHA in Marathwada has grown over years with village 
level shaka being established in various places. MHA locally has a distinct identity 
amongst the Dalit groups in Beed and is seen as a Mang socio-political group with 
Ambedkarite leanings. It is primarily distinguished from other Mang groups like 
ABMS and BRP in its Ambedkarite position. The use of “Jai Bhim” as a way of 
greeting is part of daily political ritual in MHA’s functioning, which is not the case 
among other Mang socio-political groups as they mostly associate Mahar identity 
with Ambedkar. Awad also converted to Buddhism in 2006 along with some of his 
followers at Nagpur to mark 50 years of Ambedkar’s conversion to Buddhism.  
 
Eknath Awad maintained active links with BSP till the year 2000. He was the 
Maharashtra vice president of BSP and contested parliamentary elections in 1999 
polling 15,666 votes. Awad termed these elections as “a sacrifice for the movement 
and not fought with intent to win. ... The prime goal was to purge Dalit votes from 
Congress” (Interview/24/8/08). The Congress candidate had lost the seat only 
because of Awad contesting the elections as he managed to swing Dalit votes in 
favour of BSP. The BJP candidate who won the elections polled 300,307 votes and 
the Congress candidate who was runner up had polled 294,204.   
 
                                                                                                                                          
and relatives feast on. A potraj is called to make this sacrifice in the case of goddess mari-aai. A karan 
of mari-aai can also be done by the village patil if he offers the halya (male buffalo).  Karan is 
generally done to ask for a navas (specific blessings) from gods or to return the blessings that goddess 
has extended. This will cost anything between five thousand to ten thousand rupees to the families that 
organise karan. The activists see this as hard earned savings or loans taken on high interests and 
suggest in their speeches on avoiding such expenses and instead advise people to invest in children’s 
education. 
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When Awad participated in elections, BSP workers and activists were discouraged 
from entering the (apolitical) RDC campus in Telgoan and campaign vehicles were 
generally parked at a distance when workers came to the kitchen of RDC for lunch. 
Awad withdrew from BSP in the year 2000.  One of the internal evaluation reports of 
RDC-CHR recommended that Awad should stay away from party politics.  Awad 
elaborated, ‘I realised if I become active in politics, we will lose some resources that 
we have got for people [through RDC],’ (Interview: 2/10/08). 
 
Awad, however, has not remained aloof from party politics and has pursued his 
political ambition despite being aware of the difficulties in achieving them. He led 
the process of forming an independent political party called Bahujan Majoor Paksha 
(Bahujan Labour Party – BMP hereon) in the year 2000 which was an effort to 
consolidate Mang votes.  Awad did not take any official position in this party though 
he remained the main force behind it. There was an overwhelming response from the 
Mangs in this initiative. The village level shakhas of MHA also became BMP 
shakhas with an additional logo and slogan, BMP ki kya Pahchan Hath Pe Dharthi 
Laal Nishaan (“The identification of BMP is globe on hands in red”). This logo of 
BMP was painted on the reverse side of MHA boards put up in villages. The growing 
clout of BMP and Awad amongst the Mangs in Beed were not well received by the 
local leaders of NCP who encouraged BRP (another Mang formation, part of NCP) 
to mobilise the Mangs of Beed against Awad. While some workers of BMP were of 
the opinion that it should not enter into an alliance with any party for 10 years, Awad 
formed an alliance with the BJP in 2004 to counter Congress and the BRP. Awad 
switched to support NCP in the 2009 elections and during my short visit in January 
2010 he was scathing in his criticism of politicians and termed them as terrorists and 
not policy makers. Awad’s simultaneous criticism and engagement with party 
politics seems opportunist and intriguing, they however also represent the 
importance of party politics in Dalit movements and the marginal status of Dalits in 
mainstream political parties.  
 
I will dwell in detail on the use of caste in MHA’s politics in chapter eight and its 
involvement in electoral politics in chapter nine. As of now it suffices to say that 
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MHA has a dual faced dynamic structure: one is that of a vernacular Dalit movement 
with dominance of Mangs that operates within the local context of competing and 
collaborating Dalit movements; and the other is that of a NGO in the form of RDC-
CHR.  
 
Awad: the charismatic leader 
At the RDC office Dalits, nomadic tribes and sometimes lower OBCs come to see 
Awad to seek help for problems ranging from caste atrocities, police atrocities and 
threats from upper castes to skirmishes, contractor-sugarcane labourer disputes, 
family disputes or unnecessary bribe demands from government officials.   Awad is 
respected not just amongst the Mangs but also amongst Mahars who find him to be 
aggressive and radical in his practice of Ambedkarite ideology and raising Dalit 
issues.  
 
Awad, however, holds a charismatic position particularly for his Mang supporters in 
Beed, as a leader of their own caste who has not sold out and is committed to the 
cause of Mangs and can solve their problems. Within MHA, workers continually re-
emphasise his charisma. Awad owns a fleet of three cars (SUVs) which are a matter 
of pride for his Mang supporters. His aggressive speeches and calling for self-help 
and self-respect have motivated Mangs – both men and women. Locally he is 
referred to with the respectful term jija (sister’s husband). Some activists have put up 
Awad’s pictures in their home and Awad’s birthday (January 15) is celebrated by 
activists as an occasion for protests. Some supporters even print his picture on their 
wedding invitations.  
 
Awad participated in the World Conference against Racism in Durban in 2001 and in 
the UN plenary of Human Rights Council (UNHRC) at Geneva in 2009. Locally, 
these global visits were turned into events for political performance, by organising a 
satkar (honouring) of Awad for being invited to the UN meeting to represent Dalit 
issues in Geneva. Awad is also called to speak on Dalit movements by other non-
party movements like the AIMBCS (All India Mulniwasi Bahujan Samaj Central 
Sangh) and colleges and universities in Maharashtra. There are local publications on 
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Awad detailing Awad’s personal and political struggle and his Ambedkarite 
commitment. A book titled Vadlatil Nikhara (Hope in the Storm), published by 
MHA, was written about Awad by his Mahar friend B.S Gaikwad.  
 
MHA thus contributes to the deepening of Dalit movements and politics in 
Marathwada. Its effectiveness has been in merging the global resources and local 
activism to challenge Dalit social, political and economic exclusion. It is not merely 
an elite advocacy NGO but is also rooted in the local complexities of Dalit politics. 
 
Dalit politics in Maharashtra: a continuum of socio-political struggles  
In a discussion on priesthood in Hinduism with some non-Dalits, I asked a Maratha 
in Kari village, if a Mang could become a priest? He replied that was “impossible” 
(Fieldnotes: 3/12/09). Dalit politics functions in a context of socio-cultural 
‘impossibilities’ and political and economic ‘possibilities’. It is within this context 
that Dalit movements and assertion have continued to grow. The state constitutes an 
important site of political engagement for Dalit politics as a structure of opportunity 
for socio-economic and political mobility and a target of claims for justice. The state 
also plays a role in denial of justice and mobility to Dalits. The non-party struggles 
that strive to stay away from party politics and engage in political education of Dalits 
also construct a political culture which makes the state significant thus blurring the 
boundaries between the state and civil society.  Sites of Dalit assertion for 
recognition and redistribution in political, cultural and economic spheres are also 




NGOs in Dalit Politics 
  
Two key issues that Dalit movements in Marathwada mobilise around are 
encroachment of common grazing land for cultivation purposes by Dalits and caste 
atrocities against Dalits. Dalit mobilisation for land rights or cultivation of 
government lands in the last decade has attracted international civil society actors 
who participate in such mobilisation through local Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs). 
 
 There are two broad contending positions that debate the cause and outcomes of the 
current growth of NGOs in the civil society arenas across the world; one that views 
the mushrooming of NGOs as part of an evolving transnational/global civil society 
and the other that explains NGOs as tools of expanding neo-liberalism/neo-
imperialism/neo-colonialism. This chapter contextualizes this debate by presenting 
the politics of formation of a funding-driven network of NGOs on Dalit land rights, 
its strategies and its vernacularisation through MHA.  This chapter cautions against 
exaggerating the role of international civil society actors in local democratisation 
processes. It also argues that the anticipated fear of neo-liberal governmentality that 
NGOs consolidate in depoliticising public interests, is a misplaced one in the case of 
Dalits particularly in Marathwada. 
 
India like other parts of the developing world has witnessed the mushrooming of 
private professional institutions known as NGOs in the fields of development and 
human rights since the 1980s. Democracy, development and human rights are new 
hegemonic ideas that currently legitimise national regimes (Donnelly 1999). 
Intersections of the local and the global institutions on issues of development and 
human rights are increasingly visible in the global south. UN agencies and a growing 
number of local and International NGOs (INGOs) are committing themselves to 




The rise of NGOs and their increased socio-political and economic roles has been a 
matter of contention amongst scholars. This chapter engages in the debate on the 
utility and role of NGOs through the study of NGO intersections in Dalit movements, 
particularly rights based advocacy.  
 
Legally recognised associations have been a resource in Dalit movements of western 
India since the colonial advent. However, formation and functioning of associations 
with external aid from national or international funding was a phenomenon largely 
missing in Dalit movements until the 1990s. In this chapter I conceptualise NGOs as 
‘new’ associations in the context of globalising grassroots and Dalit politics that 
network with transnational civil society. I refer to the technologies of rights used by 
I/NGOs as ‘new’ technologies of rights to primarily distinguish them from the 
technologies of state, to chart the moral and technical high ground they claim (as 
compared to ‘failed’ technologies of state), and to explore the engagement of these 
technologies with the ones of state through Dalits movements at the grassroots. 
 
Here, I begin by briefly summarising the two key competing perspectives that debate 
the rise and role of NGOs in the context of globalisation and make a case for the 
study of varied contexts of NGOs. I detail the land rights mobilisation of Dalits in 
Marathwada as a necessary site for institutional and extra-institutional struggle.  In 
chapter four I have presented the vernacular politics of MHA despite its NGO form 
in RDC. MHA’s vernacular practices also includes mobilisation of Dalis for 
cultivation of gaairan land. In the third section I present the process of formation of 
Jameen Adhikar Andolan (JAA), a network of local NGOs mobilised on the issue of 
Dalit land rights. I describe the key objectives and project components of JAA and 
will elaborate on the vernacularisation of the new technologies of rights in the local 
practices of MHA in the fourth section.  In the conclusion I argue that new rights 
technologies of global actors have been vernacularised and politicised by MHA, 




NGOs: the making of global associational revolution or neo-imperialism at 
large?  
Liberal theories confirming democracy’s dependence on associations and 
associational life are long standing. Current development efforts increasingly 
concentrate on the formation of NGOs in the belief that such institutions help foster 
and maintain stable democracies (Paxton 2002). There is a need, however, to 
distinguish NGOs as a new species of associations from those voluntary associations 
that Tocqueville (1945) makes central in establishing democracy. This will 
particularly help us delineate the voluntary character of mass based social 
movements from these new private and professional bodies called NGOs. In the 
study of human rights such a distinction will help us, ‘explore the agency of people 
in the social construction of human rights and the counter hegemony that social 
movements seek to establish at the level of public common-sense’(Stammers 1999).  
 
The current mushrooming of I/NGOs that advocate ‘rights-based’ development has 
been critiqued following the analyses of global political economy and micro field 
studies. The increased role of NGOs in development processes in the global south is 
also coupled with the wave of structural adjustment (policies) that swept the 
developing world, where curtailing fiscal deficits and state’s social welfare role 
became a priority. Critics therefore argue that a ‘new’ form of civil society through 
NGOs is pushed forward by multilateral aid agencies like the World Bank to promote 
anti-politics machinery, causing the withdrawal of state and decline in public 
expenditure. Harriss (2001: 118 emphasis in original) maintains that, ‘the concept of 
'civil society' in such discourse excludes 'political society'; and the sorts of 'voluntary 
local associations' that are endorsed are not political organisations (such as political 
parties or trade unions)’. NGOs thus act as, ‘Trojan horses for global neo-liberalism’ 
(Harvey 2007: 117), or neo-imperialism (Karat 1984), and play a key role in 
‘privatising’ public interests (Kamat 2004).  Kamat (2002: 161), based on her 
ethnographic study of NGOs, critiques them as, ‘corporatists that engender a 
corporatist identity among their members, that do not facilitate a reinterpretation of 
the material basis for a collective identity’. She critically explores the cooperative 
efforts of state and international capital in supporting the NGOs vis-à-vis the 
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expansion of global capitalist economy and process of indirect colonisation. Critics 
see NGOs as elite, non-representative, non-democratic private institutions that ‘de-
politicise’ development/public welfare and warn against the NGO-isation of social 
movements. This criticism extends to the use of rights discourse by I/NGOs. While 
the proponents argue that the ‘rights-based’ approach aims to ‘re-politicise’ 
development, those against it suggest that it is essentially dressing the same old 
exclusionary development in a new form (Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi 2004). It 
is also argued that the universality presupposed in the ‘rights talk’ of NGOs has 
pitfalls in ignoring the, ‘local particularities and daily process of political and 
economic life under pressures of commodification and neoliberalisation’ (Harvey, 
2007: 177-178).  
 
The rise of NGOs globally is also viewed as an extension of neo-liberal 
governmentality. Foucault’s conception of governmentality and associated 
technologies of dominance largely focus on the technologies of nation-state. An 
argument is made to challenge the, ‘very distinction insisted on by the term 
nongovernmental organisation, emphasising instead the similarities of technologies 
of government across domains’ (Ferguson and Gupta 2005: 123). The central effect 
of these new forms of transnational governmentality is seen as, ‘not so much to make 
states weak (or strong), as to reconfigure states’ abilities to spatialise their authority 
and superior generality and universality’ (Ferguson & Gupta, 2005: 123).   
 
A contrasting perspective to those (over) emphasising material dimensions and 
resurrection of colonialism is found in others who point to the existence of multiple 
subaltern counter publics and their global intersections. Calhoun (1999) argues that, 
‘globalisation has also led to rise in solidarities and activities that cross borders and 
transnational organisations’ links may also work to empower sub-national regions or 
other groupings.’  Appadurai (2000) suggests that the rise of an active transnational 
public sphere and networks amongst social movements makes globalisation not 
merely a phenomenon coming from above but create possibilities of ‘grass-roots 
globalisation’. In the growth of transnational networks between NGOs/social 
movements, Appadurai (2001) also posits the possibility of ‘deep democracy’, a 
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democracy that transcends national borders and ‘governmentality from below’.  
 
In the case of rights-based approaches, Cornwall and Nyamu-Musebi (2004) remind 
us about the existence of plural rights-based approaches with different starting points 
and different implications for development practice. Offenheiser & Holcombe (2003: 
299), observe, that the rights-based approach, ‘transforms needs into rights, 
capabilities, and responsibilities and puts the states’ responsibilities to its citizens 
under a lens’. With the rise of global civil society, they also see possibilities of a 
global social contract in issues of environment, livelihoods and security (Offenheiser 
& Holcombe, 2003: 300) 
 
The current era of neo-liberalism and globalisation besides capitalist expansionism 
has also rolled out certain possibilities of transnational governance and civil society, 
where I/NGOs have emerged as key institutions. Globalisation thus is not necessarily 
weakening the nation-state and non-economic dimensions of globalisation have 
varied implications for social movement politics and their functioning at grassroots. 
Caste and untouchability have been presented at UN and other international forums 
as issues of human rights violation actively in the last two and a half decades, Ilaiah 
refers to this process as globalisation of caste and untouchability (Ilaiah, 2006). 
Ramaiah (2009: 63) argues that, ‘Dalits during globalisation have been able to give 
global visibility to their issues, taking the support of a number of local, national and 
global level civil society organisations, and rightly placing caste issues before the 
United Nations.’ Studies of Dalit activism in the transnational public sphere have 
largely concentrated on the functioning of networks like National Campaign on Dalit 
Human Rights (NCDHR) and International Dalit Solidarity Network (IDSN) at 
United Nations forums and their impact in influencing policies of national 
governments and international bodies.  
 
A study of the intersections of transnational public spheres (that increasingly 
advocate coalescing of rights and development) with vernacular micro-political 
practices of Dalit movements is still missing. Mercer (2002) rightly calls for a study 
of the complex role of NGOs in development through a more contextualised and less 
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value-laden approach. This chapter makes such an attempt through examining 
MHA’s mobilisaton around land rights in Marathwada. MHA derives support from 
international civil society actors and its leaders participate in UN meetings, but 
MHA’s practices are also rooted in the daily complex and conflictual practices of 
Dalit movements. I have simplified this dichotomy in the role of MHA as dual 
accountability in the Chapter four, one is the upward accountability for the 
international supporters and the second is its downward accountability to its 
supporters that is rooted in the muddled realities of Dalit politics. 
 
 
Locating NGOs, INGOs in globalised grassroots and Dalit politics  
Long before the rise of foreign funding for the NGO sector in India in the 1980s, the 
postcolonial state finances supported non-government institutions, which 
consolidated the dominance of landed gentry in rural Maharashtra. Marathwada for 
instance, like the rest of Maharashtra, has a history of state supported cooperative 
sector (credit and sugar) dominated by the Marathas (Dahiwale 1995; Rosenthal 
1974; Lele 1990).  The credit and sugar cooperatives besides control of land are key 
institutions that sustain economic and political inequality between the dominant 
castes, like Marathas, and Dalits. Both these sectors receive regular grants from the 
state government in the form of working capital, loan waivers and subsidies. 
Similarly, various educational institutions that are managed privately by the 
dominant castes too are aided by the government; thus thickening their socio-
cultural, political and economic capital. 
 
On the other hand the discursive practice of rights mobilisation in Dalit movements 
is not a recent invention. The language of rights claiming has historically been in 
circulation in Dalit movements in Maharashtra and has roots in colonial liberalism 
(Rao 2009). The liberal democratic state, its dispersed institutions and disciplinarian 
technologies are important sites of competitive mobilisation and protests for Dalit 
movements. The post-Ambedkar phase of Dalit movements in Maharashtra furthered 
the emphasis on implementation of rights granted to Dalits under the Constitution.  
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Thus Dalit movements in current times rationalise their mobilisation around the 
democratic liberal state by symbolically evoking Ambedkar’s key role in drafting the 
Constitution and in securing rights for Dalits and other marginalised social groups. 
Dalit movements in the grassroots context of Marathwada at times violently engage 
with the exclusionary practices of the state and simultaneously make the liberal 
Constitution, the basis of their demand for rights.  The symbolic evoking of the 
Constitution can be termed as a procedural emphasis in Dalit movements, Dalit 
activists in the local context however strategise within the vernacular substantive 
practices of democracy that are deep rooted in corruption and daily manipulative 
politics which largely work in favour of dominant castes. Dalit movements thus do 
not merely resort to institutional mechanisms.  
 
The late 1980s saw a rise of NGO activity in Dalit politics in Marathwada. While 
NGOs as new associations, as per their byelaws aspire to raise voluntary 
contributions; very few NGOs actually survive financially on voluntary 
contributions. Hudock (1999) relates the emergence of Southern NGOs partly to the 
funding opportunities from northern NGOs which he suggests creates democracy by 
proxy. In India the mushrooming of NGOs can also be attributed to the increase in 
funding opportunities to such private and legally recognised bodies from both the 
government and non-government national/international funding institutions since the 
1980s. The state in the 1980s increased spending for NGOs, to promote their role in 
development activities. The funding flows from INGOs on the other hand 
increasingly cover less of public service delivery and focus on promoting public 
action through merging development and rights in a democratic context. The funding 
interests of the state are different from those of liberal funding agencies, Kamat 
(2002: 22) maintains that, ‘liberal funding agencies and more often liberal and left 
leaning individuals within private funding agencies are more often interested in 
directing funding towards political education.’ She further comments that, ‘such 
concern of funding agencies is often limited to oppression caused by feudal social 
relations, and does not refer to capitalist social relations’.  RDC-CHR, the NGO face 
of MHA too have focussed on altering feudal relations so as to liberate Dalits from 
what they termed caste-based bondage [veth beggar]. However, MHA has also 
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concentrated on cultivation of government land by Dalits like other Dalit movements 
in Marathwada.  
 
Dalit activism and the land question in Marathwada 
The Dalit land question in Marathwada is one issue that has evoked institutional and 
extra-institutional Dalit mobilisation since the 1950s. Dalit mobilisation on the issue 
of gaairan land and other lands like forest, temple and burial in Marathwada can be 
traced to Ambedkar’s period. Dadasaheb Gaikwad, a contemporary of Ambedkar led 
a satyagraha [form of peaceful protest generally attributed to Gandhi] of landless 
peasants for wasteland in Marathwada region in 1953, he was arrested and 
imprisoned for four months at Harsul Jail in Aurangabad for this protest 
(Kshrasgara 1994). Ambedkar himself had called for encroachment of government 
lands for cultivation by the landless in 1955, following which 2000 Dalits from 
Marathwada had encroached government lands (Pardeshi 2002: 32). Dadasaheb 
Gaikwad continued the land satyagraha through the Republican Party of India (RPI), 
a nation-wide protest ensued between 1959 to 1964 (most arrests were courted in 
Vidarbha and Marathwada). These protests attracted attention of the state 
government followed by the central government that made promises to provide land 
to the landless but did not fulfil them (Pardeshi, 2002: 30-54). 
 
The mobilisation for ‘illegal’ cultivation of gaairan by Dalits and other landless 
groups has continued since then. The vernacular discourse of Dalit Hakk (rights), 
which includes extra-institutional measures like illegal cultivation of gaairan is 
dominant locally and has been effective in getting institutional recognition. Under 
pressure from Dalit and other progressive political formations for regularisation of 
encroached lands, the Maharashtra state government passed Government Resolutions 
(GR) in 1978 and then on 14th April 1991 (to mark Ambedkar’s birth centenary 
year), ordering regularisation of encroachments till 1990. The GR of 1978 was 
revised in 1979 to specify “caste” criteria for regularising encroachments, which 
authorised regularisation of only those encroachments by Scheduled Castes, 
Scheduled Tribes, Nomadic Tribes, Denotified Tribes or Neo-buddhists (Bokil 
1996). Mobilisation of encroachments thus got polarised along caste lines; besides 
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Dalits other castes like pardhis and bhils [both were identified as criminal tribes in 
colonial period] too participated in encroachments. Since the GR of 1991, the 
encroachment has aggravated in the hope of further regularisation of newly 
encroached lands, a process that continues till date. 
 
The extent of gaairan all over Marathwada is 240,800 hectares belonging to 7,786 
villages; following the 1991 ordinance of the government, 28,875 ha of gaairan were 
privatised in Marathwada, this was 12 per cent of the total (Bokil 1996). Guru (1997) 
challenges these official figures of land allocation and points to the dominant caste-
state nexus that hindered the possession of land by Dalits. The actual implementation 
of the regularisation GR by the government was a very poorly done affair. The 
Government Orders of 2001 and 2005 recognise (under pressure from various socio-
political movements) that the GR for regularising encroached land in 1991 was not 
implemented efficiently by Revenue Department thereby denying ownership to many 
rightful beneficiaries. 
 
Various Dalit socio-political formations like factions of RPI, and new Dalit groups 
like Akhil Bhartiya Matang Mahasangh, Dalit Mahasangh and MHA are still 
involved in encouraging cultivation on gaairan lands by Dalits in Marathwada.62 
They also try to pressurise the government into regularising these encroachments. 
Below are notes from a mass political rally organised by RPI (A) on gairaan.  
 
A mass rally was organised by RPI (Athavale) called Dalit Hakk Parishad 
(Dalit Rights Convention).  The main roads of Beed city were flooded with 
blue flags and banners of RPI (A). Huge hoardings with pictures of Ramdas 
Athavale, president of RPI (A) were put up on the main streets.  RPI workers 
had mobilised Dalits, mostly encroachers of gaairan from villages of Beed 
district to attend the rally and around 20,000 people (mostly men) participated 
in the rally.  The District leader of RPI in his speech made the following 
                                                 
62 These organisations are not united in their efforts of securing gaairan mobilisation. The gaairan 
cultivators however participate in the multiple organisations and rallies. Dalit socio-political 
organisations however unite in their protests against cases of caste atrocity which I discuss in the next 
chapter. 
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magani (demands) from the government:  all the encroachments of gaairan till 
2005 be regularised, loans given by all Scheduled Caste development 
corporations to Dalits be waived, since BPL (Below Poverty Line) survey has 
ended up excluding most poor Dalit families a new survey be carried out […] 
Ramdas Athavale, in his usual humorous and poetic style demanded that lands 
encroached till 2010 should be regularised in advance. (Fieldnotes: 4/10/08) 
 
The above rally and talk of rights was not funded by I/NGO and presents the 
politicised nature of Dalit movements in Marathwada who raise issues of not mere 
recognition but redistribution as well. The Constitution of India is made the basis of 
such demands - another important ritual practice that Dalit movements resort to. 
However, the substantive engagement of Dalit movement activists with the state 
bodies that represent the constitution (and procedural democracy) locally is one full 
of conflict, distrust, racketeering but also hope. 
 
As part of substantive politics for land rights, Dalits illegally encroached upon 
gaairan and forest lands even after 1991 and at times such encroachments led to 
conflict between Dalits and dominant castes, resulting in social boycott, humiliations, 
even rape and murder of Dalits.  Land thus is an important cause of violence against 
Dalits in Marathwada besides other socio-political assertions of Dalits that may 
challenge the dominant caste hegemony (Guru 1994). Some Dalits who had 
cultivated land with the support of MHA too were participating in the above 
mentioned Dalit Hakk Parishad in Beed.  
 
Although MHA has been supporting Dalits in cultivating gaairan and lobbying for 
regularisation of lands cultivated by Dalits, it differs from other Dalit mobilisations 
primarily in its source of financial resources for mobilization. While most Dalit 
activists of other movements largely derive funds from Dalits, government officers 
and rival or collaborating political parties and social groups, some workers of MHA 
also receive monthly salaries as they are employed in projects implemented by Rural 
Development Centre (RDC).  
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Enter INGO discourse of rights: the formation of Jameen Adhikar Andolan 
(JAA) 
Senior activists of MHA were involved in promoting gaairan cultivation even before 
the formation of MHA as members of other Dalit formations. They continued the 
process after the formation of MHA, actively after the GR of 1991, without any 
specific project support. ‘Gaairan’ in the discursive practice of Dalit movements is a 
synonym for a variety of public lands since land encroachment encompasses temple 
lands and burial grounds.  In a letter addressed to the President of India in 1995, 
MHA made three demands regarding the redistribution of land: First, the Mahar 
watan lands [a portion of land that Mahars could cultivate in return for their caste 
duties] that have been usurped by landlords be returned to Mahars; second, the large 
tracts of temple land be transferred to the landless and; finally it demanded the 
distribution of all the gaairan to the landless without any preconditions. The letter 
further notes, ‘India is the only country in the world where a lifeless god is legal 
owner of land, whereas this land is tilled by the landless and the profits makes some 
devotees rich’. Activism of MHA attracted funding organisations to participate in the 
process of land related activism (through RDC); key amongst them was Intermon 
Oxfam. 
 
Intermon Oxfam (IO hereon), an international development support organisation 
started planning projects in India since 1994. IO’s strategy plan for India 
recommended focusing on Dalits and Tribals regarding issues like sustainable 
livelihood, education and health. Initial support to RDC was a project on violation of 
human rights of Dalits. Recognising the history of movement-based mobilisation for 
gaairan in MHA and the fairly organised Dalit movement in Marathwada, the head 
of Intermon Oxfam (Thomas) suggested that MHA (Awad) should indulge in some 
‘constructive’ work like land development of regularised gaairan encroachments 
instead of mere protests (interview with Thomas: 19/3/09). IO felt that people would 
not participate in the movement protests for long if nothing constructive was done. 
Furthermore, from the point of view of those cultivators who have been cultivating 
the gaairan land before 1990 but do not have legal right over the land, it is important 
that they cultivated the gaairan regularly. Non-cultivation meant that land was 
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reclaimed by the villagers or the forest department leading to frequent emergence of 
conflicts.  
 
A project that could serve as a model for developing waste gaairan land was 
conceived on a pilot basis in 1999. Initially, it was planned to develop the grazing 
land in 15 villages for cultivation that included – land development (levelling), 
irrigation, training farmers (gaairan cultivators) in sustainable farming practices. 
This was followed by various local development-project implementing NGOs 
approaching IO to secure similar projects for developing sustainable farming 
practices on encroached lands. Most of these NGOs (Non-Dalit led) were part of 
another network of NGOs, which was mostly in competition with RDC-CHR over 
accessing funding.   
 
IO however pressed on resolving the differences and forming a new ‘network’ of all 
NGOs with specific focus on land rights. The emphasis on rights can also be viewed 
as part of IO’s gradual movement from its service delivery missions to a rights-based 
approach (Intermon-Oxfam, 2006). IO thus managed to bring competing NGOs 
together for various meetings to form a network of NGOs called Jameen Adhikar 
Andolan (Land Rights Movement, JAA here on). Fragmentation amongst Dalit 
leadership is noted as the reason for evolution and formation process of JAA in 2000. 
One of the documents of JAA states, ‘Dalit leaders working in the land rights 
struggle have realised that they must work together and strengthen their struggle’ 
(JAA 2005b: 9). The network however does not include other local Dalit socio-
political formations like that of RPI and comprises only ‘grant seeking’ NGOs. As 
noted earlier professional institutions called NGOs do not constitute part of local 
practices in Dalit politics. The keenness of Dalit leaders in gaining political power is 
seen as a shortcoming of the Dalit movement and a case is made for new forms of 
leadership to face the challenges in the era of globalisation and liberalisation (JAA 
2005a: 43-44).   
 
JAA is conceived as a sustainable livelihood promotion programme by IO and 
participating NGOs. JAA hopes to achieve, ‘a uniform land reform policy (of the 
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state) to ensure land entitlement to all landless people and increased Government 
investment on natural resources development to enhance the livelihood of the poor 
and marginalised. “All resource poor people in Maharashtra, especially Dalits will 
have enhanced capacities to make productive use of natural resources like land and 
water for sustaining their livelihoods” (JAA, 2005b: 10).    
The key project components of JAA are research and documentation, mobilisation 
and advocacy for policy level changes, training and capital for sustainable farming 
practices and community-based microfinance. Professional consultancy firms based 
in Pune and Hyderabad are involved to assist in research, developing community 
based micro-finance institutions (CBMFI) and in developing sustainable farming 
practices on gaairan. These projects were split between NGOs part of RDC-CHR 
and the other network according to the financial resources involved. Eknath Awad 
was made the president and the head of the other competing network was made the 
secretary of JAA. RDC was to lead the mobilisation and advocacy component 
(without support of any consultants) due to its previous experience on land rights. 
Kamat (2004: 161) critiques the new category of “advocacy NGOs” for their lack of 
mass-base and their role in serving transnational capital. A similar critique of 
transnational Dalit networks is seen in Lerche (2008) who rightly doubts the 
effectiveness of advocacy-based shortcuts without active involvement of Dalit 
grassroots in achieving major social changes. The formation of JAA however is also 
an effect of MHA’s long sustained activism around land, it was this activism that 
attracted IO to support the land rights advocacy and implantation of advocacy as a 
new technology is not necessarily a top down process. MHA is thus a movement 
rooted in the local complex practices of Dalit movements and RDC and other NGOs 
part of MHA act as associations that network with INGOs.  
Vernacularsing JAA  
The project on mobilisation and advocacy supported by IO to RDC under JAA is 
titled; ‘Facilitating the process of securing land titles for occupants of grazing lands 
to enhance their livelihood in the Marathwada Region’. The mobilisation processes 
that activists indulge in as part of the gaairan issue are however not specifically 
mentioned in the project plans. The villages for mobilisation and development were 
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divided into three categories in practice, one where gaairan is cultivated and the 
cultivators have legal ownership, two where gaairan is cultivated but cultivators do 
not have legal ownership and the third category of villages where gaairan were 
available but Dalits had not yet cultivated it. The first and second category villages 
are provided inputs in sustainable farming practices and SHGs were formed to 
include gaairan holding and landless Dalits. In the second category of cultivators the 
focus is on collecting and organising evidence that would help cultivators secure land 
titles. In the third category of villages Dalits were mobilised by MHA activists to 
cultivate or re-cultivate (if vacated through force) upon gaairan lands.63 
The formation of JAA brought along new project practices like filing affidavits 
regarding cultivated land, formation of Self Help Groups (SHGs) and Livelihood 
Promotion Committees, capacity building and training for the landless and gaairan 
cultivators on their rights, sustainable farming and advocacy. These new practices 
were fused with the local mobilisation practices around gaairan by MHA, which has 
resulted in Dalit assertion and further politicisation of caste relations in Marathwada. 
I will present in brief some of these processes below. 
 
Filing affidavits 
As discussed earlier some of the lands cultivated before 1990 are still not regularised 
by the government machinery. The emphasis in advocacy under JAA is on collecting 
the “legal” documents that can prove the occupation of gaairan by cultivators as pre-
dating 1990 and therefore legal. To secure land titles the salaried activists engage in 
collecting evidential documents like previous applications to the Tahasildar, police 
cases, court cases, registration of encroachments in government records and 
affidavits from gaairan cultivators (both male and female), farmers on lands 
neighbouring the gaairan, senior citizens, gram panchayats and shepherds, testifying 
that the encroachments predate 1990. Collecting and providing evidence is seen as an 
effort to help the state in delivering its promise of regularising land through the GR 
of 1991 thereby making policy implementation effective.  
 
                                                 
63 The last activity is not supported by IO.  
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Land rights of Dalits and other landless were broad based by IO and NGOs to 
accommodate sustainable livelihood, gender issues and micro-finance. The official 
discourse of JAA does not recognise that Dalits and other landless cultivate gaairan 
and forest lands after 1990 and that this continues to result in frequent eruption of 
violence against Dalits. The problem of gaairan is conceptualised instead in 
democratic and legal terms. The technologies of advocacy of IO/JAA to a certain 
extent depoliticise the extra-institutional nature of Dalit struggle for gaairan, where 
resorting to illegal means and violence too are vernacular practices. K is one such 
village where Dalits have cultivated the forest land after 1990 and the activists of 
MHA have not excluded this village from filing of evidence involved under JAA.  
 
Dalit encroachers of gaairan from K village in Wadawani Taluka were at the 
Tahasildar office as their affidavits of encroachments [referred to as 'file' by 
MHA workers which make it sound formal and important] were to be 
submitted to the Tahasildar.  When Sadashiv asked the Tahasildar to cooperate 
with the poor encroachers, the Tahasildar in response asked the encroachers 
since when they were cultivating the land, to which one of them replied fifteen 
years [not realising that post-1990 encroachments are illegal]. Sadashiv on the 
other hand intervened showing the Tahasildar a letter from the District 
Collector requiring all the Tahasildars to ‘verify’ all the encroachments and 
legalise them if found to be legal [pre-1990]. After the submitting the files, 
Sadashiv suggested to the encroachers to pay the Talathi/Girdhawar64 some 
money if they come for field visits to survey and record the encroachments. 
The encroachers gave Sadashiv fifty rupees for what they called cha-pani (tea 
and water). Sadashiv did not ask for this money but did not refuse to take it 
either (field notes: 29/9/08).   
 
The focus of advocacy in MHA is to get the encroachments (both pre-1990 and post 
1990) registered in the records of the revenue department. Activists of MHA as part 
of advocacy engage in filing detailed affidavits regarding cultivation of gaairan 
lands by Dalits, but not all Dalit movement actors engage in filing such affidavits. 
                                                 
64 Talathi is the village revenue officer and Girdhawar is revenue inspection of a circle comprising of 
some villages.  
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The following discussion within the workers of JAA at a review meeting explains the 
differences in the strategies of RPI and MHA.   
 
Kalyan: In some villages people who have encroached land are not interested 
in filing affidavits. They do not support our efforts.  
Jadhav: Such people are largely associated with RPI, they may be karyakartas 
(activists) of RPI. Try to convince them, tell them if they do not submit the 
files there is no proof of encroachment. (Fieldnotes: 20/12/08). 
 
Filing of detailed affidavits by MHA is a new strategy that other groups like RPI 
have not been engaged in and activists of MHA try to convince the encroachers of 
the importance of submitting evidential documents to the government. Dalit 
encroachers in some cases aspire to secure land through a new GR that will extend 
the date of regularisation beyond 1990. MHA activists however based on the 
previous experience of the 1990 GR and its poor implementation persuade Dalits to 
file affidavits so that they have some proof of their gaairan possession. Dalit 
encroachers of land largely remain flexible in their affiliation and participate in 
rallies (morchas) of different Dalit groups that aim at pressuring the government to 
regularise the encroached land.  
 
Dalit cultivators of gaairan who do not have legal documents are under constant 
pressure both from the state and from the dominant castes to vacate the land they 
cultivate. Destruction of crops or letting cattle loose to rampage crops, threatening or 
resorting to violence constitute some of the strategies the dominant castes resort to 
locally. Sustaining the cultivation or starting new cultivation on land thus requires 
mobilisation of Dalits. Dalits in the mobilisation discourses of MHA are motivated to 
cultivate land not merely for economic purposes but also to gain swabhiman (self 
respect).  
 
Land as swabhiman: Self Help Groups and Livelihoods Promotion Committees as 
new sites for mobilisation 
The formation of women’s Self Help Groups (SHGs) has come to be an important 
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development strategy for poverty alleviation of various state development 
departments since the 1990s. An important project that is being implemented by the 
state government in Beed through NGOs is the Maharashtra Rural Credit Project 
funded by International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). Under JAA too, 
the emphasis is on forming women’s SHGs to encourage women’s leadership and 
economic independence. A total number of 940 SHGs have been formed as part of 
JAA comprising of 10,000 women and loans of Rs. 37,300,000 disbursed (Oxfam 
2009).65 Similarly, committees are formed under JAA at the village level of gaairan 
cultivators, which are known as Livelihood Promotion Committees (LPC). Both the 
SHGs and LPCs are engaged in the mobilisation to secure legal recognition for land 
cultivations. 
 
The women’s SHGs that are generally formed for savings and credit purposes under 
state and (I)NGO practices are also engaged by MHA in organising Savitribai Phule, 
Ambedkar and Annabhau Sathe Jayanti (birth anniversaries). In chapter four I have 
elaborated upon the visible presence and reach of MHA amongst Dalit women and 
the merger of vernacular Dalit movement practices in projects of RDC. Under JAA 
for instance, the training manual for the district level training of women members of 
SHGs and the Taluka level training manual of LPCs have songs, games and 
discussions on the Varna system and its role in degrading the status of Dalits and 
women. Activists for instance would jokingly warn SHG members that the one who 
fasts on ekdashi or visits mangir baba will not be given loans through SHGs 
(Fieldnotes: 14/4/09).  
 
Meetings of SHG women like other rallies of MHA are also sites for motivating 
Dalits to cultivate gaairan lands that were not encroached earlier by Dalits or were 
vacated after attempts of “encroachment”. Mobilisation for cultivating new gaairan 
is facilitated through fiery speeches of Awad and other MHA workers who provoke 
Dalits, particularly Mangs to “encroach” upon gaairan and live a life of self respect. 
Those who had listened to these speeches felt that these were like injecting saline in 
                                                 
65 Formation of SHGs and lending through SHGs is one component of the project. The other 
components include resources for mobilisation, research and montly salaries for activists, capacity 
building of activists and Dalits cultivators or gaairan. 
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their bodies or gave them goose bumps [See Chapter eight on politicisation of 
Mangs]. 
 
Workers of MHA would term the Mangs of Bogalwadi village as gulams 
(slaves). When they tried to persuade Mangs here for encroaching the gaairan 
for swabhiman (self respect), only few youth showed interest. Most feared a 
Vanjari backlash and also felt that encroaching upon the rocky gaairan will not 
be economically viable. (Fieldnotes: 22/4/09)   
 
While activists of MHA are aware of the challenges regarding the economic viability 
of gaairan, “encroachment” of gaairan is also encouraged as a process challenging 
the socio-political dominance of Marathas and Vanjaris and the control they exert 
over Dalits in general and Mangs in particular. Speeches or persuasion by activists 
do not necessarily evoke a good response in all villages. However some were 
immensely motivated by the speeches and ventured into cultivating gaairan. 
 
Similarly, LPCs at Village level, Circle level, Taluka level and District level are 
formed comprising of gaairan occupants (men and women) as part of the advocacy 
component under JAA. These committees are meant to ensure that the gaairan 
occupiers have the required knowledge and training of various documents and 
processes necessary for securing legal entitlements and for them to take the lead in 
the JAA movement. Though funded by IO these meetings are similar to other Dalit 
socio-political gatherings in their ritual commemoration of Ambedkar Phule, Shahu, 
Savitribai and Annabhau Sathe.  
 
When Awad entered the meeting venue at LPC training meeting in Beed, one 
of the activists shouted slogans: “Eknath Awad tum age bado (Eknath Awad 
you lead us)” and some participants added “hum tumare sath hai (we are with 
you)” [field notes 20/8/08].  
 
The activists urge the LPC members not to see themselves as “encroachers” since the 
Nizam government that had allocated the grazing lands to them. The LPC members 
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are simultaneously motivated by the activists to react violently if dominant castes 
turn repressive.  
 
If you destroy our crops by rearing your cattle, we will not only cut your cattle 
and feast on them but we will also break your hands… We will crush such 
jatiwadi (casteist) people under our feet. You should gain such strength this is 
the objective of this training camp (speech recorded: 20/8/08). 
 
This meeting ended in the formation of the District LPC in Beed with a plan to 
commemorate Dadasaheb Gaikwad Jayanti in October with Jail Bharo (Fill up the 
Jails), slogans in praise of Ambedkar, Annabhau, and Phule and on land rights and 
injustices against Dalits such as, 
 
 Jameen aamchya hakkachi nahi konachya baapachi (Land is our right and 
does not belong to anyone’s father) 
 Dalit pe anyaya rahega dharti pe tufan rahega (Whilst the Dalits face 
injustice there will be storms on the earth).  
 
Such assertive mobilisation of Dalits around the issue of gaairan has contributed in 
them (particularly Mangs) challenging their lower social and economic status in the 
villages and the politicisation of caste relations. 
 
Politicisation of caste relations 
 
Cultivation by Dalits on gaairan lands leads to the “politicisation” of relations 
between Dalits and the dominant castes at grassroots. It is not just Dalits who 
encroach upon gaairan. In Tandalwadi village, a Maratha farmer who owns land 
neighbouring the gaairan land encroached around three acres long before the Mangs 
who have cultivated the land only since 2004. However, it is only the cultivation by 
Dalits that is challenged by Marathas. An earlier effort towards cultivating gaairan 
land by Dalits in this village in 1992 was unsuccessful as the Marathas threatened 
Dalits with dire consequences, some Dalits were even beaten up and had to flee the 
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village.   
 
Not all the villages where Dalits encroach upon gaairan, however, result in conflicts 
with dominant castes. There has been an impact of the long history of Dalit 
movement struggles for gaairan and GRs that recognised the encroachments as legal. 
In some villages the dominant castes themselves “distribute” the gaairan to Dalits so 
as to sustain the patron-client relationships. As part of collecting documentary 
evidence workers of MHA try to convince the Gram Panchayats to provide a ‘No 
Objection Certificate’ for legal transfer of ownership to encroachers. An interesting 
case is of Pahadi Pargaon village. Dalits here encroached upon gaairan land in May 
2009. The gaairan land in this village had been encroached earlier in 1970, 
facilitated by a CPI (M) worker. The earlier cultivators then were from various 
castes66 who had surrendered the encroachments after being arrested. The land here 
was later brought under the control of the forest department following the release of 
the cultivators. One of the activists of MHA from this village mobilised 35 Dalit 
families (34 Mang and 1 Mahar) to cultivate the gaairan again. The dominant castes 
in Pahadi Pargaon are divided politically in this village between NCP and BJP who 
struggle to control the village panchayat. They supported the encroachments and 
helped the Dalit cultivators secure bail on their arrest. This had particularly to do 
with the united Dalit votes (a total of 300) that were crucial in deciding the village 
election results. 
 
In Phule Pimpalgaon (Majalgaon Taluka) village the Mahars had encroached upon 
the gaairan much before 1991, which were legalised after the 1991 GR, whereas 
some Mangs encroached upon the gaairan in 2002. After the GR of 1991, Dalits had 
used records of police/court cases registered against them to prove their 
encroachments as the village revenue officer did not record encroachment/cultivation 
on gaairan by Dalits in most cases. The Mang encroachers here were disappointed 
that the Marathas had not opposed this process as no conflict also meant missing 
legal recognition/records that the land is occupied by the Mangs currently 
                                                 
66 I found this out from the surnames in the court order of Judicial Magistrate dated  28/8/70 that 
ordered ten days rigorous imprisonment and a fine of rupees 50 for each encroacher. I also 
interviewed the CPI (M) worker. 
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(Fieldnotes: 1/6/09).  
 
MHA workers support the cultivation of gaairan land by Dalits also by symbolic 
gestures like putting up boards of the MHA shakha in the village and attending and 
giving speeches in support of gaairan encroachments on Annabhau Sathe Jayanti. 
They sustain the ritual practice of lobbying at local police stations to register cases of 
violence or opposition (like destroying standing crops or social boycott) by the 
dominant castes to gaairan cultivation under the SC/ST (PoA) Act (referred to 
locally as atrocity kaayda [law]). Like other Dalit movements, MHA emphasised 
‘caste’ as the reason for opposition and exclusion of Dalits. This allegation that is 
systemically denied by dominant caste social and political formations, even the 
executive and judiciary which can be seen in non-registration of FIRs locally and the 
abysmal rate of convictions in cases registered under SC/ST (PoA) Act.67 
 
Another important constituent of the project that RDC is implementing under JAA is 
advocacy with the state government for policy impact. In the following section I will 
present the advocacy efforts of MHA for securing land titles and also the nexus 
between dominant caste and state institutions that delay and deny the possibility of 
land regularisation for Dalits. 
 
Between procedural advocacy and substantive caste politics: State against Dalit 
land rights? 
Advocacy that NGO’s practice is distinguished from popular campaigning as the 
latter involves large numbers of people and the former does not. In the case of 
MHA’s advocacy, popular campaigning has been its core strength, which has 
attracted the attention of the state authorities on the issue of gaairan land. The state 
response however is a mixture of support, repression and inaction. While violent 
displacements are just one part of the political dynamics, the procedural engagement 
with the state involves long drawn and delayed processes that generally do not work 
in favour of gaairan occupants.   
 
                                                 
67 See next chapter on caste violence 
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Support 
Organising mass rallies and protests to show the strength of gaairan encroachers is 
an important strategy that sits well with the advocacy initiatives that IO supports. As 
part of advocacy under JAA, MHA has been actively lobbying the state government 
to regularise encroached gaairan by Dalits. In 2004, Sanvidhan rallies (those 
supporting the Constitution) were organised across districts in Marathwada, where 
MHA claimed that the government had insulted the “Constitution of Dr. Ambedkar” 
by not regularising encroached gaairan and forest lands (Awad’s interview on Zee 
Marathi; 14/4/04). Advocacy efforts and display of numerical strength has helped in 
consolidating Eknath Awad’s image as a mass leader particularly from the point of 
view of party politics. Sharad Pawar and his daughter Supriya Sule (leaders of the 
NCP) attended a few of the mass rallies of gaairan occupants where Awad was 
projected as a Bahujan leader and social worker. These rallies do not mention the 
support received from IO. The stage too is decorated with the symbols of Phule, 
Shahu, Annabhau, Savitribai Phule and Ambedkar. The traditional practice of 
beginning speeches by paying tribute to Bahujan leaders and ending them with Jai 
Bhim and Jai Bharat [India] is followed.  
 
As part of advocacy under JAA, MHA had filed 22, 482 cases [affidavits/evidences 
collected through RDC] of encroachments with the government that could be 
legalised (claiming that these encroachments were before 1990) by November 2008. 
A meeting with Sharad Pawar and Revenue Minister Narayan Rane took place in 
Mumbai in November 2008 to discuss the possible action on the files submitted by 
JAA. Sharad Pawar had taken interest (impressed by the show of numbers in the 
rallies) in organising this meeting of Awad and others with Narayan Rane as well as 
the Divisional Revenue Commissioners. Here Awad presented the case of landless 
Dalits who were given fallow lands for cultivation by the Nizam Government in 
1946 and requested the Minister to be considerate as this was the case of the poor 
and landless. The discussion was however brought to the 1991 GR of the modern 
state.  
 
Narayan Rane asked Awad how many cultivators of the cases submitted were 
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occupants before 1990 [...] Awad replied that most were before 1990 […] Rane 
responding to Pawar’s persuasion proposed a mohim (campaign) in this 
meeting to deal with these cases on a priority basis. Discussion on lands other 
than gaairan cultivated by Dalits was not encouraged in this meeting. […] 
Rane also maintained that earlier efforts of giving land to Dalits had resulted in 
Dalits selling their land for alcohol (Fieldnotes: 16/11/08). 
 
Awad was visibly elated on this day, however moves to regularise these 22, 482 
cases have been much slower than expected. Initially it was due to a larger crisis that 
faced the state in the form of attacks by gunmen on South Mumbai in November 
2008. While the promise was of dealing with all the cases as part of a mohim 
(campaign), in the follow-up meeting held with the state revenue minister in 
Aurangabad on 24th Feb 2009, the minister assured that only 10 per cent of the cases 
will be taken up before the parliamentary elections of May 2009 and that evidence of 
encroachments (pre-1990) will be sought.  It was also made clear by the officers that 
affidavits filed after 1990 by MHA will not be considered as evidence for 
encroachment/cultivation before 1990. 
 
Inaction 
One of the non-Dalit workers at RDC mocked these meetings held with the ministers 
to secure gaairan ownership. He asked me sarcastically once referring to the above 
meeting, “gaairan nave karun ghenya sathi nahin gela (did you not attend the 
meeting yesterday for securing gaairan ownership), as if one meeting was good 
enough to secure gaairan ownership” (Fieldnotes: 22/2/09).  
 
The state technologies work in various forms not just against the possibilities of 
regularisation but also against continued cultivations on the gaairans. While 
meetings of MHA leaders with ministers raised hopes of legal entitlements, revenue 
commissioners were simultaneously threatening eviction. The Divisional 
Commissioner of Aurangabad issued orders to vacate the encroachments on gaairan 
within a time bound manner by 18th October. Senior activists of MHA in Beed 
organised immediately to submit a letter to the District Collector warning of mass 
 141 
protests if the encroachments of poor landless Dalits and Adivasis were removed. 
The letter also demanded that the illegal encroachments by owners of sugar factories, 
private educational institutions and by the government be first vacated before the 
encroachments of Dalits.   
 
An important outcome of lobbying by MHA during my fieldwork was an order from 
District Collectors office dated 9/1/2009 asking the Tahasildars to survey the 
cultivations on encroachments and to record them in government land records. These 
orders do not automatically translate into action at the Taluka and village level and 
protest marches had to be organised in Tehsils to pressurise the Tahasildars into 
acting. The Tahasildars of some Talukas in Beed responded with orders to the lower 
staff to survey and register the encroachments from the list submitted by MHA/JAA. 
Despite the orders issued by the Tahasildar locally to enumerate all cultivations on 
the gaairans and to record them irrespective of dates, the Talathis did not actively 
pursue this task. Though the Talathis had received written instructions for recording 
the encroachments in revenue records, they were also said to have been ‘pressurised 
by officers and local politicians verbally to avoid official recording of 
encroachments.’ (Informal discussion with MHA activist: 1/2/10).  The Maharashtra 
Land Revenue Code 1966 requires the revenue officials to enter the encroachment in 
land records immediately on witnessing them and the encroacher on government land 
is liable for eviction and non agricultural assessment (NAA)/land revenue and fine at 
prescribed rates. The state authorities however deal with the old and new gaairan 
encroachments by not entering them in government records and by not evicting them, 
thus maintaining a passive silence.  
 
Repression 
After the GR of 1990 the Gram Panchayats controlled by dominant castes had 
actively allocated the gaairan lands for social forestry to avoid cultivation of these 
lands by Dalits. Forests come under the purview of Central Government thus making 
it tougher for Dalits to survive their resistance against displacement from gaairan.  
Guru (1995) points out the changes in the nature of violent displacements of Dalits 
from gaairan encroachments 1980s onwards and the crisis of Maratha hegemony. He 
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notes that the 1980s to 1990s represents direct violent displacement of the Dalits by 
the non-state forms of repression with direct Maratha participation, after 1991, the 
state took over the task of terrorizing Dalits over the gaairan issue through Gram 
Panchayats. The distinction however is largely blurred and Maratha control of state 
works in their favour to displace Dalits from their efforts to cultivate gaairan lands. 
In Dhanora village for instance the Tahasildar had read out the saat bara (land 
possession records) in the Gram Sabha meeting and declared the cultivation of 
gaairan by Dalits was illegal and asked the Gram Panchayat to vacate the gaairan, 
thus giving Marathas (panchayat) the authority to vacate the land cultivated by 
Dalits.  
 
The state machinery is particularly repressive when it comes to forest lands causing 
situation of conflict locally, at times dominant castes align with the state in such 
situations. The land in Kotarban village is identified as one of forest department. 
Dalit cultivators from Kotarban village had to face earth excavation machines on 
their gaairan which were meant for planting trees under social forestry. The 
encroachers were hesitant to resist the process, owing to the dominance of Vanjaris 
in the village. The woman officer at the social forestry department was a Vanjari and 
had the support of the local Vanjaris from the village (Fieldnotes: 26/5/09). Peaceful 
protests do not always work in favour of Dalit encroachers and aggressive resistance 
or performance of symbolic violence too is part of MHA’s strategies. In Osmanabad 
district, when forest officials forcefully entered encroached gaairan land with the 
police, revenue department officials, gram panchayat members and JCB (excavation) 
machinery for planting trees, Awad suggested to the workers to create a “law and 
order” situation and asked the encroachers to stop the plantation or to uproot the 
planted trees (Fieldnotes: 9/6/09). 
 
Activism of MHA may have failed to secure the legal recognition by the state for the 
land cultivated by Dalits. However, like other Dalit political formations it has 
ensured protection for Dalits who cultivate gaairan; it has specifically encouraged 
Mangs to venture into cultivation of public lands and has also helped Dalits to file 
legal documents with the state about their cultivation of gaairan lands. While RDC-
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CHR may represent apolitical associations if viewed through a revolutionary lens, 
MHA still retains the political and cultural specificities that are necessary for Dalit 
movements to function at the grassroots.  
 
NGOs as new associations in Dalit politics  
It is argued that, ‘top-down planning, top-down funding, and upwards accountability 
negate participation, NGOs may thus replicate patron-client relationships’ (Fisher 
1997: 456). The case of MHA does not totally reverse this thesis as Dalit activists 
may seem like patrons for Dalits cultivators of gaairan, they however also act as 
mediators of state access and justice for Dalits. The mobilisation strategies of MHA 
and the advocacy or movement visions of IO are not always in agreement. In some 
villages, forest land encroachments have been supported by MHA. This may seem 
contrary to the objective of sustainability in JAA but the process of vernacularising 
global practices also results in undermining some to suit the local context. Full 
grown trees under social forestry too have been pulled down by encroachers to make 
land available for cultivation purposes. One of the disappointments of IO has been 
the leader centered nature of MHA/JAA and there is an emphasis from IO since 2009 
on making JAA a ‘people’s movement’ by delegating leadership and planning roles 
to gaairan encroachers. IO officials informally shared their apprehensions about the 
plan eventually working out but hoped that JAA will survive even if the project 
(JAA) is over because of MHA’s activism roots (Interview: 19/3/09).  
 
The case of MHA’s mobilisation and activism around gaairan, its intersections with 
INGOs and vernacularsing of global project practices of NGOs makes an interesting 
case of the role NGOs can play in the complex socio-political realities of caste 
society if they fuse with local ideologies and protest movements. A narrow definition 
of civil society with emphasis only on associational activity like that of NGOs may 
not only miss the vibrancy of civil society in the form of extra-institutional 
movements but also fails to capture the diverse strategies that the competing actors in 
civil society may adopt. NGOs can thus play both positive and negative roles in 
social change processes and in the case of Dalit politics, they are new associations 
that create spaces for international collaborations and can aid in local protest 
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practices of Dalit movements. 
 
NGO-ising civil society and beyond 
The case of MHA’s mobilisation around land rights blurs the distinction between 
civil society and political society. In the Indian context it is difficult to maintain a 
clear distinction between state and community and also to distinguish the “state” 
from “political society” (Hansen 2001: 233).  
 
The anticipated fear that neoliberal governmentality and associated disciplining 
technologies that INGOs or NGOs consolidate, leading to “depoliticisation” of public 
interests seems, however misplaced in the case of Dalits, particularly in Marathwada. 
Many of the Dalit movements here still remain outside the bounds of NGOs, their 
associations and voluntary public spirit does not depend on INGO grants. Dalit 
movements in Marathwada represent a cacophony of voices that cooperate (and 
compete) while resorting to varied strategies to address recognition and redistribution 
concerns of Dalits. These mobilisations are full of contradictions where the 
procedural emphasis is on getting the “Constitution to work” and the substantive 
politics involves use of symbolic violence and other strategies that are considered 
effective from the marginal location of Dalits.    
 
There is also a need to be cautious of over exaggerating the democratisation 
processes while analysing the role of international civil society players. Appadurai 
(2001: 24) conceptualises ‘deep democracy’ as crossing national boundaries and 
makes two broad distinctions between grassroots political movements of “armed 
solutions” and “partnership-partnership” (between traditionally opposed groups such 
as states, corporations and workers). Such a distinction may fail to develop a nuanced 
understanding of structural violence and exclusions that Dalits face in localised 
contexts and Dalit agency that encompasses peaceful or violent politics of resistance, 
and continued importance of state in these processes. 
 
To conclude, in current globalised times and spaces, the political rationality of 
transnational governmentality (INGOs in this case) and that of the Indian state on 
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Dalit issues are not in absolute cohesion. I/NGOs, besides advocating better 
technologies of reaching out to Dalits, are not particularly influenced by the micro-
technologies of dominant caste-classes that the state is trapped in, thereby giving 
Dalits more chances of manoeuvring. Such manoeuvring and vernacularising of new 
rights technologies of global actors by MHA has contributed in bringing gaairan to 
the centre of local politics in Marathwada. Gaairan and its cultivation, like jayanti 
celebrations, temple entry protests and caste atrocity mobilisation by Dalit 
movements are crucial sites of socio-political performances that politicise caste and 
initiate processes that challenge the dominant micro-technologies of power. MHA’s 
vernacularisation of NGO repertoires thus reiterates Mercer’s argument that, ‘new 
professional institutions like NGOs can play both positive and negative roles and 
their contributions may be different spatially and temporally’ (2002: 18). 
 
The partial success of Dalit politics in cultivating the state lands explains the 
malleability of state processes and Dalit challenge to the state authority. Dalit politics 
around gaairan can be distinguished from Dalit politics for securing dignity and 
equal status in the rural public spaces which are embedded in caste hierarchies. 
While public spaces form key sites of democratisation and deliberation in civil 
society, Dalit assertion and civic engagement in public spaces evokes violence. 
Democratisation of public spaces is a process full of conflict, violence and 
contradiction, as I elaborate upon in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 6 
Caste dynamism, Dalit assertion and violence in the democratisation of public 
spaces 
Caste and its hierarchic functions are fast changing for Dalits in rural Marathwada. 
Besides the changes that caste is undergoing due to economic factors, Dalits 
participate in changing caste relations into civic relations by negotiating and 
renegotiating their social status in public spaces. In renegotiating and claiming 
dignified existence in public spaces, Dalits invite violence from the opposing 
dominant castes, particularly Marathas. In this chapter I address questions related to 
the centrality of caste in public spaces and detail the complexities of Dalit assertion 
and democratisation processes in the grassroots of Marathwada. Some of the key 
questions that I seek to explore here are: Why and how do Dalits make citizenship 
claims to public spaces in Marathwada? Why does Dalit assertion in public space 
result in violent responses from Marathas against Dalits? How do Dalit movements 
respond to the exclusions and violence they face in public spaces? What does Dalit 
assertion in public spaces mean for Dalits and non-Dalits?  
The chapter is structured as follows. In the first section I briefly present the meanings 
of the changing economy and labour practices for Dalits in rural Marathwada. This 
section describes in particular the intersections of material and cultural practices that 
sustain the ‘untouchable’ status of Dalits and the disjuncture that the increasing 
monetisation of rural society has introduced to the socio-economic and ritual 
practices in Marathwada. However, material changes for Dalits have not necessarily 
meant undoing the exclusions that they face. The second section thus explores the 
critical role of public spaces in sustaining or challenging the political and ritual 
exclusion of Dalits. It presents varied forms of Dalit assertion in public spaces that 
evokes a violent response from Marathas. The third section presents cases of 
violence that Dalits faced during my fieldwork and highlights the intersection of 
socio-religious realms with political realms, particularly the ways in which Maratha 
honour and/status sustain the degraded social status of Dalits in public spaces. 
Section four presents Dalit movement efforts to securing justice through state 
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institutions. Dalit movements do not merely mobilise against Marathas but engage 
the state institutions, at times through the use of strategic violence against the state 
apparatus.  
In the conclusion I argue that challenging traditional authority in public spaces also 
involves altering the private socio-ritual beliefs of the Marathas. Violence against 
Dalits is thus also a marker of dominant caste adjustment to a new understanding of 
public spaces where social status may not necessarily translate into political 
privileges. It is these complex processes of democratisation of public spaces that help 
Dalits gain status of equals in rural public spaces. 
Changing Dalit roles: Old labour practices as slavery 
The earlier labour practices that stigmatised Dalit bodies socially and politically are 
increasingly termed as slavery (following Ambedkar’s maxim – ‘tell a slave that he 
is a slave and he will revolt’) by Dalit activists and Dalits influenced by Dalit 
movements. Labour practices linked with gavaki and yeskarki besides causing social 
stigmatisation of Dalits also sustain their economic dependence. Dalit activists and 
labourers emphasise liberation in not being dependent on Marathas for their 
livelihood sources. As discussed in the chapter two the changing labour practices and 
increased monetisation of economy has led to mobility of labour in Marathwada. 
Migration as sugarcane cutting workers to the sugar belts of northern Karnataka and 
western Maharashtra has facilitated economic mobility and independence amongst 
several Dalit families. It is not rare to come across Dalit families who had bought 
land, built houses or invested in their children’s education based on their earnings as 
sugarcane cutting workers. Dalits also try to make the most out of other non-farm 
employment opportunities in neighbouring towns. 
One Dalit activist in his early thirties described to me how the practise of gavaki 
constructed, humiliated and stigmatised the existence of Dalits in public spaces. He 
used to go door to door through the village in the evening for bhakri (a flattened 
bread made out of jowar, bajra or maize flour), as part of gavaki till he was fifteen, “I 
used to feel that we are supposed to live like this” (Fieldnotes 7/6/09). It is 
increasingly difficult to find families now who strictly survive on traditional 
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practices like gavaki. Other caste-based practices are also being challenged. The 
traditional halagi68 playing, for instance, is now turned into commercial music 
playing groups called banjo parties who perform during marriages.  
Sukhdeo (33) from Phulepimpalgaon village runs one such commercial music group. 
He had contracts worth Rupees 2 lakhs in 2009 of which he had saved 90 thousand 
for himself. With each contract he makes around 5000-7500 rupees for events like 
marriages, jayanti and warat (processions). He has twenty workers in his group of 
whom eight are bouddha (or Mahar converts) and the rest are Mangs. He insisted that 
the pollution of touch associated with halagi playing is no longer relevant to his 
profession. For instance, he described the changed treatment for them as banjo 
players in upper castes marriages,  
We sit in their pangat, it is not like earlier we do not sit separately, some of us eat 
in turns with the guests, no one knows who we are and no one asks. (Field notes: 
1/6/07)  
Pangat refers to the seating arrangement (in rows) meant for dining during marriages 
and other socio-religious gatherings. Earlier the pangat of Dalits on such occasions 
was not part of the main pangat where castes above Dalits sat. Dalits were 
traditionally also made to carry their own plates in such functions. Metal plates are 
no longer used, instead patroli (plates made out of dried leaves) are used for dining 
that do not require washing. Though this is changing, it is still the upper castes who 
necessarily cook meals in such marriages and a Dalit cook is out of question. 
Changes though slow are evident and the new form of playing music as an 
occupation for Mangs and Mahars is not just economically attractive but is also seen 
as socially just.  
Earlier labour practices in Marathwada were non-monetary transactions - labour 
mostly being exchanged for grains. Besides denying Dalits a respectable social 
status, this practice also sustained extreme poverty and indebtedness amongst them. 
Dalit activists of various groups have made the most out of the Emergency period of 
                                                 
68 Halagi is a type of drum that Mangs are traditionally supposed to play on occasions like marriages 
and religious processions. 
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government under Indira Gandhi in 1975-1977 (referred to as aanibani locally) by 
spreading the word that the laws had changed drastically and all the loans (mostly 
grains) that were given to Dalits by the savarnas were waived. They also asked the 
Marathas to return cattle and other belongings of Dalits that had taken possession of 
as security for loans given to them.69  
Dagdu from the Mang caste who is in his late 60s recalled the lack of ‘vijjat’ 
(respect) in the earlier treatment of Mangs and recounted to me the humiliations that 
were part of their daily survival.  
Dagdu: When they [Marathas] used to go to pray to aai [meant Mari-aai] they 
used to say, chal re Manga70. […] We used to lead them playing the halagi, both 
while going to aai and coming back. 
S: And they used to pay you for this. 
Dagdu: No money, they used to give bhakar , one bhakar (flattened bread) 
S: And did working on the land too fetch you bhakar? 
Dagdu: No, they used to give us jowari (grain). We used to work [involving 
threshing grain] for months on the khala71 . There were no machines then. 
Samala (Dattu's wife): We had to go behind the bullocks, round and round for 
months during khala […] till the jowar was ready (for packaging).  
Dagdu: Then they used to give us five payali (a measure of 4-5 kg) jowar. We 
                                                 
69 The propaganda campaign during emergency that reached villages included a talk of new programs 
for the poor like land reform, debt moratoria, credit for the small farmer and homes for the 
homeless(Schlesinger 1977). The Dalit Panthers endorsed the Indian Emergency  (Morkhandikar 
1990) . Dalit activists tried to make most out of authoritarian rule in favour of Dalits by causing panic 
of new laws in the villages. Sham Tangade shared, “We started working on these issues [debt 
moratoria, land for building Dalit houses]. This news spread and Dalits started visiting us seeking help 
particularly to deal with their debts.”  (Sham Tangade: Interview 5/6/09)   
70 Chal means ‘lets go’ and re  connotes authority and rudeness.  While Mang is a general description 
of caste, the form Mang-a is derogatorily used by upper castes to symbolise their power over the 
Mang and also the inferior status of the Mang.  
71 Khala is the space on farms where the threshing of crops is done. Earlier bullocks were used to 
crush the grains. Mangs generally were not given the best grains but the damaged ones.  
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also had to give them a gofan72 annually and a broom every two months. 
Whenever we gave them the brooms we returned with bhakhar. We also had to 
give them awat and dawa [other form of ropes]. 
S: How many years back was this the case?  
Dagdu: Say around 20 -25 years ago. 
S: And now you get money for this. Is this any better? 
Dagdu: This is good. 
S: Why? 
Dagdu: This is good there is paisa-pani, vijjat (paisa means money, pani means 
water and vijjat means respect or honour). Earlier we did not know what vijjat 
was. We did not know where it was how it was? (laughs). [We] just lived, for [a 
loan of] two chipta73 jowari. I once sat in front of the patil's house till 11.00 pm. 
They were having dinner and I sat outside their door waiting. He would ask his 
wife to see if I was still waiting or had left. She would come out see me and go 
inside again. And finally when he was done with everything he came out only to 
speak badly to me. He said, “Has your father kept thevi (savings) with me that you 
are here to ask. You are sitting here till mid-night for two chipta jowari.’ Even 
then I kept quiet. When he went inside and gave two chipta jowari I returned 
home gave it to my wife which she then crushed them on the stone and cooked 
them. Finally we fed our children. This was our state. 
S: How did it change and why? 
Dagdu: Much changed since aani bani. 
S: What happened? 
                                                 
72 Gofan is a special rope used by farmers to keep sparrows away from jowar and bajra crops. Mangs 
as part of their stigmatised caste occupations were also required to make ropes.  
73 Chipta refers to a small cylindrical shaped tin jar used for measuring. Two chiptas make one sher , 
which is around one kg. Dalits were also served water and tea in the chipta earlier. 
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Dagdu: People were saying laws have changed, do not treat them like that [...] 
Don’t ask back loans, its aani bani, they [Dalit activists] used to go to the patil 
and tell him that the government has waived all the loans. (Interview: 8/3/09) 
The older generations of Dalits emphasised that the rising importance of money for 
labour had made living better for the present generations. They also associated earlier 
occupations with the discriminatory treatment that they faced daily. Bhakri as a 
medium of exchange for labour is now viewed as causing both the social and 
economic exploitation of Dalits.  
Swarga in her sixties from Phule Pimpalgaon cursed the earlier economy that 
revolved around bhakri and shared, “Paisa nazari navata (there was no money to 
see) [...] Lok fakt bhakri saathi jagayche (people used to live just for bhakri)’. Her 
daughter who is married in the neighbouring village added, “Now people take uchal 
(advance) from karkhana (sugarcane industries) and there is no need for you to go to 
their (Maratha) bandh (Fieldnotes: 2/6/09)’. The literal translation of bandh would be 
bunds in farms but it is used here to connote the lands and territories of Marathas. 
Entering these territories on a regular basis as dependents can make Dalits docile and 
susceptible to, and quiescent about, humiliation, exclusion and violence. Dalits thus 
prefer to migrate as sugarcane labourers, lured by both money and dignity. Dalits 
who work as sugarcane cutting workers take advance (uchal) from the mukadams 
(contractors) before leaving for sugarcane cutting. This was around 30,000 rupees 
per couple for six months in 2008-2009 (this was raised to 38,000 in 2009-2010). A 
sugarcane cutting worker-turned-mukadam informed me that the rate for cutting one 
tonne of sugarcane this year was 89.49 rupees. Each koyta74 (couple) could cut up to 
three tonnes and earn around 200 rupees per day, which did not include some extra 
money they could make from the owner of the sugarcane fields.  
Swarga’s son Bapu had recently got his daughter, who had studie to 10th grade, 
married to a groom from Dhalegaon (Georai Taluka) who works in a company in 
Nashik. He had spent 94,000 rupees for this marriage. His daughter had also 
                                                 
74 Koyta literally means the blade that is used cut sugarcane. However one koyta in the sugarcane 
cutting business terminology refers to two workers (mostly husband and wife) who together make one 
koyta. 
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accessed education till 10th grade. Bapu works as a centering worker in the nearby 
Majalgaon town whenever he gets work he earns up to 200 rupees a day. Bapu’s 
house is a two room semi-pucca construction with a fenced compound. 
I asked Bapu if his house was built under Gharkul, a state government housing 
scheme meant for Scheduled Castes and other poor in Maharashtra. His current 
house that stood in the place  of a small hut he had had earlier, built with money he 
had earned through sugarcane cutting. He and his wife Ramlila worked as sugarcane 
cutters for 6 years before building this house. Ramlila added, “My elder son was just 
20 days old when I went for sugarcane cutting. We used to put him in a saree [a 
cradle made by hanging a saree cloth] and worked the whole day.’ (Fieldnotes: 
2/6/09). Despite hardships, Dalits prefer to migrate to faraway places as sugarcane 
workers than to work in villages on the lands of the dominant castes.  
The economic changes though substantial are precarious. There is also no direct 
relationship between economic mobility of Dalits and Dalit assertion in public 
spaces. Not all Dalits who had experienced such partial75 economic independence 
(i.e. those who were not dependent on dominant castes) were turning their opposition 
to hierarchic practices of caste into practice. Dalits, despite being aware of the 
discrimination they face, may be neither united nor willing to question their 
exclusion. A Dalit informant from a village in Beed Taluka who was a sugarcane 
migrant worker discontent with the Marathas’ dominance in his village said, ‘our 
village is very bara bodyacha 76, they do not let us touch their water pots and pour 
water from above [a distance] for us to drink. They do not even pay our wages 
properly; they pay it once in 15 days rather than weekly.’ He also shared his 
disappointment that the 35-40 acre grazing land was still not “encroached” in his 
village by landless Dalits. 
Despite achieving some economic mobility, Dalits may still be under the socio-
political and economic dominance of upper castes. Dalits continue to face caste 
                                                 
75 It is important not to exaggerate Dalit mobility or assertion. See Jeffery et. al’s (2001) critique of 
Pai (2000).  
76 A verbal abuse, Baara bodya literally translates into twelve vaginas, a slang generally used to 
comment on a woman’s sexual promiscuity or loose character.  
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exclusion in various forms and these vary according to the struggle that Dalits have 
initiated in their local context against such discrimination. Assertive actions of Dalits 
that challenge the authority of Marathas evoke violent reactions making Dalit 
assertion a risky proposition for Dalits dependent on dominant castes.  
Mendelsohn and Vicziany (1998) distinguish traditional forms of violence against 
Dalits in the past from the present forms, which they suggest are related to modern 
forms of Dalit resistance.  Dalit assertion, resistance and the violence they face in the 
in villages of Marathwada, I argue are related to democratisation of public spaces. In 
public spaces like the village road, temple, panchayat building or village squares 
Dalits are not allowed an equal space or status. Violence against Dalits has cultural 
and politico-economic reasons and collective violence against Dalits can be viewed 
as a reaction against Dalit claims to citizenship rights in public spaces. Violence 
however has a productive role and Dalit and Dalit movements in responding to the 
violence actively engage with the state institutions and procedures.  Dalit politics 
thus marginalises traditional forms of authority that dominate public life and spaces 
in villages.  
In the following section I will elaborate on the nature of changing Dalit assertion and 
their claims of dignified entry into public spaces. It is mostly the Marathas who 
object to the assertive actions of Dalits and resort to violence as their traditional 
authority in the village is questioned. 
Dalits, public spaces and political violence 
The intersection of private and public spaces in the making of a public sphere may 
not be specific to any culture or society. The making of bourgeois public sphere in 
the European context marked such an intersection where literary writings influenced 
private realms and the rise of humanness in the family, which in turn created public 
spaces and a public sphere that was critical of public authority of the state and where 
rational arguments came to be considered sole arbiters (Habermas 1991). Public 
spaces increasingly came to be associated with the bracketing of social status and ‘a 
political consciousness developed in the public sphere of civil society which [was] in 
opposition to absoloute sovereignty [...] public opinion came to assert itself as the 
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only legitimate source of law’ (Habermas 1991: 54). While forging an Indian 
comparison with the bourgeois publicness of the west has shortcomings, the idea of 
public space as one meant for all irrespective of status and as central in forming 
public opinion is a critical one to engage with in the case of Dalits.  
If equality for all marks the ideal of public spaces, ‘then few areas in India constitute 
public space in any meaningful sense since space has usually been hierarchically 
patterned.’ (Gorringe 2005: 178).  Rao (2009) has detailed the intersections of Hindu 
right to ‘private’ property (temple) and the customary practices of caste sociality that 
segregated untouchables under colonial rule. Dalit politics in the colonial rule thus 
placed, ‘the temple within governmental control and imputed to it a “publicness” 
dissolving the distinction between civil and religious space.’ (Rao, 2009: 90).  
The postcolonial procedural practice instilled in the liberal Indian constitution 
recognises public spaces as ‘public’ - one that citizens can access equally. However, 
the actual practice besides being anti-procedural is also very complex and riddled 
with violence. The influence of socio-religious beliefs that construct the untouchable 
status of Dalits in public spaces and the liberal idea of citizenship both configure the 
complex terrain for Dalit politics of resistance. Dalit politics and empowerment in 
public spaces thus needs to be studied not through merely focussing on consensus 
that emerges in the public sphere but also through conflicts and violence in public 
spaces at the grassroots. Violence as Spencer (2007: 133) argues is, ‘not simply the 
reproduction of local structures of antagonism, but also an opportunity for a 
remaking of local social order.’  
The location of Dalits in the rural public (socio-political and cultural) spaces comes 
under pressure for change through Dalit assertion and responsive violence. Assertion 
against their marginal location in public spaces is mostly facilitated through Dalit 
exposure to Dalit movements and/or activists. Most conflicts between Dalits and 
dominant castes are still associated with the ‘mode of Dalit entry’ into the village 
(which is the non-Dalit part). For the Marathas and other castes above Dalits, 
Maharuda and Manguda (the localities where Dalits reside) are necessarily outside 
the bonds of village boundaries and publics, making the social and political exclusion 
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of Dalits a spatial necessity. For instance in Tamil Nadu, Dalit cheris (colonies) are 
jungle-like spaces for the village (Gorringe 2005). Like the dominant castes, Dalits 
too in their casual conversations do not consider their part of the village as ‘the 
village’. Most references to discrimination are against the villagers (gaavat-le or 
gaav-kari) who mistreat them. The traditional understanding of village (gaav) as one 
belonging to non-Dalits particularly Marathas is still a spatial practice in rural 
Marathwada.  
Dalits however increasingly enter the village in politically assertive forms with 
symbols of protest. Violence against assertive public displays and performance of 
Ambedkar symbols increased in Marathwada with the Namantar struggle. The 
consolidation of commemorative political symbology in Dalit politics was seen as 
Dalit militancy by non-Dalits resulting in political violence to counter Dalit 
militancy. Violence thus has come to be a mode of public communication and 
material practice that staged political antagonism (Rao 2009).  Such violence 
involves reinvention of ritual-archaic forms of humiliation against Dalits, mostly 
performed in public (Rao; 2009).  
Jayanti of mahapurushs (literally translated as great men, often used synonymously 
for Dr. Ambedkar and Annabhau Sathe)77  are important occasions for Dalit assertion 
and protesting against their excluded and untouchable status in the village. Jayanti 
celebrations in the villages pass with pomp through the main village streets where 
Dalits were not allowed to walk with their footwear few years back or were excluded 
in some other form. Entry of those people perceived as untouchables and 
untouchable symbols of protest in the village with loud political performance goes 
against the traditional understanding of Dalits as docile bodies in upper caste 
imagery. Below I describe the Annabhau Sathe Jayanti in Rajewadi that illustrates 
the masculine performance of Dalit youth in a village that did not allow Dalits in the 
Hanuman (monkey-god) temple a few years ago. 
There was loud music and sounds of whistling, Annabhau Sathe Jayanti was in 
                                                 
77 Dalit social movements merge the symbols of Ambedkar and Annabhau for socio-political 
mobilisation. I will deal with this in the next chapter on Mang mobilisation.  
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procession (mirvanuk). A large frame of Annabhau Sathe was kept in front of 
the jeep. Young men around the jeep were shouting slogans “Annabhau Sathe 
jindabad” (victory to Annabhau), “Bharatratna Dr.Ambedkarancha vijay asso” 
(victory to Ambedkar). The youth continued dancing to loud music throwing 
Gulal [red powder]. Some heads were totally smeared in this powder. (Field 
notes: 20/8/08).  
Annabhau Sathe Jayanti is not celebrated in all the villages but is an event that is 
spreading amongst the Mangs. It is through voluntary contributions that Mangs in 
Rajewadi village organise Annabhau Sathe Jayanti. This Jayanti has become a 
festival for Mangs and most of those who migrate to places like Pune for work return 
for a short period to attend it. Rajewadi though a remote village where no state bus 
plies, has a history of Dalit mobilisation.  
MHA had mobilised the Mangs here in 1994 on the issue of temple entry and against 
bonded labour. The celebration of Ambedkar Jayanti too was riddled with conflict 
and the Mahars, Mangs and Chambars had organised together for this celebration. In 
a recorded informal conversation Mangs discussed how the Marathas viewed the 
changes in the socio-economic and political functioning of Dalits at the village level. 
Shivaji: See things are changing, our women used to work at their place; we 
used to be totally dependent on them. Now things are changing, our boys dress 
better than them. In the panchayat some posts get reserved for Dalits, which 
they do not like. They feel that the village belongs to them.  
Vishnu: No one is doing caste-based work now. Earlier we used to wear their 
old clothes 
Bandu: They do not like this. They cannot see this.  
Shivaji: Let the Marathas do it now. Now the Mahars and Mangs are doing 
well. Some have land and some have jobs. Let them come and drop sarpan (fire 
wood)78. Why are they not doing it? Because they cannot do this halkat (lowly) 
                                                 
78 Earlier Dalits as part of caste duties used to cut and deliver sarpan in at the doors of patil families.` 
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work. Now our people are educated we won’t do it. So they feel that we are 
maajalet (one with excess body fat/ turning deviant) and that is why conflicts 
have increased. 
Bandu: Because we do not do caste-based work they think we are majalet. 
Shivaji: Earlier they used to say, Mang, Mahar please stay in your limits. Now 
if they comment on caste our people cannot take it. They cannot tolerate it and 
become angry if you say anything on caste. (Group Interview: 9/3/09)  
Dalits in Rajewadi have not restricted their violation of caste boundaries to mere 
celebration of Jayantis. They have further challenged the physical “village” and 
“Dalitwada” distinction as well. A Mahar in this village bought a house from a Mali 
in the midst of Maratha households despite Maratha resistance. Shivaji, another 
Mang who was a saal-gadi and turned to sugarcane cutting has now bought a piece 
of land in the “village” from a Maratha for 11,000 rupees and was planning to start a 
chakki (flour mill) here. He had already installed the grinding machine but the 
construction of a shed was stalled mid-way as the Marathas were opposing this. 
Shivaji had halted the construction of the flourmill to avoid the possibility of 
violence. While the Mangs here may have claimed some dignified space in the 
village the struggle for more is ongoing. Dalits are thus crossing the set limits of 
caste boundaries in various ways. Marathas view such claiming of public spaces in 
the village or the violation of caste boundaries by Dalits as deviance, termed locally 
as maaj, and this can prompt violent retribution. Dalit claims on the other hand also 
stretch the boundaries of dominant caste perception about Dalit existence in public 
spaces.  
Violating caste boundaries and the public-private dimensions of caste atrocities 
against Dalits 
In this section I will detail some cases of violence against Dalits and Dalit 
mobilisation that occurred during my fieldwork. The first was in Shindi village on 
19th January 2009 followed by more cases in the villages of Khadki Ghat, and 
Ladewadgaon on 26th January. In Shindi village the Marathas beat up two Dalit girls 
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aged 18 and 19 when they were returning from their field. On a later date I asked one 
of the victims what had happened on that day. She recounted to me that the Maratha 
youth used to regularly eve tease, which the sisters had chosen to ignore in the past.  
 “On that day when we were returning from the fields, one of them commented, 
“Salaam tumchya sabhyatela, Mahar layach sabhya jhale (salutations to your 
decency, Mahars have become too decent) ” and pushed me from behind and I 
fell down. I shouted back pointing my finger at him, “Can’t you see?” He reacted 
by slapping me and said, “You Mahar how can you point a finger at me like 
that?” His mother and other boys also joined him in beating me.” (Informal 
discussion: 19/5/09).  
Since they owned some land and their elder brother worked in Pune, these two girls 
were pursuing education (first year BA) and were not labouring on Maratha lands, 
but the act of pointing a finger in anger and questioning the Maratha went against the 
respect that Dalits traditionally show for patils. Such respect would include making 
way for Marathas on the paai-vat (beaten track) and not crossing them. These girls 
were beaten and dragged through the village streets till their homes. The girl who had 
pointed finger was the most badly beaten. Besides the Maratha men, two Maratha 
women were also involved in thrashing the girls. Sanjeevani, a Mahar woman, a key 
witness in this case, described to me her fear and helplessness: 
“No one came [to rescue the girls]. Everyone was watching from a distance. I 
went close and said, “Let it be. Leave her.” But I too was afraid.... They were 
hurling huge stones at her and they would have thrown some at me too... They 
first hit her with sticks and once she fell down they were throwing stones at her. 
I felt a lot but could not do anything, I and my elder daughter came home and 
cried holding each other” (Interview: 19/5/09).  
The use and performance of violence against Dalit girls in the public, for talking 
back against the Marathas, reveals the power that Marathas wield in this village over 
public spaces. The subordination and the sexual control of women and low caste men 
are also key to sustaining caste hierarchies (Chakravarty 2003: 67-77). The specific 
experiences of violence that Dalit women face are also related to the politicisation of 
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Dalits and Dalit politics of resistance. Rao (2009: 240) argues that, ‘sexual violence 
is indeed caste violence’ and that upper-caste violence ‘resurrects archaic forms of 
sexual violence and punishment in direct proportion to the politicization of Dalits’.   
The violence against these two girls was not the first incident that had happened 
against Dalit women in Shindi; another Dalit woman (Sanjeevani’s mother-in-law) 
was murdered in a land-caste dispute in 1991. This case is still doing the rounds of 
courts and is currently in the Supreme Court. The threat of violence from Marathas to 
Dalits, particularly Mahars in Shindi, dates back to the Namantar movement. Some 
amongst the Mahars from Shindi were campaigning in favour of Namantar and the 
Marathas responded by threatening to burn down the Dalit-wada forcing some Dalits 
to move out of Shindi for good. 
There were several other instances of violence against the Dalits in Shindi, which 
were not reported to the police. It was mostly the Mahars who were targeted but 
there were cases of violence against other Scheduled Castes as well, the most recent 
one against a Chambar woman in public view in early January 2009. The Chambar 
woman shared this with the women activists of MHA but had not dared to file a legal 
complaint.  
In Shindi there were also various cases of violence against young Dalit men. Two 
youth were beaten up by the Marathas in the past on the suspicion of them having 
affairs with Maratha girls. In 1998, one of them was tied to an electric pole and 
thrashed whilst his brother was hung upside down in a well and dunked. In 2001, 
another was unrobed, his head was shaven, and he was taken through the village to 
the police station where a case was registered against him under Section 395 
(Dacoity). This youth was kept in the police station for three days where he had 
begged to register a case against those who had beaten and humiliated him. However 
a simple Non Cognisable (NC) offence was registered against the Marathas.  
Dalits, particularly men, cross the social and traditional boundaries of caste by 
indulging in what are considered as “vulgar” acts of love or sex with Maratha 
women. The pure personal spaces of the Marathas or for that matter any other twice-
born caste are attached to the purity of “their” women and Dalit men loving or 
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assaulting upper-caste women is the gravest possible social violation.79 One of the 
youth who was beaten up earlier by the Marathas elaborated, “Let me tell you. If this 
case [of violence against Dalit girls] would have been ulta (vice-versa) then the 
Marathas would not have even kept our bones for panchnama (post mortem).” 
(Interview: 23/1/09). 
The gendered basis of Maratha male authority in the village adds to the blurred 
boundary between private and public at the village level as the “private” honour of 
the dominant castes is intertwined with the supreme status they hold in socio-cultural 
and political public spaces. Thus, the main village where the temple, panchayat 
building or water sources are located; though public are also rendered private in one 
way due to the ritual and political superiority that dominant castes hold in the village. 
Assertive Dalit entry into these spaces is seen as a deviant encroachment upon both 
the personal and public space of the Marathas. Nagaraj (1993) attributes 
contemporary violence against Dalits to the breaking down of the village justice 
system that gave the dominant castes an upper hand over the lives of Dalits. It was 
this control over the Dalits that made the “village” and the “Maratha household” 
supreme in status with the Maratha male as the head. Marathas thus club their honour 
and kingly (rajeshahi) claims making their sovereign claim over the village absolute. 
Dalit intrusion into public spaces in assertive forms put Maratha honour under stress 
in full public view. Nagaraj (1993: 34), thus, argues that ‘the major problem with 
Indian rural society is that it cannot handle deviation now without resorting to 
violence and whatever little restraints it has, collapses when it comes to the question 
of handling untouchables.’  
Maratha Rajeshahi against Dalit invasion of public spaces 
These Mundes […] Vanjaris they are tucch (lowly). Some ten fifteen years 
back we didn’t even touch them or allow them to get close, now they are 
everywhere […] Did you see how they were recently beaten up by Marathas in 
                                                 
79 During fieldwork another incident of violence that happened was against a twenty-year-old Mang 
youth in a village in Aurangabad District. He was tied to an electric pole in front of Shivaji’s statue 
and thrashed till he died. The Mang boy was said to be having a love affair with a Maratha girl 
(Repoter 2009).  
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Wadawani […] All the bikes with Bhagwan Baba [religious symbol of 
Vanjaris] on them were broken. (Fieldnotes: 23/8/08)  
A Maratha80 in his mid-30s shared the above in a casual conversation when a Munde 
(implies Vanjari) was called onto the stage of Annabhau Sathe Jayanti in Chinchwati 
Village. The Mundes are lower than the Marathas in caste status and the Maratha was 
sharing Maratha superiority in response to the sight of a Munde on the stage – a 
public space. The increased visibility of Vanjaris and the violation of caste distance 
from the Maratha’s perspective had to be tamed with violence against Vanjaris and 
their bikes that carried the symbol of Bhagwan Baba. The increasing presence of 
Vanjaris in public spaces, however, may not be as objectionable as Dalits presence in 
public spaces for Marathas and the idea of caste hierarchy is most strictly practiced 
when it comes to Dalits. 
There has been an increase in political violence against Dalits in Marathwada, 
between the years 1998 to 2004. Aurandabad division [Marathwada] recorded the 
highest number of atrocities against Dalits (Waghmare: undated). The participation 
of Marathas against Dalits in such violence is unusually high. This data unravels the 
conflict between semi-feudal caste practices of Marathwada and the politics and 
assertive commemorative performances of Dalits. The Rural Development Centre 
collected data for 3529 cases registered under the SC/ST (POA) Act between the 
years 1990 to 2009 in Marathwada. Amongst the cases, where caste of the accused 
was mentioned, Marathas were involved in 54 percent of cases.81  
One, however, has to be cautious of an approach that evaluates specific groups of 
‘people’ who dominate and does not situate this in a broader understanding of the 
‘society’ (Hearn 2008). Hence, the relation between Marathas and Dalits and the 
dominance that affects this relationship cannot be restricted just to the relationship 
                                                 
80He was not aware of my caste and purpose and I had joined him in mocking the speakers at the 
Jayanti.  
81 Muslims (12.58) were at the second place followed by Vanjaris (7.1) and the rest were various other 
smaller castes like Dhangar, Teli, Mali, Koli, and Brahmin. Most cases of atrocities were committed 
against Mahars (49.65 per cent) followed by Mangs (23.29) and Chambhars (4.93).  In Beed Data was 
available for cases registered between the years 2000 to 2008 which has similar trends. Out of the 
cases where caste of the accused was mentioned the Marathas accounted for 53.24 per cent followed 
by Vanjari at 21 per cent and Muslims at 11.68 per cent (caste of the accused was not available in 5.71 
per cent cases) 
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between Marathas and Dalits. It is difficult to treat Marathas as one whole as they are 
neither homogeneous nor do all Marathas participate in the violence against Dalits. It 
is, however, the powerful Marathas who influence the perspectives and positionality 
of the weak amongst them. Conflicts like Namantar, Khairlanji or Shindi are thus 
turned into sites for performing Maratha radicalism and resurrecting ideas/practices 
such as the rajeshahi of Shivaji (Maratha rule), which unite the Kunbis and Marathas 
into ‘Marathas’ against ‘majlele’ Dalits.  
.  
The making of Maratha identity in the post-Mandal period gained a new political 
turn as Maratha leaders lobbied for inclusion of a new caste called Kunbi-Maratha so 
as to include the Kunbis in the OBC list. Deshpande (2004a) suggests that the 
Marathas formed this category to serve the dual purpose of granting Marathas easy 
access to the backward quota if they wish whilst simultaneously protecting their 
status and glory as a ruling caste. Maratha elites thus innovatively mould the 
democratic processes to usurp development benefits and reconstruct rajeshahi 
(kingly status). Various Maratha social formations in Maharashtra, including 
Maratha Sevak Sangh which is the only Maratha formation known for its anti-
Brahman(ic) stance, had come together in August 2008 to make two demands - one 
was scrapping of the SC/ST(POA) Act  (referred to locally as atrocity kaayda [law]) 
and the other was reservation for Marathas based on ‘economic’ (not social) criteria.  
Maratha assertion is mostly fuelled by Dalit assertion in the political fields of 
Marathwada where Maratha emotions are mobilised against valorisation of 
Ambedkar at the cost of Shivaji. It is interesting to note that Shivaji Jayanti for 
instance was not a norm in the villages and was not celebrated or performed in public 
earlier. One of the Dalits from Phulepimpalgaon said jokingly, “Earlier there was no 
Shivaji Jayanti in this village, they (Marathas) have started it recently” and added, 
“they are learning from us, they are now asking for reservations too, we made them 
hushar (wise)” (Informal discussion: 1/6/09). Maratha mobilisation differs, however, 
in that it is not against hierarchies of caste but about consolidation of Maratha caste 
and its Hindu leanings. For instance the symbol of Raje (king) that is found on most 
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of the Maratha owned vehicles (motor-bikes, jeeps, tractors) has religious 
connotations. There is a particular way of writing Raje on the vehicles. The color has 
to be necessarily saffron and a two-edged flag pops out of the syllable je. The 
popular war cry that Marathas give when they assemble to attack Dalits is Jai Shivaji 
Jai Bhawani.
82
 Any criticism of Hinduism (which is common in Dalit movements) is 
radically opposed either through direct violence or through their thick political 
networks. 
Amol Galdhar, a leader of the NCP’s Youth Wing was at the District 
Collector’s office, dressed in white kurta pyjama, flashing thick gold chain, 
pendant and rings, and a mark of kumkuk (vermilion) on his forehead. He was 
there to give a letter of protest against the planned meeting of Andha Shraddha 
Nirmulan Samiti (a leftist organisation that organises awareness campaigns 
against blind faith practices) in Beed. He was of the opinion that faith 
(shraddha) is a personal matter and no one should interfere.  
Amol walked inside the office with the Collector whereas Dalit activsts waited 
outside till the peon called them inside after five minutes. Inside the office, 
Amol had pulled up a chair, was sitting close to the officer and was resting his 
elbows on the officer’s table, whereas Dalit activists sat in the chairs kept in 
front of the officer at a distance of at least five feet from the table. (Field notes: 
21/9/08).  
Only one Maratha politician visited Shindi village under the pressure of Dalit 
mobilisation. Leaders of Maratha non-party political formations reacted to Dalit 
mobilisation on the other hand by mobilising opinion and people against Dalits and 
the protective legislations they are entitled to. 
 Akhil Bhartiya Chava Maratha Yuva Sanghatan (All India Lion Cubs Maratha 
Youth Organisation) is a militant Maratha youth organisation which is referred to as 
Chava (Lion Cubs) locally. Chava mobilises actively whenever there is a case of 
                                                 
82 Jai Bhavani (victory to goddess bhavani) Jai Shivaji (victory to Shivaji) is a slogan generally used 
by militant Maratha social and political formations including Shiv Sena. It is actively used in public 
gatherings and while attacking Dalits and Muslims in Marathwada.  
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caste atrocity and Dalit mobilisation. They also circulate literature and musical CDs 
that highlight how Dalits are ‘misusing’ the law and marginalising the “brave race of 
Marathas”. The boards put up by Chava in villages and towns have pictures of 
Sambaji (Shivajis’son also referred to as Chava) forcing open the jaws of a lion with 
his bare hands. A text that is invariably written above this picture states ‘such is the 
caste of Marathas who open the jaws of a lion with bare hands to count its teeth.’ 
In a protest march in Beed on 30/1/09, Chava demanded a Central Bureau of 
Investigation (CBI) enquiry into the Shindi and other cases of caste violence as they 
felt that the cases were just minor quarrels that were being given a ‘caste’ colour by 
Dalits. On 26/2/09 Shalinitai Patil83 from western Maharashtra, founder of another 
militant Maratha social formation called Kranti Sena (Revolution Army), and Jawale 
Patil (Chava President) held a press conference and warned the police and the 
government against favouring Dalits in the Shindi case They reiterated that the 
government should not take steps that pamper Dalits who file wrong cases for money 
and also reminded that it is not only Dalits who vote in the elections.  
One of the important disagreements that Maratha organisations had with the Dalit 
activists was over the nature of crime in Shindi. They insisted that there was no 
dhind
84  (caste based humiliation) involved in the violence against the girls. Whereas 
Dalit activists maintained that beating the girls through the village streets was 
intended to humiliate  the girls in public.  
The Maratha socio-political organisations despite their political might were worried 
that the Dalit protest might lead to jailing of the accused Marathas. When it comes to 
accessing the state, however, the example of Amol Galdhar (above) illustrates how 
                                                 
83 Shalini-tai (tai means elder sister and is added to connote respect) is a Maratha leader from western 
Maharastra and wife of ex-Chief Minister of Maharashtra Vasant Dada Patil. She is known in 
Maharashtra for her anti-Dalit, anti-Ambedkar and pro-Shivaji stance. She was MLA of NCP earlier 
but was removed from NCP because of her anti-reservation and anti-Ambedkar speeches. Both Chava 
and Kranti Sena innovatively combine religion (Hindu), region (Maharashtra) and caste (Maratha) in 
their political performances. 
84 Dhind/dhindi refers to processions carried out in public that pass through village streets. These are 
generally religious ones but dhind can also be carried out locally to humiliate or punish social wrongs 
of villagers, particularly Dalits. This involves varied acts of humiliating like blackening of face, 
making Dalits eat human faeces, shaving heads and taking them around on a donkey. Section 3(1)3 of 
SC/ST (PoA) Act makes such humiliation in public of Dalits punishable.    
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Maratha leaders are privileged compared to Dalit activists. The differential access for 
Dalits to the state and its mechanisms of justice affects the possibilities of securing 
justice. It is not surprising that out of the 2980 cases of caste violence registered in 
Marathwada between 1995 to 2005 only 57 resulted in conviction (Waghmare 
undated).  
Similarly the status and dominance of Marathas expands over the political sphere of 
Shindi. The local panchayat in Shindi is one dominated by Marathas who also 
constitute a numerical majority here. Marathas have around 250 households, the 
Dalits have around 100 households and the OBCs (Parit [washerman], Malis 
[gardener], Sutar [carpenter] and Kumbhar [potter]) around 50. Two Maratha Patils 
who are local leaders of BJP and NCP “settle” most cases of violence or other 
disputes in the village through their traditional (patil) and political (panchayat) 
authority. The Government of Maharashtra has a special campaign called the 
Mahatma Gandhi Tantamukt Gaav Mohim (Conflict Free Village Campaign) that 
encourages the “settling” of conflicts at the village level and assures extra 
development grants or prizes to villages, which are ‘conflict free’. The objective of 
this campaign is to ensure that conflicts do not arise at all in the village and village 
level committees across castes are formed for this purpose (GoM undated). The 
attempt from above is thus toward a consensus process of solving conflicts through 
deliberations. Such deliberation or ‘settling’ of caste conflicts at the village level 
invariably means that the perpetrators of violence against Dalits go free. Since the 
case was not settled at the village level in Shindi, both the powerful Marathas in 
Shindi despite having contrasting political affiliations lobbied in various ways with 
the police and the administration to save the Marathas involved in violence against 
the Dalit girls.  
The dominance of Marathas in Shindi village had scared Dalits supporting the 
affected Dalit girls’ family. A Mahar youth had moved out of Shindi as he had a role 
in getting the police case registered. Dalits from Shindi were apprehensive about 
getting any nyay (justice) due to the economic and political might of Marathas. One 
of the apprehensive Dalit youth said, “We can never win this battle and therefore 
should not fight it.”(Informal Discussion: 24/1/09). The fears of the Dalits of Shindi 
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turned out to be true, as eight of the eleven accused in the case were not arrested for 
long. Dalits, by contrast, had to face social boycott in the village: the electricity 
connection to the Dalit locality was turned off, Dalits were denied kirana (grocery) 
in the village shops and were not allowed to use the tempos/rickshaws owned by 
Marathas for commuting. Over the following months, gave security to Dalits for 
sometime, however the hut of a Mahar was set on fire by some Marathas on 5th 
February 2009.  
On 20/2/09, the accused Marathas also managed to secure interim bail from the High 
Court bench in Aurangabad for all those who had escaped the police arrest. Their bail 
application was rejected at a lower court in Ambajogai earlier. They celebrated this 
‘victory’ by distributing sweets and bursting crackers in the village. Section 438 of 
Indian Code of Criminal Procedure that allows anticipatory bail is not applicable if a 
case is registered under the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention 
of Atrocities) Act, 1989. However an amendment to the Section that came about in 
Maharashtra in 1992 allows the High Court’s intervention. By bursting crackers and 
distributing sweets the Marathas proved to the Mahars in Shindi that the atrocity law 
was not greater than their political might.  
The Marathas benefit from their networks and their economic and political status in 
continuing their traditional social authority in newer institutions of democracy like 
panchayats.85 Dalits on the other hand may succumb to the patronising practices of 
Marathas. It is worth noting here that the gaairaan land in Shindi has not been 
‘encroached’ by Dalits assertively but ‘distributed’ by the two prominent Patils as if 
it were their own private land. Assertive ‘encroachment’ by Dalits would have meant 
a challenge to the local Maratha control of the village polity. The dominant 
Marathas, therefore, favoured Dalit families who were subservient by ‘giving’ them 
good quality and larger tracts of land.86 On the other hand Dalits who participated in 
gaairaan rallies and meetings organised by RPI and MHA for regularising the 
                                                 
85 See Jeffrey (2000) for a detailed study of how the intermediate Jat castes perpetuate their economic 
and social advantage through political networks in UP.  
86 Two gaairan cultivators (one Mang and another Chambhar) who were given lands attended the 
press conference organised by Chava in Kaij to vouch for the non-existence of caste politics (jatiya 
rajkaran) and the peace that exists in the village.   
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encroached gaairaan lands were questioned by the Marathas: ‘Why do you go for 
protest despite us giving you the gaairaan?’ (Interview: 23/1/09). Dalits from Shindi, 
who joined Dalit movements and rallies aimed at pressurising the state to regularise 
gaairan cultivations, were asked not to do so. Their participation in such protests and 
rallies that sought approval of the modern state to cultivate gaairan legally was also 
seen as a protest against the local authority of Marathas in Shindi. 
The socio-political existence of Dalits, if assertive, becomes a challenge to the forms 
of kingly status that the Marathas try to resurrect through local institutions of 
democracy. Violence against Dalits is thus a function of their assertive socio-political 
and cultural behaviour. Some Dalits from Shindi particularly told me that since a 
Mahar youth joined the BSP and erected a board of the BSP in the village there was a 
lot of angst against him and other Dalits who joined him as it was seen as a move 
against the two Patils. 
Historically, Mahars in Marathwada have been targets of the Marathas because of 
their conversion to Buddhism, Namantar and their protest against traditional 
occupation and roles. However, the current violence against Dalits is localised and 
may be evoked by varied acts of self-respect or assertion that Dalits from any caste 
may initiate. Dalits upset the caste relations and politics by questioning both the 
socio-cultural and politico-economic practices embedded in the traditional patron-
client relationships that Marathas try to sustain in new forms.  
Caste atrocity, the state and Dalit movement mobilisation 
Dalit movements mostly rely on state mechanisms despite various challenges and a 
high probability of them failing to secure justice. The informal or traditional modes 
of justice delivery at the village level are mostly avoided, as it is the Dalit challenge 
to traditional authority that causes violence against them. Dalits challenge the 
dominance and violence against them by seeking justice outside the village through 
legal measures particularly the SC/ST (PoA) Act. On the other hand, Maratha socio-
political organisations in Maharashtra, particularly Marathwada regularly mobilise 
protests for the scrapping of this act. The Dalit activists, despite being aware of the 
shortcomings of legal measures, consider the atrocity kaayda as a vital protection. 
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Perhaps aware of this, these efforts to secure justice are met with challenges at the 
local police and other administrative offices as officials hesitate to register such cases 
as ‘atrocity’ cases under political pressure.  
Sanju, a BSP worker from a neighbouring village had taken the girls of Shindi to the 
police station and to the local hospital. He informed me that the Police Inspector at 
the police station was not willing to register the case until Sanju used his political 
contacts and made one of the senior BSP leaders in Beed speak to the Additional 
Superintendent of Police who is a Chambar and supports BSP. It was this 
intervention that helped registering the FIR at the police station under the SC/ST 
(POA) act. The unwilling inspector had delayed registering the case till 1.00 am on 
20th February whereas the time on the FIR was noted as 10.00 pm of the previous 
day. Sanju was also offered a sum of Rupees 50,000 to settle the matter and not 
register the case under SC/ST (POA) Act.87 He had also consulted some Dalit 
lawyers regarding the sections of the SC/ST (POA) Act under which the case could 
be registered. This was influenced by the previous experiences of Dalit activists 
where the police register the case under a wrong section making the possibility of 
punishing the accused impossible.88 Instead of accepting the lure of money from 
Marathas, Sanju used his contacts with some sympathetic journalists who carried this 
news the next day, making the issue politically significant for Dalits, Marathas, and 
the state machinery.   On a later day he informed me that Shindi was an ‘opportunity’ 
to deal with the Marathas that he had been waiting for so long. “I have filed atrocity 
cases in all the surrounding villages of Shindi including my own. It was only Shindi 
that I was not able to get and finally I got it” (Fieldnotes: 6/5/09). Despite their 
political and economic dominance, the accused Marathas attempted to avoid legal 
measures in settling the dispute and lured the activist through money.    
Sanju however came close to facing arrest and police violence later as tension flared 
up between Dalit youth and Chava activists around the villages neighbouring Shindi.  
A case under Section 395 (Dacoity) was registered against him. However, he escaped 
                                                 
87 This offer was made by a worker of one of the RPI factions on behest of the Marathas (Informal 
conversation with the BSP worker: 20/1/09).  
88 Rao (2009) has detailed the use and abuse of legal categories like that of SC/ST (PoA) Act in 
denying justice for Dalits. 
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arrest and fled to Mumbai as a Dalit lady police constable informed him about the 
Local Crime Branch searching for him and suggested that he left Beed altogether. 
Dalit activists thus make use of their political networks from their marginal location. 
These worked marginally in their favour and use of networks was therefore coupled 
with protests which were not always peaceful.  
Dalit movements mobilised for protests against the Shindi incident and the callous 
state response. Such mobilisation and protests were dispersed and occurred at 
different times but were homogeneous in purpose. Factions of RPI held 
demonstrations on 20th January. BSP organised a rasta roko (road blockade) at 
Massajog village on 23rd and on Republic Day (26th January). It was only BSP’s 
mobilisation that had non-Dalits protesting for Dalits. The group that blocked the 
guardian minister’s car was led by a Muslim leader and speeches were made by a 
Brahman and a Muslim during the rasta roko.  
Dalit protests are not always peaceful and can turn violent against the state 
institutions. The doctor at Kaij government hospital had not hospitalised one of the 
gravely injured girls from Shindi on 19th January. Instead he had sent the girl home 
with some first aid for her wounds. Dalit activists saw this move as clearly 
influenced by political pressure.89 On the next day the girl had fallen unconscious 
and needed immediate medical intervention. Dalit activists visiting the village took 
her to the Taluka public hospital and also demanded an explanation from the Chief 
Medical Officer (CMO) for their negligence the day before.  
The CMO replied, 'the doctor on duty may have not felt the need to hospitalise 
the girl.' Workers of RPI had by now started crowding the CMO’s office. One 
of the workers of MHA said to the CMO, 'Not hospitalising the girl also means 
that the crime is not grave, nor are the injuries. It also is a way of saving the 
culprits.' Someone from amongst those standing behind said, 'This is jatiwad 
[casteism] and he [the CMO] is trying to protect his caste fellows.' A junior 
doctor in the mean time was sent to examine the girl. The doctor informed the 
                                                 
89 Dalit activists were of the opinion that the personal assistant of a local NCP MLA (who is from 
Chambar caste and elected on the SC reserved seat) had influenced the hospital authorities on the 
behest of Amar Patil. This MLA was also the public health minister till December 2008. 
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activists that the girl’s blood pressure was low. He gave her some injections 
and asked the nurses to prepare intravenous (IV) drips. Some of the angry 
activists later started pelting stones, breaking the windows of the hospital 
building and ambulances.  (Field notes: 20/1/08) 
Similarly on 26th January, ten Dalit women activist of MHA planned to humiliate the 
Guardian Minister from Maratha caste of Beed by hurling glass bangles [a sign of 
femininity] at him in protest as no Minister had visited Shindi or condemned the 
incident.90 The police were cautious and had deployed a woman police inspector 
along with two women constables. They asked the women activists to get rid of their 
bags that they were carrying. Some women activists had hidden the bangles meant 
for attacking the minister in their blouses. Dalit women’s bodies in this surprise 
attack rendered the police officials and even the Minister momentarily vulnerable. 
The women activists were arrested later.  
Alka refused to get into the police jeep complaining that there was no space for 
her to sit. A male constable walked towards her (in an authoritative way) 
amidst all the commotion. Alka did not succumb, “touch me and you will see 
what happens”, she said to the constable who moved back.  
One of constables vented his anger, “had they been men, we would have 
broken their legs” (Fieldnotes: 26/1/09)  
Sen (2007) suggests that the violent activism of women may also be part of their 
agency in making their violent public role indispensable and challenging the 
mechanical inclusion of women in male dominated movements. Dalit women’s 
(violent) activism though slightly different from Dalit men’s activism largely 
revolves around public spaces. Dalit women activists in this case had made the state 
and state officials (especially men) temporarily vulnerable through the ‘cunning’ use 
of their ‘female’ bodies (considered docile sexual objects prone to violation).  It is 
                                                 
90 A Dalit Police Inspector in Beed had provided an opportunity to women MHA workers for meeting 
the visiting Guardian Minister. This official was not aware of the intentions of MHA activists. In an 
informal conversation with the activists of MHA few days earlier they had accepted that the police are 
jatiwadi and few Dalits and OBCs who are sensitive to the Dalit cause work under a lot of pressure 
(Field notes: 24/1/09). He was recently relocated to Beed police station but was transferred out of 
Beed immediately after the incident of attack on the Minister took place. 
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however difficult to find Dalit women or activists engaging in violence against rival 
communities or individuals.  
There were more instances of violence against Dalits on Republic Day (26th January) 
in other villages of Beed. In Ladewadgaon of Kaij Taluka a Mang Sarpanch 
[chairperson of village panchayat] was stopped from hoisting the national flag and 
was slapped by some Marathas. In Khadaki Ghat village of Beed Taluka another 
Mang landless Sarpanch’s hut was set on fire. The dispute here in the Gram Sabha 
was over the allocation of two houses under the Rajiv Gandhi Gruha Vikas Yojana 
(housing development scheme). It was decided that one of the houses will be 
allocated to a Mang which the ex-Sarpanch from Maratha caste opposed. Some 
Marathas heckled and pushed the Mang Sarpanch and abused him on caste lines in 
the Gram Sabha. The houses of the Sarpanch and his mother were set on fire while 
the Gram Sabha was in progress. Both sides had filed FIRs against each other at the 
police station. However it was the Sarpanch who was arrested based on the FIR filed 
by Marathas. This was done despite the Mang Sarpanch registering his FIR 20 
minutes earlier than the Marathas. The Mang Sarpanch was arrested as a 
‘precautionary’ measure to prevent further violence. Several sections of the Indian 
Penal Code were registered against him - section 143 (unlawful assembly), 147 
(rioting), 323 (voluntarily causing hurt), 504 (intentional insult with intent to provoke 
breach of the peace), 506 (criminal intimidation) and 34 (criminal action by several 
persons in furtherance of the common intention).  
After the sudden rise in cases of violence against Dalits, the police and District 
administration’s inaction and the filing of false cases under Section 395 against Dalit 
activists, various social and political Dalit organisations came together in Beed town 
for a meeting to discuss and plan a strategy in the lobby of a government rest house. 
Around eighty Dalit male activists and the leader of MHA’s women’s wing 
participated in the meeting. Dalit workers participating in this meeting represented 
diverse, ideologically competing as well as contrasting political and social groups 
like Congress (I), Bahujan Samaj Party, Republican Party of India (A), Bhartiya 
Janata Party, Shiv Sena, Lok Janshakti Party (LJP), Democratic Party of India (DPI), 
Nationalist Congress Party (NCP), CPI (M) and Manavi Hakk Abhiyaan, Republican 
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Panthers, Dr. Ambedkar Advocates Association, and BAMCEF. Those participating 
were from various castes like Mahar, Mang, Valmiki (Bhangi) and Chambar. Besides 
Dalits there was one member from Dhangar (OBC) caste who was part of NCP and 
had come along with his Dalit friend. A senior leader who is associated with NCP 
and is also a leader of DPI (Democratic Party of India, a marginal Mang political 
formation) was made the Adhyaksha (Chair) of this meeting.  
Most participants discussed their helplessness and the involvement of both the NCP 
and BJP in influencing the administration and police so as to help the accused. Some 
advocated violence for violence, which seemed to be an idea most appreciated 
through applause but was not pursued. Some quoted Ambedkar and the need for 
Dalits to move out of villages. Dalit workers of major political formations like NCP 
and BJP-Shiv Sena acknowledged that their position in those parties is a marginal 
one and they are helpless. One of the Shiv Sena workers said,  
The prashasan (administration) is not on our side and all the parties are 
involved in this. Be it Shiv Sena, Rashtrawadi (NCP), BJP all are jatiwadi. I 
work for Shiv Sena, they cannot do anything in this regard. They say do nished 
(condemn the incident), how will nished help, you are humiliated, beaten, 
killed, how will nished help? [Speech recorded: 27/1/09] 
Deliberation on strategy in such a diverse composition of participants was not easy. 
An argument broke between the workers of BSP and Congress as the Congress 
affiliate was protesting the idea of criticising political parties. This was however 
brought under control by the Chair who summed up the discussion calling for a 
united protest on 29th January in front of District Collector’s office. He commented 
on how political parties like NCP and BJP used Dalits and also emphasised that it 
was not Marathas against whom Dalits had to fight 
None of these parties belong to your forefathers (laughter here). All our people 
there are doing rakhandari (watchmen) […] Please remember that the 
rajyakartas (political rulers) here are not afraid of samajik andolans (social 
movements) [...] All the political leaders know that all those (Dalits) who are 
leading samajik andolans are their own people [affiliated to parties]. They will 
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call you in minutes and say, ‘Ai AC [referring to himself] be quiet’ (loud 
laughter and claps here).  
No caste is bad; it is a matter of pravruti (inclination/leaning towards 
Brahmanism). We have to fight against pravrutti and not against any caste. If 
we think of attacking a caste then what about Shahu Maharaj who honoured 
Babasaheb. He too was Maratha, so we cannot say that all Maratha’s are 
jatiwadi and nor can we say that all amongst us are Ambedkarites (laughter 
here). [Speech Recorded: 27/1/09] 
This meeting was followed by a protest rally on 29th January. All the Dalit socio-
political groups united under a network that was called Samajik Nyay Sangharsh 
Kruti Samiti (Social Justice Action Committee). Around 1000 people participated in 
the protest in front of the District Collector’s office. Some leaders gave speeches and 
a signed memorandum was submitted to the DC’s office. All the local newspapers 
covered this news of local Dalit groups coming together and Dalit unity. MHA along 
with other Dalit NGOs in Mumbai lobbied with the National Scheduled Caste 
Commission and its members visited the concerned villages in the following days.  
Dalit protests, both violent and peaceful, coupled with their use of social and political 
networks had led to the state machinery responding. One of the Patils who was 
threatening the witnesses in Shindi was externed [forced to leave] out of Shindi by 
police, some police officials were suspended for their carelessness in giving 
protection to Dalits in Shindi, and the doctor on duty at Kaij hospital was suspended 
for some time. Both the Dalit girls of Shindi were treated in Ambajogai Government 
Medical Hospital for more than a week. Compensation was provided to some of the 
affected Dalit families of Shindi and Khadaki Ghat by the District Collector under 
the provisions of the SC/ST (POA) Act.  
The situation remained tense in Shindi till the end of my fieldwork in June 2009. 
After securing bail the Maratha families continued to pressurise the Dalit girls and 
their parents for an out of court settlement which the girls firmly rejected. The 
Ambedkar Jayanti in Shindi was celebrated despite the Marathas threatening 
violence if the procession entered the village. For Sanjeevani, the woman who 
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witnessed the girls beating, the Jayanti in Shindi was a success not just because the 
procession passed through the village but because, ‘Dalit youth from the 
neighbouring village came and danced in the Jayanti and this made the Jayanti good.’ 
(Fieldnotes: 19/5/09). The political performance of Dalit youth coupled with the 
commemorative celebration of Ambedkar in village public streets was also 
Sanjeevani’s mode of protest against daily humiliations and exclusions that Dalits 
face. 
On the other hand the Sarpanch from Ladewadgaon who was slapped for trying to 
hoist the Indian national flag on Republic Day did not register a police complaint 
despite being approached by Dalit activists and the matter was ‘settled’ at the village 
level through an informal mechanism. The slap and the humiliation caused in 
‘public’ was forgotten.  
Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has dwelt on the centrality of public spaces in democratisation 
processes, Dalit claims to equal citizenship in public spaces, the resulting violence 
against Dalits and the complex nature of engagement with the state in Dalit politics. 
Public spaces in rural Marathwada are embedded in caste hierarchies and are 
intertwined with the status privileges that dominant Marathas enjoy. These privileges 
blur the personal and public boundaries in public spaces in particular. For dominant 
castes the personal is guided by caste superiority, purity and honour and is performed 
and expanded in public spaces through the dispersed institutions of the liberal state. 
Not surprisingly the state engages in suppressing the conflict and on suggesting 
measures that could settle the conflict through communication at the village itself. 
Therefore understanding the state as strategic relation or strategy, is instructive for 
practices of resistance (Bierbricher 2007).  
Dalit assertion in public spaces represents a critique of the caste sociality that 
reproduces the hierarchies of caste and the untouchable status of Dalits in insidious 
forms. Dalit critique, critical political performance and the resulting crisis/violence 
affects both Maratha authority and Dalit exclusion. Looking for civil society and its 
workings in rational communicative action or forging consensus makes little sense in 
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the grassroots of Marathwada.  Civil society guarantees only the existence of the 
public and not ‘public consensus’ and a strong civil society guarantees the existence 
of conflict (Flyvberg 1998).  
Dalit activists prefer public spaces and state interventions to the traditional modes of 
justice mechanisms which sustain the prevalence of caste prejudices. Most violence 
pertaining to Dalits in rural Marathwada is associated with public spaces and Dalit 
claims to dignity or assertion in public spaces. Assertive actions of Dalits may not 
necessarily be associated with identity or ideology and may pertain to individual 
mobility; however the backlash against individual/group assertion or mobility of 
Dalits is mostly related to caste or turned into a caste issue by dominant Marathas. 
Dalits and Dalit movement actors are not always victims of such dominance and they 
too make use of caste and the state from their marginal locations. They thus attempt 
to create dignified space for themselves in ‘public’ and also actively participate in the 
process of democratisation revising socio-ritual beliefs and practices that dominate 
public spaces – a process which is full of conflict, violence and contradictions.  
Collective identities and anti-caste (?) movements in a caste society 
 
Violence against Dalits is also a function of collective identities of protest they forge 
which may not fit well within the localised caste practices and beliefs. Dalit 
movements deploy diverse and competing ‘collective identities’ around which they 
mobilise for change. The relationship between Dalits and caste is a contested one, 
while some scholars reveal the ‘consensus’ where untouchables share the ideas of 
their ritual inferiority and reproduce (replicate) caste hierarchies (Moffatt 1979), 
others highlight the ‘conflict’ and Dalit challenge to caste (Deliege 1992; Gorringe 
2005). The movements that I focussed on under my study fit into the conflict thesis 
where untouchable castes challenge their ritual inferiority and other exclusions 
through forging varied movement based collective identities and actions. Study of 
social movements as a process of collective identity formation among relatively 
autonomous individuals (Melucci 1989) can helps develop a processual 
understanding of collective identity formation in Dalit movements. The next two 
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chapters present the strategies of anti-caste collective identity formation in BSP and 
MHA respectively and their use of caste (jati) and cultural repertoires. 
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Chapter 7 
The making of “Bahujan” 
Caste and cultural repertoires in anti-caste politics of BSP 
 
In our country there are people who believe in various castes and religions. But 
within these, the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward 
Castes under the Varna system – the casteist (jatiwadi) social system – did not 
have equal rights to progress in every walk of life like other castes or to lead a 
life with man-samman (dignity). Meaning these classes (uses word varga 
[class]) did not have equal rights of education, jobs, farming or business, voting 
or even contesting elections. But there were various saints and great men 
amongst Dalits and OBCs who opposed this unequal social system, the varna 
system (Mayawati Speech: 15/3/10)91  
 
Mayawati opened her speech with the above lines in a massive rally at Lucknow to 
commemorate 25 years of BSP’s formation, where the number of participants was 
estimated by the mainstream media to be around one to two million people. The 
‘Bahujan’ centric orientation of BSP was reaffirmed in this rally. The anti-varna 
rhetoric of Mayawati and her affirmation of Bahujan symbols, leaders and ideology 
and simultaneous rejection of Gandhi and Congress were a matter of debate during 
the next few weeks in the English-language mass media. They debated two issues 
following from this event. One was the huge garland of notes that Mayawati was 
presented on this occasion. The other was whether the BSP was reverting to a ‘Dalit’ 
political agenda, and was abandoning the much-celebrated Dalit-Brahman combine. 
Mayawati’s referring to the varna system caused a kind of panic in the middle class, 
and they responded with public deliberations over the ‘vulgar’ display of wealth and 
her parochial Dalit (not Bahujan) agenda.  
 
The ‘Bahujan’ character of BSP has been a matter of debate in academic circles and 
its formation a challenge for BSP cadres. Jaffrelot (2003: 497 - 498) contests Pai’s 
(2002) claim that BSP in 1990s developed a Dalit-oriented policy. He presents BSP 
                                                 
91 Accesses from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Em7PvREoTiw 
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as a Bahujan party in Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, and observes, ‘Kanshi 
Ram continuously tried to transform the party into the crucible of the Bahujan samaj, 
by aggregating the Dalits, OBCs and, to a lesser extent, the Tribals and Muslims’. 
Similarly Chandra (2000) explores the multi-ethnic character of BSP in Hoshiarpur. 
She suggests that BSP is a multi-ethnic party that makes ‘overt ‘appeals (compared 
to Congress’ ‘covert’ appeals) to ethnic identity. BSP’s comparative ability to 
provide political representation led to its rise over Congress. Recent research on BSP 
in north India suggests BSP to be not a party of Dalits or Bahujans but a “catch-all 
party” (Jaffrelot 2006).While the non-Dalit vote-base of BSP can be termed volatile, 
the Dalit vote has largely remained intact; in the 2009 general elections more than 
half of BSP’s electorate were Dalits (Jaffrelot and Verniers 2009). In Maharashtra 
too, most of BSP’s support comes from Dalits (Palshikar 2007b).  
 
What are the BSP’s grassroots strategies of mobilising Dalit and non- Dalit votes and 
support? How are caste differences within Dalits dealt with? Most of the studies have 
tended to focus on the mobilisation process of BSP in North India; non-north States 
are missing due to the marginal position of BSP in these states. In this chapter, 
therefore, I will fill this lacuna. No Dalit party in Maharashtra is a formidable third 
force that could attract Dalits merely by patronage; BSP however remains a key 
player amongst the Dalit parties, and constitutes an important element in Dalit 
counter politics. Instead of an instrumental approach followed by Pai (2002) who 
focuses on the macro mobilisational strategies (electoral and coalitional) of BSP, and 
Chandra (2004), who explores ethnic favouritism in the Indian patronage democracy, 
I pursue here a qualitative approach to explore the formation of the ‘Bahujan’ 
collective identity at the grassroots in Marathwada. Similar studies point to the BSP’s 
use of symbolic and cultural means in expanding its base amongst the Dalits in north 
India (Jaoul 2006; Narayan 2006; Loynd 2009) By reference to social movement 
studies the focus here is on the construction of ‘we-feeling’ or community (Melucci 
1989; Gorringe 2005).  
 
Chandra’s (2004) instrumentalist approach partially ignores the strategic deployment 
of cultural-ideological material in BSP’s mobilisation. Similarly, Pai (2002: 24) 
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observes that the BSP does not pursue an ‘Ambedkarist’ agenda of challenging caste. 
Such an agenda would ideally require purging Dalits politically and culturally from 
the Hindu community (Rao 2009: 158). A key question of relevance here is, does 
BSP indulge in anti-caste politics or does it merely represent the political ambitions 
of Dalit elites, as suggested by Pai (2002)? 
 
Kanshiram had argued and mobilised for the formation of a broader political 
community that he called Bahujan (I discussed this in chapter four) with Dalits and 
an Ambedkarite ideology at its core. He avoided the concept "Dalit", preferring to 
use the term “Bahujan” from the very beginning, utilising Phule’s analogy of shudra-
atishudra vs. Aryans (Brahmans). On the other hand the BSP has clearly moved 
beyond its Mulniwasi (Bahujans as indigenous people) and anti-Aryan (Brahmans 
and other castes) rhetoric and the scale of overt attacks on upper castes has come 
down. A closer look at the portion of Mayawati’s speech that I began with unravels 
the complex dynamism in BSP’s (anti?) caste politics. Varna is constructed as an 
‘absolute’ hierarchical system by Mayawati, whereas castes are recognised as 
discrete categories with varied beliefs and ideology, caste categories that are part of 
the ‘constitutional’ scheme, i.e., SC, ST and OBC are imagined as humiliated and 
deprived ‘Bahujans’ and their ‘various’ saints and traditions are said to have 
challenged the varna system. While the mainstream media represented the anti-varna 
rhetoric (and public display of wealth) of Mayawati was synonymous with a Dalit 
political agenda, they ignored her continuous reference to the Constitution and to 
cultural traditions of protest carried out by Bahujan saints and mahapurushs. It is this 
merging of tradition and modern that I explore at length in this chapter.  
 
Dalit and OBC cadres of BSP from Beed attended this large-scale commemoration 
rally addressed by Mayawati. They had paid from their limited resources to be part of 
this commemoration. An instrumentalist approach cannot explain this voluntary 
spirit of BSP. Like Kanshiram and Mayawati, the BSP cadres in their local praxis 
emphasise the collective identity of ‘Bahujan’ who represent 85 per cent of 
population and not ‘Dalit’. But they also mobilise around caste identities like those 
of Mang, Boudha (Mahar) and Charmakar as they attempt to forge this imagined 
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Bahujan collective. It is this tension and fusion of particular (jati) and collective 
(Bahujan) in the formation of anti-caste Bahujan collective that I present in this 
chapter. I detail here the mobilisation strategies of BSP in Marathwada, considering 
carefully the use of caste as cultural and ideological material in the construction of 
‘Bahujan’ collective identity where Dalits are at the core of these mobilisation 
processes. I argue that BSP’s caste repertoires strategically deal with both the 
‘difference’ and ‘hierarchical’ elements of caste and construct a counter-politics 
where cultural-ideological roots of every caste are identified in anti-caste histories 
thus contributing to the deepening of Ambedkarite politics. Thus the dynamism of 
BSP’s socio-cultural mobilisation and its version of anti-caste politics are also linked 
to the dynamism of caste hierarchy itself.  
 
This chapter begins by briefly presenting the centrality of Ambedkar and 
Ambedkarism in electoral and Dalit politics of Maharashtra, where the factions of 
RPI have come to be synonymous with Ambedkarism. Though they engage in 
assertive Dalit politics they are also seen as parties specifically associated with 
Mahar radicalism. It is in this context that BSP tries to move beyond Mahars to 
include other Dalits and non-Dalits in its fold. In the following sections I describe the 
BSP’s attempts in Beed to mobilise three social categories -- Chambars, OBCs and 
Muslims – and present the accommodative and strategic mobilisation of BSP cadres 
to challenge the identity of BSP as the party of ‘untouchables’. BSP’s Ambedkarism 
is thus broad-based so as to include dissenting Dalits and non-Dalits to form a 
Bahujan collective from below that has anti-caste cultural groundings. 
 
Voting for RPI as religion and Ambedkar as God in Maharashtra Dalit politics 
The major challenge for consolidation of non-Dalit support for BSP in Maharashtra 
is the relatively low population of Dalits (11 percent as compared to 21 percent in 
UP) and the presence of various competing Dalit Party (RPI) factions that have a 
longer history and who claim a direct lineage from Ambedkar. The non-Mahar Dalits 
have largely remained outside the purview of RPI influence. Varied factions of RPI 
called themselves the true heirs of Ambedkar and were identified mostly with 
Mahars. Voting for RPI in electoral politics in post-Ambedkar phase thus came to be 
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intertwined with Ambedkarism and Ambedkarite politics, which constructed local 
Dalit politics well before the emergence of the BSP in Maharashtra.  
 
Some elder supporters of RPI I spoke to felt that not voting for RPI was like 
betraying Ambedkar. Assertive Mahars affiliated with the various RPI factions ended 
up voting for the alliance partners of RPI - mostly Congress. Some others had lost 
hope in electoral politics because, as they saw it, the RPI had fallen into an ‘alliance 
trap’. For example, Dhammananda is a staunch Ambedkarite in her mid-fifties who 
did not vote in elections anymore. ‘You have to become lachar (helpless) if you vote 
for them; we will have to bow in front of them’. She considered the old and united 
RPI as ‘our’ party and added, ‘I will support RPI till I die, as it is Babasaheb’s party’ 
(Fieldnotes: 13/4/09). RPI not being united and not having an independent identity in 
contesting elections meant for Dhammananda that no other party could represent 
Ambedkar and his ideology. Due to lack of Dalit unity and the missing unified 
‘Ambedkar’s RPI’ Dhammananda preferred to stay away from voting.  
 
While Dhammananda has given up voting, others have taken one of the factions of 
RPI as the path that Ambedkarite Dalits should follow. While some Mahars merge 
Ambedkar and Buddha with other Hindu Gods for worshipping (Ganguly 2004), 
other Mahars strictly worship Ambedkar and Buddha, preferring to reject Hindu 
Gods and rituals in totality. They have merged Ambedkar, Buddha and the 
Constitution to construct a new kind of bhakti where the old gods are replaced with 
modern gods and symbols. There is thus an internal critique and competition for 
being ‘true’ Ambedkarites within Dalit politics. 
 
Kailash, a BSP worker, commented critically on commitment that turns RPI into a 
kind of religion. ‘Yes, some of our people are like that, they would even worship 
Babasaheb’s dog as a god.’ (Fieldnotes: 9/4/09). BSP workers follow Kanshiram in 
criticising RPI’s tendency to work only among the Dalits, and even more especially 
amongst the Buddhist Mahars. Following Kanshiram, they term RPI’s Ambedkarists 
as chamchas who are also labelled as gulams. Shantabai Salave in her early sixties is 
currently a BSP supporter and has travelled from voting for CPI when it was strong, 
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through Congress (RPI alliance) and is presently a BSP supporter. Before voting for 
BSP she voted where the samaj [Mahars] voted under the influence of their leaders 
[called pudharis locally]. She had moved to BSP after attending some cadre camps 
organised in the village. The supporters of BSP consider its politics to be better than 
the RPI groups particularly because of its independence from non-Ambedkarite 
parties.  
 
S: Why not support RPI? 
SS: They go to Congress-BJP.  
S: What is wrong if one goes to Congress-BJP? 
SS: No, No [...] It has to be ‘all Ambedkar’. Our people contest in Congress 
and we think that they are ours (aapale). But they are sold out for money […] I 
tell these boys whatever mark [votes] you get is fine. Why go after money? RPI 
too is ours but they follow their [Congress] wishes. It is like we are cleaning at 
their place. This is how I feel (laughs). (Interview: 5/3/09) 
 
The Ambedkarism of BSP thus is not radically distinct from groups like RPI as 
Ambedkar is at the centre of all their political processes and imaginations. The cadre 
of BSP proudly reminds Dalits that the symbol of ‘elephant’ Ambedkar had chosen 
for RPI was ‘lost’ by the factions of RPI as they could not garner enough votes and 
the BSP ‘got it back’. The cadres, however, move beyond the critique of RPI to 
target major political parties and their ideology as inspired by Manu-wad.  
 
Both in the political rallies and in cadre camps the workers and leaders of BSP 
rework history to remind their listeners that universal adult franchise in India was a 
gift from Ambedkar so that even poor, un-propertied and uneducated people shall 
decide who the ‘rulers’ can be. ‘Selling’ one’s vote for money, liquor or meat 
distributed by dominant parties is therefore considered as step against, or betrayal 
(dokha) of Ambedkar. All non-BSP parties are seen as non/anti-Ambedkarite, who 
naturally lack the quest for implementing (Ambedkar’s) Constitution of India. The 
Constitution of Ambedkar is thus turned into a manifesto of BSP. 
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Jogdand [District Secretary of BSP in Beed and a Mang] recalled a speech in 
1993 of Kanshiram where he spoke on how to implement Ambedkarism [...] 
For Ambedkarism to be implemented the Constitution has to be implemented 
properly. If the Constitution is implemented India will become a great country 
in world, but how does one implement the Constitution? That is what BSP is 
doing. BSP is the only political party in the world that comes to power without 
any manifesto (Fieldnotes 21/1/09).  
 
As discussed in chapter four, symbols of Ambedkar, Kanshiram and Mayawati have 
surfaced in some Dalit households. Along with such symbols is also introduced the 
Constitution as an Ambedkarite mission – yet to be achieved. Mobilisation of such 
Ambedkarite emotions and hopes has seen voters of BSP spending money from their 
limited means, either directly contributing to the party or paying for their own travel 
to participate in rallies and meetings. Such evoking of the voluntary spirit in party 
politics is not merely a function of reworking ‘true’ Ambedkarite ideology in BSP’s 
mobilisation and strategic use of caste pride. Communal anti-caste histories and their 
intersections with class issues also contribute in consolidating support for BSP.  
 
Making of the ‘Bahujan’ collective identity: merging humiliation and 
deprivation 
Chandra (2000) observes that humiliation and not deprivation is conceived as ‘the’ 
problem in BSP and the cure is seen in political representation and not material 
benefits. The cadres of BSP in Marathwada similarly emphasised humiliation and a 
quest for self-respect as important reasons for their passionate voluntary engagement 
in BSP. They incorporate class issues and aspirations in their repertoires, however, in 
order to situate the material deprivation of Bahujans, particularly Dalits, within the 
cultural repertoires of contention that construct ‘Manu’ and Manuwad as the ‘Other’. 
One of the elder members of BSP explained the intersections of poverty with 
Manuwad. 
 
It is a chakravyuha [cyclical trap], you are supposed to be resource-less 
according to the Manu Smriti and the effects we still see [....] Things have 
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changed now, there is no direct jatiwad [casteism] but there is indirect jatiwad. 
In places where they cannot stop us we have moved ahead but our pace of 
progress is very slow (Interview: 3/2/10). 
 
The participants and supporters of BSP do not merely rally around BSP because they 
respond to the issues of humiliation and self-respect. They hope to better their lives 
through such support. Machindra Paike is a marginal farmer from Chinchala village 
who also works as a labourer on other people’s farms. He explained:  
 
If the BSP came to power in all of India everyone will progress personally 
[vyaktigat] and all the schemes and plans will be implemented as per 
Babasaheb’s Constitution. None of these are implemented properly so far. If 
this happens all people will progress [vikas] including the poor. (Interview: 
23/9/08). 
 
The BSP in Maharashtra is dominated by Mahar Buddhists but the Buddhist/Mahar 
and other Cadres of BSP make efforts to mobilise support outside Mahar Buddhists 
to form a Bahujan collective. Phule-Ambedkarism and anti-Manu emotions are 
mobilised amongst non-Mahars and the use of caste repertoires is central in the 
strategies of BSP. Each caste is constructed here as a victim of Manuwad and 
specific caste histories are mobilised through symbols that fit the anti-caste 
discourses. The workers of BSP also claim to pursue Ambedkarite politics which 
includes ‘annihilation of caste’ – a text written by Ambedkar that is supposed to have 
influenced Kanshiram. Though BSP in Maharashtra is dominated by Mahar-
Buddhists, a formation of Buddhist collective identity through en masse conversion 
is not at the centre of BSP’s political performances or mobilisation strategies and the 
cadres mobilise in bhakti mode, constructing discrete ideologies of protest which are 
close to Buddhist principles.92  
 
                                                 
92 The RPI’s critique of Mayawati and Kanshiram is that of them not converting to Buddhism. 
Kanshiram had vowed to convert to Buddhism in October 2006 with lakhs of followers but he passed 
away in March 2006. His final rites were carried out by Mayawati using Buddhist rituals. 
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The focus is on mobilisation of varied caste/s (and religions) into a collective identity 
of ‘Bahujan’ with Dalits at the core. The ‘85 – 15 formula’ of Kanshiram, as cadres 
generally refer it to, constructs Bahujan and the non-Bahujans. All the castes and 
religions (represented as low caste converts to other religions) other than the 15 
percent of ruling castes (Brahmans, Baniya and Thakur) are referred to as Bahujans. 
The term Bahujan is given culturo-historical grounding by invoking its usage by 
Buddha and Phule. On the other hand, Bahujans are also constructed as deprived 
castes and such deprivation is linked to their dispossession of ‘political’ power in 
recent (colonial and postcolonial times). Securing political power could thus result in 
implementing Ambedkar’s Constitution of India and solving deprivations, thus 
bringing in a society that is based not on the jatiwad of Manu (also referred to as 
Manuwad) but on the samata-wadi93 ideology of Baba, Shahu, Phule and other great 
men who challenged caste, but whose history and contributions were neglected by 
Gandhi and the Gandhian Congress. 
 
Self respect and self rule are merged in the public discourses of BSP; self respect is 
associated with recognition claims for the specific castes and anti-caste leaders and 
self-rule (through BSP) is presented as a necessity for securing self respect – 
something that has been denied due to the dominance of the Congress in the colonial 
and postcolonial years. ‘Bahujan’ is thus a collective identity constructed by using 
caste and fragmented caste histories. Bahujan socio-cultural history is not presented 
as one of deprivation; the stories of anti-caste protests in bhakti are selectively used 
to suit the varied contexts and castes. Thus the usage of symbolic history varied from 
pre-colonial anti-caste symbols like Buddha, Ashoka, Kabir, and Ravidas to the 
colonial icons like that of Phule, Shahu and Ambedkar. The efforts of the cadre are 
thus on the formation of an ideological alliance amongst the Bahujan (who have been 
divided and humiliated by Manu and main-stream political parties) through the use 
of diverse histories and symbolism.  
 
BSP’s coming to power with a full majority in Uttar Pradesh in its 2007 assembly 
elections with support from Brahmans created a visible stir in the politics of 
                                                 
93 Samata means equality. The emphasis here is on social equality. 
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Maharashtra.94 BSP’s success was understood to be based on the formation of 
brotherhood (Bhaichara) committees there. Dalit cadres in Maharashtra worked 
towards forming similar Bhaichara committees to collectivise castes and 
communities through mobilising caste pride and use of (anti-) caste histories. As in 
UP there was an attempt to involve the Brahmans as well, which met with some 
success. For instance, Bhonjal, a new Brahman entrant, also emphasised ideological 
and caste reasons for joining BSP: 
 
You see it was five Brahmans who became the first disciples of Buddha. 
Buddha was a Kshatriya Raja and not a Mahar. Ananda, a Brahman, was 
Buddha’s favourite disciple; there were no SCs here. You should also 
remember that Brahmans helped Phule in securing education and also in 
spreading education (Fieldnotes: 23/1/09). 
 
I will return to Bhonjal’s case in chapter nine on electoral politics where I present an 
instrumental analysis of the non-ideological factors – the use of caste muscle, money 
power and micro brokering and patronage politics – that attracted some Dalits and 
non-Dalits to BSP. Here I focus more on how the ideological commitments were 
variedly mobilised by the workers of BSP. 
 
While the mainstream public sphere reacts regularly to BSP’s political performances 
BSP workers and leaders do not engage with the mainstream public sphere. BSP has 
developed and nurtured its own counter-public sphere, however, and that provides an 
effective means for the transmission of the party’s political messages (Loynd 2008). 
Cadre trainings, political rallies, musical performances and alternative literature 
(books and CDs) are key sources and sites that constitute the alternative public 
sphere of the BSP. The literature sold is critical of the mainstream media, which is 
generally termed as Manuwadi by the cadre of BSP. Any public event of medium or 
large scale organised by BSP is accompanied by the sale of Dalit literature close to 
the venue. These books include Marathi and Hindi versions of Ambedkar’s writings 
and other writings of scholars and journalists on Kanshiram, Mayawati and 
                                                 
94 I will deal this in detail in the chapter on the parliamentary elections of 2009 
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Ambedkar, small booklets critiquing Gandhi’s life and politics, or detailing the life 
of Periyar or Phule. There are also booklets on the myth of ‘Muslim pampering’, 
detailing Muslim deprivation highlighted through the Sachar Committee.95 In this 
chapter I focus on the politicised cultural frames that BSP constructs to mobilise 
varied castes against Manuwad. I will begin by presenting the case of Charmakars, 
followed by OBCs and Muslims. 
 
Chambars/Charmakars in Dalit movements 
‘Chambar’ is increasingly seen as a derogatory term locally, especially amongst the 
new activists amongst the Charmakars aligned to varied socio-political formations. 
Charma means skin and Charmakar translates into one who skilfully works with or 
on skin. The work with skin is not considered as polluting, as was the case with the 
Mahars, who under Ambedkar’s influence chose to move away from stigmatised 
occupations. Those Charmakars pursuing leatherwork or jobs as cobblers also 
referred to their work as rohidasacha kaam (work of Rohidas). Amongst the 
Charmakars, Ravidas96 (also referred to locally as Rohidas) is a universal socio-
religious symbol and can be assimilated both within the Brahmanic Hindu traditions 
and anti-caste bhakti traditions.  
 
While the Dalits in UP particularly have used the symbol of Ravidas as one of protest 
against caste Hindu traditions, thus making a movement from Bhakti to Buddha 
(Bellwinkel-Schempp 2007), Ravidas still remains a Hindu symbol for the 
Charmakars in Maharashtra. Both in the past and present, the Charmakar leaders 
have largely opposed the alternative of conversion to Buddhism. While the Mahars 
attribute their social mobility to Ambedkarite ideology and Dalit movements, Most 
Charmakars have been socially and educationally mobile without converting to 
Buddhism. The educated elite amongst Charmakars rejects both the Mahar obsession 
with conversions to Buddhism and the identity of Dalit (or Hindu Dalit), and is more 
                                                 
95 A Committee formed by Central Government to study the socio-economic status of Muslims in 
India. The Committee brought out the miserable Muslims presence in Government services. Hindutva 
political parties criticised the formation, findings and recommendations of this committee.  
96 Ravidas was a Bhakti saint of fifteenth-sixteenth century from Chamar caste. He followed the 
Sanskritisation mode of bhakti in contesting caste and continued to practice his caste profession, never 
hid his caste, did not advocate religious conversions nor following the upper castes (Ram 2008).  
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inclined towards identifying themselves as Hindus. Dr. Bhosale, a Professor of 
Sociology at the University of Mumbai from the Charmakar caste has researched 
Charmakar organisations extensively and argues that the Charmakars had no good 
reason to be in favour of conversions, and that the Mahars remain lowly in their eyes 
(Bhosale 2003). Dr. Bhosale is regularly invited to speak in ROSA (Rohidas Officers 
Social Association) and other meetings; he shared some of his experiences.  
 
They [ROSA] hardly discuss any social issues; rather they meet for match-
making for their children. You tell me [he asked], how would an 
[educated/urban] Charmakar woman identify with what happened to the 
woman in Khairlanji? I was called to speak on a Rohidas Jayanti by Ramesh 
Medekar who is part of BJP. I told him that I would present Rohidas who is 
closer to Buddha. He allowed me to speak. But my idea of Buddha’s path as an 
alternative was not liked at all. (Fieldnotes: 17/9/08).  
 
Buddha and Ambedkar are the symbols associated with Mahars in local political 
culture and politics of culture. While for some Dalits these symbols resemble 
assertion against their untouchable status, they have also become synonymous with 
untouchable identity. Like the Mangs, Charmakars may oppose Ambedkarite 
ideology not only because Ambedkar was a Mahar and they reject Mahar dominance 
in Ambedkarite movements but also due to their proximity and comfort in Hindu 
beliefs and practices, particularly their higher social status as compared to Mahars. 
Charmakars are not happy to be associated with the symbols of Dalit protest like 
Ambedkar or Jai Bhim, because they also render the possibility of their being 
identified with ‘invisible’ untouchable identity.  
 
It is such invisibility of oppression and oppressed identity and Brahmanic 
appropriation of Dalit existence and bodies that BSP workers seek to challenge. Dalit 
suffering is thus linked in the discursive practice of BSP to Dalit bodies and minds, 
which they argue, are colonised by Brahmanic practices. Rao (2009: 268, emphasis 
in the original) has dealt with this aspect in detail and has argued that a twinned 
structure of denial and disclosure (of caste) gestures to the continued relevance of a 
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corporeal politics. The somatic symptoms of colonisation (in this case Dalit denial of 
their lower status vis-à-vis case inequality) are signs of the colonisation of psychic 
space (Oliver 2004: 28). BSP leaders emphasised the need for making these invisible 
identities of caste and status visible for forming the Bahujan identity.  
 
Yes, annihilation of caste is the agenda of Ambedkarite movements. But where 
is caste? Caste is hidden. It is in heart and brain. We have to make it visible. 
Why is it hidden? Because there is inferiority complex. Convert inferiority into 
caste ego then they will not hide caste. This is psychological treatment and it 
began in this country with Ravidas. He ends every composition with kahe 
ravidas chamar [so says Ravidas Chamar]. Ravidas has never hidden his caste. 
This was scientific treatment, a person who considers himself inferior, turns 
caste into pride for him (Interview with Suresh Mane97: 10/2/09).  
 
Ravidas thus is a symbol of contention for competing political ideologies and groups 
as he can be interpreted as close to Hinduism (caste-Hindu traditions)98 or as close to 
Ambedkar/Buddha vis-à-vis the Bahujan collective identity. Over the years, the BSP 
cadres have attracted Charmakars into the party through caste repertoires 
strategically mobilising opinion in favour of Ravidas (as one closer to Ambedkar and 
anti-caste thought). I will now move on to discuss the strategies of BSP involved in 
mobilisation of Charmakars who have been traditionally out of Ambedkarite 
movements.  
 
Charmakars in BSP  
Most BSP supporters in Maharashtra consider the musical performances by Rahul 
Anvikar as more effective than the speeches of the cadre trainers or leaders. Rahul 
Anvikar is a ‘star’ performer and his arrival on the stage attracts applause from those 
who have heard him before. Rahul mixes music with movement talk that forges a 
link between the Bahujan ideologues from Buddha to Ambedkar with BSP 
                                                 
97 Suresh Mane is a senior leader of BSP from Maharashtra. He is the national general secretary of 
BSP and is also Professor of Law at Mumbai University. 
98 See Khare (1985: 40-50) for differences between the caste Hindu and untouchable versions of the 
Ravidas legend.  
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(Kanshiram and Mayawati) and with a critique of major political formations like that 
of Congress and BJP. He also overtly engages with the caste of participants in his 
performance. As part of the Janhit Chetana [people’s awareness] Rallies that were 
organised in all districts, Rahul Anvikar99 performed in Beed on September 22 2008 
in front of around eight to ten thousand participants. His song on how the heart of 
Congress was beating because of the growth of BSP saw some of the participants 
(including a woman) getting up and dancing in their places. 
 
Rahul particularly engaged overtly with the Mangs and Chambars here. He asked the 
participants, are there any Mangs here? Some of the Mang participants raised their 
hands. He asked the Mangs to be bold and not shy, ‘I too am a Mang, do not be shy’. 
This evoked laughter from the audience and also resulted in more Mangs raising their 
hands. He followed this up by emphasising that he was a Mang of Baba, Shahu and 
Phule and also added that Matang meant ‘elephant’ in Pali (as also in Sanskrit) 
resembling not just the symbol of BSP but also the power and strength of Mangs. He 
then sang a song on Annabhau and his role in the making the life of Bahujans golden. 
He later moved to the Charmakars and asked, are there any Chambars here? Fewer 
hands compared to Mangs went up, but he added again, ‘Do not be shy I too am a 
Chambar’, causing laughter in the audience. Rahul however treated Chambars 
differently, ‘the Chambars of Maharashtra have to be gathered in one place and 
bombed to death. How come you do not have akkal [brains]. The daughter of a 
Chamar [referring to Mayawati] is going to be the PM of India’. As laughter 
prevailed Rahul went on to sing a song in praise of Ravidas and his anti-caste 
philosophy.  
 
A direct link of caste and power was thus forged between the Chamars of UP and the 
Chambars of Maharashtra and the need for the Chambars of Maharashtra to join this 
movement which would make ‘a daughter of a Chamar’ the PM of India. A general 
quote from Ravidas that is cited by the BSP cadre is,  
 
                                                 
99 There are not just public performances, either, since some cadres/supporters organise performance 
for samaj prabhodan (awareness lecture) by Rahul Anvikar on personal familial occasions.  
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aisa chahu raaj main, jahan sabhan ko mile ann [I want the kind of rule where 
everyone gets food] 
chot bado sab samm base, Ravidas rah prasann [where the big and the small 
live equally, Ravidas will then be happy] 
 
The BSP cadres argue that the kind of rule that Ravidas aspired for can be provided 
only by BSP. This quote from Ravidas, however, seemed most handy while 
convincing the Charmakars in favour of BSP. Also, the blue colour (of BSP) is 
generally associated with Mahar Ambedkarites. On 31st January 2009, a District-
level Charmakar Samaj Meeting was organised in Beed as part of the BSP’s 
mobilisation of Charmakars. BSP’s Member of Parliament in the Rajya Sabha Mr. 
Veer Singh was to address this meeting. Dr. C, a lecturer at a college in Nagpur 
University from Charmakar caste and some non-Dalits, joined him. Around a 
thousand Charmakars both men and women from across Beed attended this 
gathering. Charmakar (not Chamar) pride was again evoked by the organisers who 
introduced the khasdar (local term for MP) as a Charmakar. The M.P spoke in Hindi 
and mixed Charmakar pride with BSP’s quest for taking revenge for the humiliation 
that Congress had put Babasaheb through. While there was not as good a response 
for the suggested avenging of Ambedkar’s humiliation, Charmakar pride did evoke 
good applause from the participants.  
 
While in Maharashtra the Charmakars may be less numerically but in the 
whole country amongst the Scheduled Castes the Charmakars constitute 90 per 
cent [....] In UP out of the total SCs the Charmakars are 95 per cent [some 
applause here....] and every one considers Mayawati as their leader [....] 
Congress and BJP divide the voting of Scheduled Caste so that SC should not 
become PM [....] The Charmakars across the country are supporting Mayawati 
[...] Why should you support BSP? Because Mayawati is Charmakar, I am 
Charmakar and you are Charmakar too [applause here]. If we have to make 




The Charmakar rejection of Dalit parties including BSP in Maharashtra is also linked 
to the excessive representation of Charmakar leaders in both BJP-SS and Congress. I 
will deal with these instrumental processes in chapter nine on elections.  
 
Below I present two cases that elaborate further the complex process of rendering 
caste visible and form Bahujan ideology and identity. K (44) is an assistant lecturer 
in one of the junior colleges in Beed run by a powerful Teli from NCP. K has 
travelled from NCP to BJP and had joined BSP covertly (he called it aatun) during 
my fieldwork. K had switched from NCP to BJP as he was refused a ticket from NCP 
for contesting zilla parishad elections. K and his wife were present for the Charmakar 
Meeting of BSP but he did not come on the stage, unlike others who lined up to 
shake hands with Khasdar. He also showed me the receipt of the Rupees 500 that he 
had contributed on the occasion of contributions collected on Mayawati’s Birthday. 
It is not just K’s support for BSP that is covert but so also is his Ambedkarite 
leaning.  
 
The living room at K’s flat in Beed had two beds. One of these beds had a 
small shelf attached. K [after knowing thoroughly about my research] removed 
some literature from that closed shelf which contained some books in Marathi 
on Ambedkarite movement and on Charmakars. These were however closed in 
the shelf; no one could see them unless one opened the shelf. The living room 
had no pictures that one would find generally in the houses of a Mahar or Mang 
activists like Ambedkar Buddha or even Ravidas. It had one small idol in silver 
of goddess Lakshmi. (Fieldnotes: 24-2-09). 
 
As opposed to K, Banage, another Charmakar in Majalgaon, was more vocal in 
displaying his Ambedkarite identity and leanings. Chanderlal Banage (33) is seventh 
class pass and owns a small roadside cobbler stall in Majalgaon. During my 
fieldwork his shack was a site for regular discussions among the workers of BSP. 
One of the most noticeable aspects of Banage was his interest in reading and 
accumulating reading material related to BSP. He had kept these cuttings of 
newspapers and other magazines in his stall and he would share them during 
 193 
conversations. Besides Dalits he would engage with OBCs, Muslim and some 
Marathas. He and other committed cadres of BSP would regularly try to convince 
more members to join BSP. Banage was previously a supporter of CPI (M) and BBM 
before joining as a fulltime BSP worker.  
 
Banage informed me about a particular incident of discrimination that had influenced 
his political choices and proximity to Dalit movements as compared to other 
Charmakars who keep a distance from RPI formations. Banage was the sachiv 
[secretary] of a Muslim Bhaichara and also the Taluka President of Akhil Bhartiya 
Guru Ravidas Samata Parishad, a social organisation that mobilises Charmakars 
towards Ravidas and BSP. Banage actively purges Ravidas from Hindu leanings, he 
even considered the term Rohidas that is prevalent locally to be a Manuwadi plot. 
Banage was pursued to attend the cadre trainings by local BAMCEF workers who 
had also impressed upon him that Kanshiram and Mayawati were from Charmakar 
caste. Banage has been attending the cadre trainings since 1997. However, it is only 
since 2007 that he became a fulltime cadre involved in mobilising resources and 
people in favour of BSP. Following the ‘85-15 formula’, Banage maintains that BSP 
strives to make this vertical manuwadi system (of caste hierarchy) horizontal. 
Banage held that a lack of ‘awareness’ amongst the Charmakars was responsible for 
their miserable presence in BSP.  
 
This system [manuwad] has been fitted in our heads. You worship gods, 
various gods, and then you worship the godmen [Maharaj], and then you give 
them daan dakshina [religious gift], and feel that problems can be solved by 
godmen they know. People have become dependent on god and godmen. 
Everyone goes through good and bad times but they [Charmakars] think that 
god will solve all the problems […..] My brother used to say that this party has 
this samaj [Mahar] and we should not contribute money. I told them, you pay 
money for temple, god, why not for party and social work? Construction of 
temple does not change the status of samaj. I studied BSP and understood that 
BSP is not just about Mahars [...] The Brahmans are joining BSP, everyone else 
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is joining, why shouldn’t we? This is our home, we have freedom here. 
(Interview: 23/12/08) 
 
Banage understood that the dheya [objective or mission] of the BSP is to end caste, 
to create a society without caste, but he under-emphasised any need to convert to 
Buddhism.  
 
[Converting to] Buddhism is not important. It is just a label. What is important 
is change of vichar [ideology]. We all are human beings and we should have 
Manavtawadi [humanist] ideology. There is Manuwad and Manavtawad [...] 
we are for Manavtawad. This party is for Manavtawad. That is important [...] It 
does not make sense to label it as something. (Interview: 23/12/08) 
 
Over time Banage has removed pictures of gods and goddesses from his home. He 
also felt that Kanshiram was a selfless Buddhist monk in all practical senses. He did 
not emphasise Buddhist collective identity in the formation of Bahujan identity, 
however, but retained the Ambedkarite critique of Manuwad. This is also because an 
obsession with forming only one Buddhist identity may push out those who can be 
mobilised in favour of BSP through other means like caste repertoires. Charmakars 
are thus mobilised by evoking the bhakti leanings of Ravidas against caste and 
through mobilising caste pride and forging linkages with the Ambedkarite mission of 
ending Manuwad as conceived by BSP. In this process the identity of Charmakars is 
consolidated, rendered visible and linked to the Bahujan identity.  
 
A senior leader of BSP estimated that there are around 200 symbols – modern and 
medieval – that could be evoked for organising the scattered caste into a collective 
Bahujan identity with an anti-caste ideology. Such politicisation and consolidation of 
caste is translated into ‘we for ourselves’ in party politics. The imagined Bahujan 
identity with Ambedkarite ideology is thus merged with fragmented Bhakti and other 
symbols like Santaji (Bhakti saint from Teli Caste), Chandragupta Maurya 
(constructed as a King from shepherd caste), Prasenjit (Mang king) and various 
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others, so as to merge ambitions of political power with anti-caste ideology. I will 
now detail the strategies for OBC mobilisation that the cadres engage in.  
 
OBCs, BSP and Ambedkarism  
Congress tells Yadavs, do not follow Babasaheb, you are from the khandan 
[genealogy/lineage] of God Krishna. Babasaheb will make you Chamar, 
Harijan. So why will Yadavs follow Ambedkar if they are from Krishna’s 
khandan (laughter here). Why will the one who has a lineage of God Krishna 
follow Babasaheb and call oneself backward? (BAMCEF Cadre training 
speech: 28/6/09) 
 
There are 216 castes identified as OBCs in Maharashtra.100 Dongre, a senior worker 
of BSP and a lawyer by profession, held the view that Ambedkar had envisioned a 
coalition of OBCs and Dalits through Article 340.  
 
Babasaheb made provision of reservation for the OBCs. Babasaheb had the 
vision of understanding that the Dhobis and Telis will have no work to do in 
future, even they are gulam, and it was through Article 340 that Babasaheb 
tried to unite SC, ST and OBC (Fieldnotes: 25/12/08).  
 
Like the Charmakars, several OBC castes too consider Ambedkar (even Phule and 
Shahu) as untouchable symbols of assertion. The opposition of Congress and BJP to 
reservations for OBC during the debates over implementation of Mandal 
Commission is regularly evoked and historicised by the BSP Cadre to remind the 
OBCs of Congress-BJP betrayal (or Manuwad) and the role of BSP in implementing 
the Mandal Commission. Some from castes identified as OBCs, within and outside 
BSP, hold similar views and are critical of major political formations. This does not, 
however, translate into unity in party politics between the constitutional groupings 
like those of OBCs. Some visible passionate ‘non-political’ mobilisation of the OBC 
category during my fieldwork was against the demand of reservation of Marathas as 
the OBCs feared that Marathas will be included in the OBC category. Two major 
                                                 
100 Accessed from National Commission for Backward Classes website -
http://www.ncbc.nic.in/backward-classes/maharashtra.html 
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OBC leaders in Maharashtra, Gopinath Munde and Chagan Bhujbal, had both 
opposed this move from their respective positions in Congress and BJP. In Beed the 
Vanjaris constitute a dominant OBC caste and some Vanjaris have been associated 
with BSP in the past. On knowing that I was researching on BSP, Dadasaheb Munde 
(from Vanjari caste) who is employed in the education department spared no time to 
tell me that he was actively engaged in BSP in his college days. 
 
He gave another interesting paraphrase on caste, ‘kele ke jad mein pat mein pat aur 
hindu dharma
101
 ke jat mein jat mein jat’ [Like the layers within layers of banana 
tree are the layers of caste within caste in Hindu religion.] Munde told me that he 
got to know Charvak [an ancient Indian philosophy closer to Buddhist principles] 
and Periyar after joining BSP. We were at the dhaba [bar] where he was having 
both fish and whisky unlike his senior Vanjari colleague who was not eating fish as 
it was shravan month. When I queried Dadasaheb why he was not avoiding meat 
as most Hindus prefer to do in shravan [a holy month for observing Hindus], he 
replied, ‘‘I hope no one will feel bad here. I have had mutton with mal102 on me 
[...] I don’t believe in such things [....] India will become communist if all 
communists became Buddhist’. (Fieldnotes: 22/8/08). 
 
Dadasaheb’s analysis of caste was still influenced by the cadre trainings of BSP. 
Like Ambedkarite Dalits he saw caste as one disease that affects the public spirit of 
all Hindus. He therefore suggested that the communists should become Buddhists 
(i.e. give away caste) to make India communist. It is interesting to note however that 
Dadasaheb is no longer a supporter of BSP but supports the BJP. The recognition, 
representation and domination of Vanjaris (Gopinath Munde) in BJP are key factors 
that attract Vanjaris towards BJP. Thus BJP too uses the Bahujan rhetoric locally to 
mobilise votes in its favour. The Bahujan-ism of BJP or Congress is however not 
considered as ‘Ambedkarite’ by the cadre of BSP. 
 
                                                 
101 Dharma was generally used as a synonym for religion amongst the activists. Hindu Dharma meant 
Hindu Religion.  
102 A necklace made of tulasi beads worn by Hindu followers of god Vitthal from Pandharpur which 
requires being strict vegetarian and non-alcoholic. 
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Some OBC members of BSP emphasised Phule-Ambedkarite ideology in BSP and 
stayed in BSP much longer than several Dalits. Dr103 Bhobade (aged 70) has been 
with BSP since 1991. Bhobade is from Mali caste and he emphasised that the elite 
within the Mali community betrayed the ideology of Phule. Bhobade is also the 
district head of Satyashodhak Samaj which Bhobade felt was a defunct organisation.  
 
Bhobade does not have any following within the Malis mostly due to his anti-Hindu 
tirade; he is particularly against idol worship and against any ritual practice 
(marriage or death) that involves calling a Brahman as a priest. Bhobade owns 22 
acres of land and is amongst those few well-to-do BSP cadres who continue to spend 
from their pockets for party meeting and gatherings. Despite the disappointing 
performance of BSP in the Maharastra elections of 2009, Bhobade travelled to 
Lucknow in March 2010. He and some others cadres of the party participated in the 
national rally of BSP held on 15 March to celebrate 25 years of the formation of 
BSP.  
 
Bhobade has a past in CPI but has switched from left politics to BSP. For him 
challenging the cultural elements of manuwad were more important than mere talk 
on class issues. 
 
I grew up in the left environment since schooling. They are not against 
manuwad and vishamtamay samaj vyavashta [unequal social system]. The 
communists speak a radical language but do not bring it in practice. That is 
why I moved to Satyashodhak Samaj and then to BSP and now I am a 
Buddhist. [….] Every communist organises his or her marriage through 
manuwad by inviting the Brahmans and does all the god business. [...] The 
objective of this party is implementing phule-ambedkarwadi vichar [ideology]. 
Those who are not here because of the ideology leave the party. In samatawadi 
vichar [ideology of equality], there is no bhat-brahman – no puja archana 
[praying rituals] in this party. We have to make samajik samata [social 
equality]. We do not accept the unequal system. (Interview: 11/12/08)  
                                                 
103 Like Ghopale, Bhobade does not have a medical degree. He is however referred to as ‘Dr’ locally 
as he had done a short course in Unani medicine.  
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Bhobade’s shift from class to caste ideology is intriguing and helps us understand the 
decline of CPI (later CPI-M). Beed had a strong presence of CPI including elected 
MPs and MLAs till the late-1970s, which reduced significantly with the growth of 
the Congress followed by the BJP and Shiv Sena. The failure of CPI to bring in 
changes in the lives of the poor due to the dominance of Congress in the centre and 
the state led to the CPI losing its support base to the caste-based patronage politics of 
Congress and later BJP-SHS. CPI’s decline, however, can also be attributed to its 
inability to integrate caste-based inequalities and cultural practices surrounding caste 
into its class-based ideology. Bhobade, who was amongst the committed workers of 
CPI, was attracted to BSP after BAMCEF workers provided him with readings on 
Phule, insisting that he should read Phule as he is from Mali caste. Bhobade later 
moved on to read Ambedkar and was so influenced that he recently decided to 
convert to Buddhism.  
 
While ideological bindings do not always work in favour of strengthening BSP, the 
cadres also try to broad-base BSP’s support by involving the poor amongst OBCs in 
contesting elections and thus attracting them towards BSP and Ambedkarism. In 
Massajog village the Marathas constitute 60 per cent, the Mahars 20 per cent, Mangs 
and Chambars around 5 per cent each and other OBC castes constitute 10 per cent. 
There are three elected representatives from BSP in the Gram Panchayat of which 
Satish Jadhav is one. Jadhav, in his late 30s, is 9th grade pass and comes from Koli 
(fishing) caste. Massajog village has only one Koli household which is that of 
Jadhav.  
 
Massajog is close to the highway and hosts tea and snack stalls as long distance 
buses and transport vehicles stop here for short breaks. Jadhav is landless and used to 
work as a helper in other hotels. He has gradually moved to own a small stall on 
wheels on the highway where he sells newspaper and snacks in the morning. After 
being convinced by Raju Sonawane (BSP Taluka Adhyaksha of Kej from Massajog 
village), Jadhav had contested the last Zilla Parishad (ZP) elections on a BSP ticket 
as it was reserved for OBC; he emerged the runner-up and polled 1465 votes. Jadhav 
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was threatened by the Marathas (from NCP) to withdraw his candidature twice as 
they had hosted another OBC. However the local BSP workers rushed immediate 
support (termed as security by BSP workers). After losing the ZP elections Jadhav 
contested for the Gram Panchayat elections of Massajog on the seat reserved for 
OBC which he won with Dalit support.  
 
Jadhav now also looks after a Beer shop owned by a Maratha (who is not too 
comfortable dealing with drunkards). Jadhav’s earnings have not increased much as 
his income hovers around Rupees 3000 per month, but contesting elections has 
secured him a respectable [aadar] position in the village, something which was not 
the case earlier. Earlier people used to call him Satya (instead of Satish), Kolgandya 
(a derogatory term for Koli caste-members). It changed to Satish, later to Jadhav and 
now most call him Jadhav Saheb. Like any BSP cadre, Jadhav too considers BSP as 
‘his own’ party and he calls those affiliated to Congress or BJP slaves of Congress 
and BJP. He too felt that winning elections for BSP was not easy but emphasised that 
increasing vote percentage was important. Jadhav was not troubled by the fact that 
this was a party dominated by Dalits or Ambedkarite ideology.  
 
Ravindra [a Mahar supporter of BSP] entered the Beer shop and greeted Jadhav 
with Ram Ram.104 Jadhav responded by greeting him with Jai Bhim, and 
questioned him, What is Ram Ram? Ravindra responded curtly, ‘What I Jai 
Bhim? Ram Ram madhe mai ghalata mag kashala Jai Bhim ghalata [you lay 
your mother in Ram Ram, then why say Jai Bhim?] You have all your 
marriages in Hindu rituals and then talk of Jai Bhim.’ Jadhav smiled and said 
that things will change slowly [halu halu]. [Fieldnotes: 22/5/09].  
 
The Dalit workers of BSP indulge in discussing the ‘ills’ of Hindu religion, which 
Jadhav too has grown sympathetic to. Jadhav is not amongst those who spend a little 
time reading literature. But he seemed convinced with the persuasions of BSP cadres 
who emphasise the similarities in the issues facing Dalits and OBCs, the need for a 
Bahujan collective to secure political power for bringing change. Jadhav and his wife 
                                                 
104 This may be because of my presence here, as Ravindra knew that I was researching on Dalit 
politics.  
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are known for their contribution in mobilising support for BSP in Massajog. I asked 
Jadhav why he would continue to support BSP when it had not gained a single seat in 
the General Elections of 2009 in Maharashtra.  
 
J: Today or tomorrow you will see success, wait and see in Vidhan Sabha 
elections. I have learnt a lot from this party. Our people vote just for liquor and 
they rule. 
S: Who are our people? 
J: Mang, Muslim, Harijan, Dhangar, Koli.  
S: And who are they? 
J: The Marathas. We all have to unite, then we will be able to rule [Fieldnotes: 
22/5/09] 
 
For Jadhav, securing of political power in the local Gram Panchayat has translated 
into an improved social status where people – including his relatives – respect him 
now. This has also brought him closer to the Buddhist Ambedkarites of BSP and 
their Ambedkarism. The Bahujan identity as understood by Jadhav is one comprising 
of those communities who do not have power and it included the Muslims who are 
generally constructed as anti-nationalist in Hindutva discourses. I will now deal with 
how the BSP cadres mobilise Muslims. 
 
Muslims in the Bahujan identity  
The mainstream public sphere in the months of November and December 2008 in 
Maharashtra was jammed with nationalist pride and emotions following the attack by 
‘Pakistani terrorists’ and the martyrdom of Indian soldiers in South Mumbai. There 
was also news speculation on the possibility of war between India and Pakistan 
following the attack on Taj Hotel in Mumbai in November. Banage, who was then 
the Muslim Bhaichara Sachiv, was concerned over these developments. He asked me 
if there will be a war between India and Pakistan. I said I doubted such a possibility. 
However, Banage had more to add. He asked me, ‘Do China and Pakistan commit all 
the atrocities that have happened against Dalits and Muslims in India? Answering 
himself in the negative he added that there is no need for war with China or Pakistan 
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(Fieldnotes: 23/12/08).  
 
Banage was referring to the ‘violence within’ against Dalits and Muslims. Banage 
would highlight the plight of Muslims from Partition to Gujarat. The cadre and the 
leaders hardly emphasise the threat of the China and Pakistan in their speeches. In 
Hindutva discourses, as well as in some other mainstream party discourses, Muslim 
loyalty is always in doubt when it comes to nationalism and commitment to the 
nation. The history of Muslim rule is invoked as a dark past. In the rallies of BSP 
there were special efforts to form the Bahujan identity so as to include Muslims.  
 
Shaikh Mohammed, one of the senior leaders of the BSP in Marathwada, began his 
speech at the Janhit Chetana rally with paying ritual tribute to Phule, Shahu, 
Ambedkar and Kanshiram. He also added the names of others like Ahilyabai Holkar, 
Birsa Munda, Santai with Maulana Fais-ul-Haq, Maulana Johar and Sir Syed Ahmed 
Khan.  
 
My Salam, Jai Bhim and Namaskar to these great people [...] Oh people of 
Bahujan samaj, oh Muslims […] Bharat is our watan [nation], we are the 
inhabitants of this country, the Dravidians, the adivasis. It was the Aryans who 
gave birth to the Manuwadi system in this country […] The Bahujan samaj is 
slave, earlier they were slaves to English and now they are slaves to the thieves 
and dacoits [Congress and BJP]. Who is the Bahujan samaj? It is the SC, ST, 
OBC and Minorities. Of the 108 crore population of India most are Bahujans. If 
the majority are Bahujans then the government too has to be ours. We have the 
problem of water, road, poverty, farmer suicide. These problems are not given 
by Allah but by Congress, who have been ruling all this while. It is the people 
with evil vichardhara [by which he meant Manuwad] – the Congress and BJP.  
 
Let me remind you, the Muslims sacrificed their lives in the gadar [revolution] 
of 1857. Their names do not even figure in any of the history books […] It is all 
Bapu and Mahatma Gandhi, there is no Ashfaq-ullah or Fakr-ud-din Ali. 
Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad who was the education minister was also 
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responsible for the demise of the Urdu language. Remember the violence that 
has followed against Muslims; remember how Babri Masjid was martyred 
during Congress rule […] La ila ha illala mahommadur rasul li la – one who 
reads this kalma [words of Koran] believes in iman [faith]. Those with 
Congress are not with iman [...] How can we support them, be it the Congress 
or the BJP? Supporting them is against our kalma. That is why the Muslims of 
UP have supported BSP. (Recorded Speech: 22/9/08)  
 
Shaikh Mohammed ended his speech with ‘Jai Bhim, Jai Bharat and Khuda Hafis’. 
He constructed Muslims also as part of the Bahujan identity. He particularly 
reminded the audience of the role of Muslims in nation building and the Congress 
betrayal of Muslims and Muslim history, and retained the specificity of Muslims by 
adding salaam and Khuda hafis. He held Congress responsible for the deprived state 
of Muslims in the postcolonial period. Muslims are also made to feel proud of (and 
not sorry for) their glorious past – a ruling community that was (in the words of 
Shaikh Mohammed) turned into one of rag-pickers in current times.  
 
Along with other BSP cadres Banage had formed a Muslim Bhaichara in Majalgaon. 
He convinced some of his Muslim friends to join, and, in his mid-30s, he was the one 
amongst them who had become president of this Bhaichara Committee. While the 
formation of Bhaichara was a top-down process through orders and ideas from 
above, the cadres in Majalgaon made it a personal socio-political effort. Mubarak 
had become actively involved in BSP after a communal clash between Wadars 
(stone-mason caste) and Muslims in Majalgaon. This clash had started after bikes of 
a Muslim youth and a Wadar youth crashed into each other. An argument grew into 
fights that led to stone-pelting between Muslims and Wadars. Following this, the 
police at around 2.30 a.m. arrested a Muslim youth who was not involved in the 
violence. Mubarak opposed this move and questioned the police. The police 
responded by arresting Mubarak as well for his act. Mubarak’s brother had called 
Banage and informed him about this. Banage and Dr. Bhobade had rushed to the 
police station the next morning to secure bail for Mubarak. Mubarak’s family had 
been against Mubarak joining the BSP but have actively supported him since this 
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incident. Mubarak described the distinction between BSP and other Dalit parties in 
the following terms: ‘educated bamans (Brahmans) join RSS, our educated people 
join Jamat and the educated amongst you join BSP’ (Fieldnotes: 23/12/08).  
 
As part of the mobilisation of Muslim opinion in favour of BSP, a Muslim Bhaichara 
rally was organised in Majalgaon on 19th December 2008. In one of the planning 
meetings for this event, Siddharth (District in-charge) suggested to Mubarak that he 
should do home visits and invite educated people like Doctors, Engineers and 
Maulanas for the meeting. Mubarak asked Siddharth if they could print pictures of 
some Muslim Maharpurush along with Phule Shahu and Ambedkar like Tipu Sultan. 
Siddharth responded 
 
Shahu, Phule and Ambedkar were involved in social reform like education, 
reservation and constitution but Tipu Sultan was not. He added that Marathas 
continue to insist on respecting Shivaji105 more than Shahu but Shahu remains 
important for us. Putting Mohammed Paigambar’s picture [i.e. prophet 
Mohammed] would have been ideal as his thoughts were samata mulak 
[principles of equality] but we do not have his picture. [Fieldnotes: 11/12/08]  
Siddharth suggested that Mubarak instead print his own picture on the pamphlet as 
organiser and that he give a speech in the Muslim Bhaichara Meeting. Pamphlets 
were printed with pictures of Ambedkar, Shahu, Phule and Kanshiram along with the 
symbol of Elephant. On the top of these symbols was a quote of Kanshiram in Hindi 
– Jis samaj ka shashan hota, uska shoshan nahi hota [the community which has 
political power is not exploited]. Along with a life size picture of Mayawati and 
Maulana Firoz Ali (a senior Muslim leader of BSP in Marathwada from Jalana) a 
picture of Mubarak was printed below. Contributions were raised for this meeting 
from Dalits (BAMCEF), OBCs and Muslims.  
                                                 
105 Shivaji is also evoked at times as a Bahujan king. Cadres in informal conversations pointed out that 
it was more strategic than ideological as Marathas find Shivaji’s martial valour to be more important. 
While there were some Marathas in BSP who had joined, anticipating growth and success of BSP in 
post 2007 scenario, cadres also maintained that it was most difficult to get Marathas into the party and 
efforts were made especially to mobilise the poor Marathas against the rich.  
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This was a low budget gathering with no pandal, just a small stage on the market 
road side and mat for people to sit on the ground. Some BSP workers raised slogans 
like BSP ke Teen Kaptan [Three Captains of BSP], Dalit OBC Musalman. Mubarak 
made his maiden speech here where he spoke on the benefits Muslims had derived 
out of BSP rule in UP like reservations within OBC quota and added that, ‘all parties 
have fooled us, we are threatened if we do not vote for Congress that there will be 
riots. Therefore the need for Muslims to vote for BSP and make Mayawati the PM.’ 
(Recorded Speech: 19/12/08). Mubarak’s friends, Dalits and Muslims clapped here. 
Other Dalit and OBC speakers would end their speeches with Jai Bhim and Khuda 
Hafis. The key speaker was Maulana Firoz Ali who opened his speech with some 
prayer lines in Arabic and ritual salutations to Bahujan leaders. He repeated 
Ambedkar’s role in securing universal adult franchise for Bahujans as against wishes 
of Gandhi who wanted the voting rights for those with education and property. Ali 
questioned how many graduates are there amongst the Shia, Sunni, Dhangar, Lohar 
or Kumbhar even after 60 years independence?  
Ali attributed the deprived status of these communities to Congress misrule. He 
simultaneously constructed a Bahujan collective based on recognition of ‘distinction’ 
between these ethnic identities and the similarity they faced in their deprivation. He 
explained to the Muslim listeners how they voted under compulsion for Congress 
and they feared that not voting for Congress would mean coming of BJP-SS to power 
vis-à-vis riots. He gave the example of UP where Congress and BJP were both 
pushed to the margins by BSP growth and claimed that this could be replicated in 
Maharashtra.  
If you ask a Muslim during elections where they are planning to vote, they in 
turn ask which way the wind is blowing. Do not allow the wind to decide your 
future. There is an old saying Allah or god never helps those who are not 
concerned about helping themselves. You have to come forward to change your 
situation. (Recorded Speech: 19/12/08). 
The support extended by Muslim League for Ambedkar’s seat in the constituent 
assembly and Ambedkar’s role in instituting Muslim Personal Law Board vis-à-vis 
religious freedom for Muslims were also cited in cadre trainings (Recorded speech: 
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7/12/08) evoking the history of Dalit-Muslim alliances. In an informal conversation 
after the rally Maulana, an old timer in BSP, shared with me how he was attracted to 
Kanshiram’s selfless politics and added that BSP’s Phule-Ambedkarite ideology was 
close to the basic fundamentals of Islam like that of equality written in hadith 
(Interview: 19.12.08). Maulana’s quest, however, was not for mere representation of 
Muslims in parliament or in the legislative assembly. In his speech he gave examples 
of various measures in UP like scholarships for school-going Muslim children, aid 
for Madrasas, and the establishment of an Arabic University. Later in an informal 
conversation he informed me about how mere Muslim representation in Congress 
without ideology goes against Muslim interests. Maulana Firoz Ali is also part of a 
local NGO group in Marathwada called Muslim Vikas Manch (Development 
Forum); he shared an instance of organising a protest demanding scholarships for 
poor Muslim children going to schools. The concerned minister called Maulana for a 
meeting and asked him what else they needed as there was already a Muslim MLA 
from the region. Maulana requested the minister to remove the MLA and give 
scholarships to poor Muslim children. Maulana also ridiculed the word minority for 
Muslims and emphasised that it was only Dalits and Muslims who could mobilise 
support outside any state unlike Sharad Pawar (a Maratha leader) who has no support 
outside Maharashtra.  
 
Besides unmasking Congress as an upper caste party and its SC candidates as 
stooges, BSP extracts a negative vote for itself through narratives of humiliation, 
observes Chandra (2000). She also suggests that the new type of ethnic politics of 
BSP offers an effective check on the escalation of social conflict and in renegotiation 
of power relations than the dominance of the Congress party. Chandra (2000) 
however underemphasizes the ideological dimensions of BSP’s mobilisation. 
“Ideology dignifies discontent, identifies a target for grievances, and forms an 
umbrella over the discrete grievances of overlapping groups” (David Apter cited in 
Heller 2000: 506). The politics of BSP locates caste (and therefore religion) and not 
region or language at the centre of its ideology and mobilisation strategies, the other 
is ‘Manuwad’ an abstract formulation against which all castes can be mobilised 
including the Brahmans thus retaining an Ambedkarite agenda at the core.  
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BSP’s politics problematises the idea of ‘Hindu majority’ by locating caste at the 
centre, no caste constitutes a majority. Bahujan is thus mobilised as an alliance 
between varied castes and communities on the basis of deprived status and through 
cultural repertoires by mobilising community pride and linking it to anti-caste 
histories.  
 
Conclusion: mobilising of Bahujan from below and unsettling of caste order 
This chapter has elaborated the non-political and ideological groundings of party-
political mobilisation in BSP. Scholars have emphasised the similarity in strategies 
of Ambedkar and Kanshiram and the BSP in following the democratic path and 
politics (Kumar 2006: 131-132; Narayan 2006: 37-38; Jaffrelot 2003-424), thus 
pointing to a continuum of democratic politics in Dalit movements. BSP cadres, like 
Ambedkar, hold caste to be the central problematic of Indian society and their 
understanding of caste too is influenced by Ambedkar.  
 
State and society were both important for Ambedkar in undoing untouchability and 
annihilating caste – as caste could not be reformed, it had to ‘annihilated’ (Ambedkar 
1936). Ambedkar’s imagination of a new society was therefore based on the 
emancipatory identity of Buddhism, which he argued had principles of equality and 
cultural roots in Indian soil. Ambedkar introduced a disjunction between the 
untouchable past and the modern present for Dalits, a tension that he saw as linked to 
the incompatibility of Hinduism and democracy and also of caste and civil society.  
 
Gupta (1991) challenges the idea of hierarchy as the all embracing principle behind 
caste system and points to the existence of different hierarchies, for him, "differences 
dominate the articulation of hierarchy" in the caste system (Gupta 1991: 13). He 
suggests that conflicts arise on a far more general scale in caste societies because of 
the existence of multiple caste hierarchies, which are all separate and 'equal' and 
support their position through their own caste ideologies (1991: 18). However, Gupta 
fails to take note of anti-caste ideologies, something that Chatterjee (1989) pursues 
through the study of lower historical moments, subaltern consciousness and 
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identifying the dharma of minor sects. Chatterjee has convincingly argued that the 
dharma of the minor sects challenges the universal dominant Dharma.  
 
The dharma of minor sects that Chatterjee points to are also referred to as Bhakti 
traditions, something that Ambedkar was very critical of. Ganguly(2004) calls for a 
post-secular/modernist reading of Ambedkar’s conversion to theorise about the 
multifarious, heterotemporal ways in which caste writes itself into the body politic of 
India. She also points to the fact that Ambedkar and Buddha have been absorbed into 
the pantheon of ‘Hindu’ deities by Mahar worshippers, and emphasises the 
prevalence of the medieval Bhakti idiom in the Dalit religious everyday. Bhakti, 
however, is what political groups make out of it. In the Indian public sphere, ‘Bhakti 
is like an empty vessel into which both nectar and poison can be poured’ (Novetzke 
2007). Ambedkar was therefore cautious of the Bhakti modes of mobilisation 
because of their susceptibility to co-option into the higher Hindu dharma which for 
him was synonymous with caste hierarchy. 
 
BSP’s politics takes note of the dynamic nature of caste and its potential in 
reproducing hierarchies. It can also be said that its mobilisation strategies therefore 
are not totally synchronised with the absolute alternative of Buddhism and they point 
toward a proximity to Bhakti traditions. Through evoking anti-caste symbols 
selectively, BSP adds to the substantialisation processes of caste and not its 
annihilation. It also confers on every caste the status of political minority, besides 
reminding them of their past anti-caste or power-holding status, thus attempting to 
merge these symbologies and ideologies with ‘untouchable’ ideologies of protest 
with Ambedkar at their core. All the symbols in this process including the 
Constitution of India are mobilised towards forming an Ambedkarite political 
community termed as ‘Bahujan’ with ‘Dalits’ at its core. In the practice of alternative 
political Bhakti, the BSP cadres merge the political and cultural. While the old 
Bhakti could only think of equality through God, the new imagines one through a 
merger of modern and traditional anti-caste symbols and through securing political 
power.106  
                                                 
106 Narayan (2008) has termed these innovative uses of history as process of de-marginalisation.  
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“Caste is the public secret of secular modernity in India.” (Rao 2009: 267 emphasis 
in original). The making of caste visible and simultaneous evoking anti-caste 
traditions in BSP’s politics may be among the necessary processes that could lead to 
the annihilation of castes. In constituting an alternative public sphere the BSP cadres 
have partially succeeded in moving ‘Jai Bhim’ and Ambedkar beyond Mahars, not 
just to Chambars and Mangs but also to some Shudras. 





Caste in anti-caste politics 
MHA and making of Phule-Ambedkarite Mangs 
 
Mangs and Mahars have had traditional rivalries that revolved around competition 
for a better share in the local organisation of a caste economy in which Mahars were 
placed higher in the order than Mangs. Mangs and Mahars thus lived in close 
proximity and permanent animosity, remarks Pillai-Vetschera (1994: 46). Under pre-
colonial rulers, ‘the Mangs were public executioners, and it was said to be the 
proudest moment of Mang’s life when he could perform his office on a Mahar’ 
(Russell 1916: 241). Such repulsion and animosity in current times is associated with 
Mahar conversions to Buddhism, their relatively better socio-economic and political 
status and Mahar preponderance in government jobs in the quotas meant for 
untouchable castes. Mahars have historically dominated the Phule-Ambedkarite 
movement that challenged caste hierarchies. Thus the anti-caste identity of Buddhist 
has become one synonymous locally with Mahar identity.  
 
The Mangs have largely remained at the periphery or outside such mobilisations. 
Such exclusion of Mangs from Phule-Ambedkarite movement is attributed by Burra 
(1986) to Ambedkar’s Mahar identity. The Mang participants and activists of MHA, 
however, claim to be Ambedkarites. This stands in contrast to the general 
understanding of Mangs as Hindus or as anti-Mahars. Activists and some participants 
of MHA consider themselves as ‘aware’ and as ones who embrace Ambedkarite 
identity and ideology consciously as part of their protest against caste inequality and 
exclusions. Mang participants of MHA’s mobilisation, however, travel through 
multiple collective identities in the context of caste competition and politics that 
pervades the larger political culture.  
 
This chapter engages with the mobilisation and politicisation of Mangs in MHA. It 
details the paradox of anti-caste ideological mobilisation amongst Mangs through the 
MHA that leads to both the politicisation of Mangs and the simultaneous 
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substantialisation of Mang caste. I argue that though Jati (caste) as a resource for 
socio-political mobilisation is not an absolute social category, the mobilisation of Jati 
into a political community is a process shaped in the relational contexts of 
movements and may lead to multiple collective identities and socio-political 
outcomes. This chapter shows how the MHA functions in a multi-organisational field 
and explores the intersections of caste, class and culture that shape and get shaped by 
its mobilisation process. These processes are mapped through the participation of 
Mangs in MHA’s mobilisation, their critical public discourses and strategic use of 
caste.  
 
Locating MHA and its ‘Mang’ identity in Mahar-dominated Ambedkarite 
Politics  
MHA in Beed is identified with Mang power. In an informal conversation 
(Fieldnotes: 31/1/09), a Mahar worker of BSP contested the universal claim in the 
name Manavi Hakk Abhiyaan and jokingly referred to MHA as “Mang” Hakk 
Abhiyaan (Campaign for Mang Rights). Similarly a Mahar worker of RDC said, 
‘Yes, we are seen as people who work for Mangs’ (Fieldnotes: 27/1/09).  
 
Senior workers of MHA acknowledge that MHA is particularly interested in the 
empowerment of Mangs. Ashok, one of the Mahar workers who has been part of 
MHA since its inception, explained the ideological reasons: ‘One of the important 
objectives of MHA was to take Ambedkarvad (Ambedkarism) to Mangs. Mahars 
will simply follow if we take the name of Ambedkar whereas Mangs will not” 
(Interview: 23/5/09). Thus Mahars may become Ambedkarites and the Mangs may 
oppose Ambedkarism for Ambedkar being a Mahar. Ambedkarism amongst Mangs, 
though scant, is not new in Marathwada or Beed. Some of the Mangs who had 
accessed education at Milind College in Aurangabad during the late 1970s and early 
1980s were influenced by Dalit movements and had converted to Buddhism. They 
had actively participated in the Namantar movement and in Dalit Panther 
mobilisation. I have already described Awad’s role in movements that were 
dominated by Mahars like the Dalit Panthers, DS4, BAMCEF and BSP.  
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Awad and MHA have a strong non-political basis for their politics where Hindu 
practices that construct the untouchable status of Mangs is criticised. For instance, 
Awad converted to Buddhism in 2006 to commemorate 50 years of Ambedkar’s 
conversion with some of his followers, a move that was seen as anti-Mang and anti- 
Hindu by some Mang social formations and some of his own followers. However, 
Awad emphasised that his 2006 conversion was symbolic to attract Mang and other 
castes towards Buddhism. He said he had been a Buddhist for a long time and gave 
the example of his 30 year old son’s name which was Milind (a Buddhist name). 
Awad is thus known amongst non-Mang Ambedkarite circles and is called to address 
meetings and conventions on Ambedkarism.  
 
Conversion to Buddhism was amongst the most important strategies of Ambedkar 
and was aimed at forming an anti-caste collective identity amongst the untouchable 
castes and other deprived sections. Ambedkarite ideology thus partially spread 
beyond the dominance of Mahars amongst non-Mahars and Mahars too played a role 
in this. Awad emphasised that even though his father was illiterate, he too had 
‘knowledge’ about Ambedkar. Awad spoke of the closeness that existed between 
Mahars and Mangs at the village level and his being influenced by Ambedkarism. 
MHA had broad based its mobilisation by focusing on Dalits in general, but Mangs 
as the most deprived and non-politicised remain at the centre of such efforts. Eknath 
Awad thus discourages mang-isation of the MHA or RDC and has consciously 
included non-Mangs in it projects. He is particularly known for his aggressive stance 
in claiming Dalit rights locally through temple entry, campaigns against bonded 
labour, religious practices like karan, cutting long hair of Potraj and facilitating 
cultivations on gaairan. Senior workers of MHA acknowledge that MHA is 
particularly interested in the empowerment of Mangs. Awad saw Ambedkarite 
ideology as the reason for not emphasising Mang identity in MHA or in his own 
leadership: 
 
I never wanted to be a Mang leader. Mangs [those opposing him] have called 
me maharachi aulad (son of a Mahar). I started work radically. I did not fool 
them [Mangs]. I explained Ambedkarwad to them. When I started this work 
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there was no one with me, not even my wife. There is no compromise in vichar 
[ideology] (Interview: 24/8/08). 
 
MHA activists see their strategy as different from some other Mang mobilisations 
due to its Phule-Ambedkarite emphasis, one which does not ‘fool’ Mangs. The 
emphasis in such mobilisation is not to essentialise Mang identity as Hindu against 
Mahars [as Buddhists] but to reiterate the socio-cultural radicalism of Phule and 
Ambedkar in rejecting caste values and socio-cultural practices that denigrate the 
social status of Mangs. One of the activists clarified the distinction between other 
particularistic Mang organisations and MHA: ‘They [other movements] do not create 
a watawaran [context] of sangharsh [struggle and conflict], whereas we create 
awareness and sangharsh (informal discussion: 27/1/09)’. In creating such 
awareness, opinion is mobilised to facilitate acceptance of Ambedkar and 
Ambedkarite ideas amongst the Mangs. This is seen as a challenging process. Here is 
an excerpt from my fieldnotes that elucidates this challenge: 
 
Some workers of MHA and I were at a tea stall in Devdi village for a meeting 
which was to begin in sometime. Ashok informed Rajesh that Manisha will be 
soon getting Annabhau Sathe’s photo [pratima]107 for the meeting. Rajesh 
asked if Babasaheb’s photo was here. Ashok said yes. Rajesh then added, ‘if 
Baap [father, referring to Ambedkar] is there then it is Ok to not have Bhau 
[brother, referring to Annabhau]’. Radhabai jokingly pulled Rajesh which 
made everyone laugh, ‘In front of Mangs from Patri you will not (dare) say 
this’ (Fieldnotes: 19/1/08). 
 
Patri Taluka in Parbhani District is not as much a stronghold of MHA as Majalgaon 
in Beed district. Phule-Ambedkarism is generally seen as an ideology associated with 
Mahars amongst Dalits and everything that symbolises Ambedkar, including the 
                                                 
107 All the meetings begin with garlanding pictures of Dr. Ambedkar, Jotirao Phule, Annabhau Sathe 
and Shahu Maharaj. Activists and workers begin their speech by paying respects to these central 
figures. Savitribai Phule and Ramabai Ambedkar too are added at times in the list of Maha Purush 
[great men]. The list may extend based on the caste of people participating. The names of great men, 
however, never include the names or photographs of any gods and goddesses. There is no nostalgia 
for the past and most of history is seen as dominance of Brahmanism (except during the Buddhist 
period). The golden era in one sense begins with Phule followed by Ambedkar and Shahu.  
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‘blue’ colour or his ‘framed picture’ at a meeting may be seen in the local context as 
Mahar dominance.  
 
In the context of Dalits, it is generally argued that ‘the provision of constitutionally 
guaranteed parliamentary representation and civil service posts for members of the 
"Scheduled Castes" contributed to the emergence of collective identity’ (Nagel 
1994:157). On the contrary, in Maharashtra, the state actively engages in 
consolidation of jatis amongst the Scheduled Castes. For instance, there are separate 
Development Corporations meant for Mangs (Lokshahir Annabhau Sathe Vikas 
Mahamandal), Mahars (Mahatma Phule Vikas Mahamandal) and Chambhars (Sant 
Rohidas Maharaj Charmakar Vikas Mahamandal). Mang political mobilisation in 
current times has also been a product of anti-Mahar feelings with a call for separate 
representation for Mangs within the Scheduled Caste quotas. The formation of new 
collective identities amongst Mangs is partially a reaction to Mahar dominance. The 
Mangs however do not form a unified whole and are divided into hierarchically 
organised sub castes and not all Mang socio-political formations mobilise around 
anti-Mahar emotions, MHA being one of them.  
 
Mangs, their sub-castes and socio-political contexts  
In Beed district, Mangs mostly comprise landless labourers and sugarcane migrant 
workers. Some still carry out traditional caste occupations (considered polluting) like 
making ropes, brooms and baskets. They are also village musicians. The nature of 
their economic (inter)dependence with the dominant castes is changing at the village 
level. It is only recently that Mangs have started moving out of the traditional 
occupations of caste in the Marathwada region. They are educationally and 
economically more deprived than the Mahars and Chambars (Paik 2007). Socio-
cultural, political and economic exclusions are thus still rampant in many villages 
against the Dalits in general and Mangs in particular. MHA has had a critical role in 
identifying and challenging cases of veth begar and the long sustained socio-
economic exploitation of Mangs by the dominant castes. 
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While the current anti-Mahar mobilisations amongst Mangs and caste-based 
patronage encouraged by dominant political parties may have lead to some 
substantialisation of Mang caste, Mangs still remained divided on sub-caste grounds. 
Some Mang sub-castes like Mang Garodi, Ruckwuldar or Ghotalia Mangs were 
identified as criminal tribes during British rule (Gunthorpe 1882: 95-104). The 
Mangs are divided into various sub-castes which are hierarchically organised. The 
1884 Gazetteer of Bombay Presidency notes this hierarchy.  
 
They (Mangs) are divided into Mangs proper (also referred to as Assal/real), 
Mang Garudis, Pend Mangs, Holar Mangs, Mochi Mangs and Dakalvars. Of 
these, the first are considered the highest, and their leavings are eaten by Holars 
and Dakalvars. The Dakalvars say that they are the highest branch of Mangs 
and that the others profess to despise them to punish the Dakalvars because 
they refused to touch the other Mangs. This story seems unlikely as Dakalvars 
eat the leavings of Mangs and Nade Mangs and no Mang will touch them. They 
are not allowed to drink water from a well or stream used by Mangs. (Bombay 
1884:171). 
 
There are supposed to be twelve sub-castes within the Mangs which are endogamous 
and are organised hierarchically. However, the assal Mangs constitute a dominant 
majority within Mangs and are ranked higher than other castes within Mangs. During 
my fieldwork, Mang workers of MHA acknowledged the differences within the 
Mangs which they said ‘came up’ while finalising marriages. They could however 
only think of five sub-castes and not all amongst the younger generation were aware 
of the sub-castes.  
 
Sudhamati after the discussion told me that even she did not know about the 
pot jat (sub-castes) in Mangs, Mahadev another elderly Mang explained again 
there are only three pot jats, Holar, Mang garudi and Mang. Sudhamati asked 
him, what about telang and khakrya sub-castes? Mahadev strongly disagreeing 
said hya [meant no] (group discussion: 10/12/08)  
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Mahadev said hya implying ‘no’ with discomfort at the mention of Khakrya and 
Telang Mangs. When I asked the caste of all the participants in the discussion on 
their sub-castes there was an interesting response: 
 
S: Are all sitting here sreshta [highest]? 
K: Yes we can say that. 
H: yes, No one from lower here.  
N: Even if someone is why should we say that we are this? (Laughter).  
K (asks N): Who is it?  
N: No one (laughs) (group discussion: 10/12/08) 
 
Being a lower sub-caste within Mangs thus can be an embarrassment and may 
require one to hide one’s caste while interacting with fellow Mangs. This is similar to 
Mangs or Mahars hiding their ‘inferior’ caste while interacting with castes higher to 
them in an anonymous context and resorting to sanskritised identities.  
 
The absorption of sub-castes into castes (Mang in this case) is a process facilitated by 
modern caste organisations and is referred to ‘substantialisation’ of caste. This shift 
to more modern or 'substantialised' experiences of caste however is not complete. 
Both variants often co-exist and overlap in everyday life and thought (Bayly, 2001: 
310). While there are differences of sub-castes there is major competition amongst 
Mang social and political leaders to claim sole leadership of Mangs. Mangs as a jati 
thus cease be a homogeneous whole in terms of identity, interest or ideology and an 
axis of mobilisation therefore is constructed locally in the praxis of MHA. 
 
The construction of ‘gulam’ (slave) Mangs 
I have discussed the sub-castes and competing political currents within the Mangs 
which partially explain the internal complexities of the construction of Mang 
identity. Identity however needs to be understood as an internal-external dialectic of 
identification (Jenkins 1996: 171). There is thus another image of Mangs as ‘docile’ 
that circulates in Phule-Ambedkarite movements. This is also referred to as gulam/i 
(slave/ry). One of the Mahars from another social movement commented, 
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Mahars do not compromise … Mangs compromise ... The Mahars are militant 
as a rule whereas it is difficult to find such Mangs. The Mahars too are poor 
even then they are strong. Mahars left traditional polluting occupations 
[following call of Ambedkar], Mangs were happy, they thought everything now 
belongs to them (Fieldnotes: 8/4/09).  
 
Mang leaders had historically opposed temple entry efforts for untouchables initiated 
by Ambedkar and had sided with Brahmins; similar was their opposition to the idea 
of conversions to Buddhism (Paik 2007: 173-187). Mangs are thus considered docile 
for not radically revolting against traditional inequalities of caste, for not converting 
to Buddhism, for not following Ambedkar’s call for education and for not giving up 
traditional polluting occupations of caste. 
 
Some Mang workers of MHA too had similar views and on the apathy of Mangs to 
Ambedkarism which they felt was apathy to change. Suvarna and Meena, women 
workers of MHA on varying occasions felt that, ‘Mangs are darindar [in a culture of 
poverty] as they do not like to say Jai Bhim and are more interested in goddess mari-
aai’. A competing category is thus created of radical Mangs who are ‘aware’ and of 
darindar/gulam Mangs who are not aware, therefore backward. In another 
conversation, Awad jokingly referred to Mangs as thanda raktache prani [not hot 
blooded] while responding to a Mahar friend’s comment on a scheduled MHA-
organised Mang meeting as ‘revolutionary’.108  
 
In a context of competing Mang and other Dalit mobilisations, MHA focuses not 
only on constructing a collective political identity for Mangs with Ambedkarite 
leanings, from a movement point of view it also describes who ‘is’ (and ‘is not’) a 
present Mang.  Jaffrelot (2000) suggests that ethnicisation of caste in southern and 
western India [as against sanskritisation in north India] provided alternative non-
hierarchical social imaginaries. The process of ethnicisation of caste involves 
acknowledging and asserting caste in a non-hierarchical fashion in anti-caste politics. 
                                                 
108 Mang workers of MHA are however not just critical of Mangs and they similarly critique Mahars 
who they feel are more Mahars and less Buddhists (anti-caste).  
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This is specifically true in the case of untouchable castes so as to purge their castes 
from ‘untouchable’ status.  
 
In contrast to the gulam Mang identity, the MHA constructs a counter identity of 
swabhimani (self respecting) Mangs in its mobilisation process. Taking Ambedkar 
and his ideology beyond Mahars involves use of public discourses in multiple sites 
and forms. Such discourses encompass both public and private realms and constitute 
an important part of influencing public opinion of Mangs in favour of Ambedkarism. 
Such deliberations or discourses take place at various sites, ranging from family 
conversations to public meetings. It also involves the use of movement literature, 
CDs and movement songs performed by activists and local artists.  
 
Against gulami and caste: the making of swabhimani Mangs 
MHA has actively mobilised Mangs in favour of gaairan encroachment, a struggle 
that was dominated by Mahars amongst Dalits in the initial phase. Mobilisation of 
Mangs in MHA is thus not purely symbolic or cultural but has a material basis. 
Besides encroachment of gaairan, Mangs were also mobilised against bonded labour 
practices till mid-1990s and for temple entry. Encroachment of gaairan, refusal to 
carry out traditional occupations and insistence to enter the temple brought the 
Mangs in villages where MHA was active into conflict with the local dominant 
castes – mostly Marathas and Vanjaris. The activists of MHA also help the Mangs 
from such villages to gain access to government schemes and provisions (at times for 
a fee). The workers of MHA particularly intervene when there are cases of caste 
violence against the Mangs. 
 
These are routine practices of the MHA which strengthen Mang affiliation and build 
a relationship of trust. Most of the politicisation of Mang identity and performance 
takes place through discourses in public meetings held during Jayantis or protest 
events. Annabhau Sathe Jayanti is particularly a site for Mang mobilisation as 
Annabhau belonged to the Mang caste and is seen as a symbol of Mang pride and 
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assertion along with others like Lahuji Salave and Mukta Salave.109 Annabhau Sathe 
and Lahuji Salave are symbols of Mang assertion and identity which have 
consolidated in the last twenty years. They are also used by dominant political parties 
like Congress and BJP-Shiv Sena for attracting Mangs towards them. Annabhau and 
Lahuji thus have varied interpretations for mobilisation purposes. While Shiv-Sena-
BJP focus more on Lahuji’s physical strength and Hindu leanings, the movements 
with anti-caste leanings focus on his association with Phule and his role in recruiting 
Mang-Mahar children to school. The making of swabhimani Mangs thus involves 
mobilising Mangs to be united for challenging the daily hierarchies and oppression 
of caste that they may be facing, particularly the dominance of Marathas and 
Vanjaris. 
 
Jayanti meetings/functions are not always particular caste gatherings, and in a village 
context while Dalits dominate, non-Dalits too may attend. The use of loudspeakers in 
a village context means that there are some who listen to such conversations without 
being interested. Jayanti gatherings are thus heterogeneous in their composition and 
discourse. Besides unwilling upper caste participants who may listen to the speeches 
or music through the loudspeakers there are invited upper caste guests who also 
attend these gatherings. Furthermore, Mangs attending such meetings may not be 
Ambedkarites, may not know about Annabhau and may be not be daring to challenge 
the practice of untouchability that they may face. Thus the Mang participant may 
carry varied values which do not fit into the swabhimani Mang identity with 
Ambedkarite ideology that MHA activists seek to construct. Schudson (1997) 
criticises elitist approaches that emphasise conversations of a particular kind (‘civil’) 
in the making of democracy. He argues for heterogeneous conversations as they are 
‘truly public’ and raise the possibility of ‘uncomfortable’ talk vis-à-vis the aspiration 
to public reasonableness. 
 
Due to their heterogeneous nature and uncomfortable talk on caste, Jayanti 
celebrations are also sites of conflict and violence. Jayantis are always organised 
                                                 
109 Muktabai Salve was Mang girl who studied in Phule's class of 1852 (Paik 2007: 52). Some of her 
critical short essays are circulated in movement circles like the one titled, Oh God, what is the religion 
of us Mangs and Mahars which was published by BAMCEF.  
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with prior permission from the Police and police constables are deputed even in 
village-level celebrations. Sites of Jayanti celebrations have been riddled with 
conflict particularly when the dominant castes resist the processions of Jayanti with 
Dalit symbols of political assertion from entering the village. Dalits are often advised 
to keep the celebrations restricted to the spatially excluded Mahar and Mang wada. 
In some cases non-Dalits contribute money for holding some gatherings if Dalits 
approach them for such contributions. There is also a provision in Panchayat budgets 
for holding such meetings and some panchayats may extend support.  
 
MHA has encouraged Mangs in various villages to organise Annabhau Jayanti and 
MHA activists are called to address these gatherings. It is the Mangs who mostly 
take the initiative for organising Annabhau Jayanti. Jayanti gatherings in the village 
include procession of Annabhau’s life size photograph in the village with a lot of 
pomp which includes music, dance (mostly Dalit men) and sloganeering with 
throwing of gulal in the air.110 This may be followed with speeches (on microphone 
with speakers) and evening dinner. An atmosphere of festivity prevails in the local 
context amongst the Mangs, particularly the youth. I also came across Mahar youths 
in some villages participating in these Jayanti meetings actively, thus making 
Annabhau not just a Mang symbol but a symbol of the wider Phule-Ambedkarite 
movement.  
 
Such a gathering in the village is mostly held in the samaj mandirs (community 
temples or halls built for Dalits – sometimes separate for Mangs and Mahars). In the 
absence of space in front of community halls the open spaces in front of village 
schools or panchayat buildings are made use of, depending on the relations with the 
dominant castes in the village. Mang claims for public space and performance in the 
village can radically alter their access to public spaces.  
 
Pamphlets and posters of Jayanti are printed and distributed or pasted in other 
villages. These carry names and, at times, pictures of the organisers and chief guests 
and speakers and sometimes brief social messages. The pamphlet printed for 
                                                 
110 In some cases Jayantis become another venue for Dalit men to get drunk and dance. This is 
severely criticised by activists who give speeches during Jayanti.  
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Asardoha village had pictures of Ambedkar, Shahu and Phule starting from the left 
top and a picture double the size at the left corner of Annabhau. Written below in a 
bold large font was “Satyashodhak111 Annabhau Sathe’s 88th Public Jayanti 
Celebrations, Asardoha Village”. It continued, ‘hunger for food takes care of your 
stomach but the hunger for knowledge makes a revolution happen. Such direction 
was given by Annabhau so that the samaj [generally used to refer to caste] could 
follow the path of Dr. Ambedkar’.  
 
This was the first Annabhau Jayanti organised in Asardoha by Bhagwan Patole from 
the Mang caste. He is elected Sarpanch on a ‘un-reserved’ seat. Some months back 
he was attacked by the Deshmukh Marathas, members of an elite caste within the 
Marathas, with sticks, resulting in severe head injuries. This had to do with Bhagwan 
changing the political history of this village. Historically, it was the Marathas who 
‘selected’ the Sarpanch bin-virodh (without opposition). Bhagwan changed this by 
organising and fielding an independent panel of candidates. He himself contested on 
an un-reserved seat. This village does not have the general dominance of numbers 
that Marathas usually enjoy at the village level in Marathwada. The Hatkars (around 
300 households) and the Lamans (around 300 households) are two dominant groups 
in terms of numbers whereas Mahars (60 households), Mangs (30 households) and 
Marathas (70 households) are in a minority. The Marathas are, however, landed 
gentry and have traditionally been the political heads of this village, until recently 
deciding who the Sarpanch would be. Bhagwan managed to mobilise support from 
Hatkars and Mahars whereas most of the Mangs and Deshmukhs and the Lamans did 
not support him. Bhagwan did not have any affiliation with MHA before being 
attacked by Marathas. He was in fact termed non-cooperative by some workers of 
MHA who had approached him for some NGO interventions of RDC. MHA had 
however rushed to his support after he was thrashed by the Marathas. Bhagwan had 
earlier worked in the Dalit wing of NCP and had underemphasized his Mang 
identity. Bhagwan now is part of MHA, but he also retains his membership of BJP 
(Bhartiya Janata Party) which he joined, he says, to escape the discrimination he 
faced in NCP due to Maratha dominance.  
                                                 
111 This was to portray Annabhau as a follower of Phule’s Satyashodhak (truth seeking) philosophy 
that was anti-brahmin/nic in nature.  
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The Annabhau jayanti was organised by Bhagwan in the hope that the Mangs will 
become ‘aware’ (jagruk) after listening to Awad. He felt that Mangs had not 
supported him in the panchayat elections under Maratha pressure whereas the 
Mahars did. Bhagwan explained the docile behaviour of Mangs who are neither 
united politically nor proud of their Mang identity: 
 
‘jati ne kela tar sava rupaiya dand parjati ne kela tar aatma thand [if someone 
from within the caste fucks them (Mangs) then that person is fined 1.25 rupees 
and if someone from other caste does it then their (Mangs) soul is at peace], 
this is the case of Mangs.’ I did not agree with him and enquired further, ‘well 
this is not the sole reason, and there may be other compulsions’. Patole replied, 
‘no compulsions, the Mangs were sure that I will get defeated and they did not 
want to antagonise the Deshmukhs for a Mang who was bound to be defeated’. 
I asked him if the Mahars supported him, he replied ‘yes, 75 percent did, they 
are under the influence of Ambedkar ideology and wanted me to win’ 
(Fieldnotes: 30/9/08). 
 
For Bhagwan, the Mangs were docile in their approach and preferred to be ruled and 
raped by the upper castes and not by the Mangs. This was not the case with Mahars 
who despite their poor status took the risk of voting for Bhagwan. Bhagwan’s 
proximity to Mahars here could also be seen in the celebration of Jayanti in 
Asardoha. Loud fire crackers and some workers whose head were smeared in blue 
powder marked Awad’s entry in the village. Around 200 people were present to 
listen to the speeches. Most participants were men though there were around ten 
women from the Mang caste. One of the most important features of Jayanti in 
Aasardoha was of Nila (blue associated with Ambedkar) instead of Gulal 
(Fieldnotes: 24/8/08). The traditional gulal (red powder) used in some Hindu 
religious gatherings is also used in Annabhau Sathe Jayanti. Nila (blue powder) is a 
symbol of Ambedkarites (generally associated with Mahars and with conversion to 
Buddhism) and is viewed as reactionary by Savarnas. 
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While the adhyakhsa [president] of the Jayanti gathering in Asardoha was a local 
Maratha Deshmukh with whom Bhagwan enjoyed good relations, Sharad Gaikwad, a 
lecturer from Kolhapur University and Eknath Awad were the main speakers. Below 
are some portions of Awad’s speech in Asardoha, which took an extremely high 
pitch while emphasising the backwardness of Mangs (and Mahars) and the 
possibilities of change through Phule-Ambedkarism.112  
 
The status of Mangs in Maharashtra is worse than Adivasis.113 No political 
leader will come and change the samaj, Eknath Awad too will not help. ... You 
will have to think and act and change yourself [...] I am son of a potraj. Sharad 
[the lecturer] himself was a potraj. We both have changed. We believed in 
Phule-Ambedkari vichar like one believes in parents and that is how we could 
see the world [high pitch followed by applause here]. [...] If you want to live as 
human beings then no one is going to serve it on a platter, for that you will 
have to struggle [sangharsh] against all the injustice that happens to you. And 
you will need to unite.  
 
Our Atmaram Salave114 used to sing in those days. I was in [Dalit] Pather then. 
Name the University after Bhima (Ambedkar) or else streams of blood will 
flow [vidyapeethala naav dya bhimache nahitar path vahatil raktache]. And 
our Mang boys and women sing [romantic songs], Gaar dongarachi hava gaar 
ani baaila sosena gaar [the winds in the mountains are cold and the woman 
cannot tolerate this cold]. What do you have to do with that gaarva [cold]? 
[laughter]. [In high pitch] If you want to change, your mother and father will 
not change you. Your mai-baap [mother and father] are Phule Ambedkar and 
Annabhau and only their vichar can change you [applause]. 
                                                 
112 I attended various Jayanti and other similar gatherings organised by MHA like protests, gairan 
holders meeting, Women’s Self Help Group meetings. Portions of this particular speech are chosen 
due to its representative nature. Such meetings are also used by the workers of MHA to create and 
circulate the charisma of Awad as a national leader of Dalits who travels around the world regularly to 
raise issues facing Dalits.  
113 Adivasis (literally means indigenous people) refers to Scheduled Tribes who are seen as most 
deprived in India especially in NGO discourses.  
114 Atmaram Salave was a known leader Dalit Panther in Beed from Majalgaon Taluka. He was a M.A 
in English and was part of the group that decided to be unmarried and not own property for the cause 
of the movement. He was known for his radical songs that critiqued Hinduism. Atmaram died in 
mysterious circumstances and some Dalits think that he was murdered.  
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[…] Our people listen to Ramayan with a lot of interest. I have no objection to 
this, but for how long are you going to listen to stories? Listening to stories will 
not change your life. Your hard work is going to be the source of your change.  
 
Annabhau said, change the world with a strike, so Bhimrao told me, you need 
to understand this [...] Do not feel bad because I spoke like this. I speak 
because I am one of you […] The only purpose of speaking is that this samaj 
[caste – here meaning Mang] changes. Instead of living like a gulam you 
should live like a human being. In the 21 century you have to live not like a 
potraj but as a swabhimani citizen and samaj [applause]. Jai Bhim, Jai Anna  
(Speech recroded: 24/8/08)  
 
There is an element of emotional antipathy towards Jai Bhim and Ambedkarism 
amongst the Mangs. Emotional speeches like the above seek to mobilise opinion in 
favour of Phule-Ambedkarite ideology against the troubled present and past of 
Mangs (and Mahars). Bonding of Mang-Mahar identities is facilitated by public 
discourses that take place in Jayantis. The Mangs however are kept separate and are 
called to claim swabhimani through following Phule-Ambedkarism and in actual 
practice by challenging daily oppressions that they may be facing. Such claiming of 
swabhiman may lead to violence against Mangs which is considered part of the 
change process by the activists. Sadashiv, the district head of MHA in Beed, 
distinguished the Mangs of western Maharashtra from those of Marathwada in the 
following way: 
 
In our discussion on the increasing violence against Dalits particularly Mangs, 
Sadashiv told me that the situation here [Marathwada] was better than western 
Maharashtra. ‘Here the Mangs are assertive and therefore the violence’ […] to 
elaborate his point, he pinched my left nipple and said, ‘if a Maratha boy does 
this to a Mang girl in western Maharashtra, she will be happy and will go and 
tell her friends chotya malkane asa kela mala [younger owner or landlord did 




The formation of swabhimani [self-respecting] Mang identity thus is also constructed 
around the critique of socio-religious practices that make gulam Mangs. The critique 
of religious practices like potraj or karan is a regular discursive practice in public 
events. These are seen as inhuman practices that turn Mangs [and Mahars] into 
slaves [gulam]. The Phule-Ambedkarite ideology is associated with possibilities of 
progress and achievement for the current and coming generations through education, 
political organisation or through encroaching gaairan.  
 
It is not only Mangs who carry out gaavaki currently: in some cases Mahars do so 
also. The Mahars are however presented as an assertive community who got rid of 
such practices. Mahar thus is not the absolute ‘other’ in such discourses but a socio-
political and cultural ally who progressed due to Ambedkarite ideology. The focus is 
on merging the Mahar and Mang identities as oppressed in an alliance for change 
under the Phule-Ambedkarite ideology. The category of Mang is however also kept 
separate in its extreme deprivation, backwardness and also the increasing violence 
Mangs face. The need for Mangs to organise their ‘own’ political clout and 
leadership is emphasised. The deprived and excluded past is described as a primitive 
existence like animals that one has to consciously move out of. Annabhau’s respect 
for Babasaheb is brought to the fore by reminding participants that Annabhau 
dedicated his famous novel Fakira to Ambedkar. This is contrasted with the respect 
of Mangs for gods and goddesses. Speakers emphasise their own identity as Mangs 
and therefore take care to explain this.  
 
Besides speeches which contribute in communicating with the participants in 
Annabhau Jayanti, songs performed by local artists on harmonium and tabla are as 
effective. Some of the best local performers come from the Mang caste in Beed and 
are invited to perform on Jayanti and other such occasions. Male and female 
participants both enjoy the music. Below are a few lines of the songs that were 
played by a musical group of Mang women artists. Some listeners gave prize money 
ranging from five hundred to ten rupees to the performers (Fieldnotes: 22/8/08).  
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Dev dagdache pujun tula aj var milala kai [Worshipping gods of stones you 
have got nothing till date] 
Ai maai tujhya jivanacha sona majhya bhimane kela ga bai [Oh mother, your 
life was made golden by my Ambedkar] 
 
Another legend that is evoked in song is that of Pochiram Kamble, a Mang who was 
killed by the Marathas during the Namantar violence. He is said to have uttered Jai 
Bhim till his last breath despite being tortured to death by Marathas. His son is said to 
have taken revenge for his father’s murder by killing the erring Marathas.115 Such 
mobilisation of Mang pride through symbols of protest has led to politicisation by the 
MHA in Beed of some Mangs who have questioned their exclusion from the villages 
in various forms. 
 
The politicisation of Bivaji and family 
Participants of both BSP and MHA told me that the speeches that they heard during 
public gatherings were vital in changing their thinking. Bivaji (48) is one of the 
Mangs influenced by speeches of MHA workers. He used to be angered by Jai Bhim 
earlier, which he told me was not the case anymore. “It all began when I participated 
in the gaairan parishad [meeting or convention] in Ambejogai, when I listened to 
Jija [Awad], my blood started boiling” (Interview: 25/9/08). Bivaji has now also 
turned partially in favour of the cultural critique of the traditional Hindu beliefs 
(mariaai, mangir baba and other gods) that circulates within the movement. Bivaji’s 
son Nitin is an active volunteer of MHA in Tandalwadi village. Along with others, 
Bivaji has also encroached gaairan land in Tandalwadi under the influence of the 
MHA.116 Bivaji’s family is also amongst those influenced by the charisma of Eknath 
                                                 
115 Mang-Ambedkarites insist that Mang participation in Namantar struggle has been downsized by 
Mahar dominance. Daya Hirwale a Mang writer has written a volume in Marathi on Mangs who had 
lost lives in the Namantar struggle.  
 
116 Bivaji’s father Tatyaram shared with us that the past effort by the Dalits (Mahars and Mangs) 
around 20 years ago was shot down by Marathas in the village. “Marathas had mobilised money from 
each family for ‘cutting the legs’ of Dalits encroaching gaairan here, which forced the Dalits to back 
off” (Interview: 25/9/08). 
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Awad. Awad’s riches117 are also a matter of pride for some of the supporter of MHA 
as he moves around in one of the four SUV cars that he owns. When I asked Nitin 
‘why do you support Awad when there are various others Mang leaders?’ he replied, 
‘There is no person like jija [Awad] in our samaj, he is a man of millions [referring 
to Awad’s riches], a big leader, he belongs to our caste, and has not sold out like 
others.’  
 
On the night I stayed at Bivaji’s home a long discussion ensued between Bivaji, his 
wife (Bai), mother (Saku), father (Tatyaram) and his sons (Nitin and Raghu) on 
various issues including gods. Bivaji’s father Tatyaram118 (around 68) disagreed with 
Bivaji’s rude comments on gods, and narrated how he and his brother had recovered 
from diarrhoea in their childhood when there was an epidemic in the village, due to 
aai [mari-aai]. His mother had vowed to goddess mari-aai that she will dedicate one 
of her sons as potraj to mari-aai if her sons got cured. This had worked and 
Tatyaram felt that he and his brother were saved because of aai. Bivaji further 
questioned Tatyaram, ‘if your aai [mother] is true, I will do the karan to cure Bai’s 
[his wife’s] knee pain, let us see if it gets cured’. Tatyaram felt that this was very 
much possible ‘but aai had nothing to do with knee ailments and the sacrifice will 
have to be made to god khandoba’. Bivaji probed further: ‘What do these gods eat?’ 
Tatyaram said, ‘nothing’. ‘Then how do they survive?’ asked Bivaji. Bai intervened 
at this point and said, ‘dogs pee on them, you see’ and laughed out loud. Bai however 
did not seem to be a total believer in the rational, scientific discourse that her son 
advocates. I understood this when I had a long chat and interviewed two younger 
sisters of Tatyaram, Laxmi and Gulab. Both the sisters possess aasara-aai 
[goddesses of water] and tuljapur bhawani-aai in their bodies respectively. Gulab 
was the one who was possessed by the aasara and she told me that her goddess was 
with her all the time in various forms and that she had helped more than hundred 
                                                 
117 There is also criticism of Awad on these lines and one gets to hear regularly from other Mang 
leaders that Awad has earned a lot of money. 
118 Tatyaram is also considered a local healer in the village and people see him, to get cured of 
jaundice and snake bite. People use his prescriptions with modern medicines and he does not 
discourage this.  
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couples conceive including Bai.119  
 
Bai is an admirer of Manishatai who is the head of women’s wing of MHA and is 
influenced by her speeches. When I asked Bai about the divine intervention from 
Gulab and aai, she nodded in agreement acknowledging this (Fieldnotes: 26/9/08). 
Bai travels through multiple identities based on the varied contexts of daily life. She 
appreciates the critique of religion and associated oppression of Mangs that the 
activists advocate but is not totally convinced that Gulab does not have direct access 
to aasara aai. This is, however, not just the case with participants of movements. 
The activists too face dilemmas of identities in the competitive context of caste 
politics.  
 
Saku was in tears while sharing the relative progress that her son and grandchildren 
had made especially after encroachment of gaairan and feared a Maratha backlash. 
The Mahars in this village had faced such violence earlier leading to some of them 
leaving the village for good. She expressed her fears, ‘they (Maratha) say, earlier it 
was the Mahars who were majalet (excess body fat) and now it is the Mangs’ 
(Fieldnotes: 26/9/08).  
 
Mobilisation of MHA has thus politicised Mangs who challenge their exclusion in 
various forms. When I returned in January 2010 to Tandalwadi only Nitin was 
holding on to the critique of Hindu religious practices whereas Bivaji and Bai were 
not as convinced. Though there was disagreement on the ideological path to be 
followed, particularly giving up of Hindu religious practices, the family has 
continued cultivating the gaairan due to their politicisation through MHA. They also 
had had a good crop of bajra [ten quintals] and were hoping to reap around 5 quintals 
jowar on the gaairan they were cultivating.  
 
                                                 
119 Both the sisters explained to me about various social (including health) and economic problems of 
people that they solve through their access to goddesses. Some cases that goddess says cannot be 
handled are not dealt with. Some of the troubles (that people face) are engineered by priests (like 
them) who misuse their powers (and god) for wrong purposes. Despite her powers through access to 
goddesses, Laxmi sought advice from Nitin on the gaairan that she has encroached in Kaij. She 
aligned with another Mang organisation in Kaij led by Babasaheb Ghopale and had recently 
participated in the fasting protest that was organised by for regularising of gaairan. .  
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The collective identity of swabhimani Mangs is variedly achieved. In some villages, 
Mangs stop carrying out traditional caste occupations, enter the temple through 
protests, actively (and at times independently) participate in panchayat politics, 
organise Jayantis, encroach gaairan lands and at times even convert to Buddhism. 
One of the most revealing outcomes of such swabhimani mobilisation processes is 
the emerging social solidarity amongst Mangs and Mahars locally, where they unite 
on various occasions like Jayanti, protests, gaairan cultivation, and at times form 
political alliances during elections.  
 
Caste in anti-caste praxis of MHA activists  
An important critique in MHA activist narratives is of the Hindu dharma (religion). 
Dalit movements with Phule-Ambedkarite leanings question the relationship between 
status and power in caste and attribute most of Dalit exclusions to gradation of purity 
and pollution in Hindu Dharma. Chatterjee (1989) explores the subaltern 
consciousness on caste and offers a critique of Dumont (1980) for failing to 
understand that the ‘dharma’ of the minor sects has a homo equalis outlook. An 
attempt therefore has to be made to undertake a criticism of ‘common sense’ on the 
basis of ‘common sense’ which already exists in popular life (Chatterjee 1989). The 
dharma of Mangs and Mahars that revolves around local deities is not distinguished 
from Hindu religion in the politics of MHA. Activists instead capitalise on the 
symbols of Annabhau Sathe, Lahuji Salave, Mukta Salave which are constructed as 
protest icons against caste hierarchy that constructs Hinduism. These icons are turned 
into modern symbols of Mang pride as against mari-aai or potraj. These symbols are 
interpreted in a form to suit merging them with Phule-Ambedkarite ideologies. Some 
Mang activists of MHA have gone to the extent of changing their names from Hindu 
ones to Buddhist and one of the workers of MHA from Hingoli also heads Bouddha 
Mahasangh in Hingoli.  
 
However submerging of Mang identity into a Phule-Ambedkarite one is neither easy 
nor achieved everywhere. Some Mang workers regularly criticise the Hindu cultural 
practices of Mahars in informal and formal conversations, particularly their failure to 
become ‘true Buddhists’. Sometimes such a critique is self-reflexive, for instance a 
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female activist at the Jayanti in Punarvasan was critical of MHA activists who preach 
Phule-Ambedkarite ideology but also do karan simultaneously (Fieldnotes: 22/8/08). 
 
Mang participants of social movements respond to the competition amongst varied 
Mang and Dalit social movements by having multiple memberships. Interested 
Mangs attend meetings organised not only by MHA but by various socio-political 
formations including those organised by Mang segmental movements (Ghople, 
Dhobale Sakte, Bagawe). Only the activists are cautious of which meetings they 
attend as it may affect their standing both within and outside the movements. 
 
Sudhamati (25), a single mother who had eloped with a Vanjari man only to be 
deserted later, is now an unpaid activist in MHA. Despite her MHA affiliations, she 
was appreciative of Mayawati’s struggle as a single woman and said, ‘Mayawati’s 
work is good; she is a single woman but struggles for samaj [society]’. She was, 
however, critical of RPI leaders who had approached her with an offer to head the 
RPI’s women’s wing in Beed. She had declined this and was critical of RPI, 
particularly the Mahar dominance of RPI and their variety of activism that excluded 
Mangs. 
  
RPI people feel that the language of Yerekar [Mang music performer who is 
not attached to any political party] is aashlil [obscene]. Yerekar in his songs 
says that Krishna (Hindu god) was involved in randbaji [sleeping with 
prostitutes]. What is wrong in that? [...] do they dislike Yerekar because he 
does not belong to their caste? (Fieldnotes: 30/9/08) 
 
Sudhamati would thus question both Mahar dominance within RPI and also the 
compromising nature of their activism which is not critical enough of Hindu culture. 
Caste and caste symbols are turned into a matter of pride by the activists of MHA. 
When senior leaders of MHA met Sharad Pawar (Rural Development Minister, 
Government of India) and Narayan Rane (Revenue Minister, Maharashtra) to lobby 
for regularizing encroached gaairan lands for Dalits, another senior Mang worker of 
MHA handed over a letter to Sharad Pawar. This was requesting conferment of 
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Bharat Ratna to Annabhau Sathe. He clarified, ‘we will get anyways gaairan but this 
is a question of our asmita (selfhood).’ Conferment of Bharat Ratna and respect to 
Annabhau is thus attached to the selfhood and self-respect of Mang identity which is 
seen as one beyond material needs like that of gaairan (Fieldnotes: 16/11/08).  
 
In Asardoha Jayanti, Sadashiv (38) was another key leader of MHA who spoke on 
the need of cross-caste alliance based on Phule-Ambedkarite ideology, and criticised 
turning Jayantis into caste gatherings. Sadashiv, however, opposes every possibility 
of Mahar dominance in MHA by influencing Mang activists. He would also mobilise 
the opinion of the Mang women activists against the dominance of non-Mang 
women in MHA. While I was interviewing Sudhamati, Sadashiv, in his patronising 
fashion, intervened, ‘What is wrong with Mang women? Why can’t you speak? Has 
Taruni [non-Mang leader] taken the contract of speaking?’ (Preliminary field work: 
May 2007).  
 
While Sadashiv resented Mahar dominance in MHA he also worked towards forming 
an assertive Mang identity. In another small meeting of Mangs in Kaij Taluka, in his 
speech Sadashiv commented on the saffron dressing of one of the male participants 
(he was wearing saffron towel with a tika on forehead) to remind him of his Mang 
identity, ‘If you wear bhagwa [saffron], you are not going to be Chatrapati [implied 
Maratha], you are a Mang. If you put a gandha cha tikala [a saffron mark on 
forehead], no one is going to call you Chatrapati, you will still be Mang or Mahar’ 
(Fieldnotes: 25/9/08). The cultural proximity of Mangs and Mahars comes in handy 
while polarising these identities against inequalities of caste and creating a Phule-
Ambedkarite community, but this is not always the case. While a need to emphasise 
Mang-Mahar unity is seen, RPI and other similar factions are shown as symbols of 
Mahar unity and Mangs have the hope of MHA Awad’s genuine leadership. 
 
When faced with other competitive Mang organisations and their leaders, Sadashiv 
holds on to Phule-Ambedkarism and his loyalty to Awad. Sadashiv and I happened 
to interact with Reddy, leader of Lahuji Sena [Lahuji’s Army] in Mumbai. Sadashiv 
was in Mumbai to drop invitations to Mang Members of the Legislative Assembly to 
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participate in a meeting that MHA was holding to discuss the findings of a state 
commission on the socio-economic status of Mangs in Maharashtra. On seeing 
Reddy, it was decided to hand over an invitation to him as well. Sadashiv greeted 
Reddy with “Jai Lahuji” and introduced himself as Sadashiv Londe and handed over 
a copy of invitation letter. Looking at Sadashiv, Reddy said ‘Londe … are you the 
same who had spoiled [udhalali] my sabha [meeting] in Paithan? Yes, you are the 
one’ he insisted. ‘No’, said Sadashiv giving a surprised look, ‘There are a lot of 
Londes in Paithan, it must have been someone else’. ‘You work with Awad, don’t 
you?’ Sadashiv replied ‘yes‘. Reddy was still thinking on it trying to be sure. He 
simultaneously read the invitation letter and saw the names below of Eknath Awad 
and another co-organiser. He looked at Sadashiv again and asked, ‘Why is Awad 
doing all this for Mangs. He is no more a Mang, he has become a Buddhist now, isn’t 
he a Mahar now? He should work for Buddhists … He has earned a lot of money’. 
Looking at us he continued, ‘Mangs are Hindus, Eknath Awad should hold such 
meetings for Buddhists and call us for such meetings’. Sadashiv did not respond for a 
while. However, after Reddy’s persistent questioning, Sadashiv responded briefly, 
‘With the limited knowledge I have, I think we should remember what Mukta Salve 
said, “we do not have a religion.” Reddy seemed least interested in listening to 
Sadashiv, though he also seemed to agree with him, ‘Leave all that [soda te sagla] 
replied Reddy, ‘I will come for the meeting and ask Awad about this. He is a friend, I 
won’t leave him’. He gave us his visiting card and continued, ‘what was the hurry 
[about conversions]? Why did he go alone? How can he be a Mang again now?’ 
(Fieldnotes: 13/2/08) 
 
MHA thus functions within a competitive field and context of Mang organisations. 
These organisations base their criticism of MHA and Awad for becoming a Mahar 
(by converting to Buddhism) and for making money through NGOs. MHA, however, 
carves its specific space within Mang organisations and other Dalit organisations by 
resorting to politicisation of Mangs and through attracting them towards Ambedkar. 
They criticise other Mang organisations for their particularistic agenda which is not 
seen as an ideological one. MHA also resorts to the opportunistic utility of Mang 
identity but tries to ensure it has an Ambedkarite orientation.  
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Sadashiv and I came out of the hotel after this conversation. Sadashiv burst into 
laughter, and said to me, ‘Did you hear him? Sir, Let me tell you I was exactly the 
same 15 years back.’ He added, ‘I was the one who spoiled his karyakram 
[programme] in Paithan. He presented daiva-vad (fate-ism) and I presented Mukta 
Salve, Pochiram120 and Babasaheb after him and got a good response from the 
audience.’ (Fieldnotes: 13/2/08) 
 
Sadashiv thus innovatively combines Mang identity with Phule-Ambedkarite 
ideology in his daily practice. Awad would jokingly term Sadashiv a Mang Neta 
(Mang leader) and not a Dalit or Bahujan leader as Sadashiv was earlier working 
with another Mang particularistic movement, which was known for its anti-Mahar 
and pro-Hindutva position. He was attracted towards MHA slowly and had changed 
his views over time.121  
 
MHA makes use of Mang identity particularly during elections and Eknath Awad is 
turned into a leader of Mangs partly due to the pressures of party politics that 
revolves around caste identity. This is despite him being amongst the key leaders in 
Marathwada who have worked on the issue of gaairan and Dalit rights, and despite 
his anti-caste move of symbolic conversions to Buddhism. It is in party politics that 
caste identities get played out in the crudest forms when Dalit leaders struggle with 
each other to get recognition (seats and positions) from dominant political parties. 
The active politics of ‘presence’ thus in electoral politics does not have a broad 
transformative agenda; it is a politics of positional change, not structural reform 
(Hasan 2006). MHA too resorts to a conservative interpretation of Mang identity 
against Mang political rivals in electoral competition.122  
 
                                                 
120 Pochiram was a Mang who was killed in caste violence during Namantar riots. Some movement 
songs portray Pochiram and his radicalism in his sacrifice for Ambedkarite ideology till the end. 
121 There are also material reasons for such attraction. Sadashiv earns salary from one of the projects 
of RDC. Some of the Mang activist envied Sadashiv as he was more successful in getting schemes for 
those related to him amongst the activists. Similarly Bivaji too has partial material reasons (gaarian) 
for becoming Ambedkarite. 
122 This is discussed in detail in Chapter 9 on electoral politics. 
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Concluding discussion: Jati and anti-caste collective identity in Dalit movements  
The making of Ambedkarite Mangs that I have charted in this chapter points to the 
dynamic nature of caste and its innovative interpretation and strategic use in the 
politicisation of Mangs by MHA. These processes lead to varied modes of 
substantialisation of caste. My account also reiterates that merging sub-castes into a 
substantialised whole is an incomplete but ongoing competitive project amongst the 
Mangs. Mang identity thus continues to be blurred and requires consolidation. The 
case of Phule-Ambedkarite Mangs who are swabhimani and not gulam calls for some 
rethinking on caste and its being.  
 
Understanding of caste as discrete categories where each caste has intrinsic worth 
(Gupta 1991: 130) does not help in analysing the public performance and political 
utility of caste in Dalit movements. While difference, or the discrete nature of caste, 
can be examined through culture and internal circulation of substance amongst the 
jatis, caste plays a vital role in the dynamic public sphere. The intersections of 
political and cultural realms also reconstruct caste. Such processes may be 
overlooked in approaches that emphasise the study of the internal cultures and 
structures of each jati.  
 
‘The interpenetrations of caste concerns with caste-free thought are apparent 
throughout India’s complex social terrain’ (Bayly 1999: 314). Dalit movements are 
no exceptions, despite their anti-caste ideological claims. The rich history of the non-
Brahman and Dalit movement in Maharashtra further shapes the competitive field of 
practice for Dalit movements, where the increasing demand for Phule-Ambedkarite 
ideology is faced with the lure of jati solidarities. 
 
Jaffrelot’s (2000) distinction between sanskritisation (in north) and ethnicisation 
(south-west) as modes of low caste mobilisation in India suggests that the latter, 
sustained by the ideology of pre-Aryanism or Buddhism, provided alternative 
imaginaries for radical transformation. The practice of such alternative imaginaries 
and formation of collective identities in Dalit movements faces several challenges. 
Important amongst them is the lure of jati mobilisation amongst Dalits, which can 
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also serve to consolidate Hindutva aspirations or merely to meet the requirement of 
Dalit ‘presence’ in dominant (non-Dalit) socio-political formations.  
 
MHA, however, creates a culture of anti-caste conversations amongst the Mangs 
which is critical of the traditional Mang identity and existence. Jayanti celebrations 
and critical informal conversations amongst the activists and participants of MHA 
are venues of alternative public deliberations which are also heterogeneous in 
communication and outcomes. These result in social solidarities between Mangs and 
other Scheduled Castes, particularly Mahars. The practice of MHA challenges the 
status and power relationship in caste by constructing swabhimani Mangs and 
facilitating sangharsh. Jati in the public discourses of Phule-Ambedkarite Mangs is 
both difference and hierarchy, and difference (Mang) is mobilised against the 
perceived hierarchy of caste system. The ‘difference’ is however a political one (and 
not a socio-cultural one) where Mang is constructed as ‘deprived’, ‘not organised’, 
‘not Ambedkarite’ and ‘not educated’. Gupta (1991) emphasises the socio-cultural 
essentials in terms of origins and purity beliefs that each caste may talk about. The 
myths and beliefs about the origins of caste and caste status amongst the 
untouchables are, however, changing. Untouchable myths contradict the basic 
concepts of Hinduism (Deliege 1993). Mang historicity amongst MHA rests with 
Lahuji Salave, Annabhau, Mukta Salave and their closeness to Phule-Ambedkarite 
ideologues. The political difference of Mangs is thus turned in to a new swabhimani 
Mang collective identity, which is merged with various other identities of protest like 
those of gaairan or Dalit rights.  
 
While the ideal to be achieved is abolition of the caste hierarchy, MHA’s praxis in its 
relational contexts also contributes to the reconstruction of Mang identities. The 
public discourses of MHA, however, have radical contesting features in their critique 
of Hindu cultural practices that demean and deny possibilities of citizenship for 
Mangs (and all Dalits). The identity of Mang, Dalit and Bahujan is thus put to use 
variedly in MHA based on the dialectics of internal (agency) and external (structure) 
pressures. MHA thus contributes to the creation of an alternative public sphere, 
counter-culture and arguments against caste hegemony. Such critical reasoning is 
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largely missing in the mainstream discourses that pervade civil society and state 
institutions alike. Participants and activists of MHA thus contribute to constructing 
and re-constructing caste. It can also be argued that MHA constitutes a ‘dynamic 
element’ in the formation and realisation of civil society (Cohen and Arato 
1994:498), but not without limitations. I will chart these limitations in the next 
chapter on MHA’s participation in electoral politics. 
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Chapter 9 
Electoral Politics and Marginalisation of Assertive Dalit Politics in Beed 
    
 
Democratic citizenship, it is argued, promotes a degree of equity and reciprocity 
among citizens and voting rights (particularly adult suffrage) constitute a step 
towards equal citizenship (Bellamy 2008). Dalit belief in democratic processes and 
institutions is reflected in their robust participation in electoral politics both in voting 
and in formation of political parties. Sham Tangade who was one of my key 
respondents for BSP’s earliest functioning in Marathwada saw party politics as 
manav mukti (Human Liberation) and felt that Ambedkar’s followers could carry it 
out best (Interview: 5/6/09). The history of Dalit struggle for the ‘rights to have 
rights’ as equal citizens, however has been one of conflict with the mainstream 
political formations and the colonial and postcolonial state. Dalit claims for 
citizenship rights were in direct conflict with the inner realm of Hindu culture, which 
were considered pure and private by the Hindu political elites and were, therefore, 
defended from liberal colonial legislation. In their distinctive ways caste Hindus and 
the colonial government used the productive tension between custom and contract to 
counter Dalits’ rights claims (Rao 2009: 105-106).  A key point of contention for the 
Congress was assertive politics by Dalits, which was separatist in nature and purged 
untouchables from Hindu culture. Dalit assertive political behaviour continues to be 
considered a matter of deviation even after the collapse of the Congress system, thus 
marginalising Dalits in electoral politics.       
  
This chapter details the dynamics and challenges of Dalit participation in electoral 
politics through the study of electoral mobilisation and strategies of BSP and MHA. 
It has four sections; the first section begins with a brief discussion on the intertwined 
nature of politics and culture in mainstream politics (represented by Congress) and 
Dalit counter-assertion (represented by Ambedkar). Ambedkar’s anti-
Congress/Hindu politics laid the roots of assertive Dalit politics in Maharashtra. The 
second section moves to our field site and maps the bi-polar politics in Beed which is 
dominated by Marathas operating through the NCP and is contested by the Vanjari 
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dominated BJP. The next two sections discuss the marginal location and strategies of 
BSP and MHA respectively in electoral politics of Beed. The challenges to 
sustenance and practice of assertive Dalit politics in Beed highlight the 
institutionalization of Dalit exclusion through patronage based political practices that 
strengthen the state vis-à-vis Maratha dominance. I also present the counter-culture 
that Dalit movements attempt to create through contesting the mainstream practices 
of electoral politics. These practices are however riddled with challenges and Dalit 
movements do at times end up replicating mainstream practices.  
 
 
Dalit assertion and assimilation in electoral politics 
The history of Dalit politics in Maharashtra can be summed up as assertive and 
autonomous political mobilisation that continuously faced the challenge of 
assimilation and co-option by the dominant political forces. Congress represented the 
dominant political force for well over three decades after independence, till the 
collapse of Congress system (Kohli 1990). The roots of assertive Dalit politics are 
found in Ambedkar’s clash with the Congress leadership particularly Gandhi over the 
political rights of untouchables. 
 
The Ambedkar Phase 
Ambedkar sought to carve out a separate political identity for the untouchables 
(Depressed Classes as they were known then) from the beginning of his political 
project. The very first representation he made in front of the Southborough 
Committee which was collecting evidence from various groups for the anticipated 
Montague-Chelmsford reforms, made this clear. He observed, ‘the real divisions of 
India then are, Touchable Hindus, Untouchable Hindus, Mohammedans, Christians, 
Parsees and Jews; it will not do good to ignore these real divisions in devising a 
system of policy, if policy is to take the form of popular government’ (Ambedkar 
1979). Similarly 10 years later when the Simon Commission was constituted to carry 
out further political reforms in 1927, Ambedkar again demanded political rights for 
Untouchables through political representation, he was keen that separate electorates 
with reserved seats be given for Untouchables (Kumar 1985). This brought him into 
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direct conflict with Congress and more specifically Gandhi; Congress had boycotted 
Simon Commission and had asserted its interest in Purna Swaraj (Complete 
Freedom). Congress assumed that the universal franchise would take care of the 
rights of all individuals; Nehru’s draft constitution (Nehru Report 1928) therefore did 
not have any recognition or representation for the untouchables. 
 
The Round Table Conferences in London ended in deadlock between the demands of 
various communities and (even) Gandhi failed to bring a compromise between 
competing groups, so the decision was taken by the British Government. Gandhi was 
opposed to the question of separate electorates especially in the context of 
untouchables. He questioned Ambedkar’s claims of representing the depressed 
classes and thundered that he would protest the separation of untouchables from 
Hindus even at the cost of his life. Ramsay Macdonald announced the communal 
award in 1932 which, to much dismay of Gandhi and Congress, recognised the 
untouchables as a minority and awarded them separate electorates. The untouchables 
had been “divided” from the Hindus and the political battle had now turned into 
religious one – Untouchables vs Hindus or Untouchables as Hindus. Gandhi went on 
fast unto death to prevent this division; a compromise was reached between Gandhi 
and Ambedkar with the signing of Poona Pact in 1932. The compromise being, 
double number of reserved seats and doing away with the idea of separate 
electorates. Gandhi told Ambedkar, ‘In accepting the Poona Pact you also accept the 
position that you are Hindus’ (Jaffrelot 2005: 67).123 Cultural assimilation of 
untouchables as Hindus was thus was at the heart of Congress response to 
untouchable politics. 
 
Ambedkar on the other hand did not fit into any of the then existing major political 
forces – the Congress, Hindu Mahasabha or the Muslim League.124 The next 
important phase in Ambedkar’s political career began in 1937 when he decided to 
form a political party and contest the elections for provincial legislatures that were 
announced under the new constitution. The Independent Labour Party (ILP) was an 
                                                 
123 Ambedkar wrote a full volume in 1935 highlighting his differences with Congress and the 
manipulative politics that Congress resorted to while dealing with the untouchables (Ambedkar 1945). 
124 Occasionally he shared political platforms with Jinnah (Keer 2005: 330).   
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effort by Ambedkar to forge larger political alliances with deprived groups other 
than the depressed classes, Socialist in flavour the party accepted the “principle of 
state management and state ownership of the industry whenever it may become 
necessary in the interest of people” (Zelliot 2006: 106). Jaffrelot (2005: 74-90) 
suggests that ILP could never become a party of labourers and the kunbi gradually 
distanced themselves from the party – class did not help as a good axis of 
mobilisation as even the poorest non-untouchable considered themselves to be 
naturally superior to untouchables. 
 
The Scheduled Caste Federation (SCF) was formed after a convention of Depressed 
Classes (DCs) in July 1942, which protested the Cripps Mission for not taking into 
consideration DCs’ special needs (as compared to Muslims). For Ambedkar it was 
moving back to caste from his labour ideology. The SCF fared badly in the 1945-46 
elections and won only two seats in provincial assemblies. It did not do well in the 
1951-52 elections either. Though the SCF transcended caste with issues like land 
reforms raising the economic condition of the poorer classes, it failed to appeal to 
non-Dalits. In postcolonial India Ambedkar joined the Congress efforts of nation 
building and was appointed the Chairman of the Constitution Drafting Committee.  
He however felt ignored in Congress and went back to his labour party ideology in a 
different way by conceiving the Republican Party of India as an organisation 
representing the interests of Scheduled Castes, Other Backward Classes and 
Scheduled Tribes (Jaffrelot 2005: 88-90). The Republican Party of India came into 
being only after Ambedkar’s death in October 1956 and its political philosophy was 
understood as a return to the shudra – atishudra alliance that Phule envisaged, the 
only difference being the leadership was now to be held with the untouchables. I 
have dealt with the formation and fragmentation of RPI groups in Chapter 4. The 
formation of RPI cemented the break from Congress modes of nationalism and 
politics. 
 
Ambedkar’s demand for political commensuration had revealed that ‘Dalits were 
incommensurable’ (Rao 2009: 157); his struggle however had cast Dalits as a non-
Hindu minority. This model of Dalit identity is placed at the centre of assertive Dalit 
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participation in party politics. RPI factions thus actively engage in cultural 
separatism through commemorative politics around symbols of Ambedkar and 
Buddha. Assertive Dalit party politics is however under continuous pressure of 
cooption by dominant political parties and the post-Ambedkar phase of Dalit politics 
is also marked with growth and fragmentation of RPI groups, which have been 
increasingly co-opted into Congress (and NCP). RPI is marred by factionalism and 
cooptation; it turns assertive momentarily against dominant political parties when the 
demands of RPI leaders (for positions of power) are not met. One of the major 
shortcomings of the RPI factions in electoral politics (except for Bharipa Bahujan 
Mahasangh - which has strong presence in Akola district of Vidarbha) has been in 
their reach being limited to Buddhists -Mahar converts. Palshikar (2007a: 126-127)  
reminds that Dalits are not an ethnic or caste category which explains the uphill task 
of forming a political instrument amongst Dalits. In Beed, party politics is marked by 
bi-polar competition between NCP (Marathas) and BJP-SS the (Vanjaris+Marathas) 
and these dominant players construct the political field for the functioning of Dalit 
assertive politics.  
 
NCP as Maratha party and the politics of non-Maratha accommodation in 2009 
Elections 
Some friends in Beed and I were at the tea stall near a beef eating joint which 
we regularly visited for lunch, some Muslim men here were discussing 
elections with statistics and community-wise voting, one of them predicted 
NCP win with confidence -  ‘Maratha ke 6 lakh, Vanjari ke 4 lakh, momedan 
ke 2.5 lakh aur harijan ke 2 lakh, NCP will win as the Muslims will go with 
Congress (NCP).’  (Fieldnotes: 9/4/09).  
 
They felt that an NCP win was certain in Lok Sabha elections given the definite logic 
that merged preponderance of Marathas with the inevitable Muslim support to NCP 
(because of its secular credentials). The internal competition within NCP however 
made the possibilities of this win difficult in the Lok Sabha elections of 2009. 
Though NCP is synonymous with Maratha power in Marathwada the control of 
Marathas is not absolute. The OBCs and Muslims in NCP compete within 
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themselves to hold their marginal but important locations in the Maratha party. 
Similarly the locally powerful Marathas too compete to expand their control of 
resources and patronage within the party. Elections are the critical events for the 
local political power holders to re-consolidate their strength through intense 
competition both within and outside the party and money along with caste plays a 
very important role in such politicking.  The local MLAs and their powerful 
competitors in Beed thus have a thick network of control and patronage that runs 
deep to control all the development and administrative institutions of state. Local 
elections like those of Credit Cooperatives, Zilla Parishad, Panchayat Samiti and 
Panchayats that hold the state opportunity structure in Beed are therefore much more 
fierce and competitive where money and caste get played in the crudest forms. 
 
Interestingly however, the overwhelming competition for non-Marathas in the NCP 
is internal rather than the Maratha control of the party. On 9/8/08, there was an 
incidence of violence within the non-Maratha workers of NCP in Beed town. This 
scuffle was between Telis and Vanjaris, and a Mahar supporter of a Teli leader was 
shot at by a Vanjari leader. Jaydutt Kshirsagar, a powerful Teli leader within NCP, is 
a key non-Maratha leader and has a family lineage of holding power in Congress (I). 
His mother was elected Member of Parliament from Beed twice consecutively as 
Congress (I) candidate in 1980 and 1984. Jaydutt moved to NCP after its formation. 
Though he does not enjoy the stature that his mother enjoyed in Congress, he still 
remains a powerful leader locally because of his control of various government aided 
educational institutions in Beed.  He also serves as a non-Maratha face of NCP to 
challenge BJP, which claims to be a party of Bahujans in Beed. 
 
In the 2009 Lok Sabha elections such divisions within NCP were played overtly in 
Beed. Ramesh Adaskar, son of Maratha veteran Baburao Adaskar (who is known 
locally for his wealth, Maratha might and opposition to Namantar) was the candidate 
of NCP against Gopinath Munde. Adaskar’s elevation as a Lok Sabha candidate was 
drastic as he was just a Zilla Parishad member. During election campaigning, 
discontent Marathas and Jaydutt did not put their full support behind Adaskar.  Some 
of campaigners from Jaydutt’s group would also explain the difficult task of beating 
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Munde instead of campaigning for Adaskar in the Lok Sabha elections. Jaydutt 
Kshirsagar was in charge for campaigning in the Beed Vidhan Sabha segment, a 
stronghold of his. NCP polled only 66,554 votes in the Lok Sabha election of April-
May 2009125 which Adaskar was contesting; however in the Beed Vidhan Sabha 
elections of October 2009 that Jaydutt contested he polled 109,163 votes.126 
Respondents attributed the difference in votes to the half-hearted campaign.  
 
Some of the Maratha leaders too were discontent with Ramesh Adaskar’s elevation 
from being a Zilla Parishad member to a Lok Sabha candidate. Dalit campaigners of 
Adaskar’s group informed me that the dissenting Marathas and Jaydutt Kshirsagar 
were not liberal in spending money for campaigning. Adaskar however did mobilise 
caste emotions of the Marathas during the campaigning making it a direct fight 
between Marathas and Vanjaris. Assal Maratha ek vha (real Marathas unite) and 
Vajawa tutari hatava Vanjari (play the tutari [a kind of trumpet associated with 
Maratha warrior-hood] and chase away the Vanjari) were the sms messages 
circulated within the Maratha circles respondents alleged.  
 
BJP and NCP as synonyms for dominant caste: Locating Dalit politics at 
margins 
Electoral politics in Beed besides being competition between Vanjaris and Marathas 
through BJP and NCP is also a tussle within dominant Marathas who switch to the 
opposite parties when disgruntled. BJP though Vanjari dominated in Beed too is not 
absolutely so as the Vanjaris constitute a numerical dominant force only in Parali 
Vidhan Sabha constituency in the rest of Beed they are marginal numerically. The 
numerical compulsion of Munde to secure non-Vanjari votes works well for Maratha 
leaders (dissidents of NCP) who move between NCP and BJP to suit their interests 
while the Vanjaris largely remain attached to BJP because of Munde. Palshikar and 
Birmal rightly suggest that both NCP and Shiv Sena are Maratha parties, ‘the social 
base of NCP and Shiv Sena is identical except for the support to the former by the 
                                                 
125 All figures for Lok Sabha elections 2009 are from the report compiled by Maharashtra Election 
commission accessed from http://220.225.73.214/pdff/lokresult.pdf  
126 All figures for Vidhan Sabha elections 2009 are from the report compiled by Maharashtra Election 
commission accessed from http://220.225.73.214/pdff/vidhanresult.pdf  
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Dalit and Muslim community’ (2004: 5470). Indeed, in the present Vidhan Sabha of 
the 288 Members, over 170 are Marathas (Marpakwar 2010).  
 
The Vanjari supporters of Munde (not BJP) used anti-Vanjari mobilisation of NCP 
during the Lok Sabha elections to portray Munde as a ‘Bahujan’ leader.  Munde’s 
landslide victory over Adaskar was attributed to Munde’s generosity in incurring 
electoral expenses, which were estimated to be far higher than NCP. One Vanjari 
supporter told me, ‘He spend lots […] around 150 crore, he bought over all the 
Marathas (leaders) overnight’. Vanjari supporters of Munde also resorted to violence 
against Vanjaris who were campaigning for NCP. Munde polled 51 per cent votes 
and won the elections with the highest winning margin in Maharashtra of 140,571. 
Munde remains absolute leader of BJP with no leadership roles assigned outside his 
family; he has also remained committed to Vanjari development127 thus 
monopolising the Vanjari vote in Beed.   
 
The local political leaders from dominant castes (Maratha and Vanjari) have a thick 
network of power spread till the villages through control of local bodies. The 
Maratha leaders are more powerful than the Vanjaris due to their stronger hold over 
all the state institutions, land and their numerical advantage. Most of these political 
strongmen in Beed have expanded their economic and political patronage power 
through control of state resources like credit cooperatives, sugar cooperatives, 
government aided educational institutes, Zilla Parishads, Panchayat Samitis and local 
panchayats. The expanding state in rural India further offers new patronage 
opportunities to these political elites thus consolidating identity politics (Chandra 
2004). With the growth of Congress and BJP and the rising patronage culture in 
politics, the parties with left ideology have shrunk in the political landscapes of 
Beed. The leader of Peasants and Workers Party of India (PWPI), a Maratha with left 
leanings who polled 32 618 in the Majalgaon assembly elections of 2004, had come 
down to a meagre 10 077 in 2009. He attributed his shrinking support to the ‘money 
                                                 
127 It is local knowledge in Beed that Vanjaris benefited most when Munde was Deputy Chief Minister 
during the BJP-SS rule. The Vanjaris over time in Beed have consolidated their power in the local 
state opportunity structure. They however remain dependent on Marathas (dissidents of NCP) in areas 
other than Parali to sustain their power. 
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power’ of BJP and Congress candidates who distributed money, liquor and meat for 
votes (Interview: 28/1/10). Another left influenced female Vanjari leader who had 
hopped between all major parties except BJP observed, ‘earlier there was a need to 
go and work with people now any one can become a leader by putting their 
cardboard cutouts on the streets’ (Interview: 29/1/10).   
 
Assertive Dalits in BJP and NCP do not hold any positions of importance in Beed 
nor do Dalit needs figure prominently in their manifestos. In the political rallies, both 
BJP and NCP emphasised that their objective was to hoist Shivaji’s flag on the red 
fort (symbolizes capturing Delhi/India) while the former emphasised the saffron 
colour of the flag the latter did not. NCP symbolically printed pictures of Athawale 
and blue flags in political rallies as RPI (A) was in alliance with NCP-Congress 
during Lok Sabha elections. The manifestos circulated by BJP and NCP during these 
elections in Beed were almost identical in their emphasis on addressing issues like 
rail, roads, irrigation, industries, electricity, education, employment, water and 
health. Both noted only one identical issue for Dalits – ‘schemes pertaining to hostels 
for Dalit students’ will be implemented. Issues like gaairan, caste atrocities, and their 
exclusion from DRDA (District Rural Development Agency) list of Below Poverty 
Line (BPL) which affected the rural Dalits were not of importance.  The silence of 
state and Dalit political representatives from NCP is most visible in cases of caste 
violence against Dalits. Kaij Vidhan Sabha constituency in Beed is a SC reserved 
constituency which has been won by Dr. Vimal Mundada continuously for the last 
three elections. Mundada is from Chambar caste, she had won this seat in 1999 on 
BJP ticket and as NCP candidate in 2004 and 2009. In Dalit activist circles Vimal 
Mundada is criticised for her absolute silence on cases of caste violence against 
Dalits in Kaij and Beed and also on the issue of gaairan land.  
 
In terms of independent participation and performance, BSP was the main Dalit party 
in Beed for both Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabha elections. BBM was another key Dalit 
political party in Lok Sabha elections, which polled 11,006 votes. It however did not 
contest any of the Vidhan Sabha seats in Beed. RPI (A) turned assertive momentarily 
in the months following Lok Sabha elections as the Vidhan Sabha elections closed 
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in. RPI (A) leader Ramdas Athawale lost the 2009 Lok Sabha election in newly 
reserved Shirdi constituency and alleged that his defeat was a Congress ploy. He, 
therefore, severed ties with Congress-NCP and mobilised factions of RPI to unite 
against Congress in a RPI-Led Third Front.  Smaller and important players like 
Peasants and Workers Party of India (PWPI) who had supported Congress in the Lok 
Sabha elections due to its ‘secular’ credentials switched to be part of the RPI-led 
third front.  BBM (led by Prakash Ambedkar), however, stayed away from the RPI 
unity efforts insisting that they were opportunistic and not ideological.  
 
RPI (A) contested the Beed Vidhan Sabha constituency as part of the Third Front and 
gained some non-Dalit support as Syed Salim, a local politically prominent Muslim, 
was the candidate. Syed Salim had won the Beed Vidhan Sabha seat in 1999 on NCP 
ticket and lost in 2004. The Beed Vidhan Sabha constituency was an issue of conflict 
between Jaydutt Kshirsagar and Syed Salim and the Maratha leadership had to solve 
this. Sensing that the seat may be given to Salim or to a Maratha, Jaydutt had 
prepared to contest as an independent candidate. Syed raised the issue of Muslim 
representation in NCP, he was however denied the ticket and Jaydutt bagged it. Syed 
protested by contesting as RPI (A) led third front candidate and polled 32, 999 votes 
in Beed. Opposition to NCP by the OBCs and Muslims is not long lasting, however, 
and Syed rejoined NCP in February 2010 when they came to power. Of the six 
Vidhan Sabha seats in Beed NCP had won five, it was only the Vanjari stronghold of 
Parali that was bagged by Pankaja Munde, daughter of Gopinath Munde. There were 
moments of informal aligning between BSP workers and RPI (A) in Beed as RPI 
workers used pamphlets issued by BSP workers giving details of NCP [Marathas] 
involvement in shielding atrocities against Dalits in Marathwada.  
 
While the NCP lost the Lok Sabha elections because of internal competition, the 
Vidhan Sabha elections saw it return. Dalits politics remained marginal, illustrating 
how the Dalit relationship with state is one of continued exclusion and electoral 
politics institutionalizes such exclusion. Dalits and Dalit movements do not have the 
social, cultural, political and economic capital required to win elections and 
numerically too they are weak in Beed (and Maharashtra in general). It is within this 
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context of party politics that BSP and MHA operate as marginal but vibrant actors in 
Beed. BSP largely keeps at bay from agitations in its political performance terming 
agitations as mere reactions that are not constructive and valuable in the long run, 
whereas MHA couples protests with participation in electoral politics. I will present 
the electoral practices and marginalisation of BSP and MHA in the following 
sections. The trajectory of Awad’s political choices and compulsions coupled with 
the dynamism of MHA workers’ participation in decentralised politics, and BSP’s 
ideological and principled critique of BJP and Congress coupled with the tensions 
between principled politics of ideology and real politics of caste are elaborated. I will 
particularly engage with their participation in the Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabha 
elections of 2009. 
 
BSP in 2009 Elections: mobilising for blue flag on red fort 
The BSP’s electoral campaigning in Maharashtra kicked off immediately after its 
victory in the Uttar Pradesh Vidhan Sabha elections of May 2007. UP hui hamari 
hain ab Dilli ki baari hain (UP is ours and now it is time for Delhi) was the new 
slogan amongst the workers. As noted by Hardtmann (2009: 129-130), ‘one of the 
important changes that followed after BSP capturing power several times has been 
that of changing the Indian “culture of politics” where BSP introduced SCs as 
political rulers.’ In the political fields of Marathwada where securing justice for 
Dalits even in cases of caste violence is an uphill task, ‘Dalits as rulers’ served as a 
real morale booster for Dalit activists.  Overall a sense of self-belief and hope 
prevailed amongst the BSP cadre in Maharashtra, a state where BSP has yet to win a 
single Legislative Assembly or Lok Sabha seat, and the leadership of Dalits did not 
hinder attraction of non-Dalits to the party.  
 
Workers from Beed attended a massive rally of BSP party workers was held in 
Mumbai in November 2007, which was addressed by Mayawati. Some bigwig 
dissidents from Congress joined BSP on this occasion and others followed later. The 
Dalit-Brahman alliance and the new found slogan of sarvajan hitay (welfare of all 
communities/castes) also gained some currency amongst the workers locally. As the 
Lok Sabha elections of 2009 closed in non-Dalit newspapers (including the English 
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ones) carried reports and articles on the possibility of Mayawati emerging as PM in 
case of hung parliament. The cadres attributed the newspaper and media coverage to 
inclusion of Brahmins in the party.128 Some notable Brahmins in Maharashtra joined 
BSP including the Brahmin priest of Kalaram temple, who apologised for his 
grandfather not letting Ambedkar and his followers into the temple. Another 
formidable Brahmin was D.S Kulkarni a multi-millionaire builder from Pune who 
contested the Lok Sabha seat in Pune.  
 
In Marathwada too some political bigwigs joined including Bhimrao Hattiambire 
from neighbouring Parbhani, a Dalit from NCP who termed this a ‘home coming’ 
and organised a rally of around 50 000 people to mark his entry in BSP. Locally in 
Beed, cadres mobilised resources and organised more cadre trainings, meetings and 
performances by Rahul Anvikar to mobilise Dalits, OBCs and Muslims to make 
Mayawati the PM of India. It was usual to find stickers (on bikes and cars) and 
screen savers on mobile phones of BSP cadres that displayed pictures of Mayawati 
with text below stating Prime Minister 2009. More BSP literature also came in 
circulation locally; for instance Ambedkar Today129 which is published in Hindi from 
Lucknow/Delhi was sold by one of the workers during meetings.  
 
Non-Mahar and Non-BSP Dalits too were attracted to BSP during this period as seen 
in Chapter seven. The leaders of RPI factions were critical of BSP but some local 
party workers moved to BSP in Beed. A Bauddha (Mahar) supporter of RPI who 
attended a BSP meeting said ‘RPI is strong here so we support them’. I enquired 
what had brought him there? He replied, ‘Mayawati has become CM of U.P, I feel 
proud [abhiman vatato] about it. I hope someone from Dalit samaj should become 
C.M. here too’ (Fieldnotes: 23/1/09). The success of BSP in UP had raised hopes 
amongst the Dalits of the possibility of making a Dalit CM without any patronage. 
Dalit supporters of various socio-political factions that I came across would 
                                                 
128 While news reports in Marathi were read by workers the English ones were translated in Marathi 
and circulated in some Dalit magazines. 
129 This Magazine contained details of policies of BSP government in UP that were presented as in 
line with Ambedkarite ideology, articles on Ambedkar, Kanshiram and Mayawati and occasional 
criticism of caste beliefs and values of Hinduism. The cadres read this magazine with great interest. It 
was, however, banned by BSP Government in UP in 2010 after litigation filed against its editor for 
criticising Hindu religion as a system of inequality.  
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informally share their happiness over BSP gaining political power in UP and 
Mayawati becoming CM. Besides an increase in Dalit following, some non-Dalits 
were attracted towards the BSP which included OBCs, Muslims and Brahmins in 
Beed. The key Dalit opponents of BSP were RPI (A) and BBM and the debate thus 
was on claiming moral high ground and on being the true inheritors of Ambedkar.  In 
their political rallies leaders of RPI (A) would criticise BSP as not being a 
Republican130 party and for being a UP party, whereas BSP leaders would not 
acknowledge the RPI factions and focus on criticising BJP and Congress as enemies 
of Dalit. In their informal conversations the cadre and supporters of BSP would call 
the leaders of RPI stooges who had sold out to Congress. BBM had a similar critique 
of RPI (A) which they felt had left from Congress only because Athawale did not get 
elected to the Lok Sabha.  
 
The cadres were aware that not all were attracted towards the party because of 
ideology and that the growing political clout of BSP was also a reason. BSP for some 
was also a source of what some the cadres termed lagao le jao (invest some, take 
lots) especially if they were made the candidates or had a role in identifying the 
candidate. BSP workers would however use Kanshiram’s description of such entrants 
as ‘ladders’. ‘Ladders’ (sidi) - contrasted to the committed cadres or ‘missionaries’ 
(synonymous with Dalits) - are those who enter the party with ‘selfish’ purposes and 
see the BSP as an opportunity for their economic and political gains. The 
missionaries, however, stick to the party irrespective of its performance in elections. 
Stories of ‘missionary’ sacrifices are common amongst the cadre. While Kanshiram 
and Mayawati are considered the pinnacle of such sacrifice – having given up family 
life for the party - various local names are evoked too. ‘Missionaries’ are seen as the 
bedrock of the party who understand not only the conservative behaviour of the 
ladders but also the utility of ladders to help reach their goal of ‘political power’.   
 
The workers of BSP actively laboured to replicate the Bhaichara (brotherhood) 
model of UP in Beed which involved forming committees of various castes/religions. 
Bhaichara committees of various castes came up locally, like the Vanjari bhaichara, 
                                                 
130 It is interesting to note that locally the word republican has become synonymous with Dalit 
particularly Mahar dominated parties. 
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the Muslim Bhaichara, the Mali (gardener) bhaichara, the Kaikadi (nomadic tribe) 
Bhaichara, Dhangar Bhaichara and Maratha Bhaichara. Those non-Dalit leaders that 
approached BSP workers or those who were mobilised by the workers were made 
heads of these Bhaichara committees and Dalit workers were the secretaries. 
 
One of the notable distinctions of BSP’s campaigning was its deliberation of Bahujan 
ideology both in mass campaigns and closed door cadre trainings, these included 
emphasising the right to vote as a remarkable breakthrough in the history of India for 
Bahujans, Voting for Bahujan ideology and not for money, Congress and BJP as 
anti-people (Bahujan) and BSP and Behenji (Mayawati) as the only hope. There were 
no promises made in the campaigning though some policies in UP were provided as 
evidence of change brought in by BSP there. Mayawati’s charisma was thus 
strengthened by emphasising her ‘Ambedkarite’ power through cadre camps, public 
meetings and reading materials and musical performances by Rahul Anvikar. 
Mayawati and BSP were presented as the only alternative for Ambedkarites if they 
hoped to see the blue flag on the red fort.  Around a lakh people attended Mayawati’s 
rally in Nagpur on 8/4/09 which included a large number of women.131   
 
Mayawati appeared on the stage along with Satish Chandra Mishra. Everyone was 
up on their feet, there was some chaos with people wanting catch a glimpse of her. 
Mayawati came and waved at the crowd in all directions, the crowd responded 
similarly. […] Sachan introduced Mayawati as Bharatvarsha ki Gaurav, (the 
pride of India) the heart beat of sarva-samaj […] and the future Prime Minister of 
India. (Fieldnotes: 8/4/09) 
 
In her speech at Nagpur, Mayawati reiterated the intersection of identity and interests 
of Bahujans and the quest of BSP as an ideology based movement to serve the 
interests of not just Bahujans but sarvajans.   
 
It is sad that despite 61 years of independence, in our country Bahujan Samaj 
[explains - includes SC, ST, OBC and religious minorities like Sikh, Muslim, 
                                                 
131 As the elections neared the cadres of BSP did not have to pay for their own travel. The money 
provided by the candidates helped in organising travel for cadre and participants.  
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Christians, Parsi and Baudha], their social and economic conditions have not 
changed much. 
 
In some states the poor have become naxals because of continued poverty. We 
believe that Congress and other opposition parties are responsible for this […] 
Both Congress and BJP came into power with the help of capitalists and after 
coming to power, these governments […] made economic policies [...] to profit 
the big capitalists. BSP is the only party in the country which does not take money 
from big capitalists or sugar barons (seth) to run the party it collects money from 
lay workers who earn this money through blood and sweat (Claps here) [speech 
recorded: 8/4/09]  
 
Support for BSP was mobilised through portraying BSP (and Mayawati) as a 
Bahujan party following Phule-Ambedkarite ideology and identifying the failure of 
Congress and BJP in providing dignity and poverty-free life to Bahujans. 
Campaigning was carried by the cadre without identifying the candidate/s to contest 
the elections and mobilisation was in favour of party (and Mayawati) and not the 
candidate. The cadre focussed on expanding the base of BSP by roping in Dalits and 
interested non-Dalits. BSP was also an opportunity to make money during the 
elections for some of the new entrants. It was difficult for the committed cadre to 
identify those who would stick in BSP in the long run and those who had entered for 
brokering, as the new entrants too would adapt to the Bahujan vocabulary in no time.   
 
Maharashtra state-in-charge of BSP were two leaders (one Kurmi and one Chamar) 
from Uttar Pradesh, one of them was Member of Parliament in Rajya Sabha. In the 
special cadre training for the workers on elections the MP insisted on strengthening 
the organisation till the grassroots, i.e. voting booths and sectors as the success of 
BSP was based on taking the Bhaichara and sanghathan (organisation) to the lowest 
level. The workers were motivated to volunteer (time and money) for the 
Ambedkarite mission of creating a Samata Mulak Samaj (society based on principles 
of equality). ‘Other parties have money we have movement and ideology’ was the 
message for the cadres’ (Fieldnotes: 31/1/09). Some important precautions suggested 
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for the elections included, being wary of (mainstream) media, possibility of 
candidate or even workers getting sold out and therefore the need for commitment to 
party and not candidate – “our candidate is the elephant (party symbol) and not any 
individual” (Fieldnotes:7/12/08). The Taluka and District Committees of BSP were 
criticised regularly by state-in-charge in the review meetings for not reaching out till 
the lowest level.  Such demands of accountability from the district and Taluka 
committees were not accompanied with financial support for building organisation. 
Money was to be mobilised from supporters and well wishers, key amongst them 
was BAMCEF.  BAMCEF had mobilised 60000 rupees for the party fund on Aarthik 
Sahyog divas (economic cooperation day synonymous with Mayawati’s Birthday) 
and the cadre too had done their bit. This money had however gone to the party fund 
and was not available for local campaigning. 
 
The cadre and the leaders of BSP were aware of economic costs of campaigning 
during the elections. Since the BSP does not distribute doles to voters or brokers, the 
workers are short of money even for travel during campaigning. The candidate thus 
if economically powerful was considered a good source of resource for expanding 
the party base through campaigning. This also meant that the cadres could not move 
up the party’s organisational hierarchy, but they emphasised their voluntary spirit in 
supporting BSP and its ideology.    
 
The names of BSP candidates for other Lok Sabha constituencies in Maharashtra had 
started rolling out from February onwards. In Beed however the candidate was not 
identified till early April. Part of the problem was in Munde being a powerful 
candidate, and no one was willing to gamble their resources on what seemed to be a 
sure loss. The cadres of BSP were close to convincing a Brahmin known in Beed for 
his kirtans (religious songs), but the leaders of BJP intervened.    
 
A meeting of BSP workers (BAMCEF and party functionaries) in Beed was 
organised to discuss the ‘type’ of candidate they wanted. This was an interesting 
occasion to witness the conflict between principled politics and real politics as caste 
and money came to be discussed as the criteria for identifying the candidate with 
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some cadres calling for a balance between money/caste and ideology in the 
candidate. These choices were however influenced by the pervasive political culture 
and compulsions of BSP locally and not just ideology. 
 
We are all minorities here, Muslim, Mahar, Brahman […] Ours is a politics of 
minority (alpasankhya) […]. We should be giving the ticket to anyone who 
believes in social engineering and also to someone who does not split after the 
elections. (A Brahmin) 
Money is important and we need money for prachar (campaigning) […] and for 
spreading our vichardhara [ideology]. Identify a candidate who has money and 
believes in (our) ideology. (Mahar) 
I have only one request; do not do caste politics. Our party believes in having no 
caste, then why caste?  Why do we support the party, it is because of the vichar. 
An economically strong candidate can help but that will be kshanik sukh 
(temporary bliss). I am working with the party for 15 year just because of the 
vichar. (Parit caste) 
BJP has fielded a Vanjari and NCP a Maratha. We should look at the caste 
arithmetic and give the ticket to Dhangar, Laman, Muslim or a Mali. The 
candidate has to be economically strong. He should be able to provide at least 5 
vehicles (for campaigning) in each vidhansabha. We should form all the 
Bhaichara too in this process. (Mahar)  
Beed has a good Muslim population, we could consider giving it to Muslim or we 
can also give it to a Dhangar. We need a strong candidate, give primacy to a 
Muslim.  (Mang) (Fieldnotes: 10/3/09). 
 
The possibility of Dalit candidates or missionaries contesting was hardly raised; 
some who thought on these lines reiterated the difficulty of finding someone with the 
required resources. In informal discussions the cadres would see fielding an 
‘external’ candidate/ladder as part of the strategy. Beyond caste and economic 
compulsions, the possibility of Dalit candidate winning on non-reserved seats 
remains dismal. For missionaries it is also difficult to contest elections as the costs of 
campaigning are generally out of their reach. The effort of the cadre was to identify a 
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candidate who was neither a Maratha nor a Vanjari and who would be willing to 
spend money for the campaign and ideally is inclined toward Bahujan ideology. 
 
Experienced workers reiterated that Maratha candidates were least preferred as they 
fail to secure Maratha votes for BSP. A look at the caste profile of candidates who 
contested elections on BSP ticket in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections reveals that 
Marathas were the least preferred caste. Since the prime competition was between 
the Marathas (NCP) and the Vanjaris (BJP) in Beed, BSP cadres tried to become a 
powerful third player by not focusing on these two castes.  
 
While the discussions held above to discuss the candidate pointed towards a 
democratic practice or seeking opinion of the workers who were lower down the 
hierarchy, the actual identification of candidate did not go as per their wishes. A 
Maratha candidate was finally identified to contest elections by one of the District 
leaders (who had moved from Congress to BSP in 2004) upsetting the committed 
cadres. This was more so as this candidate was supposedly ‘planted’ by the BJP in 
the hope that he would split the Maratha votes. The cadres did not anticipate a win in 
Beed, though they were hopeful of Mayawati emerging as PM and of putting up a 
good fight (vote percentage) in Beed. All the high hopes of the cadre were affected 
with the finalizing of this candidate who had neither a social base nor commitment to 
Bahujan ideology. Some of the BSP workers shared their unease and dissatisfaction 
over the choice of candidate.  
 
Mhaske (candidate) has a past in Sangh and Congress, he is character-less. 
(Fieldnotes: 4/4/09) 
 
Look at the Rajasthan example; all the six MLA’s (of BSP) have joined Congress. 
The missionary and the mission are important for the movement. We did not agree 
with the candidate that was identified by the District head who is influenced by 
Congress culture. We opposed the candidate, some of us threatened to leave but 
they (state leadership) did not care. Mayawati seems to prefer ladder (sidi) more 




Excessive use of ladders can backfire as they are not committed to the party and 
leave the BSP at their convenience adversely affecting the morale of committed 
cadres who may also cherish the dream of contesting elections. The overwhelming 
absence of Maratha candidates affected the sarva-samaj (all castes) image of BSP. 
Thus the Beed Maratha candidates’ willingness to contribute money to party funds 
and for campaigning locally were the key factors that led to the overruling of the 
concerns of the cadres. The candidate was neither interested nor involved in 
campaigning for votes after securing the candidature. Nor did he provide the 
promised amount. The district level head of BSP who had identified the candidate 
was also involved in swindling some money meant for campaigning. This led to 
internal conflict within BSP as the committed workers roughed him up. This 
concerned leader had moved to BSP from Congress in 2004 and after the Lok Sabha 
elections joined the BJP. Zonal level BAMCEF workers intervened to advise the 
cadre against using violence as a strategy as it went against the ideology of BSP.   
 
The cadres however returned to campaigning and utilised the limited resources made 
available by the candidate to reach out to the villages. Separate booklets for Upper 
Caste, SC/ST and OBC and for Muslims in Hindi and (Urdu for Muslims) released 
from Lucknow were distributed by the cadres who particularly focussed on reaching 
Dalits. The villages that had not polled a single vote for BSP in the past returned 
with single digit votes for BSP, most of these were Dalit votes. BSP polled a total of 
25, 284 votes, which was their highest so far in Beed Lok Sabha elections. This was 
much lower than other districts in Marathwada where BSP had done much better 
compared to past Lok Sabha elections. For instance in Hingoli the candidate from 
Laman caste with a background in Bahujan politics had polled 111,357 and the 
Muslim candidate in Nanded had polled 84,743. Strong candidates with clean 
political image who also belonged to a numerical caste (other than Maratha), thus, 
were able to make a dent in expanding votes for BSP. In Beed however there were 
various factors that contributed to BSP’s un-impressive performance. Firstly it was 
the candidate, who besides not having a clean political image was also from the 
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‘wrong’ caste. Further BSP’s claim of being ‘Bahujan’ party was not put into 
practice by giving ticket to a ‘savarna’ [Marathas are not considered part of 
Bahujans by Dalits]. Secondly, the Dalit workers of BJP mobilised opinion and 
emotions against the NCP candidate by recalling the instances of Adaskar’s father’s 
involvement in humiliating Ambedkar (symbols) and Dalits during the Namantar 
conflict and Munde’s support for the Namantar movement. This worked well in 
mobilising votes for Munde as a Bahujan candidate. Munde too resorted to ‘Bahujan’ 
rhetoric and claimed to be a Bahujan leader as against the non-inclusive Maratha-
NCP. Further Munde did not allow Narendra Modi (Hindutva voice of BJP) to 
campaign in Beed thus attracting some Muslims towards BJP. Thirdly, the use of 
money affected performance of BSP as Dalits reportedly voted for money and liquor 
supplied by the dominant parties. Phule Pimpalgaaon (Majalgaon) village has a 
strong presence of BSP (and Dalits) had polled 171 (17 per cent in the village) 
votes132; the local cadres in the village were however disappointed as some Dalits 
here had voted in favour of BJP for money. BSP thus was a minor force in Beed Lok 
Sabha elections that sailed on the hard work of cadre. 
 
The workers of BSP utilised their limited resources in mobilising Dalit votes and 
opinion in favour or BSP. By voting for BSP the Dalits however risk their welfare 
entitlements in the villages as the local state bodies are controlled by either Marathas 
or Vanjaris. Such control is deep rooted and encompasses panchayats, cooperatives 
and all aspects associated with welfare and other state entitlements for the poor. K, 
one of the Mang female supporters of BSP who was sure that BSP will not win in 
Maharashtra explained the specificity of fear (dadpan) that Dalits voting for BSP 
have to face- the fear of violence and exclusion from state entitlements meant for the 
poor particularly the Dalits. 
 
K: BSP will not come to power in Maharashtra, if BSP comes to power in 
Maharashtra the whole world will shake. It will be good if she (Mayawati) comes 
to power but it is not easy. It is a difficult situation for our people, they are under 
dadpan. 
                                                 
132 The booth wise voting results were published in all major news papers and the data from Phule 





K:  They cannot go with BSP; what if they vote and BSP does not come to power?  
No one will take us close later; they will say get lost you voted for elephant. Is 
this not dadpan? That is why I told you I will not tell you who I vote for and you 
should not ask me who I am voting for (Interview: 5/3/09). 
 
As booth-wise voting is published in major newspapers locally, it is easy to identify 
who in the village has voted for whom. Dalit voting, if not in favour of dominant 
castes could also attract violence. This is a particular cause of fear for Dalits who are 
dependent on dominant castes for their daily survival. K further emphasised that 
voting for money offered by the dominant castes and parties did not ensure Dalits 
access to state entitlements. She was particularly referring to sarkari kaam (means 
government related jobs - like schemes of DRDA, Gharkul, Corporation Loans and 
various other state provisions). 
 
[...] If we take their money we become their slaves, why will they do your kaam? 
He (elected representative) too will ask for money later. You have not voted for 
free why will you get the facilities for free? They will say, you took money, liquor 
and mutton for voting now get lost (Interview: 5/3/09).  
 
BSP did not win a single seat in Lok Sabha elections of Maharashtra though its vote 
percentage increased sharply in Vidarbha and Marathwada. The tall hope of 
Mayawati becoming PM was faced with BSP not winning a single seat in 
Maharashtra and performance below expectation in UP; this lowered the morale of 
both the workers and supporters of BSP. The committed cadre however continued to 
talk of winning possibilities in the future and they would also emphasise that BSP is 
a movement and not a political party, so a loss did not affect them. In the Vidhan 
Sabha elections that followed the cadres played a greater role in identifying 
candidates. The Vidhan Sabha elections were however too competitive in terms of 
resource requirements for BSP to carve any niche. Local issues of indigenous 
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Marathi vs. north Indians was a counter force that gained much political importance 
and led to further splitting of Dalit votes in western region. In Marathwada 
candidates identified by BSP were no matches for the Maratha powerhouses of NCP 
under pressures of which even the BJP performed dismally in Beed. The only seat of 
hope in Beed was Georai as a Muslim candidate with clean political image who had 
(economic) resources was identified to contest. I will return to return to BSP’s 
performance in Vidhan Sabha after discussing the challenges the cadres faced in 
mobilising non-Dalits toward BSP.  
 
Non-Dalit Support and the challenge of lagaoo lejaoo (invest and reap) culture 
of party politics 
The success of BSP depends on non-Dalit support and BSP has increasingly grown 
into a catch all party under Dalit leadership (Jaffrelot 2006). While BSP managed to 
instil self-belief within Dalits about the possibility of a Dalit party with Bahujan 
ideology (Phule-Ambedkarite) coming to power on its own, mobilising non-Dalit 
support remained a difficult task. The ideological dimensions remained un-attractive 
to most non-Dalits even if they were emphasised by non-Dalits in BSP. Satish 
Chandra Mishra who had gained much attention of the mainstream media as the 
Brahmin architect of BSP’s victory in UP was accompanying Mayawati for the 
Nagpur rally. He gave a short speech emphasising the multi-caste character of BSP 
and its all-inclusive ideology before the salutary ending of Jai Bhim and Jai Bharat.  
 
The ideology of BSP is not against any caste or religion rather BSP is trying to 
change the social order that is based on inequality to make a samata mulak samaj 
[society based on principles of equality] where there is insaniyaat and manavata 
[both mean humanism]. I would also like to clarify here that if BSP would have 
been against upper caste then our party would not have made me General 
Secretary of BSP and also a Rajya Sabha MP (Recorded Speech: 8/4/09) . 
 
The cadres thus worked towards mobilising non-Dalit support through formation of 
Bhaichara committees and by explaining ideological basis of BSP. Such ideological 
groundings that revolved around undoing historical humiliation and exclusion 
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(social, economic and political) were however not always attractive for non-Dalits. 
Syed Irshad Ali, a well-educated Muslim in his sixties, fluent in English was invited 
to attend one of these meetings. In our informal conversation he shared that this 
‘emotional’ approach does not work (Fieldnotes: 24/2/09).  However some Non-
Dalits too had joined BSP in Beed in the post 2007 mobilisation that included 
Muslims, Brahmans and Marathas. The lure of money and power from dominant 
parties however worked in purging these new non-Dalit supporters from BSP. I will 
discuss two key cases here to further elaborate on the tension between principled 
politics and the substantive politics where caste and money matter. Uday Bhonjal 
(Brahman) from Beed Taluka and Safdar Khan Pathan (Muslim) from Georai joined 
BSP, their role and participation, compulsions that were influenced by the larger 
political culture of Marathwada are detailed below. 
 
Sudhir Das, the Mahant (chief priest) of Kalaram Temple in Nasik joined BSP in 
May 2007 after BSP came to power in UP. Ambedkar had led the protests to enter 
Kalaram Temple in 1930 and the then Mahant (grandfather of Sudhir Das) had 
refused entry to the untouchables. Sudhir Das while joining BSP issued statements 
that he was joining the BSP to atone his grandfather’s sin (IANS 2010).  Mahant also 
called upon the Brahmins in Maharashtra to join BSP. Uday Bhonjal, in his mid-40s 
joined BSP following the call of Mahant of Kalaram Mandir. Bhonjal has a degree in 
automobile engineering but has been pursuing his party political ambitions since few 
years. He had made his wife contest elections on a Congress ticket in Beed 
Corporation elections in 2006 which they lost. After joining BSP, Bhonjal actively 
participated in campaigning for BSP with the BSP cadre in the 2009 Lok Sabha 
elections. He was a very important resource of Rahul Anvikar to point out to 
participants in gatherings that BSP movement was a movement about spreading 
Ambedkarism to all sections of society and Bhonjal served as ready evidence. 
 
Such is the magic of Mayawati that even Brahmins say Jai Bhim, one such 
Brahmin is in front of us.’ Bhonjal saab please come here. Bhonjal rushed towards 
Rahul. Rahul would say jor se bolo (call out loudly), Bhonjal would follow ‘Jai 
Bhim’, Takat se bolo (call out with Might) Bhonjal would add ‘Jai Bhim bolo’, 
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with music playing in the back ground. Both Bhonjal and Rahul danced on this 
tune for a while as the crowd both men and women applauded. (Fieldnotes: 
23/1/09). 
 
Bhonjal had become friends with the cadre who would humour him as an exceptional 
Brahman, who had great liking for liquor and meat. Bhonjal provided both 
ideological and political reasons for joining BSP. He would emphasise the historic 
association of Brahmins with Phule-Ambedkarism where Phule and Ambedkar both 
were supported by some Brahmins.  He simultaneously stressed that Brahmins too 
were a minority who were most disliked and ignored by the Marathas.  
 
Have you seen or heard a Brahmin committing atrocity against Dalits in the 
village? No. It’s the Marathas. I tell them [BSP cadre] do not to trust Borade [new 
Maratha in BSP Beed] but they don’t listen. I am sure he has worked out a deal 
with NCP guys. (Informal conversation: 23/1/09) 
 
Bhonjal (and Safdar) too had given a speech in the road blockade organised by BSP 
against the Shindi case of violence against Dalit girls. He had also contributed money 
to organise meetings of BSP and meet travel expenses of cadre and for putting up his 
posters in Beed. Bhonjal however was critical of the Dalit dominance in party posts 
and the decision making power they wielded. He was critical of the policy where 
‘missionaries’ were given the key posts in the party. Bhonjal was hopeful of 
contesting the Beed Vidhan Sabha elections on a BSP ticket but this was given to a 
Maratha. Bhonjal though discontent is still with BSP, which is also a compulsion for 
him due to lack of better options. BJP is synonymous with Vanjari power in Beed, 
and Bhonjal particularly disliked Marathas and NCP. BSP thus is also a vehicle for 
self-interested politicians.  
 
Safdar from Georai Taluka was another entrant who rose in party organisation to 
occupy the post of District vice president in Beed. He was most liked by the 
committed cadre for his clean image and for running an organisation that provided 
charity for poor Muslims. Safdar would emphasise in his speeches that BSP was 80 
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per cent movement and 20 per cent politics and that is what had attracted him to the 
party. ‘I have been a social worker; I liked vichar (ideology) of the party. I am also 
economically well off [arthik paristhiti bari aahe] so I thought I should join them’ 
(Fieldnotes: 19/12/08). Safdar owned two SUV cars which were plunged into 
campaigning for the Lok Sabha elections. Some workers of BSP were hoping for 
Safdar to contest the Lok Sabha elections. While the Lok Sabha seat was given to a 
Maratha, Safdar was confirmed candidate for Georai Vidhan Sabha seat much before 
the elections were announced.  
 
Safdar who was a resident of Georai town was most critical of the political might 
of the Marathas in Georai Taluka, particularly the two Pandit (surname) families 
who controlled both BJP and NCP. He along with support of workers from BSP 
had protested on various occasions against the illegal sand mining in Godavari 
River that the NCP MLA of Georai Badamrao Pandit was involved in.  
 
These people have filled their own pockets so far, the best example is the 
Pandits in Georai, they have kept power in the family for so many years by 
controlling both Congress and BJP, they smuggle sand from Godavari and 
demand money from poor for sanctioning gharkul (housing scheme), or 
providing kerosene. They just want to earn money and nothing else. They feel 
that they were born to rule. (Speech from Fieldnotes: 22/2/09) 
 
Some of these protests were reported in local newspapers, thus resulting in 
recognition for Safdar locally. The Dalit workers of Georai had mobilised noticeable 
support for BSP in Beed. In the Lok Sabha elections Georai polling booths had 
polled a total of 4446 votes.  Safdar’s contesting on BSP ticket for the Vidhan Sabha 
elections led to distress for the NCP MLA as the competition with BJP MLA was a 
very close one and smallest margin mattered. Safdar’s clean political image and his 
being a Muslim made the matter worse as it meant transfer of some Muslim votes in 
favour of BSP. Dalit cadre in Georai laboured intensely to mobilise support for BSP 
and Safdar locally which made Georai a seat of hope not for win but for rocking the 
chances of NCP and the local MLA as both are known for their anti-Dalit stance.  
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Dalit workers were however in for a shock as Safdar withdrew his nomination at the 
last moment and joined the NCP MLA who he had been protesting against. The 
cadres of BSP had mistaken Safdar as someone who was attracted to BSP’s ideology. 
Safdar was lured by Badamrao Pandit to join NCP, which assured Badamrao’s win in 
the election of Georai Vidhan Sabha with a meagre margin of 2347 votes. Cadres of 
BSP generally kept an eye on candidates till the last date of nomination withdrawal 
but Safdar was not amongst the doubted ones. Safdar’s contesting elections would 
have turned the tide against the dominant Pandit family of Georai and established 
him and BSP as an alternative third force in politics of Georai Vidhan Sabha. Dalit 
workers from Georai informed me in 2010 that Safdar had bagged heavy contracts 
for public works from the NCP MLA. Safdar changed his mobile number after he 
defected from BSP and has remained inaccessible for me and other BSP workers 
since.  
 
The withdrawal of Safdar and the marginal performance of BSP may point to the 
failure of assertive Dalit politics if evaluated in an instrumentalist sense. BSP 
however has consolidated and sustained assertive Dalit politics in Maharashtra 
particularly Marathwada and Vidharbha despite various odds. The structure of 
patronage politics and bipolar competition between the Marathas and Vanjaris 
provides little space for Dalits to carve out space for separate identity and ideology; 
competition from RPI groups that are most malleable further complicates the matter. 
The growth of BSP in UP and the hard work of cadre in Marathwada have 
contributed in taking BSP as a political opportunity and as an ideology beyond 
Dalits. Patronage politics however remains the mainstream political culture that best 
merges and sustains through numerical advantage of Marathas and Vanjaris. Dalit 
cadre of BSP, despite failures continued to remain hopeful of change, they continue 
to spend from their pockets to attend meeting and rallies as far as Lucknow even after 
their defeat in Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabha elections. While the case of BSP 
presents continued practice of assertive Dalit politics in electoral arena, the case of 
MHA points to opportunistic alliance with NCP that too did not yield to Dalits or 
MHA leaders the desired benefit. 
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MHA in electoral politics: alliances and exclusions 
I have discussed in the context chapter the intersections between institutional and 
extra-institutional mobilisation of MHA. The workers of MHA see the participation 
in party politics as a necessity of activism and most of them actively participate in/or 
contest Panchayat elections. The reasons for participation in electoral politics echo 
those of other Dalit movements. 
 
S: Between samaj karan (social work) and some do rajkaran (political 
work/politics), what do you think is the best way? 
P: It is true that samaj karan helps to change the samaj, but even rajkaran can 
help in changing samaj. Look at Mayawati for instance [...] Mayawati feels that 
grassroots work does not change policy; we have to control the place where policy 
is made. We should have people of our vichar there. Therefore politics is 
important in changing the samaj. 
S: Does anyone want to add something? (No response, all seemed in agreement) 
(Focus Group Discussion: 10/12/08) 
 
The principled reasoning of MHA activists reiterates belief in democratic processes 
however the actual practice of elections is rooted in political competition where the 
dominant political players use intersections of caste, money and muscle variedly. 
MHA functions from its marginal location in contesting and at times replicating 
these substantive practices in electoral processes.  MHA despite its temporal alliance 
with the dominant parties has also sustained its independent identity by not totally 
toeing the line of BJP or NCP.  
 
Mapping MHA and Awad’s political choices 
Awad’s active participation in party politics began through BSP; he was one of the 
state vice-presidents of BSP in the late 1990s and had contested the Lok Sabha 
elections from Beed constituency in 1998 polling 15666 votes. The Bhartiya Janata 
Party candidate who won the Beed seat polled 300 307 votes and the NCP candidate 
who was runner up had polled 294 204. Some Non-Maratha dissidents within NCP 
 263 
had covertly extended support to Awad. The NCP Maratha candidate lost the seat 
only because of Awad contesting the elections as he managed to swing a large 
number of Dalit votes in favour of BSP. Awad considered contesting election for 
BSP as a sacrifice (bali) for the movement to ‘liberate’ the Dalit votes. 
 
Kanshiram told me you should contest elections; you should be a victim for the 
community. No one had such a strong campaigning as ours. There was an 
elephant and photograph of Babasaheb used in the campaign. We used to go in the 
village and say; the Patils from their forts (gadivarchya wadyawarche patla) have 
oppressed us. They have not allowed our vote to be free (mukt). I am contesting 
elections to free vote of manguda and maharuda133.  (Interview: 24/8/08) 
 
Though Awad entered politics in an assertive mode seeking to liberate Dalit votes 
from fear and to secure power for Dalits (Bahujans), MHA’s political strategies have 
been most fluid for the last 10 years since Awad moved out of BSP. Awad attributed 
his departure from BSP primarily to his political involvement affecting the funding 
RDC (and MHA) was receiving from INGOs.  This did not bring Awad’s political 
ambitions to an end which were intrinsically linked to his social activism. Bahujan 
Majoor Paksha (Bahujan Labour Party, BMP hereon), a political party was formed 
in 2001. Dadasaheb Kshirsagar, another important leader from Mang caste was made 
the national president. Awad did not hold any position in the party but remained a 
key force behind the BMP. Awad maintained BMP as an effort to unite non-Mahars, 
particularly Mangs who were not as politicised as Mahars. The nomenclature and 
ideology was inspired by the Indian Labour Party formed by Ambedkar (Interview: 
2/10/08).  
 
BMP came to be active locally more as a Mang social movement than a political 
party with boards/shakahas coming up at village level, at times painted on the reverse 
of the existing boards of MHA. Growth of BMP and Awad did not go well with 
Jaydutt Kshirsagar who was also State Tourism Minister. BMP was seen as a threat 
to ‘un-contested’ Mang support of NCP as Mangs were not an organised political 
                                                 
133 Manguda and Maharuda refer to Mang and Mahar localities which are traditionally outside the 
main village where Maratha or Castes above Dalit reside.  
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force in Beed before the growth of BMP. Jaydutt therefore attempted to check the 
growth of BMP by strengthening the base of another senior Mang leader of NCP 
(Dhobale) in Beed against Awad and BMP/MHA. Dhobale was made the guardian 
minister (Palak Mantri) of Beed during this period. This brought MHA in direct 
conflict with Dhobale, Jaydutt Kshrisagar and NCP locally forcing BMP to form an 
alliance with BJP.  
 
I had no alternative.  I organised Annabhau Jayanti in Majalgaon and invited 
Gopinath Munde. Munde realised our strength in that meeting and other 
meetings that followed and assured me MLC (Member of Legislative Council) 
seat. I had not allied with BJP because of any political philosophy I wanted to 
straighten Dhobale and Jaydutt. (Interview: 8/6/09) 
 
Above Awad explains the departure from his assertive Dalit politics to an alliance 
with BJP as not ideologically driven but driven by strategy and compulsions. What it 
also reflects is challenges the MHA met with due to organising and politicising 
Mangs. Awad thus came in conflict with a fellow Mang co-opted to serve the interest 
of NCP/Marathas.  
 
While Dhobale was contesting from Osmanabad district for the Lok Sabha in 2004, 
MHA extended support to BSP candidate and also hosted an independent Mang 
candidate from BMP causing his defeat. Following this, Awad was attacked by some 
local followers of Dhobale with swords in Majalgaon causing some grave injuries. In 
the 2004 assembly elections that followed, MHA mobilised votes against Jaydutt in 
favour of BJP (BSP polled 2636 votes which also contributed in dividing traditional 
Congress votes) causing his defeat by a margin of 3377 votes. Jaydutt had 
anticipated his defeat and had approached Awad for support with handsome offer 
which Awad had declined (Fieldnotes: 2/10/08). This was a grave loss for Jaydutt 
who was a Minister in the earlier NCP-Congress government which retained power 
in the assembly elections of 2004. This victory of NCP however meant little for 
Jaydutt as he had lost the assembly elections and possibility of securing a ministerial 
berth.  Awad and MHA (along with other Dalit parties) managed to cause defeat of 
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Jaydutt and Dhobale, two powerful leaders of NCP despite being small political 
players. While this points to a temporal success of MHA as a marginal player in 
talking back against the suppression of NCP what has followed is an interesting 
dichotomy of cooption of Awad in NCP and increased animosity between Dhobale 
and Awad (both Mangs within NCP). 
 
Making of Awad as ‘Mang’ leader and Dhobale as permanent enemy 
BMP did raise hopes amongst the Mangs who had mobilised to form an independent 
political party. An alliance with and support for BJP however had cost BMP its 
independent identity and assertive status. The support was not valued by BJP, which 
had chosen to ignore Awad and BMP after the election of 2004. The boards of BMP 
have turned rusty now but MHA (as non-political) continued to remain active. BMP 
is almost dormant now. Its national president Dadasaheb Kshirasagar works as an 
activist of MHA in some districts of Vidarbha on the issues of gaairan and caste 
atrocities without any NGO project support.  He also converted with Eknath Awad to 
Buddhism in 2006 (Interview with Dadasaheb: 23/2/09). MHA focussed its energy 
on the gaairan issue more intensely since 2004 following the grant from Intermon-
Oxfam. Large-scale mobilisation of gaairan claimants attracted attention of NCP, 
particularly Sharad Pawar who attended some of MHA’s rallies of gaairan 
occupants. This brought Awad in close contact with the supreme leadership of NCP 
and the local NCP leaders too had to work with Awad under compulsion. Jaydutt too 
realised the strategic importance of being in Awad’s good books and Awad on the 
other hand wanted to sever his ties with BJP. Awad’s wife, Gayabai Awad thus 
contested on a NCP ticket during the Zilla Parishad elections on a reserved seat in 
2007.  
 
BJP never gave me any MLC nor did they come around when I was attacked. 
After some time I had to sever the ties with BJP and that was also a reason for 
making my wife contest for Zilla Parishad on NCP ticket.  It was Jaydutt my 




Gayabai Awad134 won the ZP seat under stiff competition, which was primarily due 
to the Maratha angst against Eknath Awad for his activism on caste atrocities and 
some of the local RPI groups too mobilised against Gayabai. ZP elections were also a 
competition between two local Marathas one from BJP and the other from NCP.  
Local elections like Zilla Parishad, Panchayat Samiti and Gram Panchayat involve 
heavy competition amongst the established political elites which translates into 
heavy spending of money. The Zilla Parishad election win had cost Awad over 10 
Lakh rupees; with this win MHA had severed its ties completely with BJP. 
 
Awad’s rising clout in NCP has been a matter of concern for Dhobale who is the 
Dalit face of NCP. While Jaydutt has solved his differences by offering Awad the 
Zilla Parishad ticket, the rivalry between Dhobale and Awad has continued. MHA’s 
show of strength through gaairan mobilisation also raised chances of Awad being 
made a Member of Legislative Council (MLC) in 2008 by the ruling NCP, this was 
opposed by the Mang leaders of NCP under Dhobale. Awad too has resorted to 
identity politics to deal with the damage Dhobale was inflicting. It was alleged by 
MHA based on documentary evidence that Dhobale was a Holar (numerically less 
prominent sub-caste within Mangs and lower than Mang assal [real]) and not a Mang 
as Dhobale claimed.135 Though MHA’s local practice is Mang oriented it is not 
explicitly Mang centered and issues pertaining to Dalits as whole and other minor 
castes are actively taken up. Awad’s engagement in party politics, however, has also 
turned him into a Mang leader representing Mang interests. 
 
 In 2009 as the Lok Sabha and Assembly elections closed in Awad organised 
meetings with ‘Mangs’ at their centre to counter Dhobale’s influence in NCP and 
amongst Mangs. These meetings were meant to discuss the report produced by a 
government appointed commission on the socio-economic status of Mangs and the 
recommendations. The commission was a result of the demand for separate 
                                                 
134 Eknath Awad’s wife Gayabai Awad and their son Milind Awad are involved in MHA though 
neither are seen as charismatic leaders nor do they enjoy the support of Dalits like Awad. Milind is a 
PhD in English from JNU and is a lecturer at a college in Delhi University. Milind’s charisma is in 
making and activists refer to him as Nana with respect, though a few activists within the MHA were 
critical of Milind being seen as the second line leader. 
135 Awad shared the dilemma in resorting to this tactics and was wary of the fact that it may backfire. 
Luckily Dhobale turned reactionary and insisted that he was a Mang and not Holar. 
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reservations for Mangs that had been actively led by other Mang formations. As a 
result of this demand, a commission named Lahuji Salave Commission was set up by 
Congress-NCP government on the eve of the assembly elections of 2004 to study the 
socio-economic condition of Mangs and a report was prepared in 2008. One of the 
important recommendations of the commission’s final report was separate 
reservations for Mangs within the Scheduled Caste category.136 MHA organised 
meetings and discussions around this report despite Awad not being an aggressive 
proponent of separate reservations for Mangs;  
 
‘The movements on reservations do not mobilise against andh-shraddha (blind 
beliefs) or other such things. The Ambedkarite movement has a Buddhist school 
of thought, the communists have a Marxist thought and RSS has a Hindutva 
thought like that the Mang movement does not have a school of thought. 
Reservation cannot be a school of thought, reservations are a small thing 
(Interview: 2/10/08).  
 
Awad’s conversion to Buddhism has also been used by some Mang particularistic 
organisations to deny him a Mang identity.  Awad explained the reasons for 
organising this meeting, ‘the Mangs say that I have not done anything for them, so I 
thought I should’ (Informal conversation on phone: 13/2/09). 
 
The meeting of Mangs across party lines organised by MHA on 22/2/09 at Latur to 
discuss the recommendations of Lahuji Commission turned into a site of Mang 
solidarity around claiming 5 per cent reservations for Mangs within the SC category, 
criticising the government for excluding Mangs, underestimating their numbers and 
for reiterating that Dhobale was a Holar and not Mang. Major disagreement amongst 
the participants was on the political stand of Awad as some participants doubted that 
the meeting was merely a ‘social’ gathering with no political (party) agenda. One of 
the Mang members of BSP particularly alleged that this was a Congress ploy as 
elections were nearing and accused Awad of playing into the hands of Congress. 
                                                 
136 The implementation of separate reservation for Mangs is difficult to achieve which the Congress-
NCP is not unaware of. This is due to the Supreme Court verdict that quashed a similar order in 2002 
of Andhra Pradesh Government that divided Scheduled Caste reservations. 
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They also insisted on having an assertive political (party) position as most leaders  
(Awad in this case) use social activism to become politicians and never come back to 
community. 
 
Toward the end of this meeting most participants acknowledged Awad was the true 
representative of Mangs and Awad in his speech agreed to lead the process as a 
‘Mang’ and not as a MHA leader, he advocated for Mang unity across social and 
political lines. In this meeting one of the academic participants reminded the 
participants that, ‘though the focus of meeting may be Mangs for Mangs we should 
not forget the larger goal that is ‘annihilation of caste’ and also the fact that Mang 
and Mahar relations have to be strengthened’ (Recorded speech: 22/02/09). This 
suggestion of the academic received some applause. Awad himself has been an 
advocate of such unity between Mangs and Mahars.  
 
The purpose of this meeting however was to challenge the established Mang leaders 
within the dominant political parties and to carve out space for Awad within these 
parties. Neither Awads’ anti-caste move of converting to Buddhism nor his effort of 
Mang mobilisation in 2009 worked in his favour. Later at night there was a 
discussion amongst some key workers of MHA on the negatives of the meeting and 
Awad taking the lead in this Mang centred initiative as a ‘Mang’ leader was 
identified as a one that could affect his image of Dalit or Bahujan leader.  Awad then 
suggested some other workers [Dadasaheb Kshirsagar] to take up the ‘Mang’ role in 
the future planned agitations to pressurise the government to implement the 
recommendations of the commission. Awad was hoping to secure a ticket from NCP 
to contest in the forthcoming Vidhan Sabha elections and part of this Mang 
mobilisation was influenced by his political ambitions.  Awad’s support to NCP 
however was belittled and Awad’s clout was limited to Zilla Parishad and his Mang 
identity. Below are details of MHA’s support to NCP and its limited utility for 
MHA. 
 
The 2009 support for NCP 
MHA workers campaigning for NCP in Dharur were waiting for the P.A of the 
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local NCP MLA, who was to come and pay money to this group so that we could 
leave for the day’s campaigning. As we sat on the tar road facing the temporary 
NCP jan-sampark (people contact) office, Govardhan Lokhande, an old man from 
Mang caste who generally moves around with his wife singing Annabhau Sathe’s 
povada’s for a living in Dharur came closer performing and asking for money. He 
first went to a group sitting on our left who ignored him and laughed him away. 
He sang, ‘have you heard the story of 16th century about shivaji.’ The group 
ignored him and one of them told him, ‘go inside the office, money is being 
distributed there.’ Govardhan then walked towards us and stood on our right 
looking towards the office. ‘Who is giving money? He asked one of our 
accomplices, a Dalit youth amongst us replied in humor, ‘the cashier is not here 
yet.’ How much is he giving asked Govardhan. Depends on how many votes you 
have, replied the youth. 
 
Govardhan waited for while looking around through his thick glasses and then 
commented, ‘Mata viknaryana mi jhat manat nahin (those who sell their votes I 
consider them worse than my pubic hair), aaj mata vikata, udya bayaka vikal (you 
sell your votes today, tomorrow you will sell your wives), Paused for some time, 
looking at us he added tumhala 10 000 dile tar bayaka vikal tumhi  (if they give 
you 10000 you will sell your wife). Why take money and also their bulli (penis) in 
your ass… it then gets stuck like a dog’s penis in your ass. You will not be able to 
remove it then. Waited for some more time and continued, why don’t you vote for 
Mayawati? desh bouddhamai karayla nighali aahe na ti ( she is hoping to make 
the country Buddhist, isn’t it?).  (Fieldnotes 22/4/09) 
 
Govardhan though a non-entity in local Dalit politics was critical of the lack of 
assertive politics amongst Dalits. He criticised not just voting for money and Dalit 
activists acting as brokers but also the idea of dependency on dominant parties that 
necessarily use Dalit votes to oppress (for him equal to rape) Dalits. Awad and other 
workers of MHA too acknowledged in various informal conversations that NCP was 
more casteist (jatiwadi) due to Maratha dominance as compared to BJP, as those 
Marathas involved in committing atrocities against Dalits were mostly bailed out 
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through networks of NCP. The call of Mangs for Mangs and MHA’s evoking of 
Dhobale’s Holar identity went against its ideological groundings and anti-caste, so 
did their support for NCP. MHA however supported NCP in the hope of a favourable 
decision on the issue of gaairan and also the hope of Awad securing either an MLA 
or MLC seat. Awad’s objective of securing of MLA or political power can be termed 
as a personal political ambition at the cost of Dalit assertive politics, however in the 
political geography of Marathwada assertive Dalits in general and Mangs in 
particular are mostly powerless (political) and Awad hoped to continue his Dalit 
radicalism within NCP.  
 
In the general elections of 2009 MHA workers in Beed thus participated in 
campaigning for NCP candidate Ramesh Adaskar. Some of Awad’s subordinates 
were involved giving speeches at NCP gatherings.137 Awad attended some of these 
meetings and was on the stage but did not give a speech in these meetings. Besides a 
Jeep for travel and diesel cost, the local leader of NCP paid the workers of MHA 
1000 rupees a day. During the Parliamentary elections the amount of money spent by 
BJP was much higher than NCP, informal estimates reached 100 crore rupees. 
Elections are also an event for Dalit brokers/leaders to earn some money besides 
consolidating their base amongst Dalits through campaigning.  S, one of the senior 
workers of MHA was unhappy with NCP not providing him money and jeep for 
campaigning. He held Maratha arrogance as the reason for NCP ignoring MHA.  
 
When a BSP worker asked him why he was not campaigning? S looked around to 
make sure there was no Maratha and replied, ‘Kai Marathyana bokandivar basvun 
ghyayacha kai? (Should we make the Marathas sit on our ass?) […] Adaskar's 
father was against Dalits […] it was because of Gaairan that jija (Awad) was 
supporting NCP […] I think that Munde is secular (in English), even Muslims are 
canvassing for him. They say that Munde is a nice man. After all he is from 
minority [Fieldnotes: 12/4/09] 
 
Workers committed to Awad utilised the opportunity (funds) during elections to 
                                                 
137 This was the case only in Beed whereas workers in other Districts followed parties that suited their 
local interests. In Hingoli and Nanded MHA workers had lobbied for BSP.  
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reach amongst Mangs and convince them of the need to follow Awad. Bogalwadi 
was one village the workers visited, the dominance of Vanjaris is absolute. The 
Mangs constitute around 100 households whereas the Vanjari number around 600. 
The Vanjaris leaders were divided here between NCP and BJP for local panchayat 
elections but were united in supporting Munde for the Lok Sabha elections. Most 
Mang families here are sugarcane migrant workers. When we visited the village on 
the afternoon, a day before the elections, most Mang men were drunk on the liquor 
provided by BJP. After canvassing with some youths who were not drunk, as we 
started leaving the village an old drunk man came towards the jeep  shouting, he 
could barely stand on his feet, ‘Rashtrawadi (NCP) will not get a single vote, we will 
not give a single vote to Rasthrawadi’ [Fieldnotes: 22.4.09]. The activist persuasions 
of expanding clout of MHA and Awad amongst the Mang in this village partially 
failed due to the power of Vanjaris and also because of Awad aligning with NCP. 
The patronage of Vanjaris over Mangs in this village coupled with money and liquor 
provided during elections were added incentives for Mangs to vote for BJP. MHA’s 
efforts to mobilise support of Mangs for MHA (and NCP) did not work well when 
faced with money and liquor power. 
 
Awad despite intense lobbying failed to gain an MLA ticket from NCP. Awad’s 
name temporarily did the rounds for the reserved seat in Badnapur reserved 
constituency, however a local dominant Maratha leader of NCP opposed this as 
Awad was involved in filing ‘atrocity’ cases against some Marathas there as well.  It 
was Dhobale who struck this possibility of Badnapur seat totally and in a press 
conference commented sarcastically on Awad’s political ambitions, ‘social workers 
going mad over joining politics’ (Vartahar 2009). The assembly ticket was given to a 
Mang follower of Dhobale. The promise of making Awad a Member of Legislative 
Council or of regularising encroached gaairan lands of Dalits remained un-fulfilled. 
The only benefit that came out of supporting NCP was Gayabai Awad’s elevation as 
Chairman of Social Welfare in Beed Zilla Parishad. Awad’s assertive political past 
and present does not fit well with the dominant caste needs. Awad thus remained at 
the margins of NCP.  
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Dominant caste choices of Dalit politicians and the challenge of Dalit assertion 
The intersections of cultural critique that assertive Dalit politics brings to party 
politics does not go well with the dominant castes who prefer to look for Dalit 
candidates who suit their interests and ideology. Ghule, a Maratha, shared proverbs 
used amongst the Non-Dalits particularly Marathas that made explicit the choices of 
Marathas for seats reserved for Dalits.  Mahara peksha Mang bara ani Manga 
peksha Chambar bara (A Mang is better than a Mahar and a Chambar better than 
Mang), the other one was more specific, “Jai Bhim peksha Ram Ram Bara” (Ram 
Ram is better than Jai Bhim) (Fieldnotes: 22/4/09).  
 
One of the important contributions of MHA and BSP has been to sustain the radical 
critique of exclusionary cultural practices that Dalits face and creation of a Dalit 
identity and community. Such unity comes under threat in the patronage seeking 
culture of electoral politics. Sachin was one amongst those who had attended the 
Charmakar rallies of BSP. Though he campaigned passionately for Mayawati and 
BSP, he was not fully convinced about BSP’s utility in Maharashtra for Charmakars. 
He discussed his reservations with Banage who insisted on the need for rejecting 
patronising control of Congress and BJP. 
 
Sachin: A lot of Charmakars benefited when Babanrao Gholap was social welfare 
minister. Currently too there are lot of charmakars who are elected to Lok Sabha 
[..] Mayawati says jiski jitani sankhya bhari, usaki utani bhagidari (according to 
your numbers you get your share), if this is to happen then Charmakars are very 
few in numbers they will not get anything here. 
Banage: Those elected Charmakars are all Gulams (slaves), they will make them 
ministers but they have no powers  (Fieldnotes: 6/6/09) 
 
Mang workers of MHA try to make most of the Maratha antagonism against Mahars 
in local politics. However assertive Dalits with ‘Dalit’ agenda and ideology are 
hardly accommodated in the mainstream politics. When I returned to Beed in January 
2010 Awad was critical of party politics and termed them as terrorists who were law 
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makers. Awad’s no-compromise stance on caste atrocities and his anti-caste 
conversions to Buddhism also obstruct his success in party politics.  
 
When a Mahar Dalit leader tries to make his independent mark in politics, Mangs 
are preferred because Mahars have revolted against Hindu culture, not totally but 
they have tried. And this has not been liked by this (Hindu) culture. Dalits who 
follow the traditional leadership or behave like slaves succeed.  I am yet to see 
anyone other than Kanshiram and later Mayawati who have raised Dalit issues 
independently in parliament.  What they have achieved is a matter of debate but 
they present their points assertively and have also managed to win elections. Such 
leaders are exceptions (Interview 8/6/09) 
 
The choice of Chambars in Maharashtra does seem overwhelming given their 
minuscule population in Maharashtra as compared to Mangs and Mahars. Of the 33 
Scheduled Caste MLAs elected in 2009 legislative assembly elections twelve are 
Chambars, eleven are Mahars and only three are Mangs and the rest come from other 
numerically less prominent castes. Chambars were also the most preferred locally in 
the Zilla Parishad, Panchayat Samiti and Gram Panchayat elections.  
 
In Sadola village of Majalgaon Taluka where the post of Sarpanch was reserved for 
Scheduled Caste, the Marathas unanimously decided to shun the elections of Gram 
Panchayat and identified a Chambar who would be the ‘unopposed’ Sarpanch. The 
Marathas also announced the village decision to ‘blacken the face’ of anyone who 
filed nominations to contest the elections. R, one of the woman workers of MHA 
decided to file nominations. 
 
I was wondering why they talk of bin-virodh (selection without 
election/opposition) when the post of Sarpanch is reserved for us [....] It was ward 
no 2 that was reserved which had 200 Dalit votes (Mang and Mahar) [...] why 
would they blacken our face if we contested? I did not agree.  (Focus Group: 
4/3/09)   
 
 274 
R’s decision to contest Panchayat elections resulted in the united Marathas splitting 
in two groups and competing within themselves. Both the groups however remained 
firm on the choice of Chambar candidates as their representatives for the reserved 
Sarpanch post. It is however not a liking for Chambar community that Marathas 
have, clarified another worker for MHA. 
 
P: It is not about Mang, Mahar or Chambar. They do not need anyone who will 
overtake [meant cross or question] the village [Marathas/Vanjaris] here.  (Focus 
Group: 4/3/09) 
 
Some Dalits workers of MHA who resort to assertive Dalit politics locally face 
violence/threats of violence and humiliation. Tukaram another worker of MHA was 
elected as a ward member of Panchayat in Umri village of Majalgaon Taluka. 
Tukaram is postgraduate and also works in one of the projects of RDC. The seat of 
Sarpanch was reserved for OBC in Umri and one of the large landowning [Tukaram 
called him Jamindar] Marathas here incurred all the election expenses for the panel 
of candidates which included Tukaram. This Maratha was also a close confidante of 
Prakash Solanki (MLA of NCP). This Maratha vented his anger against Tukaram 
when Dalit workers of MHA had poked fun at god Hanuman in this village in one of 
their programmes as Dalits are not allowed to enter the Hanuman temple in this 
village. Tukaram too had criticised NCP government for their faulty educational 
policies that led to low quality education for the poor. The Maratha jamindar warned 
Tukaram not just against his political assertion but also his western dressing  
 
Your Karyakartas spoke against Hanuman and you tuck your shirt in and go 
around the village. You should not tuck your shirt in the village and once you 
enter the village you should remove your tucked shirt. You encroached upon the 
gaairan, did we say anything, no. Then why should you speak against our gods 
and religion. You think you are President (of India) after tucking your shirt in. 
(Interview with Tukaram: 5/12/08) 
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Tukaram, though a little scared, did not stop tucking his shirt while in village. He 
however had toned down his cultural activism in the village and would blame other 
Dalits in the village for not being as aware and assertive. The jamindar had managed 
to partially tame Tukaram’s political and cultural assertion.   
 
Conclusion: the inevitability of electoral politics and the centrality of non-party 
politics in Dalit assertion 
The marketisation of basic services and entitlements has become part of India’s 
patronage based democracy which aids the politicians develop independent power 
bases and advance within party and government; politicians have developed a stake 
therefore not in democracy but in patronage (Chandra: 2004). Chandra suggests 
decentralisation and downsizing of India’s dominant state as possible way of 
changing democracy in India but Dalit exclusion in villages of Marathwada is a 
product of the dynamic intersection between dominant caste powers with fragmented 
state institutions. The reliance of Dalit politics on democratic processes makes state 
and electoral politics central to their efforts and renders them susceptible to exclusion 
or marginalisation.  
 
The case of MHA and BSP suggests that assertive Dalit politics is resented both by 
the dominant political formations and by Dalits within these formations. Awad, 
despite being amongst the key leaders in Marathwada who have worked on the issue 
of gaairan, Dalit rights, and his anti-caste move of symbolic conversions to 
Buddhism, is turned into a ‘leader of Mangs’ in NCP. The patronage based party 
politics in Marathwada casts Maratha leaders as ‘secular’ political representatives 
and denies Dalits the right to represent not just non-Dalits but Dalits themselves. The 
representation of Dalits in NCP and BJP results from constitutional obligations in 
party politics and not from non-Dalit concern for Dalits. Dalit representation there is 
decided to suit and sustain dominant caste patronage and interests.  Awad’s travel 
from BSP to BJP and NCP reveals the compulsions of Dalit in party politics and also 
Awad’s strategic opportunism. However the numerical strength and other forms of 
capital (socio-cultural, economic and political) go against Dalit interests, ideology 
and cunning politics. MHA therefore continues to rely on non- party political means 
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of protests and campaigning against the exclusion and injustices that Dalits face and 
uses international networks to help sustains such activism.  
 
Kanshiram’s critique of the Poona Pact that forced Ambedkar into accepting joint 
electorate (instead of separate) and reserved seats seems relevant not just for Dalits 
but various other marginalised castes as well in Marathwada. It is not just Dalit 
representatives who are turned into symbols of self-representation serving dominant 
interests. While the dominant castes and parties prevent Dalits from representing 
their interests and ideology, BSP attempts to reverse the patronage-based system of 
party politics in the most difficult context of Marathwada. Dalits along with others 
here are mobilised to achieve the objective of our vote our rule outside the patronage 
of dominant parties and through volunteerism.138 It also resorts to substantive politics 
where resources provided by ideologically disagreeing BSP candidates are put to use 
for consolidation of Bahujan ideology and politics. The call for independent Bahujan 
politics with Ambedkarite leadership has attracted both Dalits and some non-Dalits 
towards BSP. BSP’s growth at a national level offers hope for the cadres of BSP who 
continue their activism as ‘missionary’ work to challenge dominant politics and free 
Dalit politics and votes from dadpan (fear). One of the major shortcomings of BSP 
however is its one-dimensional agenda of struggle for political power, this limited 
focus is not best suited for the grassroots for Marathwada where gaining of political 
power seems a distant possibility and real issues facing Dalits continue to exist on a 
daily basis. 
 
The challenges faced by Dalit mobilisation in electoral politics also point to the 
continued importance and relevance of non-political spaces in creating ‘Dalit’ 
identity and cultures of protest. The case of MHA unravels the limited benefits of 
aligning with dominant parties, it particularly presents the curtailing of dynamic 
potentials of Dalit movements in such alliances where Dalits end up competing 
within themselves and replicate the patronage-based politics that pervades the 
political culture. MHA however retains its apolitical (non-party) politics and 
continues to challenge the dominance of dominant castes and parties. MHA and BSP 
                                                 
138 vote humara raj tumhara nahi chalega nahi chalega (Our vote and your rule will not work) 
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point to the importance of electoral politics in Dalit movements but also the 
centrality of non-electoral political spaces for assertive Dalit politics and ideology to 
survive. 
Vote share of Mainstream parties and Dalit parties in Beed 
  
 Lok Sabha Elections April 2009 
 Georai Majalgaon Beed Ashti Kaij Parali Total 
BJP 93,779   81,901 77,659 109,971 91,958 98,673 553,994 
 NCP* 68,284   
 
70,143 66,554 70,737 82,377 54,925 413,423 
BSP 4,446   4,273 3,009 4,221 5,681 3,654 25,284 
BBM 2,224  2,248  1,347  2,126  1,670  1,391 11, 006 
 Vidhan Sabha Elections October 2009 
 Georai Majalgaon Beed Ashti Kaij Parali  
BJP 98469 79,034 33,246 84,157 66,188 96,222  
NCP* 100 816 86,943 109,163 118,847 110,452 60,160  
BSP Withdrawn 1948 1,551 2,369 3,917 3,662  
RPI (A) Not Contested Not Contested 32,999 Not 
Contested 
Not Contested 1,144  




Dalit politics and the making of civility in India 
 
My ethnographic study of Dalit politics in Maharashtra has illuminated not merely 
what civil society ‘is’ but what civil society ‘does’. Through an anthropology of 
Dalit politics I have elaborated upon the intersections of the state and civil society, 
the penetration of dominant interests in the state and civil society and the resulting 
Dalit exclusion. I have also presented a nuanced picture of the ensuing politicisation 
of Dalits in civil society, their protests, daily civic engagement with caste inequalities 
and fractured institutions of state, processes of ideology building, formation of 
collective identities of protest and the intersections of Dalit politics with the state and 
international civil society actors. Dalit politics in many ways shapes the 
transformation of state, civil society and caste; it causes a revolution in the realm of 
civility and civil relations.  
 
In this concluding chapter I argue that civil society remains central in democratic 
processes, but the making of civil society and of civility in India is a complex 
process which does not fit into the normative prescriptions of liberals. The politics of 
Dalit movements present the vernacular processes of democratisation that include 
protests and violent manifestations as part of democratisation. Social transformation 
is thus not achieved through gift of a benevolent state or the product of elite self-
reform as Gandhi envisaged but sustained struggles of lesser citizens like those of 
Dalits.  
 
Between high democracy and less civility 
Civility is considered as a key virtue of civil society that helps in arriving at common 
good in liberal democracies; ‘civility treats others as, at least, equal in dignity, never 
as inferior’ (Shils 1991: 12). ‘Civility is also a key ingredient in linking the general 
culture of a people to their political culture’ (Pye 1999: 769). Challenges to universal 
and ideal practice of civility arise both from economic and non-economic factors. In 
the Indian context, caste privileges and power affect the possibilities of civility 
across castes. The liberal Constitution of India partially recognises the violent and 
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exclusionary potentials of caste, and envisages procedures for repairing civil 
relations and conduct affected by caste. In real practice however, neither the state nor 
non-caste collectives have been the locus of transforming caste and instilling civility 
amongst caste-privileged citizens. The violence and inequalities of caste have largely 
been made visible through politicisation of caste, more particularly through the 
politicisation of Dalits. 
 
Liberal approaches to civility believe in arriving at a common-good through 
consensus building (Shils and Grosby 1997). Conflict or war is seen as return to the 
‘state of nature’ therefore antithetical to civil society. A focus on reaching consensus 
through deliberation, however, can mistake silenced voices for consensus, it may 
also ignore the mixing of traditional modes of authority with more modern ones. If 
consensus for a common good is believed to be the core of civil society, then caste 
relations which participants and activists of Dalit movements term slavery (for 
Dalits), too could be termed ‘civil’ as they would seem to be operating with a 
political consensus. Dalit subjects even today in some villages of Marathwada 
operate in such manner, embracing silence over daily exclusions they face - by not 
entering the temple, not contesting elections, not cultivating gaairan, not celebrating 
Jayanti and by voting under compulsion. Dalit lower status thus sustains the 
privileged selfhood of dominants. 
 
The moral impediment that liberals favour of deliberative procedures, politeness, 
rational communication and undoing of status privileges in the practice of civil 
society are not antithetical to the freedom of Dalits. The liberal procedures and 
institutions of civil society are crucial to unsettle the traditional modes of civility that 
construct Dalits as lesser subjects. These traditional modes of civility when merged 
with liberal democratic practices can reproduce Dalits as what Gorringe (2005) calls 
‘untouchable’ citizens.  I have argued in chapter one that the colonial imposition of 
civil society (and civility) served as a political space of freedom and self-realisation 
for Dalits, and its widening in postcolonial phase led to Dalit politics and associated 
political violence against Dalits. Civility in postcolonial politics thus is not merely a 
matter of politeness and deliberation but a political process involving extra-
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institutional mobilisation for reforming both the state and civil society. While inter-
ethnic associations ensure civic engagement and ethnic peace between Hindus and 
Muslims (Varshney 2001), the case of Dalit civic engagement seems to be a reverse 
one. Dalit participation and assertion in public spaces also evokes violence against 
them. India thus has a peculiar case of more democracy and less civility when it 
comes to Dalits and Dalit politics is at odds with this complex merger that sustains 
Dalit exclusion. Dalit thus face many forms of ‘uncivil violence’ they however are 
most committed to ‘civil democracy’(Lynch 2001).  
 
Violence, alternative civilities and collective identities 
The making of civility across castes in India includes both violence and democratic 
deliberations. Violence, thus, need not mark a return to ‘rude’ society or the ‘state of 
nature’. The real processes of the making of civility are demonstrated through 
violence that Dalits face and the Dalit response to such institutionalised violence. 
After four Dalits were burnt to death by Kunbi-Marathas in September 2006 in 
Khairlanji village of Bhandara District (Maharashtra), for example, most cities in 
Maharashtra came to a standstill temporarily as Dalits indulged in violence damaging 
‘public’ property, creating a situation of ‘anarchy’ for the elite middle classes. 
Khairlanji, except for the scale of violence and Dalit protest, offers in many ways a 
routine story of violation of Dalit bodies and citizen status. The Dalit protest 
attracted national and international attention forcing the disinterested Maharashtra 
(Maratha) government into action. On September 24 2008, a fast track court 
delivered its verdict including the death penalty for some of the accused. Dalit 
activists from Beed who participated in the protests and public damage did not 
consider the verdict satisfactory, however, as the court did not recognise the case as 
one of ‘caste atrocity’.  
 
The denial of caste violence against Dalits in liberal institutions despite procedural 
recognition sheds light on the merger of liberal politics with local exclusionary 
traditions. It also helps understand that civility cannot be introduced by state 
interventions, since non-state socio-cultural practices are important. “Religions do 
greatest service to civility when they preach not only love of neighbour but resistance 
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to wrong,” argues Carter (1998: 285). Dalit movements, therefore, are wary of 
Hinduism’s role in the making of civility since it upholds caste, and share a similar 
but lesser suspicion of the state. An activist shared with me the news reports of the 
Judge in Khairlanji case making a special trip to a Hindu temple before delivering his 
verdict, which for him implied that there would be no justice. The High Court in July 
2010 further commuted death penalty and reiterated that caste was ‘not’ the reason 
for Dalit killings in Khairlanji.  
 
Continued violent humiliations against Dalits are aimed at reminding Dalits of their 
‘outcast’ status, and point to the lack of civility in the local political culture and civil 
society. In cases of violence against Dalits, a sense of anarchy prevails in the village 
where the dominant castes undermine the political authority of the modern state. 
Dalit movements on the other hand bring the state back in through violent 
demonstrations aimed at the state and simultaneous evocations of the Constitution 
against the tradition of caste violence, making liberal institutions important despite 
their shortcomings. Chapter six has particularly demonstrated the violence evoked by 
Dalit assertion and citizenship claims in public spaces. It is not just through violent 
performances that Dalits seek to establish civility in political relations, they also 
participate in elections and engage in formation of pragmatic alliances and collective 
identities from below that civilise polity and democratise civil society.   
 
Collective identities of protest and substantive electoral politics  
One of the senior women leaders of MHA, a non-Dalit married to a Dalit activist 
enjoys much respect amongst Dalit women. In May 2009 she was nominated for the 
most valued annual prize of Bhartiya Vidhyarthi Sena (Indian Students’ Army, a 
social organisation of Shiv Sena) as recognition for her activism. After some 
dilemma over accepting this award she decided to accept it. In her short award 
acceptance speech, instead of emphasising the historical martial valour of Shivaji as 
a Hindu King and Savarkar as a saviour of Hindus, she reminded the twenty 
thousand strong youth participants in Mumbai about Phule, Shahu and Ambedkar 
and particularly their contribution to ‘democracy’ in India.  She also appreciated Shiv 
Sena for condemning the Shindi violence in Beed. Shiv Sena’s antipathy to 
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Ambedkarite politics is well known and the MHA activist did not receive the routine 
applause one generally expects in Dalit dominated gatherings. Shiv Sena’s 
compulsion of awarding their most prestigious award to an activist of MHA informs 
us of the dynamism that electoral politics and Dalit politics can bring to radical 
ideologies forcing them into civil conversations and positions.  
 
Politics pursued by BSP and MHA does not fit into Schmitt’s (2007) friend-foe139 
distinction. The objective of Dalit politics is not elimination of those oppressing 
them; it rather stretches the imagination of civil relations and civility of their 
opponents. Dalit politics has deepened and caused expansion of civil spaces and the 
state has continued to be at the core of Dalit politics. The key modes of forming 
alternative ideas and collective identities of protest are discussed in chapters seven 
and eight. I have elaborated on the dynamism of caste and its innovative uses in Dalit 
politics in influencing public opinion and forging collective identities of protest. In 
doing so, Dalit politics opposes the hierarchic and exclusionary traditions of caste 
and imaginatively reconstructs alternative identities towards Dalit liberation. The 
case of MHA presented Ambedkarisation beyond Mahars and the making of 
swabhimani Mangs whereas BSP’s politics and the making of Bahujan exemplified 
mobilisation beyond the Dalit category.  
 
I have presented the ideological persuasion by Mahars of non-Mahar Dalits, and of 
non-Dalits by Dalits in enlarging the scope of Dalit politics and ideology. Assertive 
Dalit participation in electoral politics stages distrust of Dalits not in party politics or 
political representatives but their failure to recognise caste inequality and Dalit 
issues. While Dalit movements, as shown in chapter nine, are partially affected by 
the patronage culture that prevails in the political culture they also attempt to reverse 
the domination of dominant castes and ideologies that make not just caste invisible 
but Dalits lower subjects.  
 
                                                 
139 Schmitt points to contradiction between liberal parliamentarism and democracy, for him the 
politics is essentially conflictual resulting in a friend-foe contradiction and annihilation of liberal 
parliamentarism (Scheuerman 1995). 
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A liberal notion of equality and inequality with individual at its centre overpowers 
the real inequalities that caste constructs in civil society. Similar can be the 
oversights of understanding the state as a monolithic and oppressive neo-liberal unit. 
Radical approaches with focus only on political economy ignore nuanced processes 
of the constitution of a modern caste-subject. They may also ignore the potential of 
caste as a problem and as a solution for the making of civility in India.  
 
Further globalisation cannot be reduced to growth of neo-liberalism/imperialism as 
globalisation has also opened newer spaces for Dalit politics at grassroots. Global 
power does not operate as a ‘well-oiled machine’ and there is ‘friction’ at various 
levels through which hegemony can be ‘made and unmade’ (Tsing 2005: 6). Chapter 
six has outlined the loosening of caste associated labour practices that affected Dalit 
mobility. My primary concern however has been with transformation of civic spaces 
under globalisation and Dalit politics and status in these spaces. The intersections of 
the state and dominant caste interests had contributed to the local unequal civil 
realm. Dalits though subordinate have continued protest politics in Marathwada. 
Chapter five has particularly exemplified the workings of the globalised grassroots in 
Marathwada through the intersections of I/NGOs and Dalit politics, to argue against 
simplistic accounts that emphasise the ill effects of I/NGOs on politics in general and 
Dalit politics in particular. Intersections of Dalit politics with international civil 
society actors is coupled with Dalit politics revolving around the state. This suggests 
that radical transformations in society can be undertaken through engaging the 
(capitalist?) state and its hegemonic civil society. The practice of ‘untouchablity’ was 
made an offence by the modern postcolonial state. This ‘political’ decision in the 
Constitution went against the ethics of rural society where practice of untouchablity 
continued to remain at the heart of caste doxa. The ethical interests of Dalits were 
against the ethical interests of rural dominants.  
 
Civil society and civility are not only merely related to property and capital and 
incivilities can be generated by non-economic factors too (Alexander 2006). The re-
feudalisation of civil society through market forces and rising consumption culture 
that worries Habermas (1991) is considered ‘less dangerous’ (Awad’s Phrase) for 
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Dalits who engage in the task of ‘de-feudalising’ local liberal practices that resurrect 
Dalit exclusion and deny the existence of caste inequalities.  The incivility generated 
by caste has partially invented the current paradox of low civility and high 
democracy in India’s politics. Parliamentary democracy in India is thus functioning 
without respect for principles of civility.  
 
Caste, Dalit politics and the making of civility  
The distinction between civil society as ideal and political society as substantive 
(Chatterjee 2004), refutes not only the intersections of civil and political in civil 
society but also subaltern aspirations to civility and civil society. In the case of Dalits 
the virtue of civility has much to offer due to dynamic incivilities generated by caste. 
Incivility in terms of denying equal status to some individuals/groups and authority 
of civil institutions like courts, media etc. exists in all cultures. These may continue 
to reinvent themselves according to changing politics. The promise of civility and 
civil society lies not in etiquettes of politeness but in the possibility of transforming 
civil relations and state through politics of ideology. The Hindutva mobilisation in 
India too fits within Chatterjee’s (2004) conception of political society because of its 
reliance on non-civil means. The ideals of Ambedkarite ideology and Dalit politics 
on the other hand merge ‘protest’ politics with ‘civil’ discourses (Ambedkar’s 
Constitution) of equality.   
 
Dalit politics does not contradict civil society, it rather strengthens civil society and 
the state institutions, the modes by which they affect such developments however do 
not fit into liberal modes of civility. Dalit politics, despite not following the liberal 
terrain of civility, works towards politics of civility where the Constitution too 
becomes a cultural and political symbol of protest. These innovative symbols of 
civility travel deep amongst Dalits to the mud-walls of Dalit homes, which are 
decorated with framed pictures of Ambedkar. 
 
The intersections of ideology, interests and identity in Dalit mobilisation leave Dalit 
politics in a state of pendulum swinging between the substantial (interest and 
identity) and ideological (anti-caste collectives). Dalit politics does not intend 
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annihilation of state institutions, caste and of those who are not with Dalit ideology. 
Dalit ideology does not entail irreconcilable conflict based on identity and Dalit 
politics requires caste as a resource for politicisation of Dalits.  
 
My research re-affirms that the state, civil society and caste are not static, 
homogeneous and absolute systems and that the state and its liberal tenets do not 
always work against Dalits. Besides their intersections and co-evolution of the state, 
caste and civil society, they are also malleable to the influence of the most 
marginalised groups like Dalits.  
 
Dalit politics in Maharashtra, in the post-Panther phase, represents a cacophony of 
voices that compete and cooperate in the practice of Ambedkarite politics. The 
stigmatised bodies and existence of Dalits in insidious forms construct collective 
trauma and collective identities of Dalits. Caste, therefore, forms the core of anti-
caste struggles that Dalit activists engage in. Dalit politics has unquestionably 
changed the local norms of civility and has partially challenged discriminatory 
elements of society. The ideal of political equality generated by civil society is 
infectious and has led to growth of Dalit politics. Like the project of civil society, 
Dalit politics is an ongoing project. The dynamism of Dalit politics thus makes it 
indispensible in the cultural process of democratisation. Dalit politics engages in 
what Alexander (2006) calls ‘civil repair’, thus contributing to the continuing process 
of reforming the state, society and civil society. 
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Annexe I 
Map 1  
 






Map of Maharashtra [Districts of Marathwada including Beed highlighted in 




(Details of interviews and rallies/meetings0 
MHA 
 
Network Respondents = 5 
1. Country Director Intermon Oxfam 
2. Counrtry Director SWISS AID 
3.Sharad Jadhav, Lecturer Kolhapur Uni 
(Mang) 
4. Gangadhar Pol, MHA Parbhani  (Mang) 
5. B.P Suryawanshi MHA Latur  (Mang) 
 
MHA Participants = 4 
1. Bivaji - Interview turned into a family 
Discussion with grandparents, parents and 
grandchildren participating (Mang) 
2. Kisan’s  family  (Mang) 
3. Hanumant and his wife, Ambewadgaon 
(May 2007)  
4. Vishnu’s Family, Rajewadi (Mangs)  
--------- 
Focus Group Interviews  
1. Kolpimpri gairan occupiers (May 2007) 
Eight participants [Mangs and Mahars] 
2. Sadola MHA participants (Seven 
participants- Mangs ) 
3. Women activists  (Four participants) 
4. MHA activists (Seven) 
5. Focus group MHA activists and participants 
Dharur (Eight participants– all Mangs   ) 
6. Focus group participants Rajewadi ( Five- 




MHA Leaders/Workers = 13 
1. Madhukar Londe  -  Male - Mang   
2.  Ashok Tangade-    Male - Mahar 
(2007 and 2009). 
3. D.R Jadhav Male - Mang 
4. Keshav Avhcar -  Male Mang  
5. Eknath Awad-      Male Mang   
(several interviews)   
6. Subhash Gaikwad-   Male – 
Mahar 
7. Vimal Taskare-   Female- Mahar  
8. Manisha Tokale -  Female-  
Yellam (2007) 
9. Alkatai Taktode - Female- Mang   
10. Parmeshwar Adagale Male Mang 
11.  Bhagwan Patole  Male – Mang 
12. Sudhamati Lokhande-Female- 
Mang (2007 and 2008) 
13. Rajesh Kshirsagar – Male Mang  
 
MHA Programmes/meetings 
1.Annabhau Sathe Jayanti - Wadawani, 
Bhopa, Chinchwati, Asardoha. (August 
2008). 
2.Awad’s B’day Public Gathering,  
Devadi Village (January 2009) 
3 Gairan Dharak – Women’s rally- 
Kalamb (December 2008) 
4.Gender Sensitisation Meeting 
Limbgaon (August 2008) 
5. Kej workers meeting for Mang 
mobilisation (September 2008) 
6.Ambedkar Jayanti Telganv (April 
2009) 
7. NCP Tally  (April 2009) 
8. Savitribai Phule Jayanti Navgond 
Rajori (January 20009) 
9. Activist Meeting on Atrocity (January 
2010) 
10. Meeting on Mang Commission, Latur 
(February 2009) 
11. Protest against rape case, Udgir, Latur 
(October 2008) 
12. Womens group Meeting Chinchvati 
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(May 2009) 
13. Gaairandharak Training, Beed 
(August 2008) 
14. Meeting with Sharad Powar and 







Bahujan Samaj Party 
Workers/volunteers = 7 
1. Chanderlal Banage -Male- Charmakar 
2.Dr. Bhobade - Male - Mali 
3.Keshav Waghmare Male- Mahar 
4.Sarvajit Bansode Male- Mahar 
5. Vitthal Vairage - Male - Matang 
6. Abhimanyu Salave   Mahar  
7 Bhonjal   Male- Brahman 
 
 
BSP Meetings/Speeches  
1. Chetana Rally Beed (September 
2008) 
2. Majalganv Muslim Bhaichara 
Meeting (December 2008) 
3. Charmakar Samaj Sammelan 
(January 2009)  
4. BSP Workers Meeting Beed  
(January 2009) 
5. Mayawati - Election Public Rally, 
Nagpur (April 2009) 
6. BAMCEF Cadre Camp, Mumbai 
(June 2009) 
7. Rahul Anvikar Cadre Programme, 
Parali ( January 2009) 
8. Cadre Camp Beed(February 2009) 
9. Cadre meeting on candidate 
(March 2009 
10.  BSP internal conflict resolution 
meeting (April 2009 not recorded) 
11. Kanshiram Jayanti, Beed (March 
2009) 
12. BSP Rasta Roko,  Massjog 
(January 2009) 
BSP Supporters = 9  
1. Sanjeevani Jadhav     Female- Mahar 
2. Machindra Paike      Male-     Mahar 
3. Shanta Sadashiv Salave   Female - Mahar 
4. Kshirsagar Female - Mang  
5. Chaya Salave     Female - Mahar 
6. Haribhau Salave Male - Mahar  
7. Hankare Male - Chambhar 
8. Shinde    Male - Chambhar   
9.  Advocate Salave Male Mahar 
 
 
Leaders = 4 
1. Dr. Sachan   Male- Kurmi 
2. Chaube Male- Brahman   
3. Suresh ManeMale – Mahar 
4. Maulana Firz Ali  Muslim 
Other Meetings/Processions/rallies 
1. Bahujan Samaj Federation, 
Mumbai ( September 2009) 
2. RPI Dalit Hakk Parishad (October 
2009) 
3. All Party/Group Meeting after 
violence (January 2009) 
4. Mulniwasi Sangh, Delhi and 
Mumbai ( part of a BAMCEF 
faction- was called to address the 
meeting ) 
Focus Group interviews 2 
Workers of AIMBUS, BSP, SKP and 
BRP[3 Mahars, 1 Takari, 1 Maratha] 
 
Participants of BSP Phule Pimpalgaon [ Six 
members turned into an argument between 
RPI and BSP worker] 
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5. Pune University of scholars and 
activists  
6. Ambedkar Jayanti, Beed (April 
2009) 
 
Key informant interviews (context) 
1. D.S Kambale 
2. Eknath Awad 
3. Sudhakar Kshirsagar 
4. Sham Tangade 
5. Rajbhoj [Eldest Dalit movement participant from Phule Pimpalgaon] 
6. Sanap [Potraj] Rajewadi 
7. Aasarubai [possesses goddess Aasara]  
8. Laxmi [ possesses goddess  Mari-aai]  
9. Sushila Morale [A local academic and politician from Vanjari caste] 
10. Motiram [72 year old Maratha ex-CPI worker) 
11. Bhagwat Nakhate [92 year old Maratha ex-CPI worker] 
12. Gangabhisan Thavare (leader peasant and workers party of India) 
13. Prof. Bhosale, Mumbai University. 
 
 





         Dalit Hakk Parishad [Dalit Rights Convention] organised by RPI (A) in Beed 
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MHA protest rally organised in Udgir [Latur District] for registering a case of rape 




Pictures of Kanshiram and Mayawati at a BSP workers home along with Ambedkar  
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Eknath Awad addressing Dalits at a programme of Ambedkar Jayanti in April 2009 





Participants at a BSP rally in Nagpur trying to get a view of Mayawati after her two 
hour delayed arrival 
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Pamphlets for a Dalit family event where Rahul Anvikar [BSP cultural performer] 
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